JUDGMENT DHARMADHIKARI J.-In Special Civil Application No. 1766 of 1975 as also in the other petitions which were beard along with this Special Civil Application, so far as the common questions of law are concerned the State Government is acquiring lands belonging to the petitioners as the same are needed or are likely to be needed for the public purpose, namely, providing house sites to landless labourers It further appears from the notifications issued under section 4 of the and Acquisition Act, 1894, referred to hereinafter as the Act, that as the Additional Commissioner, Nagpur was of the opinion that the acquisition of the lands is urgently necessary, he directed under sub-section (4) of section 17 that the provisions of section 5-A of the Act shall not apply in respect of the said lands. A schedule is attached to each of the notifications issued under section 4 of the Act giving details about the landed property. Thereafter in some cases notifications under section 6 of the Act are issued, whereas in Special Civil Application No. 1389 of 1975 a notice under section 4 (I) of the Act is issued to the landholder and it is at that stage he has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. In some other Special Civil Applications notifications under section 6 of the Act are issued directing the Land Acquisition Officer to take recourse to the provisions of subsection (1) of section 17 of the Act so as to enable him to take possession of the lands needed for public pm pose, on expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (I) of section 9 of the Act. Therefore, in some of the petitions, which are pending for hearing, in pursuance of such a direction after issuing a notice under section 9 (1) of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer was taking necessary steps for taking possession and at this stage the petitioners have approached this Court for a writ of certiorari or mandamus under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. 2. As the main questions involved in all these petitions were common the counsel appearing in all these writ petitions were heard on two main questions, namely, (i) As to whether the acquisition of the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the landless labourers is "a public purpose" as contemplated by section 4 (I) or section 17 (1) of the Act? And (2) as to whether the Additional Commissioner was right in exercising his power under sub section (4) of section J7 in dispending with the enquiry contemplated by section SA of the Act. 3. Shri V. M. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1389 of 1975 contended before us that giving sites to landless labourers is not a "public purpose", as in substance the land is being acquired by the Government for providing house sites to named individuals. He further contended that the benefit arising out of the present acquisition proceedings is being given to the named individuals, namely, the landless labourers as per the list attached to the proposal. The general public as such is neither being benefited, nor providing the house sites to the landless labourers is in the interest of general public or a community as a whole. He further contended that the Additional Commissioner has further committed an error in exercising his power under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act, when in fact there was no real urgency for acquiring the land for providing the house sites to the landless labourers. 4. Shri Udhoji, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1486 of 1975, adopted the argument advanced by Shri V. M. Kulkarni and contended that the present purpose for which the land is being acquired is not covered by the expression "public purpose" as defined by section 3 (f) of the Act. He further contended that section 17 of the Act was amended by the State Legislature by Maharashtra Act No. XLII of 1973 whereby the words 'waste or arable' appearing in sub-section (I) of section 17 were deleted. In spite of such an amendment to the Act, the expression "public purpose" is not amended, nor the provisions of Bombay Village Panchayats Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide for a procedure of extension of Gaothall, are modified or altered by the State. In spite of such an amendment to the Act, the expression "public purpose" is not amended, nor the provisions of Bombay Village Panchayats Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide for a procedure of extension of Gaothall, are modified or altered by the State. Therefore, according to Shri Udhoji, unless such amendments were introduced in the Legislation, it was not possible for the State to acquire the lands for providing house sites to the landless labourers. So far as application of urgency clause is concerned, Shri Udhoji contended that though the opinion of the authority concerned is subjective, it will have to be examined on the touchstone of objectivity. According to the learned counsel, the landless labourers for whom the house sites are being provided have already accommodated themselves in the village and are living in the rented houses. If this is so, then there was no urgency for providing the house sites to these landless labourers. He also contended that under section 5-A of the Act a person interested has a right to raise an objection with· in a period of 30 days after the issue of notification under section 4 of the Act. Therefore, unless the need was &0 urgent that the State could not have waited for a period of 30 days, it was not open to the Additional Commissioner to exercise his powers under section 17 (4) of ~he Act. In substance, therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel that in the cases before us, there was no real urgency. He also based his argument on the different phraseologies used in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 17 of the Act. According to Shri Udhoji, sub-section (1) of section 17 deals with special powers in cases of urgency, whereas sub-section (2) of section 17 deals with the powers to be exercised by the authorities concerned in the matters of sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency. According to Shri Udhoji, the 20-point programme which is the basis of the scheme for providing house sites to the landless labourers is a political programme and could at best be termed as a political urgency and not a real urgency as contemplated by section 17 of the Act. 5. According to Shri Udhoji, the 20-point programme which is the basis of the scheme for providing house sites to the landless labourers is a political programme and could at best be termed as a political urgency and not a real urgency as contemplated by section 17 of the Act. 5. Shri L. Mohta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1756 of 1975, after adopting the arguments advanced by the counsel in other petitions, contended that the definition of the expression "public purpose" in section 3 (f) of the Act clearly indicates that unless it is declared by a notification in the Official Gazette that it is customary for the Government to make a provision in this behalf in the village sites, the acquisition of the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the landless labourers is not contemplated. According to the learned counsel, there is no provision in law which enjoins a customary duty upon the Government to provide house-sites to the landless labourers. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, acquisition of the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the landless labourers being not a customary obligation for which the lands could be acquired, the acquisition is wholly bad. He further contended that so far as the exercise of the power under sub section (4) of section 17 is concerned, it is quite clear from the bare reading of the section itself that after applying his mind to all the relevant data before him the Additional Commissioner can issue a direction in that behalf. In the present cases there is no application of mind at all on the part of the Additional Commissioner, and therefore, the direction issued in that behalf is wholly bad. 6. Shri Madkholkar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 2065 of 1975, has contended before us that the power exercised by the appropriate authority in issuing the notifications for acquiring the lands for the purpose of providing house sites to the landless labourers is ultra vires of the power and the authority conferred by section 4 (l) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, how a village is to be constituted is provided by the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Chapter VIII of the said Code deals with the constitution of village as well as its local area. According to the learned counsel, how a village is to be constituted is provided by the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Chapter VIII of the said Code deals with the constitution of village as well as its local area. It also provides as to what provisions should be made in a village by the Government. There is no provision in the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which enjoins a duty upon the Government to provide house sites to the landless labourers. It is neither a customary right of a landless labourer nor it is the duty of the Government to make a provision in that behalf. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, unless a specific provision is made in the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, or in any other law, it is not possible for the appropriate authority to acquire the land fur the said purpose. He has also relied upon the definition of the expression "public purpose" in section 3 (f) of the Act, and contended that unless a notification in that behalf is issued by the Government, the powers under section 4 (1) of the Act cannot be exercised. 7. Shri J. N. Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in Special Civil Application No. 1926 of 1975, contended before us that the people, namely, landless labourers, are not on the street, but are already accommodated in the rented houses or otherwise in the village itself. They are living either as licensees or as tenants in the village. Therefore, it cannot be said that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is so urgent that the appropriate authority could not have followed the procedure prescribed by section 5-A of the Act. He further contended that once the petitioners make out a prima facie case that there was no urgency in the matter, then the burden shifts upon the Government or the appropriate authority to justify the urgency and this has not been done in the present case. 8. Shri Gorde, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 200 of 1976, adopted the arguments advanced by the counsel in other cases and further contended that the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of section 17 of the Act should be read harmoniously. 8. Shri Gorde, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 200 of 1976, adopted the arguments advanced by the counsel in other cases and further contended that the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of section 17 of the Act should be read harmoniously. These provisions indicate that the need of the people should be so urgent that the procedure prescribed by section 5-A could not be adhered to in a given case. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, in each case very strong reasons will have to be given by the appropriate authority for applying the urgency clause. Shri Gorde further contended that if sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 17 are read harmoniously and together, they clearly indicate that the power under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act can be exercised by the appropriate authority in the cases where the land is needed for the purposes specified in sub-section (2, of section 17 of the Act The phraseology used in sub-section (1) of section 17 should be read in the con text of sub-sections (2) and (3) of that section and the term "public purpose" used in sub-section (1) of section 17 should be construed accordingly as it takes its colour from sub-section (2). He further contended that the sub-section (1) of section 17 should be interpreted by applying the rule of ejusdem generis. Read in this context, the learned counsel further contended that the acquisition of the lands for providing house-sites to the landless labourers is not covered by the provisions of section 17 at all, as it is not a public purpose similar to those mentioned in sub section (2). In substance, therefore, it is contended by Shri Gorde that the learned Additional Commissioner has exceeded his jurisdiction in exercising his power under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act, and therefore, the notifica. tion issued by him under section 6 of the Act is wholly without jurisdiction and is illegal. 9. In reply to these various contentions it is contended by Shri Qazi, the learned Additional Government Pleader, that providing house sites to the landless labourers is a "public purpose" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 4 and section 17 (1) of the Act. 9. In reply to these various contentions it is contended by Shri Qazi, the learned Additional Government Pleader, that providing house sites to the landless labourers is a "public purpose" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 4 and section 17 (1) of the Act. He further contended that the need of the landless labourers to get the house sites or a shelter over their head is so urgent that unless steps are taken by the appropriate authority to complete the acquisition proceedings within a specified time, it is not possible for the Government to provide the house sites or huts to the landless labourers at all. In support of his contention, Shri Qazi has strongly relied upon the scheme framed in this behalf by the Central Government, and adopted by the State G0vernment. According to the respondents, such a scheme was a part and parcel of the Five star Plan. However, as it was not properly implemented, instructions were issued by the Central Government and the State Government to complete the scheme within a specified period, namely, before 31 March 1976. According to the respondents, as the lands for providing house sites to the homeless and landless labourers are urgently required for settlement of these landless labourers, after applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of each case, as well as to the urgency of the matter, the urgency clause was rightly applied by the Additional Commissioner. He has further relied upon the Government resolutions issued from time to time in this behalf. It was also contended by Shri Qazi that after examining each and every case, submitted by the Sub-Divisional Officer Land Acquisition Officer with a request that urgency clause should be applied, the Additional Commissioner has issued the notification in exercise of the power under section 17 (4) of the Act. The Additional Commissioner has also stated in his affidavit that whenever he found that the material ",as not sufficient to justify the application of section 17 (4), he has refused to exercise the power. According to him, he has taken every possible care to see that the urgency clause is applied only when it was thought to be absolutely necessary. The Additional Commissioner has also stated in his affidavit that whenever he found that the material ",as not sufficient to justify the application of section 17 (4), he has refused to exercise the power. According to him, he has taken every possible care to see that the urgency clause is applied only when it was thought to be absolutely necessary. Before exercising the said power he scrutinized each and every case and only when he was satisfied that the subordinate Revenue Officers have followed all the instructions incorporated in Land Acquisition Manual and the relevant Government resolutions, he has exercised the said power, after applying his mind to each and every case. 10. For properly appreciating the controversy involved in these petitions, it is necessary to understand the scheme for which the lands are being acquired. It appears that initially a Circular letter was issued by the Deputy Secretary to Government, Revenue and Forest Department, State of Maharashtra, on 1st December 1971. At that time a scheme was under active consideration of the Government by which it wanted to avail of the financial assistance offered by the Government of India for providing house sites to landless workers in rural areas who do not already have a house site or a house or a hut of their own. Then by another Circular letter dated 19th July 1972, top priority was given to this scheme, which was meant for providing house sites to the landless workers' families. By this letter the Government decision was communicated to the officers concerned that the Government has now decided to provide house sites to all landless workers in the State who have no house sites of their own. It was estimated then that about 10 lakhs of landless workers' families who do not have house sites of their own and would not be covered by the homestead rights that can be extended under tenancy laws, be provided house sites under the scheme. It was also informed to the officers concerned that the Government of India and the State Government attach the highest importance to this scheme and would like to ensure that no efforts are spared to provide every family of landless workers a house site within the minimum time possible. The top priority was given to this programme as a part of the celebrations of 25th Anniversary of Independence. The top priority was given to this programme as a part of the celebrations of 25th Anniversary of Independence. The procedure to be followed in this behalf was also indicated in the said Circular. With the said Circular, the scheme framed' by the Central Government was also circulated. The scheme was known as a scheme for making a provision of the house sites to the landless workers in the rural areas. From the introduction of the scheme it appears that it aims at assisting the State Government and administrations of Union Territories to provide house sites free of cost to families of landless workers in the rural areas, who do not already own a house site or a built-up house or a hut on the land of their own. With the house sites so provided, the workers will have to build houses or huts thereon with their own resources and leave in peace without being constantly threatened with eviction by the owner of the land on which they have built their houses or huts. The scheme was introduced as Central Sector scheme and it was also made clear that the benefit of this scheme will be admissible only to such families of landless workers in rural areas, who cannot be given house sites in terms of clause (b) of para 2 of the said scheme. So far as the financial assistance is concerned, the entire cost of acquiring the developing land for providing house sites to the families of landless workers in accord2nce with the approved programme was to be met by the Government of India as 100 % grant assistance which will be made available to the States and Union Territories outside their plan ceilings. Certain guidelines were then laid down for utilisation of financial assistance and no family was to be allotted more than one house site and the size of the site was not to exceed 100 sq. yards. The scheme further provided that while allotting the house sites there should be no segregation of families belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Such families should be suitably interspreaded along with other families, being a allotted house sites in or adjoining village. yards. The scheme further provided that while allotting the house sites there should be no segregation of families belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Such families should be suitably interspreaded along with other families, being a allotted house sites in or adjoining village. Thereafter it seems that with the sole object of removing number of difficulties faced by the Government in taking possession of the private lands, which are needed to be acquired for various public purposes, the State Legislature amended section 17 of the Act by Maharashtra Act No XLII of 1973. 11. In furtherance of this very scheme, by Government resolution dated 17th March 1975, the Government of Maharashtra clarified the position that the State Government has been implementing the centrally sponsored scheme for providing of house sites to landless workers in rural areas, as a part of the programme of provision of minimum needed to the weaker sections of the society. It further clarified the position that the State Government gives top priority to the above scheme and in order to ensure its speedy implementation has formulated a time bound programme for allotment of house sites to the eligible landless workers in rural areas and construction of houses on the sites allotted under the scheme. With a view to execute the time bound programme, certain directions were issued to the officers concerned. By Government resolution dated 19th July 1975, the Government noticed from the reports received from the Collectors that out of 4.05 lakhs eligible families, only 2.54 lakhs persons have been provided with house sites till the end of June 1975. It was also noticed that 14,000 families were still to be granted house sites from out of the Government land and about 1.37 lakhs families were to be provided with house sites by acquiring or purchasing suitable private lands. Then after considering various matters, the Government took some decisions which are incorporated in the said resolution. Para 4 of the said resolution further makes it clear that the Government has also undertaken a programme of construction of huts on the plots allotted under the Scheme for provision of house sites to landless workers in rural areas" since March 1975. Then after considering various matters, the Government took some decisions which are incorporated in the said resolution. Para 4 of the said resolution further makes it clear that the Government has also undertaken a programme of construction of huts on the plots allotted under the Scheme for provision of house sites to landless workers in rural areas" since March 1975. Under the Pilot Programme of construction of 1000 huts per district sanctioned under Government resolution dated lith March 1975, simple houses measuring 10' x 10' were to be constructed by the Collector at the cost of Rs. 150 each and the beneficiaries were expected to provide walls of mud/mud stones/any local material traditionally used and also a thatched roof. Accordingly, 25,000 buts were completed by 3 ht May 1975. However, considering the utility and urgency of the programme, the Government decided to undertake construction of 1 lakh huts during the period from 1st June 1975 to 31st March 1976 in addition to those that would be constructed by the Co-operative Sugar Factories. Therefore, in partial modification of the previous orders on the subject, the Government issued furthers orders laying down divisionwise targets etc. The Government contribution was increased from Rs. 150 to Rs. 200 per hut. In addition, it was also provided that the