JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. This appeal filed by the defendant is directed against a judgment and decree of the First Addl. District Judge Raipur, dated 9th September, 1970, affirming the judgment and decree of the IVth Civil Judge Class II, Raipur, dated 17th September, 1968 decreeing the plaintiff's suit for his eviction under section 12 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 2. The relevant fact in brief, is as follows :- "The parties stand in the relation of landlord and tenant: The plaintiff is a Partnership firm styled as M/s Indian Mill Stores Raipur which is doing business of Oil-engines Pumps Electric-motors, Machineries, Pipes Spare-parts etc. at Ganjpara, Raipur in a rented house. The plaintiff firm purchased a building at Ganjpara Raipur, consisting of 4 identical blocks of one room each of which the demised premises is one, by a registered sale-deed dated 23-3-1965. The defendant who is in occupation of one of the blocks is running a hotel under the name Dau hotel, attorned to the plaintiff on 1-4-1965 vide Ktrayanama Ex. P-2" 3. The plaintiff stated that it is a registered partnership firm under the Partnership Act, and that Narsi Bhai who signed the plaint, is one of the partners of the firm. The plaintiff's case is that the partnership firm purchased the building for location of its business and that it does not have any house of its own in Raipur city. Therefore, the plaintiff bonafide requires the demised premises for the purpose of continuing its business under section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961. The plaintiff states that the tenancy of the defendant was according to the English Calendar month and commenced from first and ended on the last day of the month and that his tenancy had been determined after the close of last day of May, 16 , by service of a notice dated 22-4-1967, Ex. P-3. 4. The defendant contested the plaintiff's claim while admitting that the plaintiff-firm had purchased the building in which the demised premises is located, The defendant pleaded that the alleged need of the plaintiff was just a pretence to secure his eviction, It was denied that plaintiff requires bona fide the suit accommodation for its business purposes or that it has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of its own for that purpose in Raipur city. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff-firm is already doing its business in its present site taken on lease since last so many years which is in the heart of the business locality and has earned reputation and goodwill and therefore the alleged requirement was not bona fide but was made only with a view to secure an increase of the rent. He further pleaded that the tenancy has not been validly determined according to law, denying that the tenancy commences from the first and ends on the last day of the month. On these pleadings the parties went to trial. 5. Both the Courts below have concurrently found, as a fact, that the plaintiff firm has established that it bonafide requires the suit accommodation for purposes of continuing the business of the partnership within the termed of section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, relying on the testimony of Narsi Bhai (PW1) one of the partners of the firm That is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence. A finding of this nature which is a finding on a pure question of fact cannot interfered with in second appeal. See, Sarvate T.B. v. Nemichand 1965 JLJ 973 = 1966 MPLJ 26, SC and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal 1975 JLJ 1 = AIR 1974 SC 1596 . 6. No doubt, the burden of proving bonafide requirement for its business, as also that the plaintiff has no reasonably suitable accommodation of its own, lay on the plaintiff. Whether in a given case that burden is discharged by the evidence on record is the question of fact: Sarvate T.B. v. Nemichand (supra), 7. The conclusion that the Courts below have reached is the only conclusion possible on the evidence on record, in the light of the circumstances appearing. The plaintiff, which is a Partnership firm trading in Oil-engines, Pumps, Electric motors. Machineries, Pipes, Spare-parts etc., at GanjPara, Raipur, from a rented premises, purchased the building of which the demised premises forms a part, by a registered sale deed dated 23-3-1965. The testimony of Narsi Bhai (PW 1), one of the partners of the firm shows that the plaintiff-firm which is carrying on business from a rented premises at Ganjpara purchased the building situate at Ganj para for location of the business of the partnership. The testimony of Narsi Bhai (PW 1), one of the partners of the firm shows that the plaintiff-firm which is carrying on business from a rented premises at Ganjpara purchased the building situate at Ganj para for location of the business of the partnership. The building consists of 4 identical blocks of one room each of which the demised premises is one. According to him the entire business of the firm cannot be located in one of the blocks and therefore, the plaintiff has filed separate suits against all the tenants. He states that it is intended to pull down the intervening walls, to convert the four separate blocks, into one business premises. There is no reason to disbelieve this witness. In the circumstances, it cannot be asserted that the plaintiff's need is a mere pretence. The Act was not meant to deprive the owner of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. 8. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the appellant has tried to assail the decree on other grounds. He has put forward a four-fold submission. His first contention is that the plaintiff's suit was based under section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act. It is urged that the moment a fresh deed of partnership dated 26-4-1964 Ex.