Judgment.-This is an appeal by the Mate against acquittal of the respondent. The respondent was prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 340 (c) read with section 211 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the allegation that he has constructed a shop room after demolishing the old building Door No. 7-3-29 without permission as provided under section 211 of the Act. That without permission the respondent did the act complained of is not in dispute and that it is an offence punishable as provided under section 340 (c) of the Act also is not in dispute. It is provided under section 211 of the Act that the construction or reconstruction of a building shall not be begun unless and until the Commissioner has granted permission for the execution of the work. Provision is made under section 34o of the Act for penalty for unlawful building. It is provided under sub-section (c) of section 340 of the Act that if any construction or reconstruction of any building or well is carried on or completed in breach of any provision contained in the Act the owner of the building shall be liable on conviction to be fined which may extend in the case of a building to Rs. 500 subject to a minimum of Rs. 50. 2. For the same unlawful construction, the respondent was already once prosecuted and convicted under section 340 (c) and fined to pay a fine of Rs. 50 and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of ten days. The present prosecution was again launched on the ground that the unlawful construction still continues and therefore, it is a continuing offence. The lower Court by coming to a conclusion that the alleged offence is not a continuing one, acquitted the respondent. To come to the conclusion that it is not a continuing offence, the learned Magistrate placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in Palaniappan v. Commissioner of Salem Municipality1. In that case the prosecution was launched under section 317 (c) of the Madras District Municipalities Act for failure to comply with a notice under section 216 (3) of the said Act directing the accused to remove an unauthorised construction. As provided under section 347 of the Act, the complaint should be made within three months of the commission of the offence. As provided under section 347 of the Act, the complaint should be made within three months of the commission of the offence. The prosecution was launched after the expiry of the three months period. Under section 347 of the Act, there is a proviso that the failure to take out a licence, obtain permission or secure registration under the Act shall, for the purposes of that section, be deemed a continuing offence until the expiration of the period, if any for which the licence, permission or registration is required and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within twelve months from the commencement of the offence. The Madras High Court came to the conclusion that where there is a notice given under section 216 of the Madras Act, directing the accused thereto to remove the constructions within 3 days of the receipt of the notice by him, the offence was complete on the failure of the accused to remove the construction within three days of the receipt of the notice as directed and to such a case the proviso to section 347 has no application. 3. The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is that the reconstruction of the shop room after demolishing the old one having been made by the respondent without the permission as proveded under section 211 of the Act, so long as that unauthorised construction remains, the offence continues and the respondent is liable for prosecution more than once at anytime so long as that unauthorised construction remains and not removed by him. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the offence committed by the respondent in making the unauthorised construction continues so long as the unauthorised construction is kept in existence without removal. 4. As provided under section 211 read with section 340 (c) of the Act it is an offence punishable with a fine if any construction or reconstruction of a building is made without the permission granted by the Commissioner for the execution of the work. Now the respondent has reconstructed the shop room without any permission from the Commissioner for the reconstruction. The reconstruction of the shop room was over. As soon as the reconstruction of the shop room was over, this offence was completed. Now the respondent has reconstructed the shop room without any permission from the Commissioner for the reconstruction. The reconstruction of the shop room was over. As soon as the reconstruction of the shop room was over, this offence was completed. The permission necessary was for construction or reconstruction of a building and if the work was executed without the permission provision is made under section 340 (c) for imposition of a fine. When the permission required is for construction or reconstruction of a building and without the permission if any construction or reconstruction is made the offence punishable as provided under section 340 (c) is for contruction or reconstruction without a permission. Therefore, once the unauthorised work is completed the offence is completed. No offence is made for keeping in existence the unauthorised construction or reconstruction. It is not as if the Municipality is left without any remedy after imposing a fine for the offence as provided under section 340 (c) of the Act and is powerless to do anything with the unauthorised construction thereafter. As provided under sections 359 and 360 of the Act, if any unauthorised construction is made, the Chairman, Commissioner or other Officer may, by notice, required the person so doing such act to remove it, within a time to be specified in the notice and if such notice is net complied with within the time so made, action can be taken by the concerned officer of the Municipality for giving due effect to the notice i.e., in the case of unauthorised construction the Municipality can take action to get it removed and as provided under section 361 recover the expenses incurred for getting the unauthorised construction removed. 