labour under Employment Guarantee scheme at a rate not exceeding Rs 60 per hut may be employed for manufacture of unbaked brick~ or collection and cutting of local stone etc. Empty tar drums available with the Buildings and Communication Department were also to be used and the Government also observed that taking into account the objectives of the programme viz. to help the weaker sections of the society, the members of social and philanthrophic institutions like Rotary Club, Lions Club etc. and organizations like Sugar Factories have expressed their desire to assist the Government in the implementation of the programme. It is further clear from the Government resolution placed on record that initially Talathi was directed to prepare a list of all the landless workers' families in the village with the assistance of village Panchayat Secretary. He was also asked to prepare a list of the suitable Government and village Panchayat lands that are available for being assigned for the house sites. If such lands were not available then he was directed to prepare a list of lands proposed to be acquired for the said purpose. He was also asked to prepare a list of the suitable Government and village Panchayat lands that are available for being assigned for the house sites. If such lands were not available then he was directed to prepare a list of lands proposed to be acquired for the said purpose. Government had also directed that a meeting should be convened of the President, Chief Executive Officers, Chairman of Panchayat Samitis, Block Development Officers and Tahsildars etc. Then a committee should be formed at Taluka level, with Tahsildar, Chairman of Panchayat Samiti, Block Development Officer and Sarpanch of the village concerned, who will be co-opted member. It was also made clear that while deciding the suitability of the land proposed for house sites and in preparing layout, the principles of extension of village sites and Regulation of Buildings Rules may be adhered to except in regard to the size of house site. In case where Government or village panchayat lands are not available efforts should be made to obtain suitable private lands as gifts and possession be taken by negotiations. It was also made clear that after the list is prepared by the Talathi with the assistance of Village Panchayat Secretary, the same should be placed before the Taluka Committee for approval and it should also be published in village. For this purpose a meeting of the villagers in the village could be convened and list may be read out aloud in that meeting. The steps for acquisition of private land should be taken if it was found that suitable Government or village panchayat land is not available. A committee at district level was also formed for supervising the progress of the scheme. It was also realised by the Government that mere providing of house sites to landless worker would not solve his real problem of having a house of his own. The allotment of the house site to a family which has been forced to remain landless on account of his poor condition would be meaningless unless some other provisions are made Therefore, suitable arrangements were made for levelling of land, contribution of funds and providing building material. A Pilot Programme was also prepared. 12. The allotment of the house site to a family which has been forced to remain landless on account of his poor condition would be meaningless unless some other provisions are made Therefore, suitable arrangements were made for levelling of land, contribution of funds and providing building material. A Pilot Programme was also prepared. 12. On the basis of these various Government resolutions it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the present scheme has been framed by the Government to provide shelter to the weaker section of the society to achieve the object of the welfare State. According to the respondents, the said scheme is in the interest of the public as a whole and to acquire land for executing the said scheme is, therefore, a public purpose within the meaning of the said expression as defined in section 3 (f) as well as section 4 (1) and sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act. 13. It is not necessary to refer to the various decisions cited at the Bar for finding out the real meaning of the expression "public purpose" as used in the Act. Suffice it to make a reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court has laid down the true scope and import of the said expression. As back as in 1956, in State of Bombay v. R. S Nanji1 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the true import of the expression "public purpose". After making a reference to the Privy Council decision in Ramabai v. Secretary of State2, the Supreme Court observed as under: "The expression 'public purpose' has been considered in many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them except the three cases cited by the Attorney-General. In "Ramabai v, Secretary of State the observation of Batchelor J. to the effect "General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in the lease; it is enough to say that in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned received the approval of the Privy Council. Their Lordships, however, rejected the contention that there cannot be a 'public purpose in taking land if that land when taken is not in some way or other made available to the public at large. This contention has been raised because the Government had resumed lands, which had been the subject of a lease and a sanad, the terms of which permitted the Government to resume the lands for any public purpose, with a view to erect thereon dwelling houses for the use of Government officials as their private residence on adequate rent. The concluding portion of the judgment of the Privy Council is important and needs to be quoted. It stated, "But here, so far from holding them to be wrong, the whole of the learned Judges, who are thoroughly conversant with the conditions of the Indian life, say that they are satisfied that the scheme is one which will redound to public benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own statement it coml11ends itself to their judgment." 13·A. In (S) A I R 1955 S C 41 (B) the requisition was for housing a person having no housing accommodation. After considering the affidavits, the facts and the circumstances of the case, Bose J. observed- . "The Constitution authorizes requisition for a public purpose. The purpose here h finding accommodation for the homeless. If, therefore, a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact homeless, the purpose is fulfilled." 14 In (S) A I R 1955 S C 810 (C) the requisition was for the purpose of housing a member of the staff of a foreign Consulate. This Court held that the requisition was for a State purpose, which it is Deedless to say must be regarded as a public purpose. An examination of these and other cases leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to precisely define the expression public purpose. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined in order to determine whether a public purpose has been established. 15. 'Prima facie' the Government is the best judge as to whether 'public purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined in order to determine whether a public purpose has been established. 15. 'Prima facie' the Government is the best judge as to whether 'public purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. The Courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a 'public purpose'. 16. Then in Somawanti v. State of Punjab? the Supreme Court had all 'Occasion to consider the true import of expression "public purpose" in the 'Context of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. After making a reference to the definition clause where the expression "public purpose" is defined, the Supreme Court observed as under: "This is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one and, therefore, does not assist us very much in ascertaining the ambit of the expression 'public purpose'. Broadly speaking the expression 'public purpose' would, however, include a Purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned." The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in. Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra4 and in Ratilal v State of Gujarat5. In Arnold Rodricks' case after making a reference to the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court observed as foil0WS: "The main idea in issuing the impugned notifications was not to think of the private comfort or advantage of the members of the public but the general public good. At any rate where a very large section of the community is concerned its welfare is a matter of public concern, and when the notifications served to enhance the welfare of this section of the community this is public purpose and the notifications are valid and cannot be impugned on the ground that they were not issued for any public purpose." In Ratilal's case the Supreme Court held that a housing scheme for a section of a public may also be for a public purpose. In this context in para. 7 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose. In this context in para. 7 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose. It was said that there were hardly about 20 members in the co-operative society in question and therefore the housing scheme for their benefit cannot be considered as a public purpose. It was also urged that there was no need for acquiring any land for the scheme in question. Section 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that a declaration under section 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for a public purpose. Therefore this Court cannot go into the question whether the need was genuine or not unless we are satisfied that the action taken by the Government \\as a fraudulent one. We are also unable to concede to the proposition that the need of a section of the public cannot be considered as a public purpose. Ordinarily, the Government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purpose or not and further the declaration made by it under section 6 is a conclusive evidence of the fact that the land in question is needed for a public purpose-see Snit. Somvanti v. Stare of Punjab. That decision lays down that conclusiveness in section 6 (3) must necessarily attach not merely to a 'need' but also to the question whether the purpose was a public purpose." 17. Therefore, it is obvious from these decisions of the Supreme Court that the expression "public purpose" would include purpose in which the genera' interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual is directly or "vitally concerned. Whatever furthers the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual must be regarded as public purpose. Thus scope of the expression is obviously not static and must change with varying concept, time, state of society and its needs. Therefore, the proper approach is to consider the scheme as a whole and then examine whether the entire scheme of acquisition is for a public purpose or not. Thus scope of the expression is obviously not static and must change with varying concept, time, state of society and its needs. Therefore, the proper approach is to consider the scheme as a whole and then examine whether the entire scheme of acquisition is for a public purpose or not. It will be an entirely wrong approach to pick up a stray item or clause out of the scheme and then say that the said clause is not actuated by public purpose. The phrase "public purpose" will have to be construed according to the spirit of the times and the needs of the society. The question wilt have to be decided in each case on the touchstone as to whether the acquisition is in the interest of community or section of society as distinguished from private interest of an individual. 