-P-6 was executed, a new firm came into existence. The old firm styled as M/s Indian Mill Stores Raipur, therefore, ceased to exist. It is said that it was therefore incumbent on the partners of the new firm to get the firm registered. The contention is that the old registration, Ex.-P-1, would not ensure to the benefit of the new firm. The submission is that in law, it must be held, that the plaintiff firm is not registered under the Partnership Act. It is further urged that Narsi Bhai could not sign the plaint as he was not shown as a partner of the new firm. The contentions are wholly unfounded, and can hardly be accepted. 9. The question whether a partnership is registered or not is a mixed question of fact and law and, therefore, cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal. The defendant nowhere pleaded that the plaintiff's wit was bad on the ground that the firm was not registered, by reason of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act. There was no issue on the question of registration. The defendant nowhere pleaded that the plaintiff's wit was bad on the ground that the firm was not registered, by reason of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act. There was no issue on the question of registration. The point was not taken in the Courts below. It is not pure question of law, but a question which depends on facts. When the point was not raised in the pleadings, the question is not before the Court at all, To permit the point to be raised for the first time at this stage, would not only take the plaintiff by surprise and cause prejudice but would work manifest injustice. I, therefore, do not think it proper to allow the defendant to raise this issue, because this point with regard to the non-registration of the firm was not taken in the written statement. 10. I was, however, referred to Mohanlal Jogannath v Kashiram Gokul AIR 1950 Nag 71, Abdul Karim v Ramdas Narayandas AIR 1951 Nag 159 Govindmal Gianchand v. Kunj Biharilal and others AIR 1954 Bom 364 and Balasore Textile Distributors Association v. Indian Union and another AIR 1960 Orissa 119. These cases are all distinguishable on facts. They rest on the principle as stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Surajmul Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. AIR 1925 PC 83 that, if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality the Court ought not to assist him. It is necessary to refer to only two of them, In Abdul Karim v. Ramdas Narayandas (supra) there was an admission made by the plaintiff in his evidence, that the firm was not registered and consequently the suit was dismissed under section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act even though no such plea was taken in the written statement. That was because the defendant was entitled to rely upon the admission made by the plaintiff. In Govindmal Giachchad v, Kunj Biharilal and others (supra) it transpired during the cross-examination of the witnesses, that the plaintiffs were not a registered firm and thereupon an issue was raised and tried as to whether the plaintiffs were a duly registered firm at the date of the suit and it was found on the evidence that they were not so, and, therefore the suit was dismissed. Each case depends on its own facts. 11. Each case depends on its own facts. 11. Narsi Bhai (PW 1) one of the partners of the plaintiff firm, was subjected to a searching cross-examination but he has nowhere admitted that a new partnership firm was brought into existence. On the contrary, his evidence shows that there was merely a re constitution of the firm. All that he states is that Rudha retired from the partnership w.e.f. 28-10-1962 and in his place, his minor son Kantilal who had been admitted to the benefits of the partnership, became a partner w.e.f 29-10-62. The change was duly, notified to the Registrar as required under section 63 (2) of the Partnership Act, vide, Certificate of Registration. Ex. P-1 His evidence does not show that there was a discontinuance or the business of the firm styled as M/s. Indian Mill Stores Raipur, or there was a dissolution of the firm followed by some of the erstwhile partners taking-over the assets and liabilities of the dissolved partnership and forming themselves into a new partnership. In his cross-examination, Narsi Bhai (PW 1), has no doubt, used the terms 'old firm' and 'new firm' but the use of these terms by a person not well-versed in taw is of little significance. 12. That the same partnership styled as: M/s Indian Mill Stores Raipur continued to exist is further borne out by the recitals of the instruments of partnership dated 26-6-1964, Ex. P.6. The only change was that a new partner was brought in. and he was Kantilal son of Rudha, as stated above. The preamble to the deed read,: "WHEREAS parties No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 were carrying on partnership business under the name and style of Indian Mill Stores, Raipur vide partnership deed dated 39th October. 1962...'" "AND HEREAS in consequence of the aforesaid change, the aforesaid parties No 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 decided orally to continue the partnership business and also decided the term and condition, thereof orally and whereas there was no authentic evidence of partnership the aforesaid parties agreed to reduce the terms of the oral agreement into a formal, deed and the parties agree that the terms and conditions of the said partnership (which came into existence on 22-5-64), under which they were working so far and propose to work in future be reduced in writing. NOW this deed witnesses as under:-" 13. In Commissioner of Income-Tex v. M/s Ratanchand Darbarilal Satna 1973 JLJ 885 = 1973 MPLJ 996 , I had occasion to bring out the distinction between dissolution and reconstitution of a partnership. I had then observed: "The dissolution and reconstitution of a partnership are two different legal concepts. The dissolution puts an end to the partnership but