Judgment :- 1. The judgment-debtor is the appellant. The decree in question was passed on 27 61953. Execution was laid on 9 81966 as per E.P. No. 554 of 1966. A property belonging to the judgment-debtor was attached. A claim petition was filed under Order XXI R.58, Code of Civil Procedure as E A No. 1845 of 1966. This was allowed on 22 91967 and E.P No. 554 of 1966 was dismissed. Consequently the decree-holder filed O.S. 171 of 1968 under Order XXI R.63 CPC. The suit was decreed on 15 71970. Thereafter E.P. No. 320 of 1972 was filed to proceed with execution. 2. The contention of the judgment-debtor appellant is that the execution is barred by limitation since the original E.P. No. 554 of 1966 was dismissed on 9 81966. The present execution petition is filed only on 7 4 1972. 3. The main contest in this second appeal therefore has to be resolved with reference to the question whether the period during which the suit under Order XXI R.63 was pending, could be taken into account to save limitation. The counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the decision reported in Ramasubbayyah v. Thimmaiah (AIR 1942 Madras 5), where a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that when a suit under Order XXI R.63 is filed, it will not revive the original execution petition which was dismissed. There, a property was attached in execution of a decree which was released on objection by third parties. No further relief was asked for in the execution application and hence the said application was dismissed. Thereafter the decree-holder filed a suit under Order XXI R.63 CPC. which was eventually dismissed. Their Lordships held that the order dismissing the execution petition became conclusive and the execution petition cannot be said to be in suspended animation until the suit under Order XXI R.63 is dismissed. It was held that the second execution petition filed three years after the date of dismissal of the first petition was time barred. That case can be easily distinguished from the one on hand. What happened there was that the original execution order was the subject matter of a suit under Order XXI R.63 CPC. which suit itself was dismissed. The second execution petition was filed three years after the dismissal of the original execution petition. That case can be easily distinguished from the one on hand. What happened there was that the original execution order was the subject matter of a suit under Order XXI R.63 CPC. which suit itself was dismissed. The second execution petition was filed three years after the dismissal of the original execution petition. Therefore the Madras High Court rightly held that the second execution petition was barred by limitation. 4. The case before me is entirely different. The original execution petition was dismissed on 9 81966. The claim petition E.A. 1845 of 1966 under Order XXI R.58 was allowed on 22 91967. Therefore the decree-holder had necessarily to file a suit under Order XXI R.63 CPC. When the suit was decreed, the original execution petition automatically got revived, since the dismissal order in the execution petition became non est. A decree in a suit under Order XXI R.63 is only a declaratory decree. When ultimately the court found in the suit, that the claim put forward was not valid, the original order was rendered ineffective. No argument is necessary to hold that the original order dismissing the execution petition automatically revived. So far as limitation is concerned therefore, time runs from the date when the suit O. S.170 of 1968 was decreed. The second execution petition E. P. No. 320 of 1972 was filed on 7 41972, that is, within three years of 15 71970, the date when the suit was decreed. 5. Although no authority is necessary for this position, counsel for the respondents invited my attention to the following observations at page 761 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by Sanjiva Row under Art.137 (1973 Edn. Vol. 2): "Where a property attached is realised on the claim of a third party, and the decree-holder institutes a suit and the same is decreed and thereupon the decree-holder makes an application for execution against that property, such application is regarded not as a fresh application but as the revival of the previous proceedings and is governed by this Article, and the period of limitation runs from the date of the decree in the claim suit and not from the date of the previous application. Where certain properties are attached before judgment, and after a decree is obtained in the suit, a claim petition is put in by a third party and allowed, and the decree-holder consequently files a suit to establish his right to sell the properties in execution and the same is decreed in his favour, an application by the decree-holder for sale of the property attached before judgment is governed by this Article and not by Art.136, and the period of limitation runs from the date of the decree in the suit under Order XXI, R.63, and not from the date of the decree under execution." My attention has been invited to the following passage also appearing at page 1148 (A. I. R. Manual, Vol. 13 of D. V. Chitaley and S. Appu Rao): "(7) Where the execution is stayed, or is prevented by injunction, or become impossible to be proceeded with, owing to a claim being advanced to the property which is the subject of the execution or owing to some other obstacle placed by the judgment debtor in the way of execution and the application is "dismissed", or "struck off ", or "consigned to the record room" or "returned", the order will not be regarded as having finally disposed of the petition and a subsequent application will be regarded as one for the revival and continuation of the original proceeding... (Application for execution of decree-Claim petition by third party followed by title suit by decree holder period of contest of claim case and title suit is excluded from limitation Original application for execution is revived though dismissed because of claim case)." These observations were supported by decisions reported in Government of Rajasthan v. Sangram Singh (AIR 1962 Rajasthan 43) and in (AIR 1960 Madh. Pra. 388). The authorities are therefore clear and it is also in consonance with common sense that when the original order upholding the right of a third party to the property attached, was set aside in a regular suit, the original execution petition should be deemed to have been restored and it cannot be said that the time taken for the filing of the suit and obtaining of the decree cannot be availed of by the decree-holder. 6. The appeal is without merit and it is dismissed. But I direct the parties to bear their costs. Dismissed.