This is an appeal against the decision of the learned District Judge, Nowgong, dated 31-5-1968 passed in Money Suit No. 4 of 1968 by which he de­creed the plaintiffs' suit on a promissory note for Rs 5,500/-. 2. The plaintiffs are Afgan Nationals residing in Nowgong town and doing Money lending business. Their case was that the defendant Bhanwarilal Tatar borrowed Rs. 5000/- from them on 9-3-1965 executing a promissory note in their favour, stipulating to repay the same on demand with interest at the rate of 6 pies per rupee, per month. As the defendant did not pay any money in spite of demand they filed the suit for a decree of Rs. 5,500/- including interest at the rate of Rs. 10/- per hundred, per year. 3. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff No. 2 Phata Khan instituted the suit for and on behalf of himself and plaintiff No. 1 Ahmed Khan describing himself as an Attorney of plaintiff No. 1. 4. The defendant filed a written statement contesting the plaintiff's claim. He alleged that there is no cause of action for the suit and that the suit is not maintainable under the Assam Money Lenders Act. The defendant denied that he had executed any promissory note in favour of the plaintiffs or that he had borrowed any money from them. According to him the alleged promissory note is a forged one, 5. Upon the pleadings the following issues were framed: (i) Whether the suit is maintainable under the Assam Money Lenders Act: (ii) Whether the alleged hand-note was executed by Bhanwarilal Tatar, as alleged in the plaint? (iii) Whether the present defendant is in any way liable? (iv) To what releief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6. The plaintiffs examined only one witness, namely, the plaintiff No. 1 Ahmed Khan and the defendant also examined only himself. 7. On a consideration of their evi­dence the learned District Judge answered all the issues in favour of the plaintilis and accordingly he decreed the suit. Hence the defendant has preferred this appeal. 8. Mr. 6. The plaintiffs examined only one witness, namely, the plaintiff No. 1 Ahmed Khan and the defendant also examined only himself. 7. On a consideration of their evi­dence the learned District Judge answered all the issues in favour of the plaintilis and accordingly he decreed the suit. Hence the defendant has preferred this appeal. 8. Mr. D. K. Sen, the learned coun­sel for the appellant challenged the decree of the learneu District Judge on three grounds which are as below:- (i) that the plaintiff No. 2 had no legal authority to institute the suit for and on be­half of plaintiff No. 1 and as such the learn­ed District Judge should nave held that the suit is not maintainable under Rule 10 (3) of Order 1 of the C. P. C. (ii) that the learned District Judge erred in law ill holding that the suit is not barred under Section 6 of the Assam Money Len­ders Act. (iii) that the District Judge erred in law in holding that the defendant executed the hand note Ext 1 which is in English, on the basis of the evidence of P. W. 1 who is igno­rant of the English language. 9. Mr. J. N. Sarma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents resist­ed all the three contentions of the appellant. 10. I now propose to examine the merits of the above contentions of the ap­pellant in the light of the arguments ad­vanced before me by the learned counsel for the respective parties. 11. So far as the fast contention is concerned Mr. Sen submitted that the plain­tiff failed to produce any power of attorney executed by plaintiff No. 1 in favour of plain­tiff No. 2 to enable the latter to file the suit on behalf of the plaintiff No. 1. He further submitted that one of the joint promissees alone is not competent to file the suit. That being the position, according to him, the suit should have been dismissed as not maintain­able. 12. The appellant did not take this plea in his written statement and consequent­ly no issue was struck on the point. The ap­pellant is, therefore, not legally entitled to take such, a plea at the time of hearing, for the first time. Be that as it may, the plaintiff No 2 stated in the plaint that he was the constituted attorney of plaintiff No. 1. The ap­pellant is, therefore, not legally entitled to take such, a plea at the time of hearing, for the first time. Be that as it may, the plaintiff No 2 stated in the plaint that he was the constituted attorney of plaintiff No. 1. The plaintiff No. 1 Ahmed Khan himself deposed in the suit and said that, by a power of Attorney, he conferred necessary powers on the plaintiff No. 2. No doubt, this power of attorney has not been produced in Court. When no such plea was taken by the defen­dant appellant in his written statement and there was no issue on the point, the plain­tiffs were not supposed to come prepared to meet such a challenge at the time of hearing. 13. Even if no power of attorney was executed by the plaintiff No. 1 in favour of plaintiff No. 2, that would not go to make the suit not maintainable. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the C P. C. simply provides that no person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. The learned counsel for the appellant could not produce any law be­fore me to show that in such a case a power of attorney is indispensable. When the plain­tiff' No. 1 himself has come and deposed that he gave necessary power to plaintiff No. 2 to file the suit on his behalf, there is no scope to contend that the plaintiff No. 2 filed the suit without the consent of plaintiff No. 1. 