*ORDER.- This is an appeal against an acquittal of the respondent who was tried for offences of adulteration under section 7 read with sections 2(1)(a) and 10(1-a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The respondent was acquitted by the lower Court on the sole ground that the Food Inspector failed to supply a copy of the report of the Public Analyst as required under rule 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. It is provided under that Rule that it shal be the duty of the Food Inspector to send by Registered Post a copy of the report received in Form No. III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report if the report is against the person. However, if the report shows that the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder, it is enough if the person is informed of the same in which case no report need be sent. Here the report of the Public Analyst is that the groundnut oil sent for analysis contained 7 per cent, of Castor Oil. Therefore, it was adulterated. Admittedly when the report of the Public Analyst was received by the Food Inspector even prior to 19th June, 1975, till 19th July, 1975 no efforts were made to serve a copy of the same on the respondent. This mandatory provision is obviously made to enable the person against whom the report was given, to send the sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for a certificate, whose certificate will supersede the report given by the Public Analyst. The provision relating to the supply of the report of the Public Analyst under the Rule is a mandatory one. Sri Madhusudan Rao, J., took a similar view in the decision reported in Public Prosecutor v. Sreeramulu1. The same learned Judge in another case in Criminal R.C. No. 773 of 1975 dated 27th January, 1976 came to the conclusion that mere non-compliance with the Rule does not entitle the accused to an acquittal unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to him. After a lapse of time, it is difficult to send a sample of the food article to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory to get a correct analysis of the food article. After a lapse of time, it is difficult to send a sample of the food article to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory to get a correct analysis of the food article. That is why it is provided under rule 9(j) of the Rules that a copy of the report of the Public Analyst shall be served on the person within ten days of the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst. I am unable to understand how an accused person can be able to prove that a prejudice has been caused in his defence for non-supply of the report of the Public Analyst to him in time except to say that if it were to be supplied to him in time, he would have asked the concerned authority to send the other sample to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory for an authoritative report on the matter. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has brought to my notice the above two decisions of my learned brother Sri Madhusudan Rao, J. Prima facie I think the non-supply of the report of the Public Analyst in time as required under rule 9(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules will be fatal to the prosecution case. I think some authoritative decision is necessary on the point, as it may frequently arise in Food Adulteration Cases. Accordingly the case is referred to a Bench. The papers may be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to direct the office to post the case before a Bench. Pursuant to the above order the case came before the Bench (Sambasiva Rao and Muktadar, JJ.) The Judgment of the Bench was delivered by Muktadar, J. — The Food Inspector, Circle No. 11 Municipal Corporation Hyderabad filed a complaint against the accused on 25th August, 1975 alleging that the accused has contravened the provisions of section 7 read with section 2(1)(a) and section 16(i)(a)(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Food Inspector visited the shop of the accused on 10th February, 1975.After complying with the formalities prescribed in the Rules framed under the Act, he purchased 375 grams of groundnut oil for Rs. 3-15 p. He divided the oil into three equal parts and put them in three empty, dry and clean bottles, corked them, and affixed his seal. The Food Inspector visited the shop of the accused on 10th February, 1975.After complying with the formalities prescribed in the Rules framed under the Act, he purchased 375 grams of groundnut oil for Rs. 3-15 p. He divided the oil into three equal parts and put them in three empty, dry and clean bottles, corked them, and affixed his seal. He gave one sample to the accused, and sent another sample to the Public Analyst while retaining the third with himself. The Public Analyst in his report dated 22nd March, 1975 came to the conclusion that the sample contained about 7 per cent, of castor oil and was therefore adulterated. It is not known as to when exactly the report was received by the Food Inspector but we have it in the evidence of P.W. 2 that on 19th June, 1975 he received the record in the case along with the Public Analyst report which would go to show that the report of the Analyst was received before 19th June, 1975. Thereafter the complaint was filed on 25th August, 1975. The trial Court came to the conclusion that under rule 9(j) of the Preventionof Food Adulteration Rules(hereinafter referred to as the Rules) it was incumbent on the part of the Food Inspector to sent a copy of the report of the Public Analyst within 10 days of its receipt by him, and since the Food Inspector has not complied with that provision, the accused was entitled to acquittal. The trial Court, therefore, acquitted the accused. 3. The State has preferred this appeal against the acquittal. It came up before our learned brother Ramachandra Raju, J., who by his order dated 15th October, 1976 referred the case for consideration of the Bench. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the provisions of rule 9 (j) of the Rules were mandatory. In Public Prosecutor v. Sreeramulu1, Madhusudan Rao, J., had taken a similar view but in Crl.R. No. 173 of 1975 dated 27tb January, 1976 the same learned Judge had held that mere non-compliance with the rule does not entitle the accused to an acquittal unless prejudice is shown to have been caused. In Public Prosecutor v. Sreeramulu1, Madhusudan Rao, J., had taken a similar view but in Crl.R. No. 173 of 1975 dated 27tb January, 1976 the same learned Judge had held that mere non-compliance with the rule does not entitle the accused to an acquittal unless prejudice is shown to have been caused. Hence our learned brother Ramachandra Raju, J.,was of the opinion that the question as to whether rule 9(j) of the Rules is mandatory or directory should be decided by a Bench, and that is how this appeal is before us. 4. Mr. Obulapathi Chowdary, the learned Public Prosecutor contends that rule 9(j) of the Rules is not mandatory but directory. He contends that simply be cause the word ‘shall’ is used in the rule it cannot be concluded that the rule is mandatory. In support of his contention, be has cited Babudal v. State of Gujarat2and Shiveswar v. District Magistrate3. 