JUDGMENT : S. P. Sinha, J. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner seeks an ORDER :quashing Annexures ‘1' and 2 of the petition. Annexure 1' is an ORDER :passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Supaul, dated the 23rd September. 1974, in Case no. 316 of 1968 by which he has refixed the trial after reframing of the charge and for examination of two of the prosecution witnesses after reframing of the charge. Annexure 2 is an ORDER :passed by the learned second Additional Sessions Judge, Saharsa who had been moved in revision against the ORDER :passed under Annexure 1'. The revision of Annexure 1’ was refused by Annexure 2. 2. The facts of this case lie in short compass. The petitioner filed a criminal case before the Sub-divisional Officer, Supaul, against respondent no. 2 to 7. After examining the petitioner, who was the comp1ainant, on solemn affirmation cognizance of certain offences was taken against the said respondents. On the 24th September, 1970, charges under Sections 143, 379, 427 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code were framed. On this very date, an application under Section 540A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') was tiled on behalf of four of the respondents for permission to be represented through their lawyer. After framing of the charge it was read out and explained to the accused persons out of whom two were personally present and four were represented through lawyer. The two, who were personally present, as also the four, who were represented through a lawyer pleaded not guilty to the charges. The trial, then commenced. Prosecution witnesses were cross examined on behalf of defence. The argument was then heard and the 23rd September, 1974, was fixed for delivery of JUDGMENT : and ORDER :s in the case. On the 23rd September, 1974, the learned Judicial Magistrate did not deliver the judgement, instead be observed that when charges were framed on the 24th September, 1970, all the accused persons were not personally present and since those, who were not personally present, had not been personally heard in regard to the charges against them, it was necessary to reframe the charges in their presence. He, accordingly, reframed the charges under the very same sections under which charges were previously framed against respondents 2 to 7. He, accordingly, reframed the charges under the very same sections under which charges were previously framed against respondents 2 to 7. They claimed to be tried. A petition was then filed by the accused persons to recall prosecution witnesses 2 and 3 for further cross-examination. The petition was allowed and 1st October, 1974 was fixed for further cross-examination of the said witnesses. This ORDER :, as stated earlier, is Annexure 1 to the petition. Being aggrieved by the said ORDER :(Annexure 1) the petitioner moved the learned Sessions Judge, Saharsa, in revision, which was numbered as Criminal Revision no. 340/74/25/75. The learned Sessions Judge by his ORDER :dated the 26th April, 1975, dismissed the application on the ground that the revision application was not maintainable having been directed against an interlocutory ORDER :. The ORDER :passed by the learned Sessions Judge is Annexure; 2 to the petition. The petitioner bas then moved this Court by this application. 3. Mr. Jaiswal, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the ORDER :contained in Annexure 1 was without jurisdiction and that the same should have been set aside by the learned Sessions Judge, whose ORDER :is contained in Annexure 2 and that therefore, both these ORDER :s should be quashed. Mr. Jaiswal has submitted that when an accused has been permitted to be represented through a lawyer, the lawyer representing the accused was competent to make statement on behalf of the accused pleading not guilty to the charge. In this case the procedure, which was adopted, being one as laid under Chapter XXI of the Code, the lawyer could come with plea for trial in terms of Section 256 of the Code. He, therefore, submitted that no illegality had been committed by processing with the trial after the two accused persons who were personally present and the lawyer, representing the absentee accused persons, had pleaded not guilty to the charges. 4. No body has appeared on behalf of respondents 2 to 7 to oppose this application. 5. In my opinion, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is sound and must be accepted. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an accused persons being represented by a lawyer at the trial. Sections 205 and 540A are such provisions in the Code. The case also lays down the procedure for trial of summons cases, warrant cases and cases. triable by the court of Session. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an accused persons being represented by a lawyer at the trial. Sections 205 and 540A are such provisions in the Code. The case also lays down the procedure for trial of summons cases, warrant cases and cases. triable by the court of Session. In each of those trials the accused has been provided with an opportunity to plead or not to plead guilty to the charges against him. In summons cases such provision is to be found in Section 242; in warrant cases instituted on a police report such provisions is to be found in Section 251A (4); in cases instituted otherwise that the police report such provisions is to be found in Section 255, and the• other provision, which is a well known provision, is Section 342 of the Code. The question as to whether a lawyer representing an accused was competent to mike a statement under Section 242 and 342 often arose for consideration before the courts in India. The views, which were expressed regarding the statement made under Section 342 by a lawyer representing an accused were diverse in nature some courts holding that the lawyer was competent. others holding to the contrary. The Supreme court, however in the case of (1) Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta V. State of West Bengal (A.I. R. 1969 Supreme Court 381) has since settled the issue. By this decision it has been held that the privilege of making statement under Section 342 of the Code is personal to the accused and that no body else except the accused himself can be examined under it. A decision of the Bombay High court in the case of (2) Dorabshah- V. Emperor (A. I. R. 1926 Bombay 218) was cited before the Supreme court in connection with this case. The Bombay High Court had considered the question as to whether the pleader representing the accused under Section 205 of the Code could plead guilty under Sections 242 and 243 of the Code on behalf of the accused. The court had held that the pleader could. The Supreme court, however, observed that since those Sections, namely, Section 242, 243, 251A and 255, did not directly arise in the case which was before it, no opinion need be expressed regarding them. The court had held that the pleader could. The Supreme court, however, observed that since those Sections, namely, Section 242, 243, 251A and 255, did not directly arise in the case which was before it, no opinion need be expressed regarding them. Their Lordships, however, observed that it is sufficient to say that the language of these Sections and the effect of admissions under them are entirely different" meaning thereby that the language of Sections 242. 