14. The second contention of the appellant also has got no force at all. Sec­tion 6 of the Assam Money Lenders Act sim­ply provides for maintenance of accounts by a Money Lender and supply of statement of such account to the borrower. If any money lender fails to comply with the provisions of Section 6 he is liable to penalty, as pro­vided in Section 11 of the Act. There is no bar for institution of any suit in case any money lender fails to maintain such accounts. If any money lender fails to comply with the provisions of Section 6 he is liable to penalty, as pro­vided in Section 11 of the Act. There is no bar for institution of any suit in case any money lender fails to maintain such accounts. It was only in 1969, by amendment of the Act (vide Assam Act XVIII of 1969) the Legislature enacted a new section, namely, Section 7-D which provides that no suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a money lender shall proceed in a Civil Court until the Court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not re­quired to have a registration certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of money lending. Such provision was not there in 1968 when the suit was in­stituted. Be that as it may, it is not the case of the appellant that the suit is bad for wait of registration. 15. The next and the most important point which arises for consideration is whe­ther the execution of the promissory note has been proved by the plaintiffs. 16. Mr. D. K Sen, the learned coun­sel for. the appellant submits that though P. W. 1 Ahmed Khan (plaintiff No. 1) in his evidence stated that the defendant executed the promissory note Ext. 1 and put his signa­ture Ext. 1 (1) in his presence, he admitted in cross-examination that he does not know how to write English and that he would not be able to read all the contents of the docu­ment Ext. 1. Thus it is clear, according to Mr. Sen that P. W 1 is ignorant of the En­glish language and so he is incompetent to prove the promissory note Ext. 1 which is written and signed in English. I 17. Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signa­ture or handwriting of so much of the docu­ment as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. Section 47 of the Evidence Act lays down the mode of proving such signa­ture or handwriting. Section 47 of the Evidence Act lays down the mode of proving such signa­ture or handwriting. It provides that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person ac­quainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or sign­ed, that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. The ex­planation to this section clarifies as to who can be said to be acquainted with the hand­writing or signature of another person, Ac­cording to this explanation a person may be acquainted with the handwriting of a person in three ways: (i) when he has seen a person writing; (ii) when he has received documents purporting to be written by the person in answer to documents written by himself; (iii) when in the ordinary course of business docu­ments purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him. 18. It is seen from the provisions of Section 47 that if a person has seen another person signing or writing a document he can be said to be acquainted with his handwrit­ing and so he is competent to prove that it is in the handwriting and/or signature of that person. There is nothing in the section to indicate that to be acquainted with the hand­writing or signature of a person, the person in whose presence the signature or writing was made must be able to read such signature or writing. 19. The question as to whether a person ignorant of the language in which a document is written can prove the same to be in the handwriting or signature of a parti­cular person, if he saw such person writing or signing the document, came up for consi­deration before the Rajasthan High Court in Bheek Chand v. Parbhuji, AIR 1963 Raj 84 , where it was held as below:- "Section 67 of the Evidence Act does not lay down any particular kind of proof for proving that a particular writing or signature is in the hand of a particular person. The fact that a particular person has written a particular writing can be proved by the direct evidence of those persons who have seen him making the writing on the particular docu­ment irrespective of whether or not they can read what was written. A document can be executed not only by affixing one's signature, but also by making a mark on it. When a document bearing a thumb mark of a person is proved it is not necessary that the person proving the affixation of the thumb mark should be able to identify the thumb mark. All that is required is that he should be able to identify the document on which he states that the thumb mark was affixed." 20. A similar view was taken in Ram Chandra v. Jaithmal, AIR 1934 All 990. I respectfully agree with the view taken in these decisions. 21. The question, therefore, is whe­ther P. W. 1 can be said to be in a position to identify the document Ext. 1., to be able to prove the same to be in the handwriting and/or signature of the defendant. 