JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also dispose of Misc. Petitions Nos. 382, 333, 384 and 386 all of 1975. The facts giving rise to these petitions are that respondent Kishorilal was a driver employed by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. On 20th November 1967 the bus of the Corporation which the respondent was driving was involved in an accident resulting in the death of a boy. The accident gave rise to a criminal case in which the respondent was prosecuted. The respondent was convicted by the trial Court on 14th november 1971. The respondent went up in appeal and the order of conviction was set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge on 13th February 1972. The respondent made an application for recovery of wages for the period from 1st january 1972 to 23rd July 1972 before the Authority under the Payment of wages Act, 1936. The Corporation took the defence that the services of the respondent were terminated by an order passed on 31st January 1972 and, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to any wages after that date. After recording the evidence, the Authority came to the conclusion that the respondents services were not terminated as the order of termination was not communicated to him. The Authority, therefore, allowed the application for recovery of wages. The Corporation went up in appeal to the Industrial Court. The Industrial court also held that the order of termination dated 31st January 1972 was either not passed or, if passed, was not communicated to the respondent. In this view of the matter, the finding of the Authority that the respondent continued in service and was entitled to wages was confirmed by the Industrial Court and the appeal was dismissed. Misc. Petition No. 385 of 1975 has been filed for quashing of the orders of the Authority and the Industrial Court. ( 2. ) THE respondent made four other applications before the Authority for recovery of wages for the periods from 1st August 1972 to 27th July 1973, 1st august 1973 to 31st July 1974, 1st August 1974 to 31st November 1974 and 1st december 1974 to 28th February 1975. In all these applications, the Corporation has taken the same plea that the services of the respondent were terminated by order dated 31st January 1972. Nothing further has been done in these cases. In all these applications, the Corporation has taken the same plea that the services of the respondent were terminated by order dated 31st January 1972. Nothing further has been done in these cases. The Corporations contention is that the Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed with these applications and Misc. Petitions Nos. 382, 383, 384 and 386 of 1975 have been made in this Court for prohibiting the Authority to proceed with the applications made by the respondent. ( 3. ) THE main question argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Authority had no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the services of an employee have been terminated and, therefore, all proceedings taken by the respondent before the Authority are incompetent. The relevant provision in this context is section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Subsection (1) of section 15 authorises the State Government to appoint an Authority "to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims. " Sub-section (2) of section 15 provides that where contrary to the provisions of the Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person may apply to the Authority for appropriate direction for payment of wages and compensation under subsection (3 ). The scope of section 15 was considered by the Supreme Court in shri Ambika Mills Co. v. S. B. Bhatt, (air 1961 s c 970,) and Payment of Wages Inspector v. B. E. S. and I. Co. , (AIR 1969 S c 590.) The Supreme Court held that in dealing with claims under section 15 the Authority would have jurisdiction to consider incidental questions; but in determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited. When an employee applies to the Authority that payment of his wages has been delayed by the employer for any particular period, the authority, in case of dispute, will have to determine whether the applicant was employed and whether the employment continued during the period for which the wages were not paid. If the employer contends that the applicants employment was terminated, this could also be a question which the Authority will have to determine while deciding the application. These, in our opinion, would be all incidental questions falling within the jurisdiction of the Authority under section 15. In Ramcharan v. District Judge, Jabalpur, (1961 M P L J 1192=a IR 1962 M P 220.) an employee claimed retrenchment compensation before the Authority. After holding that the Authority has jurisdiction to decide a claim relating to retrenchment compensation because such a compensation is included in the definition of wages, a Division Bench of this Court observed that the Authority will also have jurisdiction to decide "the incidental questions, namely, whether the petitioner was at all an employee and whether his services had been terminated or whether he was still in employment". This case is a direct authority on the question that the fact of termination of service will be an incidental question and the Authority will have jurisdiction to decide it under section 15 (2) of the Act. ( 4. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has relied on A. R. Sarin v B. C. Patil, ( AIR 1951 Bom. 423 .) and Viswanath Tukaram v. G. M. , Central Rly. , ( AIR 1958 Bom. 111 (F B ).) In both these cases it has been held that the Authority would be competent to decide whether the employee was employed. In A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil (supra) there are, however, certain observations that the question whether the services of an employee were terminated will not be within the jurisdiction of the Authority. But read in the context of the facts of that case these-observations only mean that the authority will have no jurisdiction to decide whether the services of an employee had been rightly or wrongly terminated or whether the dismissal was lawful or unlawful. But read in the context of the facts of that case these-observations only mean that the authority will have no jurisdiction to decide whether the services of an employee had been rightly or wrongly terminated or whether the dismissal was lawful or unlawful. Indeed, this is how Sarins case has been understood in the Full bench case of Viswanath Tukaram v. G. M. , Central Rly. (supra ). ( 5. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners also contended that as the respondent can get the relief under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, the authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to entertain his claim for wages. In our opinion, there is also no merit in this contention. A claim for delayed wages falls within section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and the Authority under that Act has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. By section 22 of the Act the jurisdiction of the Authority is exclusive. The madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act is a general Act and it does not take away the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act as conferred by section 15 of that Act. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to us Payment of Wages Inspector v. B. E. S. and I. Co. (supra ). There is, however, nothing in that case which supports the argument of the learned counsel. In that case it was held that a claim for compensation under section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was denied by the employer on the ground that it was defeated by the proviso to that section, was a claim which could not fall within the jurisdiction of the Authority under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. It was further held that the Labour Court in such cases would be the proper forum for determining such questions under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It will thus be seen that the Supreme Court clearly held that the matter in dispute in that case did not fall within section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. The Supreme court did not hold that although the matter fell within section 15 (2), the jurisdiction of the Authority was taken away by section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme court did not hold that although the matter fell within section 15 (2), the jurisdiction of the Authority was taken away by section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The aforesaid case, in our opinion, is of no assistance to the learned counsel. Learned counsel also relied upon the case of D. P. Kelkar v. Ambadas, ( AIR 1971 Bom. 124 . ). In this case it was held that a claim for bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, could not be entertained by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The reasoning behind this decision is that the payment of Bonus Act, which is a special Act, creates a special forum for the trial of disputes under that Act and, therefore, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act would have no jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. The case has no relevance on question whether the Authority can have any jurisdiction to entertain a claim for delayed wages which directly falls under section 15 (2), simply because that relief can also be obtained under the Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act. ( 6. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners then assailed the finding reached by the Industrial Court on the question that the order of termination said to have been passed by the Depot Manager on 31st January 1972 was communicated to the respondent. The respondent examined himself before the Authority and stated that the order had not been communicated to him. The petitioners produced no evidence before the Authority to show that the order was in fact communicated to the respondent. In the circumstances, the finding reached by the Authority and the Industrial Court that the order was not communicated to the respondent cannot be said to be unwarranted. Even otherwise, under article 226 of the Constitution this Court has no jurisdiction to quash a decision on the ground that a finding of fact has been erroneously reached. A writ of certiorari to quash a decision can only be issued when there is error of jurisdiction or apparent error of law. There being no such error in the findings reached by the Authority and the Industrial Court, no case is made out for interference under Article 226. ( 7. A writ of certiorari to quash a decision can only be issued when there is error of jurisdiction or apparent error of law. There being no such error in the findings reached by the Authority and the Industrial Court, no case is made out for interference under Article 226. ( 7. ) IT has not been disputed before us that an order of termination, even if passed, could not be effective unless it was communicated to the respondent. Indeed, it is settled law that an order of termination of services takes effect only when it is communicated; [see State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, (airi966sc1313.)]. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners also contended that as the respondent was not allowed to work during the period for which he claimed wages, it must be held that his services were terminated even though no order of termination of services was communicated to him. In our opinion, this point cannot be raised before us because the point was neither taken before the authority nor before the Industrial Court. All that was contended by the petitioners before the Authority and the Industrial Court was that termination of services was brought about by issue of an order to that effect on 31st January 1972. As the point now argued was not raised in the proceedings under the payment of Wages Act, it cannot for the first time be allowed to be raised in this Court. ( 9. ) AS regards Misc. Petitions Nos. 382, 383, 384 and 386 of 1975, we have already stated that the inquiry is still pending before the Authority. No order has yet been passed in proceedings giving rise to these petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the respondent in his statement dated 26th March 1973 (Annexure F) has admitted that he received a letter on 17th January 1973 that his services were terminated and, therefore, the claim for wages subsequent to that date could not be entertained by the Authority. The statement of the respondent referred to by the learned counsel was made in the case out of which Misc. Petition No. 385 of 1975 arises. This statement is not a part of the records of the cases out of which Misc. Petitions Nos. 382, 383, 384 and 386 of 1975 arise. The statement of the respondent referred to by the learned counsel was made in the case out of which Misc. Petition No. 385 of 1975 arises. This statement is not a part of the records of the cases out of which Misc. Petitions Nos. 382, 383, 384 and 386 of 1975 arise. It would be open to the petitioners to produce a copy of the said statement in these cases and to urge before the Authority that the respondents services were at least terminated from 17th January 1973 and, therefore, he could not claim any wages after that date. The respondent would then have opportunity to meet this case. It is not open to us at this stage to prohibit the Authority from proceeding with these cases when the authority has not given any finding and no order has been passed in these cases. ( 10. ) AS a result of the above discussion, all these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 50 in each case, if certified. The outstanding amount of the security deposit in each case, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed.