Sambasiva Rao, J.-In a prosecution for food adulteration,, is it necessary for the prosecution to prove not only the allegation of adulteration but also that the adulterated article is injurious to health or that purchaser has been prejudicially affected? In Public Prosecutor v. Nalam Subba Rao1, Munikannaiah, J., held that both these aspects must be proved before any criminal liability is fastened to the vendor. In Manibai v. State of Maharashtra2, it was held that it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the article was deleterious to health. What all that need be shown is that the article was adulterated. The lower Court acquitted the accused (respondent before us) following Nalam Subba Rco’s case1. This led our learned brother Ramachandra Raju, J., to refer this appeal to a Division Bench. 2. What has happened in this case is simple. A Food Inspector purchased from the respondent, who is a dealer in edible oils, a sample of groundnut oil and sent it to the Public Analyst for analysis. The analyst in his report found that the sample practically accorded with item A. 17.03 in Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulterat on Rules, excepting that the temperature is one degree less than the prescribed minimum and the Iodine Value is 1. 2% more than the permissible percentage. Other tests resulted in the negative. The only thing that emanated from the report is that the sample contained about 15% safflower oil and was therefore adulterated. It is common ground as well as common knowledge that safflower oil is also an edible oil which is of higher quality than groundnut oil for the purpose of cooking and is more expensive. Prosecution was launched against the respondent under section 16 (1) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The allegation was that the respondent had sold adulterated groundnut oil on 8th October, 1273. The Court below found that purchasing a sample, selling it and sending it for the opinion of the Analyst were all done properly. The respondent, as accused, claimed immunity because of the warranty which was given by the wholesale merchant. The allegation was that the respondent had sold adulterated groundnut oil on 8th October, 1273. The Court below found that purchasing a sample, selling it and sending it for the opinion of the Analyst were all done properly. The respondent, as accused, claimed immunity because of the warranty which was given by the wholesale merchant. On a consideration of the evidence the Courts held that an inference was possible that the accused had mixed safflower oil in the groundnut oil and so the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the written warranty issued by the wholesale dealer. The other defence was that the safflower oil was costilier than groundnut oil and so its mixture with the latter would not come within the purview of section 2 (i) (a), (b) or (c) of the Act and attract criminal liability. The Court below was of the opinion that in the absence of any evidence to show that the mixing of safflower oil with groundnut oil affected the quality of groundnut oil adversely or caused injury to the health of the purchaser, the adulteration in question did not fall within the purview of section 2 (i)(a), (b) or (c) and did not attract criminal liability under section 16. In coming to this conclusion it followed Nalam Subba Rao’s case1. The State preferred the present appeal. 3. There cannot be any hesitation to accept the findings of fact which were recorded by the Court of first instance. Undoubtedly there was mixture of safflower oil with groundnut oil and the former oil formed 15% of the sample sold. This mixture was sold as groundnut oil, while in fact it contained 85% of groundnut oil and 15% of safflower oil. This is clearly established by Exhibit P. 6, the certificate of the Public Analyst. Evidence disclosed that the mixture occurred while the oils were in the custody of the respondent and consequently he could not invoke to his aid the written warranty given by the wholesale dealer who had sold him the oil. In fact these conclusions of fact have not been seriously canvassed before us by the learned Counsel for the respondent. 4. The debate centred round the question of law which we have indicated even at the threshold of our judgment. Does such a mixture fall within the purview of section 2 (i) (a)? In fact these conclusions of fact have not been seriously canvassed before us by the learned Counsel for the respondent. 4. The debate centred round the question of law which we have indicated even at the threshold of our judgment. Does such a mixture fall within the purview of section 2 (i) (a)? This is the aspect which has been argued before us at great length by the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for the respondent. Section 2 (i) of the Act defines the word "adulterated". It says: "An article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated: (a) if the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or represents to be; (b) if the article contains any other substance which affects, or if the article is so processed as to affect, injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof; (c) if any inferior or cheaper substance has been substituted wholly or in part for the article so as to affect injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof; (d) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability." 5. Though the word "or" does not occur at the end or beginning of every succeeding clause, it is manifest from a reading of the provision that if an article falls within the ambit of any one of these clauses, it is "adulterated’‘ article within the meaning of the Act. To say that the features of all the clauses must exist before an article is said to be "adulterated" would be doing violence to the section and intendment of the Parliament. In fact, that is not the contention of Sri Eswara Prasad, learned Counsel for the respondent. It is common ground that the sample of groundnut oil sold to the Food Inspector does not come within the ambit of either clause (b) or clause (c).Learned Public Prosecutor’s stand is that it comes squarely within the ambit of clause (a) . Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale etc., of certain articles of food like (1) adulterated food, (2) misbranded food etc. So, section 7, Prohibits sale of adulterated food. Section 16 provides for the penalties. Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale etc., of certain articles of food like (1) adulterated food, (2) misbranded food etc. So, section 7, Prohibits sale of adulterated food. Section 16 provides for the penalties. If any person whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, among other things, imports into India or manufactures for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food (i) which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food Health Authority in the interest of Public health; and (ii) in contravention of any one of the provisions of the Act or any rule made thereunder, become liable to penalty. Rule 44 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 lays down that no person shall either by himself or by any servant or agent sell, among other things, a mixture of two or more edible oils. 6. Applying these provisions to the facts of the case, a mixture of groundnut oil with safflower oil, though the latter is also an edible oil and is a more expensive one, is forbidden to be sold as an edible oil under rule 44. If the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or represents to be, then it is adulterated article within the meaning of section 2 (i). Sale of such adulterated article of food is prohibited under section 7. Penalty for selling adulterated article of food is proviied under section 16 (1) (a) and (d). Therefore, if the sale in question of the sample containing 85% of groundnut oil and 15% of safflower oil as groundnut oil is an “adulterated” food article within the meaning of section 2 (i) (a), then the respondent must be held to have committed an offence. To express the same idea in other words, if this article comes within the scope of clause (a) of section 2 (i), then there cannot be any doubt that there is an offence committed by the respondent. 7. The decisions cited do not render much assistance on this aspect of the matter. In none of the decisions placed before us, the import, the ambit and analysis of section 2 (i) (a) have been considered. 7. The decisions cited do not render much assistance on this aspect of the matter. In none of the decisions placed before us, the import, the ambit and analysis of section 2 (i) (a) have been considered. In Nalam Subba Rao’s case1, on analysis of the bengal gram flour which was sold, it was found to contain 15% of pea-powder which was found to be a costilier substance than bengal gram flour. Since there was no evidence that the pea-powder, when mixed with bengal gram flour, was injurious or injuriously affected the nature, substance or quality of the bengal gram flour, it was not possible to bring the mixing of the two powders as “adulteration” falling under clause (c) or (b) of section 2 (i) of the Act. As for bringing the case under clause (a) there was no evidence to show that the purchaser had been prejudicialy affected. Learned Judge obviously proceeded on the impression that to bring a case under clause (a) it must be shown that the purchaser has been prejudicially affected. Excepting this, there was no discussion of the scope of clause (a). 8. Sharfuddin Ahmed, J., in Public Prosecutor v. K. Ramalingaiah2, did not agree with the view expressed by Munikannaiah in Nalam Subba Rao’s case1. The learned Judge held that “adulterated food” as defined in section 2 (i) (a) takes in its ambit, the mixing of two edible oils. An accused under the Act cannot escape conviction by pointing that the adulteration was neither injurious to the health of the purchaser nor prejudicial to him in any other way. The criteria in deciding the contravention of the Act need not be only with reference to the injury or prejudice to the purchaser. Learned Judge was not inclined to accept the restricted scope of adulteration as accepted by Munikannaiah, J., in Nalam Subba Rao’s case1, that the criteria for contravention of the Act is only with reference to the injury or prejudice to the purchaser. This decision also does not contain my analytical consideration of clause (as) of section 2 (i). 9. In the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in S. Moses, In re3, it was held that under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the adulterated substance need not be poisonous or injurious. Indeed, it may even be conducive to health. This decision also does not contain my analytical consideration of clause (as) of section 2 (i). 9. In the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in S. Moses, In re3, it was held that under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the adulterated substance need not be poisonous or injurious. Indeed, it may even be conducive to health. The object of the Act is to see that the substance sold is not mixed with any other thing not permitted by law. Hence the plea that the adulteration was not prejudicial to health and would not injure anybody but only added colour to the substance and made it attractive to the buyer cannot be sustained . 10. In M.V. Joshi v. Shimpi1, the Supreme Court held, that if the quality or purity of butter falls below the standard prescribed by the rule or its constituents are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability, it shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of section 2. If the prescribed standard is not attainted the statute treats such butter, by fiction, as an adulterated food though in fact it is not adultered. 