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1976 DIGILAW 63 (KER)

RAMUNNI NAIR v. THE STATE OF KERALA

1976-03-10

P.GOVINDA NAIR, P.NARAYANA PILLAI, P.SUBRAMONIAN POTI

body1976
Judgment :- 1. The main question that arises for determination in these civil revision petitions is the interpretation to be placed on the words "commencement of this Act" occurring in sub-section (4) of S.82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Sub-section (4) of S.82 was amended twice after it was enacted by the Act and after it came into operation on 1-4-1964. We shall extract the above section as it stood between the period 1-4-1961 and 1-1-1970 and the term of the section between 1-1-1970 and the date on which Act 25 of 1971 came into force, and as it was worded after passing Act 25 of 1971. S.82(4) as it stood between the period 1-4-1964 and 1-1-1970 was in these terms: "82. Ceiling area (4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion shall be determined without taking into account such conversion." 2. S.82 (4) as it was between 111970 and 1181971 was in these terms: 1182 (4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion shall be determined without taking into account such conversion." 3. After the passing of Act 25 of 1971 the S.82 (4) read thus. 1182 (4) Where, after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or into a plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined without taking into consideration such conversion." We must add a word of explanation. Act 25 of 1971 brought into force retrospectively sub-S. (4) of S.82 as it stands today with effect from 1-1-1970. Act 25 of 1971 brought into force retrospectively sub-S. (4) of S.82 as it stands today with effect from 1-1-1970. It is therefore unnecessary to read the provision that stood in the statute book from 1-1-1970 to the date on which Act 25 of 1971 was passed because the present section has been substituted with effect from 1-1-1970. 4. We must also refer to the terms of Schedule II which is referred to in the sub-section as obtaining during the respective periods. Before Act 35 of 1969 amended sub-section (4) of S.82 the Second Schedule to the Act took in among the classes of lands specified therein all types of plantations; but by the amendments introduced by Act 35 of 1969 to the Second Schedule plantations were left out from the Second Schedule. It has to be noticed that this has got significance in view of the wording of sub-section (4) of S.82 as it was enacted by Act 35 of 1969 In the section the words " any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein "were used without adverting to the fact that Schedule II had also been amended by Act 35 of 1969 by omitting the classes of lands described as plantations in the original schedule. This appears to have been a mistake and therefore when the present sub-section (4) of S.82 of the Act was introduced by Act 25 of 1971 the wording of the sub-section has been changed in this regard and it is stated "any class of land specified in Schedule H has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or into a plantation". This sub-section as we said, had been introduced with effect from 1-1-1970 and therefore we need only consider the sub-section as it stood before 1-1-1970, and as it stands today. 5. And during both these periods a conversion into a plantation will have to be ignored. In the sub-section at all relevant times there were the words "the commencement of this Act." The Act has provided in S.1 (3) thus: (3) The provisions of this Act except this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint. In the sub-section at all relevant times there were the words "the commencement of this Act." The Act has provided in S.1 (3) thus: (3) The provisions of this Act except this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint. Provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act, and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act, shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision." 6. The argument that was advanced was that the wording of S.82 (4) clearly indicated that conversion between 1-4-1964 and 1-11970 will have to be ignored because "after the commencement of this Act" occurring in sub-section (4) of S.82 can only mean after 1-1-1970. Counsel contended that since the words now occurring in the sub-section have come into force only on 1-1-1970 no question of ignoring the conversion arises because there has been no conversion admittedly after 1-1-1970. In other words is determining the ceiling area, which is necessary for deciding how much lands can be held by a person and how much lands will have to be surrendered for the purpose of the Act in the light of the provisions in S.83 and 85 of the Act, only conversions that have taken place after 111970 should be taken into account. This contention can be accepted only if we interpret the words "after the commencement of this Act" which occurred at all times in the section as applicable only to the sub-section that was introduced by Act 25 of 1971. We think we must understand the words "after the commencement of this Act" occurring in the sub-section in a different manner. The sub-section as it stood at all times provided for a certain consequence that conversions referred to in the sub-section should be ignored. The type of conversion to be ignored remained the same from 14-1964. For determination of the extent of the land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the time of conversion the conversion referred to in the sub-section will have to be ignored. The present section instead of using the words "owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person" uses the word "person". The present section instead of