JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation of which respondents 2 to 5 are landlords. An application was made by respondents 2 to 5 for release of the said accommodation under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The application was opposed by the petitioner and was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority. An appeal was filed by respondents 2 to 5 which was allowed by the District Judge by his order dated 16th of January, 1974. It is this order of the District Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the order of the District Judge cannot be sustained. The Prescribed Authority in its order pointed out that even though respondents 2 to 5 were living in rented houses, it has not been established that they had big families and that the present accommodation at their disposal was not sufficient for their needs. The Prescribed Authority further held that so far as the petitioner is concerned his need was bona fide and more pressing. One of the grounds taken in the application for release was that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction. The Prescribed Authority repelled this contention also. The District Judge has agreed with the Prescribed Authority that the house in question was not likely to fall down and that it was fit for residence. He, however took the view that since respondents 2 to 5 had purchased the house in question for a sum of Rs. 8,000/- were getting Rs. 12/- per month only as rent and were themselves occupying rented houses, their need was bona fide. In regard to the petitioner the Prescribed Authority took the view that since he was a railway employee getting above Rs. 260/- as pay he should try for a railway quarter or he can be accommodated in any of the two houses which the respondents 2 to 5 shall vacate on occupying the houses in the question. The mere fact that respondents 2 to 5 had purchased the house in question for Rs. 8,000/- which was fetching a rent of Rs. 12/- per month only could hardy afford a good ground for evicting the petitioner. The mere fact that respondents 2 to 5 had purchased the house in question for Rs. 8,000/- which was fetching a rent of Rs. 12/- per month only could hardy afford a good ground for evicting the petitioner. The house was purchased by respondents 2 to 5 knowing fully welt that it was in the occupation of the petitioner who was paying Rs. 1/- per month as rent. If knowing these facts they still chose to purchase the house for Rs. 8,000/- they could not on its basis urged that the petitioner should be evicted from it. As seen above the Prescribed Authority had regarded a categorical finding that respondents 2 to 5 had failed to establish that they had big families and the present accommodation at their disposal is not sufficient for their needs. This finding has not been set aside by the Distract Judge. If the accommodation at the disposal of respondents 2 to 5 in the rented houses was sufficient for their needs and there was eminent danger of their being evicted from these houses the mere fact that respondents 2 to 5 had purchased the house in question would not be enough to hold that their need for the house in question was bona fide. In observing that the petitioner could occupy one of the two houses which shall be vacated by respondents 2 to 3 on the house in question being occupied by them the District Judge seems to have in view Rule 16(1) (f). It provides that where the landlord offers to the tenant alternative accommodation reasonably suitable to the needs of the tenant and his family the landlord's claims for release of the building under tenancy shall be construed liberally. Before Rule 16(l)(f) could be applied by the District Judge it was necessary for him to record a finding that one of the two houses which were to be vacated by respondents 2 and 3 on. the house in question being made available to them was reasonably suitably to the needs of the petitioner and his family. Even this finding has not been recorded by the District Judge. His order, therefore, deserves to be quashed. 3. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order of the District Judge dated January 16, 1974, is quashed and he is directed to decide the appeal fresh in accordance with law.