11. These are all general propositions of law which do not help us in resolving the problem posed and canvassed before us. As we have pointed out, both sides were one in contending that the sample of groundnut oil sold to the Food Inspector in the case comes only within the ambit of clause (a) of section 2 (i). They pointed out that clause (a) is in two parts and provides for two different situations. While Sri Eswara Prasad for the respondent maintained that the present case comes within the scope of the first part, learned Public Prosecutor would have it that it comes under he latter part. It is this analysis of clause (a) which has not been attempted in any one of the decisions placed before us. 12. We have already extracted clause (a). Undobutedly it is in two parts providing for two situations. The first part is “if the Article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice”. 12. We have already extracted clause (a). Undobutedly it is in two parts providing for two situations. The first part is “if the Article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice”. The second part is “if the Article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or represents to be.” The words “the nature, substance or quality” are common to both are parts. But still there is a vital difference between the two limbs. In the first part there is a demand by the purchaser of an Article of a particular nature, substance or quality. In other words, while purchasing he has demanded an Article with certain specifications regarding the nature, substance or quality. To illustrate, a purchaser may go to a vendor and ask for coffee powder with 5 per cent chickory. That means he has specified the nature, substance or quality of the coffee powder he wanted to purchase. If what has been sold to him is not of that nature, substance or quality required by him, then the first part of clause (a) covers that situation. If a case belongs to this category, the prosecution will have to prove not only that the Article sold by the vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality required by the purchaser but also that it is to his prejudice. The second part has no such requirement. In it there is no demand by the purchaser of an article of a particular nature,, substance or quality. He just names the Article which he wants and if something is sold to him which purports or which is represented to be an article of a particular nature, substance or quality, then it comes under the second part., Once again to illustrate, if a purchaser asks for coffee powder simpliciter and the vendor sells to him saying that it is pure and unmixed coffee powder but in fact not of the nature, substance and quality which has been represented to be, then such a case comes under the second part. Likewise if coffee powder is kept in a tin with a lable “pure coffee powder” and a purchaser wants to purchase from that tin, that coffee powder by virtue of the lable on the tin, purports or is represented to be pure coffee powder. If what is sold from the tin to the purchaser is not pure coffee powder but contains something else, it would be a case coming under the second part. In such category of cases, the prosecution need not prove prejudice to the purchaser in addition to the allegation that the Article sold to the purchaser is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or represents to be. 13. However, the expression “prejudice” occurring in the first limb of clause (a) appears to be of wide amplitude. Its scope is not limited only to injury to or deleterious effect on the health of the purchaser or consumer. Even if any loss, for example financial loss, is caused by such a transaction, then it would be prejudicial to the purchaser within the meaning of clause (e). For instance, if an article of a particular variety was asked for by a purchaser and an article of another nature, substance or quality was sold to him thereby causing financial loss to him, then, in our opinion, it is to his prejudice. 14. Also the need to prove injury to the nature, substance or quality of an article is postulated by clauses (b), (c) and (d). So, if the prosecution wants to bring a case under any ‘of these clauses, then injury to the nature, substance or quality of the article will have to be proved. Likewise clauses (e), (f), (h) and (i) postulate injury to health. The need to prove prejudice or injury to the nature, substance or quality of the article sold or injury to health would arise depending on the application of the particular clause of section 2 (1). It needs to be emphasised that this proof of injury would be necessary only in cases falling under section 16 (1) (a) (i) under the head “adulterated” article of food. It should also be noted that section 16 (1) (a) (ii) excludes from its ‘purview cases falling under clause (i) . It needs to be emphasised that this proof of injury would be necessary only in cases falling under section 16 (1) (a) (i) under the head “adulterated” article of food. It should also be noted that section 16 (1) (a) (ii) excludes from its ‘purview cases falling under clause (i) . So, when the charge is adulteration, it will have to be found out whether the concerned article of food comes under any of the clause of section 2 (i) . 15. The present case comes undoubtedly within the scope of the second part of clause (a) as contended by the learned Public Prosecutor. The evidence on record discloses that the Food Inspector, examined as P.W. 1 wanted to purchase groundnut oil for sample. He did not specify the nature, substance or quality of the groundnut oil he wanted. He simply wanted groundnut oil and the respondent sold to him the sample purporting or representing that it was pure groundnut oil. However, it happened that it contained 15% of safflower oil. Thus, it is a case coming under the second limb of clause (a). So it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove “prejudice” to the purchaser. The proof of selling an adulterated article of food was complete when the prosecution established that the groundnut oil sold to P.W. 1 was not of the nature, substan:e or quality which it purported or represented to be. 16. For these reasons, we set aside the finding of the lower Court that no offence of adulteration has been committed by the respondent. 