22. It is the evidence of P W. 1 that the defendant borrowed money from him and plaintiff No. 2 by executing the promissory note Ext. 1 in his presence. He also stated that defendant put the signature Ext. 1 (1) in the said document in his presence. Evi­dently this document was in their possession since execution and it was filed in the court from their possession. There can, therefore, be no reason as to why P. W. 1 would not be able to identify the document Ext. 1 and to say that it was written and signed in his presence by the defendant. The position however might have been otherwise if the document, after execution, remained, in pos­session of some other person. 23. Then again 'it may be mentioned here that the promissory note Ext. 1 was marked as Ext. without any objection from the defendant. As observed by the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Thakurji AIR 1943 P, C. 83: "Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular and insufficient it is es­sential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes be­fore a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of' the mode of proof," 24. A similar view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Rajeswari Dasi v. Pulin Behary Mittra, 62 Ind Gas 647 = (AIR 1921 Cal 71) and Abdul Samad v. Gunendra Krishna Roy, AIR 1925 Cal 452. It was held in the latter case that when rent receipts were admitted in evidence without objection in the Court of the first instance, no objection can be taken afterwards that they were not properly proved. 25. Mr D. K. Sen, the learned coun­sel for the appellant relied on the decision in Bhagawan Din. v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1957 All 119 where it was held: "Where in a suit on the basis of a pro-note the defendant denies the execution of the pronote the onus of proving that the document had been duly executed by the de­fendant evidently lies upon the plaintiff and the plaintiff ought to lead satisfactory evi­dence to prove that the signatures were made by the defendant." 26. This was also a suit on a pro-note where no other evidence was led ex­cept that of the plaintiff and the defendant. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge that the defendant executed the pro-note was based entirely on his comparison of the disputed signatures with some admitted signatures of the defendant. There is noth­ing in the judgment to show what was the nature of the evidence given by the plaintiff himself in that case whether or not he said that the defendant executed the pronote in his presence. The decision, therefore, has got no bearing on the present case. 27. In the instant case the evidence of P. W 1 satisfies, in my opinion, the tech­nical requirements of proof, as laid down in Sections 47 and 67 of the Evidence Act. How­ever, these sections deal only with the admissibility of a variety of opinion evidence and mode of proof and not with the value of such evidence. The value of the evidence is to be judged from the attending facts and circumstances. 28. In his evidence the defendant stated that he does not know how to read and write English and that he did not execute the pronote Ext. 1 which is written and sign­ed in English. The value of the evidence is to be judged from the attending facts and circumstances. 28. In his evidence the defendant stated that he does not know how to read and write English and that he did not execute the pronote Ext. 1 which is written and sign­ed in English. In his written statement he did not state that he is ignorant of the En­glish language. In cross-examination he ad­mitted that he did not care to see the pronote before filing the written statement. This is a circumstance which goes against him. 29. In a civil suit the plaintiff is not required to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt, as in a criminal case. A suit can be decreed merely on preponderance of pro­bability. As already pointed out, the plain­tiff has made out a prima facie case by his evidence that the defendant executed the pronote in his presence. The defendant how­ever did not adduce any evidence to rebut the same. He stated in his evidence that they maintain accounts of their business and that when money is taken from somebody for their business it is entered in their accounts. He further stated that even when he borrows money for his personal use, it is noted in their business accounts. If that is so, the production of those accounts by him would have thrown sufficient light on the disputed transaction. The learned judge has drawn adverse presumption against the defendant for non-production of such accounts and, I think rightly. 30. The defendant stated in his evi­dence that he is not known to the plaintiffs at all. The learned District Judge has ob­served that it is not believable that the plain­tiff who is a Kabuli would come to file a false suit against the defendant who is not known to him and evidently who bears no grudge against him, by fabricating a promissory note. Having regard to the common course of human conduct such a presumption cannot be said to be unreasonable 31. Considering all the facts and cir­cumstances of the case and upon the evi­dence on record, as discussed above, I find that the learned District Judge was perfectly justified in decreeing the plaintiff's suit. The decree appealed against is accordingly affirm­ed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.