5. In the decision in State of Bihar v. Deokaran1, the Supreme Court came to consider, when an act or omission is committed, the distinction between an offence which takes place once and for all and a continuing offence. The Supreme Court was considering section 66 of the Mines Act (1952) which provides that any person omitting inter alia to furnish any return shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. The Supreme Court was considering section 66 of the Mines Act (1952) which provides that any person omitting inter alia to furnish any return shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. Section 79, however, lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act unless complaint thereof has been made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed or within six months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, whichever is later. The Explanation to the section provides that if the offence in question is a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the said offence continues. Under Regulation 3 of the Indian Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1926, an owner, agent or manager of every mine is required to forward to the District Magistrate and to the Chief Inspector annual returns in respect of the proceding year in the forms prescribed therein on or before the 21st of January, in each year. In that case the respondents failed to furnish the annual returns for the year 1959 by the 21st of January, 1960. On 28th March, 1960 the Chief Inspector drew their attention to the said failure and warned the respondents that if they failed to furnish the returns within two weeks from the date of the said letter, proceedings would be instituted against them under the Act and on their failure to do so despite the said warning, a complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate. Ghanbad on 12th April, 1961. The question that arose was whether the offence in question was covered by the substantive part of section 79, or whether it was covered by the Explanation thereto. If the offence was of the former kind, the complaint in regard to it would be clearly time-barred. It would not be so if the offence was of the kind, of a continuing offence, in which event the explanation to section 79 would operate. In this connection the Supreme Court has observed thus: “Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuanc and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It would not be so if the offence was of the kind, of a continuing offence, in which event the explanation to section 79 would operate. In this connection the Supreme Court has observed thus: “Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuanc and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with the rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or noncompliance occurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offence is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuace of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all”. 6. The Supreme Court has considered a number of decided cases in this connection. In England, the Trade Union Act, 1971, by section 12 provided that if any officer, member or other person being or representing himself to be a member of a trade union, by false representation or imposition obtained possession of any moneys, books etc., of such trade union, or having the same in his possession wilfully withheld or fraudulently misapplied the same, a Court of summary jurisdiction would order such person to be imprisoned. The offence of withholding the money referred to in the section was held to he a continuing offence, presumably because every day that the moneys were wilfully withheld, an offence within the meaning of section 12 was committed. (Best v. Butler and Fitzgibbon1). 7. In another English case in Verney v. Mark Flecker and Sons Ltd.2, the question again was whether the offence for which the information was lodged therein was a continuing offence. Section 10 of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, inter alia provided that every flywheel directly connected with steam, water or other mechanical power must be securely fenced. 7. In another English case in Verney v. Mark Flecker and Sons Ltd.2, the question again was whether the offence for which the information was lodged therein was a continuing offence. Section 10 of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, inter alia provided that every flywheel directly connected with steam, water or other mechanical power must be securely fenced. Its sub-section (2) provided that a factory in which there was contravention of the section would be deemed not to be kept in conformity with the Act. Section 135 provided penalty for an occupier of a factory or workshop if he failed to keep the factory workshop in conformity with the Act. Section 146 provided that information for the offence under section 135 shall be laid within three months after the date at which the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector for the district within which the offence was charged to have been committed. The contention was that in May, 1905 and again in March, 1908, the flywheel was kept unfenced to the knowledge of the Inspector and yet the information was not laid until 22a d July, 1908. The informatiion, however stated that the flywheel was unfenced en 8th July, 1908 and that was the offence charged. It was held that the breach of section 10 was a continuing breach on July, 1908 and therefore, the information was in time. The offence under section 135 read with section 10 consisted in foiling to keep the factory in conformity with the Act. Every day that the flywheel remained unfenced, the factory was kept not in confirmity with the Act, and therefore, the failure continued to be an offence. Hence the offence defined in section 10 was a continuing offence. 