using the words "owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person" uses the word "person". There is a reason for this. Originally S.82 only provided for a ceiling limit on lands held by an adult unmarried person or a family But later S.82 (1) (d) provided a ceiling area "in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, " as well. This, we think, is the reason why the words "family or adult unmarried person" have been omitted and the word 'person' has been introduced into the present section. The change by adding plantation in the present section has become necessary because of the omission of plantation from Schedule II and it does not in any manner change the scope or applicability of the sub-section. Nor do we think that the omission of the words in the old sub-section "holding such land at the time of the conversion" has effected any material or for that matter any change in the import of the section. We understand these words only as descriptive of the person who converted the land. There is no other significance. The date of conversion is also immaterial as long as the conversion took place after 141964. We must also note the further difference introduced by the latest amendment introduced by Act 25 of 1971 by which it provided "...the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined.." The old sub-section (4) talked of the determination of the extent of the land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person. This alteration has also not introduced any material change. The determination of the one is necessary for the determination of the other and often flows from the determination of the first. When it is decided how much land can be held or owned by an adult unmarried person or a family or for that matter any other person, and the total extent of land held by the person is also determined, the extent of the land liable to be surrendered will automatically get ascertained. When it is decided how much land can be held or owned by an adult unmarried person or a family or for that matter any other person, and the total extent of land held by the person is also determined, the extent of the land liable to be surrendered will automatically get ascertained. The purpose of the statute is to get the excess land and the present section therefore emphasises the extent of the land to be surrendered and does not seem to be concerned about the extent of the land that can be held by a person; but it makes no change in substance. 7. To sum up, we find that there has been a provision from the inception, that is the date on which old S.82(4) of the Act came into force (1-4-1964 providing that the conversion of one class of land specified in the schedule to another class of land also specified in the schedule shall be ignored for the purpose of determination of the extent of land that can be held by an adult unmarried person or a family or a person for the purpose of this Act. We can therefore understand the sub-section as it stood at all relevant times as a "provision" which resulted in certain consequences; that the conversion of a certain type referred to in the sub-section will have to be ignored in determining the extent of the land that can be held by a person. If we look at sub-s. (4) as it stood at the relevant periods as a provision, then the question is when that provision can be said to have come into existence. Such a provision without any doubt came into force by virtue of the notification in accordance with the proviso to S.1 (3) of the Act on 141964. We must look at the substance of the matter and not at the garb that sub-section 4 of S.82 were at different periods. In substance there was a provision in the Act at the all relevant periods from 141964 providing that certain types of conversion should be ignored. This provision had been brought into force on 1 41964. It may be noted that sub-section (3) of S.1 also refers to the "provision" of the Act. In substance there was a provision in the Act at the all relevant periods from 141964 providing that certain types of conversion should be ignored. This provision had been brought into force on 1 41964. It may be noted that sub-section (3) of S.1 also refers to the "provision" of the Act. If a provision remained the same, substantially, and we have endeavoured to show that it so remained, notwithstanding the two amendments, the question is only when that provision came into existence. Undoubtedly the answer is 14 1964. 8. We should refer to another aspect of the matter, which also, we think, will preclude the petitioners from contending that the conversion that took place between 141964 and 111970 should be ignored. The effect of Act 35 of 1969 which substituted a new sub-section (4) of S.82 for the old one is that which follows on repeal and re-enactment. This rule must apply to the change to the sub-section introduced by Act 25 of 1971. It is a well accepted principle that a repeal will not wipe out the previous existence of a law unless there be express provision to that effect in the repealing Act or in cases of repeal and re-enactment there are provisions in the new enactment which either expressly or by necessary implication indicates a contrary intention. Provisions are made in the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, which is applicable, in S.4 and 23 saving the previous application of the laws that had been repealed. 4. Provisions are made in the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, which is applicable, in S.4 and 23 saving the previous application of the laws that had been repealed. 