18. It cannot be forgotten that section 6 (3) of the Act lays down that the declaration made under section 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be. Therefore, so long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose or is ultra vires of the powers of the Government, the declaration of the Government that the acquisition is for a public purpose is normally not open to challenge. In this Context a reference could usefully be made to a later decision of the Supreme Court in Jage Ram v. The Stale of Haryana6 where the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the new State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a social-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a social-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Government that it is made for a public purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6 (3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find out whether in a particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not see Smt. Somvanti v. State of Punjab and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U. P.7. On the facts of this case there can be hardly any doubt that the purpose for which the land was acquired is a public purpose." In the said case the Supreme Court held that starting of a new industry is in the public interest, because in involves a socio-economic question, and therefore, the industrialization of an area is in public interest. 19. However, it is contended before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the cases before us the lands are being acquired by the Government for providing house sites to the individual landless labourers. It is an acquisition meant for a particular interest of individuals, namely, the landless labourers and it does not involve the general interest of the community as a whole. It is not possible for u, to accept this contention. 20. As already referred to hereinbefore, the scheme framed by the Central Government as adopted by the State Government for providing house sites to the landless labourers in the rural areas is Ii scheme meant for the benefit of the landless labourers as a class. It is not possible for u, to accept this contention. 20. As already referred to hereinbefore, the scheme framed by the Central Government as adopted by the State Government for providing house sites to the landless labourers in the rural areas is Ii scheme meant for the benefit of the landless labourers as a class. It seeks to provide benefit to the families of the landless workers in the rural areas and the entire cost of acquiring and developing of the lands for providing house sites for families of the landless workers is to be borne out by the Government. Not only this, the Government is going to contribute Rs. 200 per hut for the construction of the huts. The objective of the scheme is to help the weaker section of the society, namely, the landless labourers and their families. It cannot be disputed that the scheme framed for providing houses to the landless labourers which will ensure a bare shelter t() them, and which is one of the basic need of human being, is in the interest of the general public. By framing such a scheme the State is only making a provision for securing just and humane conditions for the landless labourers to live and work. This scheme is obviously in conformity with the directive principles of the State policy. The scheme also contemplates that there will be to segregation of the families belonging to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes while allotting the house sites. The persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes will be made to live with other families belonging to other castes and classes so as to change the geographical and social map of the village. By providing these house sites to the landless labourer, and their families the Government wants to check illegal eviction and ejectment of these landless labourers from their abode by the unscrupulous landlords. This is one of the means by which the Government seeks to check the exploitation of the landless labourers. In our opinion, the present scheme is framed for the purposes of achieving an object solemnly declared in the Constitution and particularly in Chapter IV, relating to directive principles of the State policy. This is one of the means by which the Government seeks to check the exploitation of the landless labourers. In our opinion, the present scheme is framed for the purposes of achieving an object solemnly declared in the Constitution and particularly in Chapter IV, relating to directive principles of the State policy. The ideal we have set before us in Article 38 is to evolve a State which must constantly strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing as effectively as it can a social order in which social economic and political justice will be established in all the spheres of national life. If, therefore, the State is expected to give effect to these avowed principles then we must regard as a 'public purpose' all that which is calculated to promote the welfare of the people or of the weaker section of society as envisaged in these directive principles of State policy. In this context reference could usefully be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Chendra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore and another8, which are as under: "The provisions of the Constitution are not erected as the barriers to progress. They provide a plan for orderly progress towards the social order contemplated by the preamble to the Constitution. They do not permit any kind of slavery, social, economic or political. It is a fallacy to think that under our Constitution there are only rights and no duties. While rights conferred under Part III are fundamental, the directives given under Part IV are fundamental in the governance of the country. We see no conflict on the whole between the provisions contained in Part III and Part IV. They are complementary and supplementary to each other. The provisions of Part IV enable the Legislatures and the Government to impose various duties on the citizens. The provisions therein are deliberately made clastic because the duties to be imposed on the citizens depend on the extent to which the directive principles are implemented. The mandate of the Constitution is tt" build a welfare society in which justice social, economic and political shall inform all institutions of our national life. The provisions therein are deliberately made clastic because the duties to be imposed on the citizens depend on the extent to which the directive principles are implemented. The mandate of the Constitution is tt" build a welfare society in which justice social, economic and political shall inform all institutions of our national life. The hopes and aspirations aroused by the Constitution will be belied if the minimum needs of the lowest of our citizens are not met." Therefore, in our opinion, a scheme framed for the purpose of securing an aim declared in the constitution to be a matter of State policy is obviously for public purpose. 21. It is not correct to say that in effect the result of the acquisition is merely to transfer the property belonging to certain individuals to certain other individuals. Though ultimately a house site will be allotted to an individual landless labourer and he will be benefited by this acquisition, it cannot be overlooked that they are benefited not as individuals but in furtherance of a scheme of public utility. Scheme for construction of huts for poor landless labourers. in the rural areas is for a public purpose as it will tend to promote social welfare and prosperity. Providing housing accommodation to the landless and homeless labour is a social necessity. Social necessity requires that a proper housing accommodation should be made available to this large section of the community. The welfare of this large and unorganised section of community is a matter of public concern. It is one of the duties of the Government in the Welfare State that it should promote with special care the economic interests of weaker section of the people and to protect them from social injustice and all forms or exploitation. Though the directive principles of State policy are not enforceable, it cannot be forgotten that they are fundamental in the governance of the country. These principles cast a duty upon the State to endure to secure, by legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. In the organised industrial sector the employees are getting these amenities as a result of collective bargaining through their trade Unions. In the organised industrial sector the employees are getting these amenities as a result of collective bargaining through their trade Unions. However, in the case of unorganised landless labourers in the rural areas, it is the duty of State as well as of the society to make such a provision. Then alone this weaker section of the community can be protected from social injustice and exploitation. By the present scheme a bare shelter is being provided which is a basic need of all the human beings. This is the minimum a poor man can expect in a free country wedded to the principles of Welfare State, at least after 25 to 30 years of independence. Earlier it is done, better it is for the society in general. This will have an obvious effect of increasing sufficiency of an agricultural labourer and his status in social life. In such a' scheme public as a whole is interested. It is no doubt true that in the ultimate analysis it will be the individual landless labourer who will be getting the house sites, but he gets the house site not because he is "X" or "Y", that is, an individual, but he gets the house site because he belongs to the class of landless labourers. The acquisition is, therefore, meant for a class of landless labourers and their families and not for individuals. Therefore, if the scheme framed by the Government for providing house sites to the landless labourers and their families is considered in this context, then it will have to be held that the acquisition of the lands for the said purpose is for the "public purpose" as contemplated by section 4 as well as section 17 of the Act. 22. The argument that unless it is declared by an notification in the official gazette that it is customary for the Government to make a provision for providing house sites to landless labourers in the village sites in a district the land cannot be acquired for the said purpose is obviously a wrong approach to the whole problem. A further argument that unless the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which deal with the Constitution of village as well as its local area are followed the land cannot be acquired for providing house-sites to the landless labourers is equally fallacious. A further argument that unless the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code which deal with the Constitution of village as well as its local area are followed the land cannot be acquired for providing house-sites to the landless labourers is equally fallacious. This is not a case by which authorities concerned or the State are constituting a village. The village is already constituted, The provision which is being made by this scheme is to provide house sites to the landless workers in the village, which is already constituted. The provisions of the Village Panchayats Act or the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code dealing with the constitution of the village, therefore have no application to the present case. By providing house sites to the landless labourers in the village itself neither new village is being constituted nor its boundaries are being altered. Moreover, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are independent one and it has nothing to do with the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code or the Bombay Village Panchayats Act. The powers conferred on the appropriate authority by the Land Acquisition Act are neither controlled nor restricted or abridged by any of the provisions of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act or the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Furthermore the present scheme is already sanctioned by the Government itself. As a matter of fact in pursuance of this sanctioned scheme, the present notifications are Issued by the competent authority. These notifications are published in the official gazette. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code as well as the Bombay Village Panchayats Act have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 23. As already observed, the expression "public purpose" as defined in the Act is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The illustration given in the definition clause not being exhaustive, it is not correct to say that unless it is shown that it is customary for the Government to make a provision for house sites for a landless labourer in the already constituted village sites, it will not constitute a 'public purpose'. In the view which we have already taken, it is obvious that purpose for which the lands are being acquired is a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. In the view which we have already taken, it is obvious that purpose for which the lands are being acquired is a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. If this is so then, in our opinion, the illustration given in the definition clause bas no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to accept any of these contentions, 24. It is also not correct to say that the present scheme is framed by the State Government is colourable exercise of its power to implement political programme of the party in power, which is known as the 20·Point Programme. It cannot be overlooked that the directive principles set forth in part IV of the Constitution are not merely the matters of policy of any particular political party but are fundamental in the governance of the country. Whatever political party comes into power is expected to follow these principles. The scheme in this behalf was framed by the Government in the year 1971 itself, which was a part and parcel of Five-year plan. In 1972 itself the instructions in that behalf were issued to the State Government. The circular issued in that behalf also provided the guidelines as to how the scheme is to be implemented. The scheme itself was circulated to the officers concerned with the Government letter dated 19th July 1972. For properly implementing the said scheme, the necessary instructions were also issued in the years 1972 and 1974 and also vide Government resolution Gated 11th March 1975. This was all done even before 20-Point Programme was formulated. Obviously, therefore, the present scheme cannot be termed to be a political policy of any particular political party. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the present scheme has been framed by the Government in colourable exercise of the power. The Government resolutions provide a data as to how many familities of the landless labourers should be provided with house sites. Even from the latest resolution issued by the State Government it is quite clear that about 1.37lakhs of the families of landless workers were still not provided with the house sites by acquiring or purchasing private lands till the Government resolution dated 19.7.1975 was issued. Even from the latest resolution issued by the State Government it is quite clear that about 1.37lakhs of the families of landless workers were still not provided with the house sites by acquiring or purchasing private lands till the Government resolution dated 19.7.1975 was issued. The problem of housing the families of landless labourers was, therefore, under the consideration of the Government since the year 1971 itself. This was as a matter of part and parcel of the Five year plan. It not only helped rehabitation of the families of the landless labourers, but it has also checked their exploitation by the unscrupulous landlords. These landless labourers were under constant threat of eviction by the owners of the land Therefore, taking an overall view of the matter in our opinion, the scheme framed by the Government for providing house sites to the landless workers in the rural areas is obviously in the public interest and is, therefore, a "public purpose" for which the lands can be compulsorily acquired by the Government under the provisions of the Act. 25. Once it is held that the purpose for which the lands are being acquired, framely, for providing house sites to the landless labourers and their families is a public purpose, then, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the notification issued by the appropriate authority under section 4 (1) of the Act is ultra vires. Section 4 (1) of the Act provides acquisition of the lands, if they are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose. Therefore once it is held that the aforesaid purpose is a public purpose, then, in our opinion, the officer concerned was within hi~ right in issuing notification under section 4 (1) of the Act, as the said land was needed or was likely to be needed for the public purpose, namely, for providing house sites to the landless labourers and their families. 26. So far as the other part of the argument, namely, that there was no urgency in acquiring these lands for the purpose of the scheme, nor the purpose for which the land is being acquired is a public purpose covered by section 17 of the Act, is concerned, in our opinion, there is no substance in this contention also. 26. So far as the other part of the argument, namely, that there was no urgency in acquiring these lands for the purpose of the scheme, nor the purpose for which the land is being acquired is a public purpose covered by section 17 of the Act, is concerned, in our opinion, there is no substance in this contention also. Section J 7 of the Act, at amended by the Maharashtra Act No. XLII of 1973, reads as under: "17 (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government or the Commissioner so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. (2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any nevigable river or other unforseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire immediately possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, or whenever, owing to a like emergency or owing to breaches or other unforseen events causing damage to roads, rivers channels or tanks, it becomes necessary for the Slate Government or the Commissioner to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining road communication or irrigation or water supply service, as the case may be, or whenever due to failure of the monsoons or otherwise there is acute scarcity of water for drinking or agriculture and failure of crops in the State, it becomes necessary for the State Government or the Commissioner to acquire the immediate possession of any -land, for the purpose of providing water for drinking or agriculture and by setting up or continuing relief works for providing employment to persons affected by the conditions referred to above, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (I) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government or as the case may be, of the Commissioner enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably· sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops, and trees, and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government or, as the case may be, of the Commissioner, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government, or, as the case may be, of the Commissioner may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it or he does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1)." Sub section (I) of section 17 of the Act confers special powers on the appropriate Government, or the Commissioner as the case may be, incases of urgency. Initially such a power could be exercised by the appropriate authorities only in relation to the "waste or arable lands", but the said words are deleted by the aforesaid Amending Act, and therefore, now the powers in that behalf could be exercised by the appropriate authority in relation to any land if the said land is urgently needed for a public purpose. Sub-section (1) of section 17 is independent of sub-section (2). 27 However, a contention was raised before us that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17 should be read as ejusdem generis with sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 17 of the Act. In our opinion, this will not be correct reading of the provisions As already observed, these sub-sections stand on independent footing. Sub-section (1) of section, 17 is of general application, whereas sub-section (2) of section 17 applies to the cases specified therein including the case of unforeseen emergency. Sub-section (3) of section 17 deals with standing crops and the trees etc. Sub-section (1) of section, 17 is of general application, whereas sub-section (2) of section 17 applies to the cases specified therein including the case of unforeseen emergency. Sub-section (3) of section 17 deals with standing crops and the trees etc. If it was the intention of the Legislature that sub-section (2) should control the provisions of sub-section (I), then it was Dot necessary for the Legislature to have enacted an independent sub-section. Sub-sections (I) and (2) of section 17 of the Act cover different and independent areas and are not interdependent. Initially section 17 (I), as unamended, applied only to the "Waste and Arable" lands. However, by aforesaid amendment the State Legislature had deleted these words as a result of which now sub-section (1) of section 17 will obviously apply to all lands which are urgently needed for a public purpose. This is the result of the aforesaid amendment. In our opinion the intention of the Legislature is made clear by the deletion of these two words from sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act. Once it is found that sub section (l) of section 17 applies to a particular acquisition proceedings, then, if the appropriate authority forms an opinion in that behalf, it can direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply to the said proceedings. Similar argument based on the principle of ejusdem generis was rejected by the Supreme Court in Jage Ram v. The State of Haryana (cit. supra). In our opinion the principles laid down in the said decision will aptly apply to the present case also. In the present legislation also, there is no basis for holding that the general words used in sub-section (1) of section 17 are any way controlled by particular or specific words used in sub-section (2) of section 17. Both these sub sections being independent of each other none of them constitutes a category, class or genus. If this is so, in our opinion there is no scope for applying the principle of ejusdem generis to sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act. Hence we are unable to accept the contention that while interpreting sub section (1) of section 17 we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis. If this is so, in our opinion there is no scope for applying the principle of ejusdem generis to sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act. Hence we are unable to accept the contention that while interpreting sub section (1) of section 17 we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis. In the view which we have taken, therefore, it is not possible for us to apply rule of ejusdem generis to the said sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act. 28. However, it was contended before us that there was no urgency in the matter, nor the purpose for which the lands are being acquired by the Government is so urgent that an enquiry contemplated by section 5-A could not be adhered to. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the scheme in that behalf was framed as early as in December 1971. If this is so and if the Government or the officers were either lethargic or negligent in implementing the said scheme till the year 1975, then it cannot be said that the land was urgently needed for implementing the scheme itself. In this context a reference was made to section 5-A of the Act, which lays down that after it is notified under section 4 of the Act that the land is being needed or is likely to be needed for the public purpose, then any person interested in the land can object to the acquisition of the land within 30 days after the issue of the notification. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the said provision only requires 30 days time for raising an objection. If this is so, unless the matter was so urgent that the authorities could not have waited even for 30 days, there is no occasion for exercising the power under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act. In support of these contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the following decisions of the various High Courts: Thirumalaran v. State of Mysore9; K. Seshagiri Maller v. Special Tahsildar10 and Varadaraja Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu11. 29. In our opinion, the decision on which reliance is being placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts of these cases. 29. In our opinion, the decision on which reliance is being placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts of these cases. Obviously it cannot be disputed that the question regarding exercise of the power under section 17 (4) of the Act must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is no doubt true that the scheme was formulated in the year 1971 and was not implemented till the urgency clause was applied by the Additional Commissioner. A contention was also raised before us that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is not relevant for deciding the urgency or the exercise of the power under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act. The said formation of the opinion in that behalf must depend upon the fact as to whether the Government or the appropriate authority could not have waited till the enquiry contemplated under section S.A of the Act was completed, that is, for a period of 30 days or a reasonable time which is normally token for deciding the objections in an enquiry under section S.A (2) of the Act. In our opinion, the whole approach is fallacious. 30. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired is urgent and the very purpose of the acquisition of the land will be frustrated. if the land is not urgently acquired, then, in our opinion, the said purpose is very much relevant for forming an opinion to exercise the power under section 17 (4). 31. From the affidavits filed before us on behalf of the respondents it is quite clear that initially an enquiry was held to find out as to how many persons belong to the category of landless labourers. A Revenue Officer of the rank of Naib Tahsildar was directed to make an enquiry in that behalf. After making such a survey he was also directed to make a recommendation about suitability of the land and the area of the land which would be required for providing the house sites to the landless labourers and their families. The Grampanchayats were also consulted. The sites found suitable were inspected by the Naib Tahsildar in the presence of the Panchas and the Patwari. The Grampanchayats were also consulted. The sites found suitable were inspected by the Naib Tahsildar in the presence of the Panchas and the Patwari. Before such a proposal for acquisition of the land is sent, the Revenue Officer is also obliged to make efforts to find out as to whether the acquisition of the land is possible by private negotiations. If ultimately he comes to this conclusion that compulsory acquisition of the land is necessary, then he is required to make a proposal. In this proposal he is also required to State as to why he decides that the possession of the land should be immediately taken under sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Act. This proposal is then scrutinised by the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Land Acquisition Officer. If he agree, with the said proposal, then a letter is forwarded to the Additional Commissioner for scrutiny and issuing a notification by applying urgency clause under section 17 (4) of the Act. If an opinion is formed by the Land Acquisition Officer that it is not necessary to take recourse to the urgency clause, then he himself is competent to issue notification under section 4 (1) and then normal procedure of raising objections and holding enquiry under section 5-A is followed and ultimately the matter is remitted to the Additional Commissioner for issuing of a notification under section 6, of the Act. However, if the Land Acquisition Officer or the competent authority comes to the conclusion that unless the urgency clause is applied the very purpose of the scheme could not be fulfilled, then he makes a recommendation to the Additional Commissioner for issuing a notification in that behalf. Before issuing a notification the Additional Commissioner scrutinises the whole matter and if on the basis of the material placed before him he forms an opinion that the special powers under sections 17 (1) and 17(4) should be exercised then alone he issues the necessary notification. In the present cases, it is the case of the respondents that the scheme now framed by the Government is a time bound programme. In the present cases, it is the case of the respondents that the scheme now framed by the Government is a time bound programme. The Government resolution dated 11th July 1975 clearly contemplates that considering the utility and the urgently of the programme, huts for the landless labourers should be constructed before 31st March 1976 It is further clear from the Government resolution that taking into account the objective of the programme, that is, to help the weaker section of the Society, a number of social and philanthropic institutions like Rotary Clubs and Lions Clubs have come forward to assist the implementation of the programme. The necessary expenditure for the acquisition of the land is borne out by the Central Government, whereas the Government is contributing Rs. 200 per hut so that the landless labourers and their families will get huts free of costs. The scheme, therefore, envisaged a construction of the hut itself and not merely the acquisition of house sites. It is a time bound programme, and therefore, if in given case an opinion is formed by the Additional Commissioner that unless urgency clause is applied, it will not be possible to implement the programme itself, then, in our opinion, he is welt justified in taking recourse to the urgency clause or in exercising power under section 17 (4) of the Act. 32. As already observed, the financial sanction for acquiring lands and constructing the huts is given upto the end of present financial year, that is, 31st March 1976. The provisions of section 17 (I) of the Act leave it to the discretion of the appropriate Government or Commissioner in cases of urgency to direct the Collectors to take possession of the land needed for public purpose, even though no award has been made. So the question as to whether there is an urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of these authorities. Under sub-section (4) of section 17, in the case of any land to which in the opinion of these appropriate authorities the provisions of sub-section (I) is applicable, the appropriate authority can direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply. There is no dispute before us that the provisions of subsection (1) of section 17 applies to the lands in question. Therefore. There is no dispute before us that the provisions of subsection (1) of section 17 applies to the lands in question. Therefore. if after applying its mind to the provisions of the scheme, urgency of its implementation and the period within which it is to be implemented, the appropriate authority has decided to dispense with the provisions of section 5 A of the Act, then in the absence of anything else it cannot be said that the exercise of the power is without any authority of law. 33. It is not correct to say that only 30 days' time is required for completing an enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. Section 5·A provides 30 days' time for raising objections. If the objections are raised, then an enquiry as contemplated by section 5-A (2) of the Act is required to be held after giving an opportunity to objector of being heard. According to the Additional Commissioner, he was satisfied that if opportunity as required under section 5-A is given, then the acquisition proceedings will be inordinately delayed and it may not be possible for the Government to get the land even for some years. He has made this statement on affidavit which is based on his experience. According to him, his experience shows that whenever an opportunity under section 5·A is given, persons come forward with every type of objections and then the proceedings take very long, long time for deciding these objections. It was not disputed before us by Shri Udhoji, the learned counsel appearing in Special Civil Application No. 1486 of 1975, that many times years are taken to complete the enquiry contemplated by section 5·A (2) of the Act. 34. The Gujarat High Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in lshwarlal v. State12. It was not disputed before us by Shri Udhoji, the learned counsel appearing in Special Civil Application No. 1486 of 1975, that many times years are taken to complete the enquiry contemplated by section 5·A (2) of the Act. 34. The Gujarat High Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in lshwarlal v. State12. After making a reference to the decision of Kerala High Court, namely, Seshagiri v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Gujarat High Court observed as under: "In that case a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court observed that since section 5-A gives only 30 days' time to a person affected or interested to file his objections to the proposed acquisition under the notification under section 4, any urgency that demands dispensation with Section 5-A must necessarily be an urgency which will not brook a delay of 30 days. This observation, in our view, does not represent the correct law and there arc two very good reasons why we find ourselves unable to accept the validity of this observation. Tile first is that the observation seeks to determine the urgency by reference only to the time like to be taken up by the inquiry under section 5A which, as we have pointed but above, is not the correct test f{)r determining the question of urgency and secondly the observation seems to proceed on the assumption that the only time which is likely to be taken up in the inquiry under section SA is a period of 3() days. But this assumption is wholly unfounded as the period of W days referred to in section SA is merely the period given by the Section for filing objections against the proposed acquisition. This period can, under the Rules made by the Government under section 55, be extended by the Collector, if proper cause is shown. But this assumption is wholly unfounded as the period of W days referred to in section SA is merely the period given by the Section for filing objections against the proposed acquisition. This period can, under the Rules made by the Government under section 55, be extended by the Collector, if proper cause is shown. After the objections are filed, a date has to be fixed for hearing the objector in person or by pleader The hearing then takes place and if the Collector permits, oral as well as documentary evidence can be led and where evidence is led by one party, the opposite party has to be given an opportunity to cross-examine tile witnesses of the first party as also to rebut the case by means of other evidence The Collector then has to consider the objections and to make his report to the Government and the Government has to decide the objections after taking into account the report of the Collector. This elaborate procedure is bound to lake a considerable amount of time and it is difficult to see how the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has limited the determination of the existence of urgency by saying that the urgency must be of such a nature as cannot brooke a delay of 30 days” We respectfully agree with these observations of the Gujarat High Court. and therefore, it is not necessary to discuss in detail the decisions of the Mysore or Madras High Courts on which reliance is placed by the counsel for the petitioners. 35 As already observed, it is not even disputed by the counsel for the petitioners in the cases before us that sometimes an enquiry contemplated by section 5-A of the Act takes years. To the same effect is the experience of the. Additional Commissioner as stated by him on an affidavit. Therefore, it is not possible for us to accept the contention raised in this behalf by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter in detail as the same has been fully discussed by the Gujarat High Court in the aforesaid decision with which we respectfully agree. It is pertinent to note that it is this very decision of the Gujarat High Court in lshwarlal v. State (cit. It is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter in detail as the same has been fully discussed by the Gujarat High Court in the aforesaid decision with which we respectfully agree. It is pertinent to note that it is this very decision of the Gujarat High Court in lshwarlal v. State (cit. supra) which was approved by the Supreme Court in lshwarlal v. State of Gujarat13 in an appeal against the said decision. Therefore, in view of the experience of the responsible officer like the Additional Commissioner, in this behalf, which is not disputed even by the counsel for the petitioners, in our opinion, it cannot be said that recourse to the urgency clause cannot be taken unless it is demonstrated that the delay of 30 days could not be tolerated. 36. It is no doubt true that the scheme in this behalf wall first framed in the year 1971 and was not implemented till the urgency clause was applied by the Additional Commissioner. A neglect, default or omission, if any, could also be attributed to the Governmental machinery. However that in itself is not enough to negative the exercise of the power by the competent authority under section] 7 (4) of the Act. As observed by the Gujarat High Court in ishwarlal's case- “... an earlier neglect or default or omission of the Government cannot by itself negative the existence of urgency at a given point of time. It may happen sometimes that by reason of such neglect, default or omission itself, urgency may arise. The cause for the urgency would be irrelevant ill considering whether urgency in fact exists or not. So also Subsequent delay in implementation cannot necessarily of itself lead to the inference that there was no urgency at a given point of time for it is possible that despite existence of urgency, delay might be caused in the implementation owing to various factors and circumstances. Merely from subsequent delay therefore an inference would not necessarily follow that there was no urgency and the satisfaction of the Government on the question of urgency was arbitrary, unless of course the delay is of such a nature, as for example, is so gross that, unexplained, it must irresistibly lead to the conclusion that there could not be urgency. Merely from subsequent delay therefore an inference would not necessarily follow that there was no urgency and the satisfaction of the Government on the question of urgency was arbitrary, unless of course the delay is of such a nature, as for example, is so gross that, unexplained, it must irresistibly lead to the conclusion that there could not be urgency. if there was urgency, such delay could not possibly have occurred" Similar view seems to have been taken by the Supreme Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (cit. supra). While deciding the question of urgency in that case, in para. 10 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as under: "Now coming to the question of urgency, it is clear from the facts set out earlier that there was urgency. The Government of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the project upto April 30, 1969. Therefore, urgent step had to be taken for pushing through the project. The fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not. The conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusive." As already indicated, in the present case, it being a time bound programme, which was required to be completed before 31st March 1976, in our opinion, it cannot be said that there was no urgency in the matter. We fail to understand if there is no urgency of such a scheme even after a period of 25 to 30 years of Independence, then when such an urgency will be felt. To us it appears that this should have been done long back. Whatever be the reasons for not making such a provision at the earlier point of time, in our opinion, the question of providing house sites to the landless labourers is so urgent that any delay in implementing the said scheme might frustrate the whole object of the scheme itself. 37. Further what is the scope of reviewability of the opinion formed by the Government in this behalf is also well settled. In Raja Anand v. State of U. P., the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. 37. Further what is the scope of reviewability of the opinion formed by the Government in this behalf is also well settled. In Raja Anand v. State of U. P., the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. After making a reference to the earlier decisions on the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed as under: “But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under section 17 (4) of the Act in subjective terms the expression of ol'linion of the State Government can be Challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide." This Court had also an occasion to consider the scope of section 17 (4) of the Act in Narayan v State of Maharashtra14. In this context this Court observed as under: "When the formation of an opinion or the satisfaction of an authority is subjective, but is a condition precedent to the exercise of a power, the challenge to the formation of such opinion or to such satisfaction is limited. in law, to three points only. It can be challenged, firstly, on the ground of mala fides, secondly, on the ground that the authority which formed that opinion or which arrived al such satisfaction did not apply its mind to the material on which it formed the opinion or arrived at the satisfaction; and, thirdly, that the material on which it formed its opinion or reached the satisfaction was so insufficient that no man could reasonably reach that conclusion." Thereafter this Court considered the question as to whether it is the petitioner who has to bring material before the Court to support the contention that no urgency existed, or whether it was incumbent upon the respondent to satisfy the Court that there was material upon which the State could have reached the opinion as mentioned in Section 17 (4) of the Act. In this context, after making a reference to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, ultimately this Court came to the conclusion as under: "In our opinion, these observations clearly mean that when the existence of the circumstances on which an opinion is to be formed or has been arrived at, the question of the existence of circumstances has to be proved at least prima facie and that it would not be sufficient for the authority which arrived at that opinion to assert the circumstances existed but give no clue whatever as to what circumstances were. We have held that the burden of proving such circumstances, at least prima facie, is on the respondents. All the respondents have brought no relevant material on the record, the respondents have failed to discharge that burden" 38. In view of the decision of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to make a reference to other decisions on which reliance is placed by both the parties. Therefore, the scope of reviewability of the opinion formed by the Additional Commissioner white exercising his power under section 17 (4) of the Act is very limited. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is not at all relevant for deciding the question of urgency. As already indicated, in the present cases, the purpose for which the land is being acquired is urgent. Moreover, the programme for implementing the scheme meant for providing house sites to the landless labourers and their families is also a time bound programme which is intended to be completed within a specified period. This itself is a relevant factor which could have been taken into consideration by the Additional Commissioner while exercising his power under section 17 (4) of the Act. Further, the earlier lethargy or negligence, if any, of the governmental machinery is also not relevant for deciding the urgency, as it existed on the date on which the power was exercised by the Additional Commissioner. In the affidavits filed before us it is contended by the respondents that such an urgency clause is not applied in each and every case. In the affidavits filed before us it is contended by the respondents that such an urgency clause is not applied in each and every case. It is applied only in such cases where the Additional Commissioner was satisfied that all the procedure prescribed by the Government resolutions and the instructions laid down in that behalf are followed by the Revenue Officers and that the Additional Commissioner was of the opinion that unless the urgency clause was applied it was not possible to implement the scheme. According to the respondents, in such matters only after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of each case a power has been exercised by the Additional Commissioner under sub-section (4) of section 17 of the Act. 39. In the present cases, the scheme itself contemplates following of certain procedure It further contemplates that the lands belonging to certain persons will not be acquired or the land of small landholders should not be acquired if as a result of the acquisition they become landless. These guidelines incorporated in the Government resolution are not disputed before us by the Additional Government pleader appearing for the State. He has further admitted that the said guidelines are binding on the Government though breach of these guidelines cannot give rise to a cause of action to an aggrieved person to enforce the same. He further stated that these guidelines are being followed as far as possible. Therefore, in a given case if it could be shown that these guidelines were not at all considered by the Additional Commissioner and the acquisition is in breach of the Government instructions or by exercising the powers under section 17 (4) of the Act the very purpose of the scheme is being defeated, then, in that case, it is open to the petitioners to challenge the formation of the opinion or the exercise 01 the power of the Commissioner under section 17 (4) of the Act, obviously on the ground of non-application of mind. This position is also not disputed by the learned Additional Government Pleader. Therefore, in the light of these observations, it Will be necessary to scrutinise each and every case on its own merit after taking into consideration the allegations made and the contentions raised in that behalf. This position is also not disputed by the learned Additional Government Pleader. Therefore, in the light of these observations, it Will be necessary to scrutinise each and every case on its own merit after taking into consideration the allegations made and the contentions raised in that behalf. Therefore, in the view which we have taken, it is not possible for us to quash the notifications issued by the Additional Commissioner at the threshold without going into the merits of each case. Special Civil Application No. 1776 of 1975. 40. So far as this petition is concerned, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who is the owner of survey number 3/2 from which o 8094 hectors of land is being acquired for providing house sites for landless workers of Sutala Kd., in taluq Khamgaon, district Buldana, that there are other lands available which could have been acquired for the said purpose. In para. 3 of the petition the petitioner has stated that some survey numbers belonging to other landholders are available, who are having more land than the petitioner. He further stated that according to his information certain landlords are willing to sell their lands. Then in para. 5 of the petition it is alleged by him that in pursuance of the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat on 22- 7-1975 his land is being acquired by the Government. He further alleged that the Gram Panchayat has passed the said resolution mala fide with a view to harass the petitioner and to deprive him of his valuable land. The petitioner also alleged in the petition that there are about 20 plots still vacant out of 43 plots of the newly formed Gaothan and the lands from the said vacant plots could be allotted to the landless labourers for construction of huts. According to the petitioner, the respondents have decided to acquire his field survey number 3/2 of Sutala arbitrarily, without any application of mind. He also contended that he owns only about II acres of land and has to maintain a family of about 20 members, who are solely dependent on agricultural income of this land. 41. The contentions raised in the petition are denied by the respondents. The respondents denied that the petitioner holds land which is Jess than economic holding. He also contended that he owns only about II acres of land and has to maintain a family of about 20 members, who are solely dependent on agricultural income of this land. 41. The contentions raised in the petition are denied by the respondents. The respondents denied that the petitioner holds land which is Jess than economic holding. So far as the lands proposed by the petitioner are concerned, the respondents in para 3 of the return have explained as to why these lands are not being acquired. According to the respondents, either those lands belong to very small landholders or are under irrigation. The respondents further contended that after inspecting all the available lands, the authorities found that survey number 3/2 was most suitable for the purpose of providing home sites to the landless labourers. This was done after the spot inspection and on verification and consideration of the relevant factors. The respondents further contended that the plots are not available from the land which was initially acquired for the purpose of extension of Gaothan in the year 1970. All the plots were distributed. Only 2 plots remained to be allotted, but the said plots Were specifically kept vacant for the public and community purposes to be used by public in general. Moreover, two reserved plots are close-by to the school. It was also clarified in the return that the petitioner personally owns land measuring 11 acres 27 gunthas, excluding the land owned by his 300, which, is about 4 acres 4 gunthas. Therefore, even if the present land is acquired from survey number 3/2, the petitioner will not become landless but will be holding land more than one-third of the family holding. The respondents further stared that near about 40 to 50 persons require the house sites and considering their need, the minimum possible land is being acquired. Before the proposal for acquisition was made, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer, Khamgaon had enquired into the matter through his subordinate officer. He also consulted the village Panchayat and had inspected the spot on 16-5-1975. Before the proposal for acquisition was made, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer, Khamgaon had enquired into the matter through his subordinate officer. He also consulted the village Panchayat and had inspected the spot on 16-5-1975. Before coming to the conclusion regarding the suitability of the land, he considered the suitability of the Government and the Panchayat land and also other lands around the present village Gaothan and ultimately came to the conclusion that the land from survey number 3/2 belonging to the petitioner is the only suitable land for the purpose. The allegations of mala fides made in the petition were also denied by the respondents. 42. A statement was also made at the Bar on behalf of the respondents that normally the authorities are following the instructions incorporated in the Manual of Land Acquisition for the State of Maharashtra meant for the purposes of extension of existing Gaothan. These instructions are being followed as far as possible. The instructions Nos. 1 (c), (vi) and (vii) are only relevant for deciding the controversy involved in this petition. The said instructions read as under: "I (c) The Tahsildar should devise a programme of visits to as many villages in their charge as possible for ascertaining on the Spot needs of the villagers for extension of Gaothan. The following points should be taken into consideration. *** *** *** (vi) The site selected should be suitable from Public Health point of view and sufficient for a well planned layout providing for all kinds of rural amenities like approach and internal roads, wells, hospital, schools, community halls, play· grounds, parks, burial ground etc. (vii) As far as possible, irrigated land should not be acquired and the person from whom land is acquired should not be left with land less than one third of an economic holding, i.e. one-third of (a) 7 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or (b) 16 acres of dry crop land, or (c) four acres of perentially irrigated land." It is Contended on behalf of the respondents that in the present case these instructions were scrupulously followed. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in this writ petition. ' 43. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in this writ petition. ' 43. It is well settled that so far as the suitability of the land is concerned, it is the appropriate authority, who is the best Judge of the matter. It is for the Government to decide which land is most suited for the acquisition and the decision of the State Government in this behalf would be final. See Mukhtyar Begum v. The Commissioner Nagpur Division, Nagpur15. 44. In the present case, after taking into consideration all the adjoining lands and the relevant instructions, the appropriate authorities have came to the conclusion that the land belonging to the petitioner was the most suited land for the purpose of housing the landless labourers. It is not open for this Court to sit in appeal over the said decision, more so having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 45. So far as allegations of mala fides are concerned, the petitioner has alleged that the village Panchayat has passed a resolution recommending his land for acquisition mala fide with a view to harass the petitioner and to deprive him of his valuable land. The allegations of mala fide are wade against the village Panchayat as a whole, which is a statutory and Corporate Body. The Gram Panchayat has passed a resolution III a meeting of the Gram Panchayat. Moreover, the allegations regarding mala fides are beautifully vague. 46. It is well settled that mere allegation that the power is exercised mala fide would not be enough, but in support of the said allegation specific material should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often made very easily and light heartedly, without placing any material in support of such a plea. Normally, the very seriousness of the allegations demands a credible proof of high order in support of such allegations, more so when the allegations are made against the Government or a statutory Body. It cannot be forgotten that the village Panchayat was merely consulted in the matter, but the ultimate decision was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Sub-Divisional Officer, who, in his turn, made a recommendation in that behalf. It cannot be forgotten that the village Panchayat was merely consulted in the matter, but the ultimate decision was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Sub-Divisional Officer, who, in his turn, made a recommendation in that behalf. After such a recommendation was made, ultimate decision was taken by the Additional Commissioner after scrutinising the material placed before him. The Village Panchayat was not an authority to take the decision in the matter. No material has been placed before us to indicate the malafides of any of these superior officers, including the Additional Commissioner. Moreover, the allegations made in the petition are denied by the respondents. In this view of the matter, it is not possible for us to hold that the resolution was passed by the Village Panchayat mala fide with a view to harass the petitioner. As already observed, the Members of the Village Panchayat have no hold in the matter of the acquisition of lands. The land is not being acquired either for or at the instance of the Village Panchayat. The notification was issued by the Additional Commissioner and the opinion regarding the urgency was also formed by him. In none of these matters the members of the Village Panchayat had any say or hold. Moreover, no material has also been placed before us as to why all the members of the Village Panchayat should come together or conspire together to harass the petitioner. The allegations themselves are so vague that in our opinion they do not call for any enquiry or scrutiny. 47. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in Special Civil Application No. 1766 of 1975 and the petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.