243, 251A and 255 were entirely different from the language under Section 342 of the Code. Impliedly, therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court (Supra) would mean that it is because of the difference in the language and the special privilege which is given to an accused person for making statement under Section 342, that distinguished Section 342 with the rest of the provisions of the Code under which an accused person is called upon to answer the charge framed against him. In other words, the provisions other than Section 342 may not require the statement to be made by the accused person personally. In the case (3) of Deolakhan Thathera V. State of Bihar (A.I. R. 1963 Patna 371) a Bench of this court was seized with the question that after an accused has been exempted from personal attendance on his own asking and allowed to be represented by lawyer up to the stage of his examination under Section 342, or, for the matter of that, under Section 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pleader is examined under either of the above Sections in place of the accused, whether the non-examination of the accused himself in person will constitute an illegality so as to vitiate the trial or it is a mere irregularity coverable under Section 537 of the Code. The answer which their Lordships gave on the illegality part was in the negative. In view of the decision of the Supreme court (Supra) the said answer, in so far as' it concerns Section 342) is clearly overruled but so far as the answer concerns Section 242, it remains in its position. The answer which their Lordships gave on the illegality part was in the negative. In view of the decision of the Supreme court (Supra) the said answer, in so far as' it concerns Section 342) is clearly overruled but so far as the answer concerns Section 242, it remains in its position. Now, with regard to Section 242 their Lordships observed that "it is true that the word 'the accused' appears in both Sections 242, and 342 but once a provision has been made for dispensing with the presence of the accused and his representation through a pleader instead as provided in Section 205 as also in Section 540A, it must be interpreted that the accused for the purpose of examination either under Section 242 or Section 342 would include his pleader representing him at his own request and on his own behalf. No accused can be heard to plead any illegality or irregularity later on after he has himself sought for his exemption from personal attendance and representation by a pleader." In the case of (4) Roop Kumari Tewary V. Registrar of Companies. Bihar (1974 B. L. J. R 481) the question was only relating to Section 242 of the Code. In this case the petitioners were four in number, all connected with a private limited company, and it had been prayed on their behalf that for explaining the accusation under Section 242 of the Code they be permitted to be represented through lawyer. The trial court had refused the prayer. The petitioners had moved this court against that ORDER :. K. B. N. Singh, J. dealt at length with the matter, noticing the Supreme court decision as also the Bombay High court decision, both mentioned above, as also certain other decisions and ultimately came to the conclusion that when an accused has been allowed to be represented by Pleader under Section 205 of the Code, he can be allowed to be represented by the pleader for the purpose of Section 242 of the Code as well." The view, as expressed in the aforesaid two Patna decisions, appeal to me. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta, had laid stress on two facts; the purpose and the language of the Section. Now the purpose in Section 255 is only to assertain whether or not the accused pleads guilty. As stated earlier, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the case of Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta, had laid stress on two facts; the purpose and the language of the Section. Now the purpose in Section 255 is only to assertain whether or not the accused pleads guilty. At this stage, the accused is not expected to say any thing more. It is not a case, as is to be found in Section 342 that the court is required to question the accused person directly and the answers given by the accused have to be recorded in the word s as spoken by the accused. The Section merely requires an answer on the question as to whether the accused pleaded guilty or claimed to be tried on the charges. No further privilege is available to an accused on the language of Sections 255 and 256. Section 242, however, afford an extra privilege because an accused is asked if he has any cause to show as to why he should not be convicted, which language may be interpreted to mean that the accused could say something more than merely plead guilty or not guilty and yet the aforesaid two decisions of this court there come to the conclusion that once an accused person. on his own asking, has been permitted to be represented through a lawyer, the lawyer is competent to answer to the accusation on behalf of the accused under Section 242. The answer, which is required under Section 255, is still simpler, namely, whether the accused pleads guilty or claims to be tried. 6. In my opinion, therefore, the contention made on behalf of the petitioner is sound and is accepted. The ORDER :s contained in Annexures 1 and 2 are quashed. Let the trial proceed on the evidences already on the record and on the charges framed on the 24th September, 1970. The trial court will. however, hear arguments of the parties before giving its JUDGMENT :. The application is allowed. UDAY SINHA, J. I agree Application allowed.