4. "Where any Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 23. Where any Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted." 9. We have already pointed out that in substance and in reality the sub-section as it has been re-enacted provided for the same thing which had been provided for by the old sub-section. There is nothing expressly provided in the re-enacted law and nothing arises by necessary implication that the prior application of the law repealed should be abrogated. In T. S Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras AIR. 1969 SC, 701 and Jayntilal Amratlal v. The Union of India and others AIR. 1971 SC. There is nothing expressly provided in the re-enacted law and nothing arises by necessary implication that the prior application of the law repealed should be abrogated. In T. S Baliah v. T. S. Rangachari, Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras AIR. 1969 SC, 701 and Jayntilal Amratlal v. The Union of India and others AIR. 1971 SC. 1193 it has been ruled that the quest must be not to find out whether there is any provision in the re-enacted law which expressly saved the repealed Act or its provisions but the search must be to find out whether there are provisions in the re-enacted law which militate against the operation of the existing law during the time that operated. Since there is no indication in the re-enacted provision the previous operation of the sub-section cannot be obliterated, If there was a liability incurred by a person to whom the Act applied to ignore any conversion of one class of land into another that liability will continue to exist even after 1-1-1970. The wording of sub-section (4) of S.82 as it stood clearly indicated that for the determination of the extent of the land that can be held or owned by a family or adult unmarried person, the conversion referred to in the subsection should be ignored. It appears to us that it does not matter when that determination should take place. That determination has to take place after 1-1-1970 in accordance with S.85 (5) of the Act. In so determining, the conversion shall be ignored. In other words the person who held or owned the land would not be heard to say that the real nature of the land that should be taken to be that in which it appeared at the time of determination if there has been conversion of the land after 141964. The determination will be made as if the land had not been converted. This is an important provision which has serious consequences, particularly when the conversion as in most of these cases, is of a dry land into a plantation. Plantations were and are exempted from the purview of the Act under S.81. The determination will be made as if the land had not been converted. This is an important provision which has serious consequences, particularly when the conversion as in most of these cases, is of a dry land into a plantation. Plantations were and are exempted from the purview of the Act under S.81. If the conversion is allowed to stand, the land which should have been reckoned for the purpose of determining the extent that could be held by a person would be diminished and therefore the extent that will have to be surrendered would also get diminished. This was sought to be averted by introducing sub-section (4) of S.82 and it thus clearly introduced a liability on the part of the person who held or owned the land, in that he will not be heard to say that the land must be looked at in the shape and form in which it appeared at the time of the determination, provided a conversion had taken place after 1-41964. Counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no law prohibiting the holding of land in excess of the ceiling area at any time before 1 1170 when the notification under S.83 of the Act prohibiting the holding or owning of land in excess of the ceiling area was issued. It has to be remembered that the ceiling area had been fixed by S.82 with effect from 141964. The exemptions were also applicable with reference to the state of affairs as on 1- 41964, S.81 of the Act having come into force also on 141964. Further exemptions arising from conversion were sought to be avoided by S.82(4) imposing an obligation on the part of every person who held or owned the land, by providing that such conversion will be ignored. Conversion could have a dual effect. At times conversion could be to an exempted category. Even if the conversion was not to an exempted category the area that could be held and so that which had to be surrendered will vary as a result of the conversion because the table of conversion in Schedule II provided different extents for reckoning the standard acre with reference to different class of lands. The purpose of the provision was also to avoid such variation. The purpose of the provision was also to avoid such variation. Thus the area to be held and so to be surrendered were to remain unaffected by conversion We cannot therefore look at these cases forgetting the existence of S.82(4) as it stood between 141964 and 111970. That was a valid law which has to be applied in determining the extent of land that could be held by a person and therefore necessarily in determining the extent of land that has to be surrendered. This is the manner in which the matter has been viewed by the Taluk Land Board in all these cases. We shall deal with each of them separately. 10. CRP. No. 1269 of 1974. 15.79 acres of dry land was converted by the revision petitioner in 1965 into rubber plantation. The Taluk Land Board had ignored this conversion. In the light of what we have stated above and in the light of the rulings of this court in P. R. Ramavarama Raja v. Land Board of Kerala 1973 KLT. 918 and Narayanan Namboodiri v. Taluk Land Board, Perintalmanna 1975 KLT. 171 this conversion has been rightly ignored. The order of the Taluk Land Board therefore calls for no interference. We dismiss this revision petition. CRP. No. 1503 of 1974. 