5. In order to determine whether R. 9(j) of the Rules is mandatory or directory, it is necessary to quote the relevant rule. Rule 9 provides for the duties of the Food Inspector, and it reads as follows: . Rule 9. It shall be the duty of the Food Inspector * * * * (j) to send by registered post, a copy of the report received in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within 10 days of the receipt of the said report. However, in case the sample conforms to the provisions of the Actor Rules made thereunder, then the person should be informed of the same and report need not be sent. 6. A reading of the said rule would show that a duty is cast on the Food Inspector to send a copy of the report which he has received from the Public Analyst within 10 days of its receipt to the person from whom the sample was taken. If in case the report which the Food Inspector had received is in favour of the person from whom the sample was taken, then, the Food Inspector need not send the report. The reason for not sending such, a report is obvious because when the report is in favour of the accused, no question of future prosecution could arise. If in case the report which the Food Inspector had received is in favour of the person from whom the sample was taken, then, the Food Inspector need not send the report. The reason for not sending such, a report is obvious because when the report is in favour of the accused, no question of future prosecution could arise. But it is evident from Rule 9 (j) that where the report of the Public Analyst is against the person from whom the sample was taken, the Food Inspector is duty bound to send a copy of the report to such person within 10 days of its receipt by him. No doubt the Act is passed with the objed of preventing adulteration of food: but a reading of section 10 of the Act would show that heavy penalties of imprisonment for not less than six months but which may extend to six years and a fine of not less than Rs. 1,000 are provided for commission of offence sunder the Act. Of course, the Courts have been given the power to impose a lesser sentence in some cases provided adequate and special reasons are given. Keeping the severity of the sentence in mind, we think, that the Legislature intended that the right of liberty of the subject should also be safeguarded. With this view in mind, the Legislature had imposed several duties or, the Food Inspector so that the accused should have a fair chance in meeting the case against him, and to defend his case against any improper action on the part of the complainant. We are not laying any undue emphasis on the word ‘shall’ used in the rule, but we are of the opinion that having regard to the scheme of the Act and the severity of the punishment, the Legislature has insisted on the requirement of sending the report of the Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken as a protection for safeguarding the liberty of the subject. We are fortified in our conclusion by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshan Prasad4, in which the Supreme Court has observed: "It is needless to add that he employment of the auxiliary very ‘shall’ is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. We are fortified in our conclusion by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshan Prasad4, in which the Supreme Court has observed: "It is needless to add that he employment of the auxiliary very ‘shall’ is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specified provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. It would, inter alia, depend on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection for the safeguarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve." 7. From what has been stated, above we should not be misunderstood as having held that even a delay of one day over and above ten days would be enough to throw out the case of the complainant for noncompliance with rule 9 (j) of the Rules. Of course, if there is some delay in sending the report, the complaiant’s case cannot be thrown out unless the accused shows that even this slight delay has caused prejudice to him. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule regarding the delay in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken. Every case will have to depend on its circumstances. But when the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the accused even until the filing of the complaint, then to our mind, in such a case, the accused could be acquitted without his pleading prejudice. The ruling of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor has no relevancy to the case on hand. In Babulal’s case1it was held that the plea of the accused that due to inordinate delay in launching the prosecution, he could not invoke provisions of section 13(2) of the Act, was not available to him as he did not make any endeavour to send the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory under section 13(2) of the Act. In Babulal’s case1it was held that the plea of the accused that due to inordinate delay in launching the prosecution, he could not invoke provisions of section 13(2) of the Act, was not available to him as he did not make any endeavour to send the sample to the Director of Central Food Laboratory under section 13(2) of the Act. It is to be noted that there is no provision in the Act prescribing any limitations within which the prosecution should be launched. 8. We consider it unnecessary to discuss Shiveshwar’s case2in the light of what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshan Prasad3. 9. In the instant case, admittedly the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the accused at all. The copy of the report was filed along with the complaint. Rule 9(j) provides for the sending of one copy of the report of the Public Analyst by registered post. P.W. 2 is silent as to whether he sent the report by registered post or by messenger. Except for his bald statement that he came to know that the accused had closed his shop three months prior to 29th July, 1975, there is no other evidence to corroborate his testimony. The trial Court has acquitted the accused on the ground that rule 9(j) of the Rules was not complied with. Hence having regard to what has been stated above and the circumstances of the case, we do not see any reason to interfere in the judgment of the trial Court. 10. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.