17. Then the question of penalty arises section 16 (1) lays down that the offender shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term whi:h shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years and with fine which shall not be less than one thou; and rupees. However, there are two provisos to this section. However, there are two provisos to this section. If a case comes within the scope of any one of these two provisos, the Court, for special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees. 18. Sri Eswara Prasad for he respondent raised a two-fold contention in the matter of punishment. In his submission the offence committed by his client comes under the first part of the first proviso. Therefore, he may be let off with a very light punishment because what is alleged against him is only a technical offence. His second submission is that in any case it is a matter which should properly and reasonably come within the ambit of the Probation of Offenders Act. 19. We do not think that the case comes under the first part of the first proviso to section 16 (1). That proviso reads like this: “if the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of section 2 or misbranded under subclause (k) of clause (ix) of that section.” 20. It a case is to come under the first part of the proviso, the offence should be under section 16 (a) (1) and should be with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of section 2. Since what was sold is an adulterated article of food, the first requirement is satisfied. The second requirement is that the article of food should be one which is adulterated under section 2 (i) (1) . That clause is to the following effect: “If the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability.” The prescribed standard or prescribed limits of variability of groundnut oil are contained in Entry A. 17.03 in Appendix B to the Rules. That clause is to the following effect: “If the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standards or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability.” The prescribed standard or prescribed limits of variability of groundnut oil are contained in Entry A. 17.03 in Appendix B to the Rules. Going by the Analyst’s report, it is not possible to say that the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standards or its constituents are in excess of the prescribed Units of variability as prescribed in Entry A. 17.03. Therefore, the groundnut: oil sold to P.W. 1 by the respondent does not come within the purview of clause (1) of section 2 (i) . Consequently, we will have to reject the first contention of Sri Prasad that the offence comes under the first proviso to section 16 (1). 21. Learned Public Prosecutor invited our attention to the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Muralidhar v. State of Maharashtra1. It was laid down there that the facts that actually the groundnut oil, which was mixed with khurasani oil, costs more and so profit motive stands negatived and the mixture of these edible oils, though technically forbidden, is in fact non-injurious are probably right but ex necessitate legis the Court has to inflict the heavy minimum sentence. Relying on this decision, learned Public Prosecutor suggests that we should impose the minimum sentence prescribed under the Act. However, in this case before the Supreme Court, the Probation of Offenders Act has not been invoked before the learned Judges. 22. Section 4 of the said Act enables the Court to release the accused on probation of good conduct in appropriate matters. In a case arising under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Supreme Court held in Ghanshyam Das v. Delhi Municipality1, that it was a fit case in which the order of the learned Sessions Judge, whereby he directed that the accused be bound down by section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, be restored. In that case, the learned Judges were of the view that as the matter pertained to the year 1965 and as the accused since then had faced protracted criminal proceedings, it would not be proper to send him to jail. In that case, the learned Judges were of the view that as the matter pertained to the year 1965 and as the accused since then had faced protracted criminal proceedings, it would not be proper to send him to jail. Consequently they directed that the appellant therein be bound down under section 4 of that Act on his executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 2,000 with one surety for the like amount. 23. In our opinion, the case before us is pre-eminently one which would require similar application of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. What is proved against the respondent is a technical offence. What was mixed with the groundnut oil was safflower oil which; was costlier than groundnut oil and was not at all injurious to health. On the other hand, it is common knowledge that safflower oil is preferred to grounnut oil since it contains less fat. How in the business premises of the respondent the costlier oil came to be mixed with groundnut oil is not possible to divine. But is a mixture which does not cause any harm to anybody. Probably the only harm that is done is to the respondent himself because he mixed costlier oil. Further, the matter has been pending for the last three years. In these circumstances, we do not think it would be proper to send him to jail by imposing on him the minimum punishment. Following the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, we also direct that the respondent be bound down under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, on his executing a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 2,000 with one surety for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Eleventh Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad. 24. In the result, the decision of the lower Court is modified and the appeal is allowed in the manner stated above.