11. 23.25 acres were converted into plantation after 141964 and before 1964. This conversion has been ignored by the Taluk Land Board and we think rightly. One other point was urged by counsel for the revision petitioner in this case. He appeared for a family consisting of eight persons, husband, wife and their six minor children. This family which had only five members in 1961 had alienated 6 acres of land. This alienation has been ignored in view of the provision in S.85(1) explanation. That explanation is in these terms: °85(1) Explanation. Where any land owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding land in excess of the ceiling area was transferred by such family or any member thereof or by such adult unmarried person, as the case may be, after the 18th December, 1957, and on or before the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963. in the Gazette, otherwise than (i) by way of partition; or (ii) on account of natural love and affection; or (iii) in favour of a person who was a tenant of the holding before the 18th December, 1957, and continued to be so till the date of transfer; or (iv) in favour of a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature solely for the purposes of the institution, the extent of land owned or held by such family or adult unmarried person shall be calculated for purposes of fixing the extent of land to be surrendered under this section as if such transfer had not taken place, and such family or adult unmarried person shall be bound to surrender an extent of land which would be in excess of the ceiling area on such calculation, or, where such family or person does not own or hold such extent of land, the entire land owned or held by the family or person; but nothing in this Explanation (a) shall affect the rights of the transferee under the transfer; or (b) shall apply in the case of any transfer of land by a family or any member thereof or an adult unmarried person if the extent of land owned or held by such family or adult unmarried person, as the case may be, immediately before the transfer was not in excess of the ceiling area specified in the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, and applicable to such family or adult unmarried person." With reference to the explanation (iv)(b) mentioned above counsel contended that if the family is taken to have had eight members at the time of the transfer, the transfer would be valid according to the provision of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961 and would be saved by that provision. It is not possible to understand the word 'family' occurring in clause (b) without reference to the number of persons in that family at the time of the transfer contemplated by that clause. It will be impossible to read the clause as contended by counsel. We negative this contention. This revision petition is also dismissed. C.R.P. No. 1642 of 1974: 12. It will be impossible to read the clause as contended by counsel. We negative this contention. This revision petition is also dismissed. C.R.P. No. 1642 of 1974: 12. This too was a case of conversion and that in the year 1965, of 15 acres of land principally cultivated with cashewnut trees which fell within the exemption contained in S.81(1)(f) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act as it stood at the time of the conversion. S.81(1)(f) with the explanation as it stood read as follows: "81. (1)... (f) cashew estates existing at the commencement of this Act and having a contiguous extent of ten acres or more. Explanation, For the purposes of this clause "cashew estate" shall mean dry lands principally cultivated with cashewnut trees;" 13. Schedule II too described a particular class of land as item 2 for the various Districts in the following manner: "Dry land principally cultivated with cashew" The conversion was of the 15 acres corning within this classification into a rubber plantation directly attracting the terms of sub-s. (4) of S.82. This conversion had therefore to be ignored. The contention that was raised by counsel was that the land that was converted was also exempted and therefore even without the conversion it has to be left out of reckoning for the purpose of determining the ceiling area and for determining the area to be surrendered. This argument failed to take note of the fact that the exemption had been omitted, and that the conversion has to be ignored because of the provisions in S.82 (4) of the Act. The combined effect of the omission of the exemption and the ignoring of the conversion by the compulsion of S 82 (4) is, to bring the converted land within the total area that had to be reckoned to determine the ceiling area as well as the land to be surrendered. The question that was considered by this court in the decision in Sivaramakrishnan v. State of Kerala and others 1973 KLT. 356 which has been relied on by counsel cannot help him. We therefore dismiss this revision petition as well. C.R P. No. 33 of 1975 14. The same question that arose in CRP. The question that was considered by this court in the decision in Sivaramakrishnan v. State of Kerala and others 1973 KLT. 356 which has been relied on by counsel cannot help him. We therefore dismiss this revision petition as well. C.R P. No. 33 of 1975 14. The same question that arose in CRP. No. 1642 of 1974 arises in this case The two petitioners are members of a family and they are made liable to surrender the land in excess under the Act on the basis of the shares they were supposed to hold in the family on 1 11970. For the reasons that we have stated in disposing of CRP. No. 1642 of 1974, we dismiss this civil revision petition also. 15. We direct the parties in all these cases to bear their respective costs.