8. In another case in the London County Council v. Worlef3, section 85 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1852 prohibited the erection of a building, on the side of a new street of less than fifty feet in width, which shall exceed in height the distance from the front of the building on the opposite side of the street without the consent of the London County Council and imposed penalties for offences against the Act and a further penalty for every day during which such offence should continue after notice from the County Council. The Court construed section 85 to have laid down two offences; (1) building to prohibited height, and (2) continuing such a structure already built after receiving a notice from the Courty Council. It was held that the later offence was continuing offence applying to any one who was guilty of continuing the building at the prohibited height after notice from the County Council. 9. The Supreme Court also considered the case in Emperor v. Karsandas4There the question was as to the proper construction of section 390, sub-section (1) of the Bombay City Municipality Act, 1888. That sub-section provided that no person shall newly establish in any premises any factory in which it was intended that steam, water or other mechanical power should be employed, without the previous permission of the Commissioner nor shall any person work or allow to be worked any such fatory without such permission. The sub-section thus laid down two distinct offerees; (1) establishing a new factory in which mechanical power was intended to be used without the permission, and (2) working such a factory in which mechanical powder was intended to be without permission The Bombay High Court held that the first offence would be completed when a new factory was established without permission, an offence completed once and for all while the other offences would be committed whenever such a factory without the permission was worked, that is, on every day that it has worked without the permission. The distinction between the two kinds of offences lay between an act which constituted an offence once and for all and an act which continued, and therefore, constituted a fresh offence every time on which it continued. 10. In State v. Bhaiwandiwala1, three offences were charged against the respondent: (1) failure to submit a written notice of occupation of his factory as required by section 7 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948; (2) failure to submit an application for registration and grant of licence as required by section 6 of the Act read with rule 4 of the Bombay Factories Rules, 1950, and (3) for using the premises as factory without a licence. The Bombay High Court held that the first two offences were offences completed on failure to submit the notice and the application for registration and licence, and a complaint in respect of them would he barred if it was lodged beyond the period of three months from the date of the offence under section 106 of the Act. But a prosecution in respect of third offence would not be so barred as that offence was a continuing offence in the sense that using the premises a? a factory without registration and licence was an offence committed every time that the premises was used as a factory 11.In State of Bihar v. J.P. Singh2, the Patna High Court held that conducting a restaurant without having it registered and without maintaining registers required by the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act VII of 1954 and the Rules framed thereunder were continuing offences as every time a restaurant was run without its being registered and with out maintaining the requisite registers was an offence and therefore, the period of limitation under section 36 of the Act would begin to run from the date of the occurrence of each of the defaults. 12. After considering these decisions, the Supreme Court held that Regulation 3 read with section 6,6 of the Mines Act makes failure to furnish annual returns for the preceding year by the 21st of January of the succeeding year a completed offence. The language of Regulation 3 clearly indicates that an owner, manager etc. of a mine would be liable to the penalty if be were to commit an infringement of the Regulation and that infringement consists in the failure to furnish returns on or before 21st January of the succeeding year. The infringement therefore, occurs on 21st January of the relevant year and is complete on the owner failing to furnish the annual returns by that date. Regulation 3 does not render a continued disobedience or non-compliance of it an offeree. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: “As in the case of a construction of a building in violation of a rule or a bye -law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as the default occurs in furnishing the returns by the prescribed date. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: “As in the case of a construction of a building in violation of a rule or a bye -law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as the default occurs in furnishing the returns by the prescribed date. There is nothing in Regulation 3 or in any other provision in the Act or the Regulations which render the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out.” 13. In the present case also there is nothing in the provisions of the Act which renders the continuance of unauthorised construction an offence until it is removed . Once the construction is made without the necessary permission, the offence is completed once and for all. The offence committed for construction or reconstruction without applying for the necessary permission as provided under section 211 of the Act is completed as soon as the unauthorised construction is made. The respondent was already prosecuted for the offence of constructing the shop room without permission and he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50. It is provided under section 300 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure that if a person is once convicted or acquitted he shall not be tried for the same offence. Therefore, the lower Court has rightly acquitted the respondent. There are no merits in the appeal. Accordingly it is dismissed.