JUDGMENT Tankha, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by appellant-defendants under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 26th June 1968 passed by First Additional District Judge, Durg, in Civil Appeal No. 5-4-A of 1964. 2. Facts of the case in brief are that the respondent-plaintiff no. 1 Mst. Padmabai and her son Nand Kishore (plff no. 2) had filed the present suit for partition of immovable and movable property on the allegations that the same belonged to the joint Hindu family. The respondent-plaintiff was the wife of deceased Janva who along with Daulat (deft. no. 1), now dead, were members of a joint Hindu family which owned immovable property shown in schedules A & B in the plaint excluding a house in possession of one Balaram. It was not disputed before the lower appellate Court that the respondent plaintiff Mst. Padmabai was the first wife of deceased Janva except for a period of four months after her marriage she never lived with her husband and continued to stay with her parents. Her son Nand Kishore (plff. no. 2) was born to her in her father's house. Deceased Janva had a second wife named Girjabai (deft. no 2) and through her a son Dharampal (deft. no. 3). In 1954, respondent-plaintiff no. 1 Mst. Padmabai also had applied under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for maintenance which was granted. Subsequently, her husband Janva died in April 1961. According to the plaintiff they had a right for half share and partition be effected by metes and bounds of the suit property. 3. As regards the defendants, before stating their claim it be mentioned here that Daulat who was defendant no. 1 expired during the pendency of the second appeal and substituted by his Legal-representatives namely, his daughter and wife who are now respondent nos. 3 (a) and (b). The defendants disputed the claim of the plaintiffs. According to them, the respondent plaintiff no. 1 Padmabai was living unchaste life giving birth to a son Nand Kishore (plff. no. 2) on 23-12-1954. To say in other words, Naod Kishore (plff. no. 2) was an illegitimate child. They also contended that she was divorced by her husband deceased Janva. That being so, neither of the plaintiffs had any right to inherit the property of deceased Janva who died on 6-4-1961. no. 2) on 23-12-1954. To say in other words, Naod Kishore (plff. no. 2) was an illegitimate child. They also contended that she was divorced by her husband deceased Janva. That being so, neither of the plaintiffs had any right to inherit the property of deceased Janva who died on 6-4-1961. As regards joint nature of the property, it was pleaded that a partition had taken place between the deceased Janva and Daulat (deft. no. 1) in the year 1960 by a registered partition deed and as such the plaintiffs on this count also have no right to seek petition, alleging the suit property as joint Hindu family property. 4. The first Court held that a partition had taken place between Janva and Daulat (deft. no. 1. now dead) The said Court further held that though respondent-plaintiff no. 1 Mst. Padmabai was the wife of Janva and no divorce had taken place, but since she was living away from her husband, the son Nand Kishore (plff. no. 2) born to her, was her illegitimate child and being so, the claim of Nand Kishore (plfr. no. 2) was dismissed. As regards respondent-plaintiff no 1 Mst. Padmabai was concerned, she was held entitled to 1/4th share in her husband Janva's property and seperate possession after partition since while the property was found in possession of defendants no. 2 and 3, namely, second wife of Janva and a son born from her who were held entitled to 1/4th and 1/2 shares respectively. Thus a preliminary decree was passed in the partition suit. 5. Two appeals were preferred before the lower appellate Court. One appeal was by the plaintiffs and the other appeal was preferred by the defendants i.e., the present appellant-defendants against that part of the decree granting relief to the extent of 1/4th share in the suit property and partition to respondent-plaintiff Padmabai. The appeal of the plaintiffs was dismissed but the appeal filed by the appellant-defendants was partly allowed and the decree of the first Court was modified to the extent that the respondent-plaintiff Padmadai was held entitled to 1/4th interest in the houses as shown in red colour in the map filed by the defendants. Since both the parties were still unsatisfied they filed separate second appeals in this Court. Since both the parties were still unsatisfied they filed separate second appeals in this Court. The appeal (Second Appeal No. 716 of 1968) which was filed by the plaintiffs (including the present respondent) has abated in its entirety as per order of this Court dated 17-12-1974 passed in that appeal (Second Appeal No. 716 of 1968) as the application for the substitution of the names of legal-representatives of Danlat (deft. no. 1) under Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure was made after the period of limitation prescribed for applications under Rule 4, sub-Rule 2 of Rule 9 of Order 22 of the Code had expired. As such now there remains only one appeal, the present one, filed by the appellant-defendants for consideration. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this appeal has no merit and as such it must be dismissed. The only contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants was that since the respondent-plaintiff no. 1 Mst. Padmabai gave birth to an illegitimate child Nand Kishore on 23-12-1954 as held by the Courts below, and as she was living an unchaste life when her husband Janva died on 6-4-1961, she as an unchaste widow was not entitled under Hindu Law to inherit to her husband That being so, learned lower appellate Court has committed an illegality in bolding the respondent-plaintiff no. 1 entitled to inherit him. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff no. 1, Mst, Padmabai, submitted that the evidence on rec0fd is lacking for the finding that Nand Kishore (plff. no. 2) was her illegitimate child and as such the finding of the learned lower appellate Court is incorrect. Alternatively, it was also submitted that even if it may be assumed that Nand Kishore (plff. no. 2) was an illegitimate child born to her, the solitary act of the year 1954 was not sufficient to divest her of her right to inherit to her husband's property who died to the year 1961. According to him unchastity of the widow must continue at the time of the death of her husband and in this connection referred to the opening words of section 96 of the Hindu Law. Since in the present case there is no evidence about unchastity when her husband Janva died in the year 1961. According to him unchastity of the widow must continue at the time of the death of her husband and in this connection referred to the opening words of section 96 of the Hindu Law. Since in the present case there is no evidence about unchastity when her husband Janva died in the year 1961. The learned lower appellate Court was right in decreeing her claim to the extent of 1/4th share in her husband's property. 8. At the outset I may mention that the learned counsel appearing for (he parties did not cite any case law. The finding of both the Courts below that Nand Kishore (plaintiff No.2) was an illegitimate child of the respondent-plaintiff Mst. Padmabai is not open to challenge now as the second appeal filed jointly by both the plaintiffs has been dismissed as abated vide order dated 17-12-1974 passed by this Court for the reasons stated in para 5 above. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal it has to be assumed that the respondent-plaintiff Mst. Padmabai was unchaste and gave birth to an illegitimate child Nand Kishore (plaintiff No.2) in the year 1954, though much earlier prior to the death of her husband. It is also true that the evidence on record is completely lacking that she continued to be unchaste when her husband died in the year 1961, which fact was also not disputed by the counsel appearing for the appellants. Thus, the only point on which the decision of this appeal rests is whether the respondent plaintiff can be held to have divested herself from inheriting to her husband's estate who died in the year 1961, for her act of unchastity leading to a birth of an illegitimate child in the year 1954. 9. In this connection I may refer to section 96 of the Hindu Law which reads as under: "96. Unchastity -A widow who is unchaste at the time of her husband's death is not entitled to inherit to him, but once the husband's estate has vested in her which could only be if she was chaste at the time of her husband's death it cannot be divested by her subsequent unchastity. Similarly where the widow of a joint owner is given a widow's estate on her husband's death under a family arrangement, such an estate is not divested by her subsequent unchastity in the absence of any provision to that effect. Similarly where the widow of a joint owner is given a widow's estate on her husband's death under a family arrangement, such an estate is not divested by her subsequent unchastity in the absence of any provision to that effect. Reference may also be made to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and Notes at p. 111." No doubt, in view of the provisions of this section, on plain reading itself, respondent plaintiff No.1 on account of her unchastity could not inherit to her husband. But that was the law prior to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as this Act replaces the general rules of succession of the Hindu dying intestate in respect of all matters of which provision has been made in the Act. It must, therefore, be held that succession of property of a male or female Hindu on his or her actual death has been reorientated by this Act. Therefore, if the death of a full owner occurs after the date 17-6-1956, the inheritance will be governed by this Act there can be no two views about it. In the present case since Janva died in the year 1961, provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be applicable. This is also clear from the wordings of section 4 of the Act Said section gives an over-riding effect to the provisions of the Act. Manifestly, the legislature intended to supersede the rules of Hindu Law on all matters in respect of which there was an express provision in the Act. [See. S.S Munna Lal v. S.S. Raj Kumar ( AIR 1962 SC 1493 =(1962) SUPP.l3) SCR 418)] 10. Therefore, one has to look into the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to find out if the bar of unchastity with regard to a Hindu widow to inherit her husband as provided under section 96 of the Hindu Law still holds good. Therefore, one has to look into the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to find out if the bar of unchastity with regard to a Hindu widow to inherit her husband as provided under section 96 of the Hindu Law still holds good. Section 28 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 reads as under: "No person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease defect or deformity, or save as provided in this Act, on any other ground whatsoever." Words starting "or save as provided in this Act, on any other ground whatsoever" occuring in the section are of great significance, which are preceded by opening words of the section "No person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease defect or deformity." That being so the section discards almost all the grounds which imposed exclusion from inheritance and rules out disqualification on any other ground whatsoever excepting those expressly recognised by any provisions of the Act. The exceptions are very few and unchastity of a widow is not now under the Act a ground for disqualifying her from succeeding to the estate of her husband. I am also supported in my view by a reported judgment of Mysore High Court in Appa Sahery v. Gurubasawwa and others [AIR 1960 Mysore 79]. 11. In the present case, inspite of the finding regarding unchastity of respondent-plaintiff No. 1 Mst. Padmabai, for the rule discussed above, I hold that she has been rightly held entitled to succeed to 1/4th share of her husband Janva by the Court below; 12. For the reasons stated above the appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per certificate or according to schedule whichever is less.