reconstitution keeps it subsisting though in another form. A dissolution followed by some of the erstwhile partners taking over the assets and liabilities of the dissolved partnership and forming themselves into a partnership is not reconstitution of the original partnership. A partnership formed after dissolution is a new partnership and not a continuation of the old partnership for it would be a contradiction in terms to say that what ceased to exist was continued. A reconstitution of a partnership necessarily implies that the firm never became extinct, what it notes is the structural alteration of the membership of the turn by addition or reduction of members, and the incidental redistribution of the shares of the partners. That distinction must be borne in mind..." A certificate of registration of the firm Ex. P-1 clearly show that the firm had been reconstituted and not dissolved Rudha cased to be a partner w.e.f. 28-10-1962 and his son Kantilal. Party No. 10 to the deed of partnership dated 26-6-1964, Ex. P-6, became a partner from the 29th i.e. the next day. 14. The conclusion, therefore is irresistible that the same firm continued its business as before and therefore it is a duly registered partnership firm under the Partnership Act vide the Registration Certificate. Ex. P-1. The objection to the maintainability of the plaintiff's suit based on the ground that it was not a duly registered firm and the suit should, therefore, be dismissed under section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act, must be overruled. 15. The second contention that since the entire business of the partnership could not be located in the suit accommodation on the admission of Narsibhai (PW 1) and therefore, the plaintiff's alleged need could not be treated to be a bonafide within the meaning of S.12 (1) (f) of the Act can hardly by accepted. Narsi Bhai (PW 1) has stated that the plaintiff needs the entire building and that separate suits have been filed against all the tenants. The building consists or four blocks. Narsi Bhai (PW 1) has stated that the plaintiff needs the entire building and that separate suits have been filed against all the tenants. The building consists or four blocks. At the hearing. I was informed by the learned counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff has secured possession of two of the blocks in execution of the decrees. The 3rd block was the subject matter of Narayan v, M/s Indian Mill Stores 1977 JLJ 434 , and the suit accommodation is the fourth. This means that the plaintiff has established its need in three other suits but it cannot get the suit accommodation and reconstruct the building The genuineness of the requirement of the building by the plaintiff-firm is not in dispute Merely because the suit accommodation forms a part of the building, wherein the entire business cold not be located, would not imply that its need is not a bona fide need within the meaning of section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The second point must, therefore, fail. 16. The next contention that the notice Ex. P-3 served by the plaintiff did not validly terminate the tenancy, as it did not expire with the end of the month of tenancy, is wholly devoid of substance. The defendant attorned to the plaintiff by the writing Ex. P-2 w.e.f. 1-4-1965, and thereafter, he had paid the rent to the plaintiff, vide Exs. D-1 to D-3. The rent receipts show the month of tenancy to be according to the English Calender month and commenced from the first and ended on the last day of each month. The plaintiff has averred this fact in para 3 of the plaint. The defendant merely denied this in the written statement, but did not take a specific plea as to the date of commencement of the month of tenancy. Under O. 8, R 5 of the Code, the denial was, therefore not a specific denial. My attention was, however, drawn to the cress-examination of Narsi Bhai (PW 1) where he disavows all knowledge about the actual date of commencement of the tenancy, but nothing turns on this. It is but natural that he would not know the terms agreed upon between the defendant and his previous landlord. The defendant Dual (DW 1) admits in his cross-examination, that the tenancy commences from the first day of each month. It is but natural that he would not know the terms agreed upon between the defendant and his previous landlord. The defendant Dual (DW 1) admits in his cross-examination, that the tenancy commences from the first day of each month. In view of this position, it must be held that the tenancy of the defendant was according to the English Calendar month, and that his tenancy commenced from the first and ended on the last day of the month. That being so, the notice dated 22-4-67 Ex. P-3 validly determined the tenancy after the close of last day of May 1967. This point must also fail. 17. It is, however, urged that 'the in any event "the notice, EX. P-3 must be held to be invalid, because Narsi Bhai (PW 1) during his cross-examination admits that the notice was served by the old firm; As already, held, there was no, new firm brought into existence by execution of the deed of partnership dated 26-6-1964, Ex. P-6. All that happened was that there was only a re-constitution of the firm by the retirement of Rudha w.e.f. 28-10-1962, and his son Kantilal who had come of age, being brought in as a new partner. The building was purchased by the firm styled as: M/s Indian Mill Stores Raipur i.e. the plaintiff-firm, and the notice, Ex. P-3, was given by the firm to terminate the tenancy i.e. by the same firm. 18. The last contention based on sub-section (6) of section 12 of the Act, as regards the quantum of compensation payable i.e. it must be double the amount of rent, was not pressed by learned counsel for the appellant when his attention was drawn to the learned Addl. District Judge has awarded compensation upon that basis. 19. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.