SAPRU. J. This writ petition arises out of a suit under section 229-B read with section 209 of the U. P. Zaraindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act filed by the petitioners against one Babu Lal respondent, the State of U. P. and the Gaon Samaj. One Madhua was subsequently impleaded as defendant no. 4. The plaint allegations were that the plaintiffs along with Madhua were hereditary tenants of the plots in suit prior to the abolition of zamindari and they became sirdars on the coming into force of U. P. Act I of 1951, The holding was joint. The plaintiffs case further that is they deposited the necessary amount of money and acquired bhumidhari sanad in respect of the half share on 11-11-1949 and became bhumidhars of their half share in thetholding which, however, was not partitioned. According to the plaintiffs case Madhua went away and they continued in possession over his share and as such, by adverse possession, they became sirdars in respect of the share of Madhua. According to the plaintiffs, Babu Lal got a wrong entry made as being in possession of the land and, hence, they sought a declaration that they were sirdars of the share of Madhua and also eviction of the defendant, Babulal. The suit was contested by Babulal who denied the plaintiffs case and alleged that the plot in suit was the exclusive holding of Madhua -and the contesting respondent Babu Lal claimed that he entered into possession over the portion belonging to Madhua even prior to the date of vesting. It was further pleaded by him that a suit had been filed against him by Madhua under section 209/229 of the U. P. Z. A. & L. R. Act in which there was a compromise and the case was decided in his favour. Babu Lal also pleaded estoppel and limitation. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a written statement and alleged that the share of Madhua had vested in the Gaon Samaj and the name of Babu Lal was wrongly recorded as sirdar. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the plaintiffs had not acquired sirdari rights over the share of Madhua and Babuial defendant no. 1 was the sirdar of the land in dispute. The petitioners filed an appeal. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the plaintiffs had not acquired sirdari rights over the share of Madhua and Babuial defendant no. 1 was the sirdar of the land in dispute. The petitioners filed an appeal. The learned Additional Commissioner, who heard the appeal, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff petitioners never acquired sirdari rights by adverse possession over the half share of Madhua. The finding was that as the plaintiffs and Madhua were admittedly joint tenants of the land and as there was no evidence of the ouster of Madhua, the plea of adverse possession advanced by the plaintiff-petitioners could not succeed. The learned Additional Commissioner, however, held that Babu Lal was not in actual possession up to 1370 F. He, however, found that Babulal entered into possession of plot no. 1682/2 in 1371 F. and plot no. 1682/1 in 1972 F. Having found this, the learned Additional Commissioner recorded a finding that Babulal did not acquire any rights over the share of the holding belonging to Madhua by adverse possession. The khatauni entry as sirdar made in favour of Babu Lal was, according to the Additional Commissioner made under the orders and decrees which were without jurisdiction and had no legal basis and, therefore, had to be ignored. As regards the consent decree against Madhua which had been obtained by Babu Lai, the Additional Commissioner found that the decree was collusive and, in any case, was not binding on the plaintiff petitioner. Having regard to this finding the Additional Commissioner has come to the conlcusion that the plaintiffs are bhumidhars of their half share in the land and were not bound by the decree between Madhua and Babu Lal as they were not parties to the suit, and that the plaintiff-appellant and Madhua were still co-tenure holders. Madhua continued as such unless there was a partition of the holdings under section 138 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Additional Commissioner, therefore, directed that the plaintiff-petitioners were not entitled to get a decree for ejectment of the trespassers from their undivided holding. The Additional Commissioner, however, recorded a finding that his decision will not affect the rights of the Gaon Samaj in any way and will not debar it from bringing a suit if so advised. A second appeal was filed by Babu Lal before the Board of Revenue. The Additional Commissioner, however, recorded a finding that his decision will not affect the rights of the Gaon Samaj in any way and will not debar it from bringing a suit if so advised. A second appeal was filed by Babu Lal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue after reciting the various contentions on behalf of the different parties to the appeal, observed in paragraph 6 of its judgment as follows:- " I have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. In ihis case there was an earlier suit between Madhua and the defendant-appellant and it, therefore, acts as an estoppel between Madhua and the defendants and the defendant has become sirdar in place of Madhua. It does not act as an estoppel against the plaintiffs. But. the plaintiffs are consulted as they are bhumidhars of 1/2 the share which is separately recorded in their names. Half the area is recorded as sirdan of Madhua and the plaintiff can have no claim over this area. It is entirely a matter between Madhua and the defendant The plaintiffs are not co-tenants of this area. Section 138 is intended for a suit of partition. It is not a partition case It is a case u/s. 229-T/209. The plaintiffs case for adverse possession has been disbelieved by the courts below. They have, therefore, no claim on the basis of adverse possession. The finding of the lower appellate court is, therefore, wholly erroneous. The plaintiffs are nonsuited and I agree with the learned counsel for the appellant and affirm the finding of the tiial court. " The Board of Revenue has held that the plaintiffs are non-suited as they are bhumidhars of half share which is separately recorded in their names. Admittedly, there was no partition by metes and bounds between the plaintiff and Madhua. According to the submissions of Sri K C Saxena counsel for the respondent that there was a severance of status between the plaintiff petitioner and Madhua when the plaintiff petitioners acquired bhumidhan sanad. Admittedly, there was no partition by metes and bounds between the plaintiff and Madhua. According to the submissions of Sri K C Saxena counsel for the respondent that there was a severance of status between the plaintiff petitioner and Madhua when the plaintiff petitioners acquired bhumidhan sanad. In support of his contention Sri K C Saxena referred me to the provisions of sections 137 and 138 of the u P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and argued that the consequence of one co-sirdar obtaining a bhumidhari sanad while the other co-sirdar does not obtain a bhumidhari sanad is that there is a severance in status between him and the other sirdar, which is just now the finding of the Board of Revenue, that there had been a partition between the petitioner-plaintiff and Madhua. In the first place the petitioner obtained a Bhumidhari sanad on Novemcer 11, 1949 at that time the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not in force. There was an Act in force called the United Provinces Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act 1949. Under that Act the tenants of the classes mentioned in section 3 95 of the Act were entitled on a deposit being made by them to the acquisition of certain privileges. The privileges acquired as a consequence of the declaration granted under the Act are specified in section 7. Section 7 (1) (c) of the Act provides:- " The applicant shall, except as hereinafter excepted, be entitled, notwithstanding anything contained in the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or any contract to bequeath by will or transfer by way of sale, simple mortgage or gift his interest in the holding or his share therein. " Thus, among the other privileges acquired by a tenant as a result of a deposit being made under the Act and grant by declaration under section 3 of the Act was the right to transfer his holding. Section 18 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided for the settlement or certain lands with intermediates or cultivators as bhumi-dhars. Clause (d) provides that an occupancy tenant, a hereditary tenant, a tenant on patta dawami or istamrai referred to in section 17 (e) held by a grove holder possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale shall become bhumidhar. Clause (d) provides that an occupancy tenant, a hereditary tenant, a tenant on patta dawami or istamrai referred to in section 17 (e) held by a grove holder possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale shall become bhumidhar. The plaintiff petitioners, therefore, having had a right to transfer by way of sale their holding as a result of the acquisition of the declaration under the aforesaid Act, became bhumi-dhars of the Land. Madhua had become a sirdar under section 90 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The holding was joint. Sri K. C. Saxena is not right in arguing that the grant of a certificate under section 137 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act operates as a notional partition in law. Section 137 (2) run as follows:- " Upon the grant of the certificate, under sub-seclion (1) the sirdar shall, from the date on which amount referred to in subsection (1) of section 134 has been deposited- (a) Becomes and be deemed to be a bhumidhar of the holding or the share in respect of which the certificate has been granted, and (b) Be liable for payment of such reduced amount on account of land revenue for the holding or his share therein, as the case may be, one-half of the amount of land revenue payable or deemed to be payable by him therefore on the date of application. " It, therefore, contemplates that there can be a bhumidhar of a share in a holding. Section 138 of the Act deals with the question of the partition of the holding upon acquisition of bhumidhari rights. It provides: " (1) Where any person has become a bhumidhar, whether under section 18 or section 134, in respect of a share of a holding held by him jointly with other or others who are sirdars, the bhumidhar may sue for partition of his share in the holding and upon partition he shall be deemed to be bhumidhar of the land allotted to his share. (2) In any suit under sub-section 1 any other bhumidhar entitled as such to a share in the holding may apply to the Court for partition of his and the bhumidhar shall, subject to payment of court fees, be entitled to get his share separated: Provided that no such application shall be entertained after the issue has been framed. (2) In any suit under sub-section 1 any other bhumidhar entitled as such to a share in the holding may apply to the Court for partition of his and the bhumidhar shall, subject to payment of court fees, be entitled to get his share separated: Provided that no such application shall be entertained after the issue has been framed. " Therefore, section 138 contemplates suits for partition of a holding by persons who have become bhumidhars eiiher under section 18 (as the plaintiff petitioners became) or under section 134 in which there is another or other sirdars. These two sections clearly show that in a joint holding there can be both bhumidhars and sirdars, and this situation would continue until there is a partition of the holding. I cannot, therefore, accept the finding of the Board of Revenue that the result of the acquisition of the bhumidhari sanad by the petitioners was that there was a partition of the holding between them and Madhua who was a sirdar. Sri K. C. Saxena then urged that the plaintiff petitioners could not file a suit under section 209 against Madhua. He submitted that an ejectment suit under section 209 cannot be filed by one co-sharer in a holding against another. This was, or course, an argument in the alternative to the argument first advanced by Sri K. C. Saxena. fn the first place, the answer to this argument is that the suit had been filed by the plaintiff petitioners not against Madhua but against Babu Lai, the State Government and the Gaon Samaj alone. Maliua and the plaintiff had only prayed for a declaration that he was the sirdar of the plots in suit and in the alternative asked for the relief of ejectment against Babu Lai, if he was held to be in possession. Madhua was subsequently impleaded in the suit at his own request. The Additional Commissioner, when he dealt with the appeal of the plaintiff petitioners, had in his judgment held that the plaintiff had never acquired sirdari rights against Madhuas half share, as the possession of one co-owner could not be adverse to another co-owner, unless ouster was proved, which was not done in the instant case. The Additional Cormiissioner decreed the suit and granted the relief claimed i. e. the relief for eviction of Babulal and not of Madhua. The Additional Cormiissioner decreed the suit and granted the relief claimed i. e. the relief for eviction of Babulal and not of Madhua. This argu nent, therefore, of Sri K. C. Saxena cannot also be accepted. The Board of Revenue has held that as half of the area of the plot is recorded as the sirdari of Madhua, the plaintiffs can have no claim over this area. The mere fact that there was an entry over different plots of the same holding cannot make Madhua the exclusive tenant of those plots. Lastly, Sri K. C. Saxena submitted that if this court were to allow the writ petition, it should remand the case to the Board of Revenue for a fresh decision. 1 do not think that any useful purpose would be served by asking the Board of Revenue to decide the appeal afresh. The arguments advanced on behalf of the defendant respondents were fully considered by the Board of Revenue when it decided the appeal. In the result, I allow the writ petition, set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and restore the order of the Additional Commissioner. The petitioners will be entitled to have their costs of this writ petition as against Babulal, respondent no. 3. .