JUDGMENT K.N. Seth, J. - This appeal arises out of an election petition challenging the election of respondent Amar Pal Singh as Pramukh of Kshettra Samiti Block Dhonipur at the election held on 2nd March 1973. 2. Learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that neither the election petition nor the present appeal was maintainable as the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the rules made thereunder do not prescribe grounds on which an election could be challenged. Section 7 of the Act provides for election of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh of the Kshettra Samiti and lays down that the elections shall be held by secret ballot and in the manner provided by rules which shall also provide for resolution of doubts and disputes relating to the election of Pramukh and Up-Pramukhs. Rule 35 prescribes for the time and manner of presenting election petitions. Rule 36 provides that an election petition shall specify the ground or grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is questioned and shall contain a summary of the circumstances alleged to justify the election being questioned on such grounds. Section 7 and the rules mentioned above do not specify the grounds on which an election can be challenged. However, Section 13 mentions the disqualifications for being chosen a member or for being coopted a member of the Kshettra Samiti or being elected as Pramukh under Section 7. It is not disputed that the election of a Pramukh can be challenged if the candidate suffered from any one of the disqualification mentioned in Section 13. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the grounds on which the election of Pramukh can be challenged has not been prescribed under the Act and that the election petition was incompetent. There is no dispute that Rule 49 provides for an appeal against the order 41, of the Judge deciding an election petition. The preliminary objection has no merits. 3. In the election petition the main attack on the election of the respondent was on the ground that he was disqualified from being election account of the fact that he had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life on a murder charge. The preliminary objection has no merits. 3. In the election petition the main attack on the election of the respondent was on the ground that he was disqualified from being election account of the fact that he had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life on a murder charge. The only ground pressed before me was that the view taken by the court below that since the respondent was not convicted under Section 302 simplicities he suffered from no disqualification as provided for under clause (a) of Section 13 was erroneous. There is no dispute that in Sessions Trial No. 152 of 1959 - State v. Ram Chandra Singh and others the respondent, along with dues, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal preferred by the accused persons was dismissed and their conviction and sentences were upheld. The sentence of death awarded to two of the accused persons by the trial court was also affirmed. 4. Section 13(a) provides that a person shall be disqualified for being elected as Pramukh if he "has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to transportation for contravention of any order made under the Essential 1 Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, or that U.P. Control of Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947, or for an offence which is declared by the State Government to imply such moral turpitude as to render him unfit to be a member...... " The State Government issued a notification dated February 27, 1962, under clause (a) of Section 13 of the Act declaring certain offences for the purposes of the said section of the Act. Section 302, I. P. C. figures as one of the offences which implied such moral turpitude as to render a person convicted of that offence unfit to be a member. The stand taken by the respondent was that he had been convicted under Section 302/149 and not under Section 302, I. P. C. and since the offence under Section 302/149 was different from an offence under Section 302, I. P. C., he was not disqualified for being elected as a Pramukh. The stand taken by the respondent was that he had been convicted under Section 302/149 and not under Section 302, I. P. C. and since the offence under Section 302/149 was different from an offence under Section 302, I. P. C., he was not disqualified for being elected as a Pramukh. The main question for consideration, therefore, is whether disqualification attaches to a person who has been convicted: under Section 302/149, I. P. C. and the answer to that question depends whether the offence under Section 302/149 is different from an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. in Nanak Chand v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 274' dealing with the distinction between Section 149 and Section 34, I. P. C. the Court observed that under Section 149 a specific offence is created. This section postulates that an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such as a member of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object and declares that in such circumstances every person who was a member of the same assembly at the time of the commission of the offence, was guilty of that offence. Section 34 does not however, create any specific offence. Again in Bhajan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1564 the Court observed that Section 149, I. P. C. constitutes perse substantive offence although the punishment is under the section to which it is tagged being committed by the principal offender in the unlawful assembly, known or unknown. This Court in Om Prakash v. State, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 241 drawing a distinction between Sections 34 and 149, observed that whereas Section 34 is merely declaratory of a rule of criminal liability and does not create a distinct offence, Section 149 is not a merely declaratory provision and does create a distinct offence. In Shabbir Khan v. Mohd. Ismail Khan, 1974 A.C.C. 20, a question arose whether an offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 149, I. P. C. was compoundable. In Shabbir Khan v. Mohd. Ismail Khan, 1974 A.C.C. 20, a question arose whether an offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 149, I. P. C. was compoundable. After considering a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court the Full Bench held that Section 149 of Indian Penal Code creates a separate and distinct offence, and, therefore, an offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 149, I. P. C. is an offence distinct from an offence punishable under Section 323, I. P. C. and is not compoundable. The Court noted that no offence covered by the provisions of Section 149, I. P. C. falls within the purview of Section 345 of the Criminal. Procedure Code. Sub-sec. (7) of Section 345 Criminal Procedure Code laid down that "no offences shall be compounded except as provided by this section." The intention of the Legislature was further made clear by including Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code in Schedule II of the Code of Criminal. Procedure as an offence which is not compoundable. 5. A question more akin to the question in hand arose in Sukhram Karansingh v. State of Madhya Bharat, A.I.R. 1957 M.B. 134. Under Section 14 of the Madhya Bharat Public Security Act, 1953, the Government issued a notification specifying the offences which the Special Court constituted for the disturbed area of the revenue district of Morena could try. In those enumerated offences or the offence under Section 149, I. P. C. had not been included. A question arose whether the Special Judge was empowered to try an offender who was charged with under Section 302 read with Section 149, I. P. C. The Court held that a charge for the substantive offence under Section 302, I. P. C. is for a distinct and separate offence from that under Section 302 read with Section 149. Since Section 149, I. P. C. was not included among the offences enumerated in the notification under Section 14 of the Madhya Bharat Public Security Act the Special Judge was not competent to try any person charged with any of the enumerated substantive offences read with Section 149, I. P. C. 6. Since Section 149, I. P. C. was not included among the offences enumerated in the notification under Section 14 of the Madhya Bharat Public Security Act the Special Judge was not competent to try any person charged with any of the enumerated substantive offences read with Section 149, I. P. C. 6. On the strength of the authorities mentioned above it must be held that an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. is distinct from an offence under Section 302/149, I. P. C. In the notification dated February 27, 1962, issued under Section 13 of the Act, Section 149, I. P. C. has not been included. Section 13 is penal provision and must be strictly construed. Since Section 149, I. P. C. is not included in the notification the intention appears to be that a person would be deemed to be disqualified only if he has been convicted for the substantive offences enumerated: in the notification. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Mahabir Gope v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 118 In that case the question that came up for consideration was whether Section 303 was confined only to cases where a person undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life actually and infact himself commits an act which results in the death of the victim or the said section would apply even in cases where a person undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life is convicted either under Section 302 read with Section 34 or under Section 302 read with Section 149. The Court held that the legal effect of such conviction in either case is that he must be deemed to have committed the murder as much as the actual murderer has. The rule laid down in that case has no bearing on the question whether Section 149 is a distinct offence or not. 8. In the present case the respondent was convicted not under Section 302 simplicities but under Section 302/149, I. P. C., an offence which is not covered by the notification issued under Section 13 of the Act. He was, therefore, not disqualified from being elected as Pramukh of the Kshettra Samiti. 9. No other point has been raised before me. 10. The appeal has no merits and is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.