ORDER C. M. Lodha, J.- 1. Two points have been urged in support of this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby it has been prayed that it may be declared that the petitioner was wrongly retired on the completion of age of 55 years and that he has also been wrongly fixed in Class 'C' Municipal Service. 2. It is not disputed that the petitioner had attained the age of 55 years on 24-6-68. The petitioner's contention is that he could not have been retired before the attained the age of 60 years. This contention is based on the ground that the petitioner was initially appointed in the erstwhile Gwalior State and was consequently governed by the Gwalior State Civil Service Rules. It is submitted that under Sec. 2, Para 10 of Sub-Sec. 2 of the said Rules, the superannuation age prescribed for Government servants like the petitioner was 60 years, To fortify this submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a Bench decision of this Court in Narain Prasad Bhatnagr v. State of M. P., MP No. 200 of 1971, decided on 12-10-72 3. We have gone through the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Undoubtedly it supports him. But, there is an insurmountable hurdle in the present case which takes it out of the purview of the authority relied upon by him. It may be pointed out that the impugned order in Narain pasad's case (supra) was of 22-10-71 by which the petitioner was to retire w.e.f 8-12-71. The writ petition in that case was filed on 6-12-71. However, in the present case, the petitioner was retired by order dated 18-5-68 (Annexure C) by which he was to retire w.e.f. 24-6-68. The present petition was filed on 23-8-71 i.e. admittedly after more than 3 years. It is candidly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a Civil suit did lie for declaration that the petitioner had been wrongly retired w.e.f. 24.6.68. It is also conceded that the limitation for such a suit would be 3 years. Consequently, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner's remedy by way of suit was barred on the date the present writ petition was filed. It is also conceded that the limitation for such a suit would be 3 years. Consequently, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petitioner's remedy by way of suit was barred on the date the present writ petition was filed. A serious question then arises whether we should grant relief to the petitioner in extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court even though his remedy by way of Civil suit had already been barred. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Caltex (Indian) Ltd, Indore v. Assistant Commissioner Sales-Tax, 1971 JLJ 505 and Haryana State Electricity Board v. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 1806 4. In Caltex (India) Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner of Sales-Tax (supra) it was held that where the mistake of law could be discovered by a ruling of the Madras High Court and also by the later rulings of the Supreme Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the petitioner in Madhya Pradesh could treat the date of the decision of the Supreme Court or the Madhya Pradesh High Court as the date of knowledge. In our opinion, the ratio of this decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Before the decision in Narain Prasad's case (supra) there is nothing to show that the law laid down by this Court or by any other competent Court was that the superannuation age of the petitioner would be 55 years and not 60 years. There was no question of the petitioner being misled on this point, and he could have filed a civil suit within limitation or could have moved this court for issuance of a direction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. within the limitation prescribed for a suit. 5. The authority of the Supreme Court referred to above and relied upon by the learned counsel is also completaly distinguishable. It was held in that case that the writ petition by a Government servant in connection with the fixation of his seniority could not be dismissed on the ground of laches or delay when it was shown that he had made representation and moved the appropriate authorities at all stages. There was no question of limitation involved in that case. It was held in that case that the writ petition by a Government servant in connection with the fixation of his seniority could not be dismissed on the ground of laches or delay when it was shown that he had made representation and moved the appropriate authorities at all stages. There was no question of limitation involved in that case. No doubt it was open to the petitioner to have made representation to the Government but the date of dismissal of such representation could not have extended the limitation. 6. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that this is not a fit case in which we should exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. 7. There is yet another aspect of the matter and it is this that the petitioner had an alternate, adequate and efficacious remedy by way of civil suit and it was not pointed out to us how it would have been onerous. For that reason also we are not inclined to interfere by way of writ juisdiction. 8. It would not be out of place here to draw attention to Notification No. 2110-CR-2569-IV-R-I, dated 12th November 1959, published in the M. P. Rajpatra of 20th November 1959 at page 1609 (Part I) by which the State Government decided that subject to the reservations mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Notification all Government servants under their Rule making control including those who were employed for the affairs of any of the Constituent State immediately before the 1st November 1956 would be governed by the set of Rules mentioned therein. Amongst those Rules item No.1 is:- "The old Madhya Pradesh Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules, as amended from time to time, in relation to matters other than leave Rules ... ... … …All Government servants. We are inclined to think that this Notification has some bearing on the case, but since the attention of the learned Judges who decided Narain prasad's case (supra) was not drawn to it, we do not consider it necessary to examine the implications of this Notification of this case. 9. Be that as it may, so far as the present case is concerned, suffice it to say that the petitioner is liable to be nonsuited on the ground of lachas and alternate remedy. 10. 9. Be that as it may, so far as the present case is concerned, suffice it to say that the petitioner is liable to be nonsuited on the ground of lachas and alternate remedy. 10. As regards other points, the learned counsel submitted that the matter of fixation of the petitioner is still under consideration of the Government and, therefore, he would not press it before this Court. We, therefore, refrain from deciding the other points. 11. In view of what we have said above, the petition is devoid of substance. The same is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.