JUDGMENT : N.D. Ojha, J. A report was submitted by the Inspector of the Rent Control Department on 6th of September, 1973 to the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, that the accommodation in question had been in the tenancy of one Girdhari Lal, that the said Girdhari Lal had shifted to his own house in Mohalla Iftikharabad and that the Petitioner was occupying the accommodation in question in an unauthorised manner. According to the Inspector, in the circumstances, the accommodation in question could be declared vacant. On the receipt of the report the persons concerned were given notice to file objections. It further appears that some applications were made for allotment of the said accommodation. Two such applications had been made by Respondents 4 and 5. The Petitioner filed an objection along with an affidavit. A copy of the objection and the affidavit has been attached as Annexure II to the writ petition. From a perusal of the affidavit it appears that the case of the Petitioner was that the accommodation in question had teen taken on rent by a joint Hindu family comprising of Girdhari Lal and the Petitioner and that the contract of tenancy on behalf of the joint Hindu family was made through Girdhari Lal who was its manager Karla. It was further stated in the affidavit that the family continued to reside in the said accommodation, that the family got constructed house No. 90/240, Iftikharabad, Kanpur, and certain members of the family shifted to the said newly constructed house in the year 1960-61. The Petitioner, his wife and children, however, continued to occupy the accommodation. In the alternative the Petitioner's case was that in the beginning of the year 1972 by way of abundant caution a fresh contract of tenancy was made whereby the Petitioner was accepted as a co-tenant along with Girdhari Lal by the landlord. It is on those facts that the Petitioner asserted that the accommodation in question could not be deemed to be vacant as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the Petitioner had failed to substantiate his case as set up in the affidavit stated above. It is on those facts that the Petitioner asserted that the accommodation in question could not be deemed to be vacant as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the Petitioner had failed to substantiate his case as set up in the affidavit stated above. It was held by the Prescribed Authority that the accommodation in question would be deemed to have been vacated by its tenant within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act. Subsequently an order allotting the accommodation in question was passed in favour of Respondent No. 4. An appeal was filed by the Petitioner and another appeal was filed by Respondent No. 5 against the order of allotment in favour of Respondent No. 4. The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the Petitioner and allowed that of Respondent No. 5 with the result that the order of allotment passed in favour of Respondent No. 4 was set aside and the house was ordered to be allotted in favour of Respondent No. 5. Aggrieved the Petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. It was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that the accommodation in question had never fallen vacant nor could it be deemed to have fallen vacant within the meaning of Section 12 and accordingly the order of allotment passed in favour of Respondent No. 5 was without jurisdiction. In support of his submission it was urged that the accommodation in question had been in the tenancy of the joint Hindu family comprising of the Petitioner and Girdhari Lal and even though Girdhari Lal shifted to the newly constructed house the Petitioner in the capacity of a member of the joint Hindu family was entitled to occupy the accommodation in question and if he continued to occupy it as such no vacancy occurred. In the alternative it was urged that in view of the subsequent contract of tenancy entered into in the beginning of 1972 the Petitioner was a co-tenant along with Girdhari Lal and even on this ground the accommodation in question could not be declared to be vacant. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that there is no substance in this submission. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that there is no substance in this submission. The Prescribed Authority came to a categorical finding that the Petitioner had failed to establish that he was a member of the joint-Hindu family of Girdhari Lal or was occupying the accommodation in question in that capacity. From the order of the Additional District Judge it is clear that he was in agreement with this finding of the Prescribed Authority. In this view of the matter it could not be said that the Petitioner was entitled to occupy the accommodation in question as of right being a member of the joint Hindu family which was the tenant. At best what could be said in favour of the Petitioner was that he was occupying the accommodation in question along with Girdhari Lal as a member of his family (not as a member of a joint Hindu family which was the tenant). Even if the Petitioner continued to occupy the accommodation in question after Girdhari Lal shifted to his own house in the years 1960/61 it cannot be said that the petitioner became a tenant in his own right. In law it would be Girdhari Lal who would be the tenant. 4. In so far as the plea raised by the Petitioner that there was a fresh contract of tenancy in the beginning of 1972, whereunder he became a co-tenant or a joint-tenant along with Girdhari Lal is concerned, suffice it to say that this plea has been specifically negatived by the Additional District Judge. He has recorded a categorical finding that the Petitioner neither paid rent in his own right before the coming into force of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, nor was rent payable by him. 5. It was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that his case that a fresh contract of tenancy had been entered into in the beginning of 1972 found corroboration from the statement of the Munim of the landlord. According to counsel the Additional District Judge was not right in not placing reliance on the statement of the Munim merely on the ground that he was a poor and unacceptable substitute for the landlord or Girdhari Lal who according to the Additional District Judge were the best persons to give evidence in regard to the fresh contract of tenancy. According to counsel the Additional District Judge was not right in not placing reliance on the statement of the Munim merely on the ground that he was a poor and unacceptable substitute for the landlord or Girdhari Lal who according to the Additional District Judge were the best persons to give evidence in regard to the fresh contract of tenancy. In my opinion there is no substance in the submission either. 6. As is apparent from the affidavit filed before the Prescribed Authority the parties to the fresh contract of tenancy were the Petitioner, the sitting tenant Girdhari Lal and the landlord. Nothing has been shown to me to indicate that it was ever the Petitioner's case that the said contract of tenancy was entered into in the presence of the Munim aforesaid. In the circumstances only those persons could give evidence in regard to the contract of tenancy who were parties to the contract. It is not the Petitioner's case that Girdhari Lal or the landlord was not available for being produced as a witness. In this context if the Additional District Judge was of the view that reliance could not be placed on the statement of the Munim it cannot be said that he committed any manifest error of law justifying this Court to set aside his finding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further no copy of the statement of the Munim has been filed along with the writ petition and it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that the Munim had made any such statement which corroborated the case of the Petitioner in this behalf. The other evidence which the Petitioner had produced in support of his case of being a joint tenant along with Girdhari Lal after the aforesaid fresh contract of tenancy was in the nature of rent receipts. The first rent receipt was dated 14th August, 1972, by which rent for the period commencing on 1st of January 1972, ending on 15th July, 1972, was said to have been paid by the Petitioner. The other two receipts were dated 28th of August, 1973 and 2nd of November, 1973. The first rent receipt was dated 14th August, 1972, by which rent for the period commencing on 1st of January 1972, ending on 15th July, 1972, was said to have been paid by the Petitioner. The other two receipts were dated 28th of August, 1973 and 2nd of November, 1973. The Additional District Judge has come to the conclusion that the receipt dated 14th August, 1972, had been interpolated on its basis it could not be inferred that Madan Lal, the Petitioner, had been accepted to be a co-tenant from before 15th of July, 1972 viz., the date on which the Act aforesaid came into force. Photostat copies of the aforesaid three receipts have been filed along with the counter-affidavit. A perusal of the receipt dated 14th August, 1973 indicates that it had originally been issued in the name of Girdhari Lal alone. Subsequently the words “through Shri Madan Lal” were added. The space in between the words and the size of the letters make it clear that these words were not written at the time when the original receipt was granted. Not only that the words “through Shri” were scored out subsequently so as to indicate that the tenant was Girdhari Lal Madan Lal. A bare perusal of the receipt dated 14th August, 1972 makes it clear that the Additional District Judge was right in taking the view that there was interpolation in the receipt dated 14th August, 1972. The subsequent two receipts are dated 28th August, 1973 and 2nd November, 1973. They cannot certainly be used as evidence to prove that the Petitioner had been a tenant of the accommodation in question either exclusively or as a joint tenant from before 15th July, 1972. These receipts could be of help only if the receipt dated 14th August, 1972 was found to be genuine because on the Petitioner's own case it was the first receipt issued after the alleged fresh contract of tenancy entered into in the beginning of 1972. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the Additional District Judge committed any manifest error of law in taking the view that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he had been accepted as a co-tenant along with Girdhari Lal in the beginning of 1972. 7. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the Additional District Judge committed any manifest error of law in taking the view that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he had been accepted as a co-tenant along with Girdhari Lal in the beginning of 1972. 7. On the basis of a review application filed by the Petitioner before the Prescribed Authority on 3rd March, 1975, a copy of which has been attached as Annexure VI to the writ petition, it was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that the Petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the new Act in view of the facts stated in the said application even if he was not entitled to the benefit of that section on the case set up by him in the affidavit filed by him earlier along with his objection referred to above. I find it difficult to accept this submission. Firstly, no evidence has been brought to my notice which have been produced by the Petitioner before the Prescribed Authority in support of the facts stated in the review application. Unless the facts stated therein were proved by producing some evidence no finding could be recorded on the basis of those facts which cannot be placed on a footing higher than that of a pleading. It is settled law that pleading itself is not proof. Secondly, a perusal of the order of the Additional District Judge indicates that no arguments were advanced before him on the basis of the facts stated in the review application. It has not been stated in the writ petition that arguments on the basis of the facts stated in the review application were addressed before the Additional District Judge and yet he did not consider those arguments. In those circumstances the Petitioner is not entitled to make this submission for the first time in the writ petition. 8. It was then urged by counsel for the Petitioner that no specific finding had been recorded either by the Prescribed. Authority or by Additional District Judge that it was Girdhari Lal who was paying the rent even after he vacated the accommodation in question in the year 1960/61 and shifted to his own house. 8. It was then urged by counsel for the Petitioner that no specific finding had been recorded either by the Prescribed. Authority or by Additional District Judge that it was Girdhari Lal who was paying the rent even after he vacated the accommodation in question in the year 1960/61 and shifted to his own house. So far as this submission is concerned, suffice it to say that it was not the Petitioner's case before the authorities below that rent receipts had been issued in his name after the year 1960/61. Even the three receipts which had been filed by the Petitioner were in the name of Girdhari Lal Madan Lal, the first being interpolated as already pointed out above. The case set up by the Petitioner was that it was joint Hindu family which was the tenant till the beginning of the year 1972 and thereafter Girdhari Lal became a co-tenant with the Petitioner. It is thus clear that the Petitioner's case was that so far as Girdhari Lal is concerned he continued to be the tenant throughout firstly as Karta of joint Hindu family till the beginning of 1972 and thereafter as a joint tenant along with the Petitioner. If the case of the Petitioner that it was the joint Hindu family which was the tenant or that there was a fresh contract of tenancy in the beginning of 1972 by virtue of which he became a joint tenant along with Girdhari Lal is not correct, the inescapable conclusion is that Girdhari Lal was the tenant in his individual capacity and he continued to pay the rent not only for the period prior to 15th of July, 1972, but even for the period thereafter, may be through the Petitioner. Further, if the order of the Additional District Judge is read as a whole it leaves no doubt that he was of the view that it was Girdhari Lal who continued to be the tenant of the accommodation in question and the mere fact that rent may have been paid through the agency of the Petitioner would not make the Petitioner a tenant of the said accommodation. In this context and in view of the case set up by the Petitioner himself the fact that no specific finding was recorded by the Additional District J udge that Girdhari Lal was paying the rent is of no consequence. 9. In this context and in view of the case set up by the Petitioner himself the fact that no specific finding was recorded by the Additional District J udge that Girdhari Lal was paying the rent is of no consequence. 9. It was then urged that the Additional District Judge had also not recorded any finding that the joint Hindu family was not the tenant. According to counsel if the joint family was the tenant, the accommodation in question could, not be deemed to be vacant u/s 12 of the Act. There is no substance in this submission also. Even if for the sake of argument it is accepted that it was the joint family which was the tenant and continued to be the tenant even after the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force, the accommodation in question could still be deemed to vacant in view of the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. The said Sub-section (3) with its proviso reads: (3) In the case of a residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to cease to occupy the building under his tenancy. Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family had built any such residential building before the date of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from the said date. On the Petitioner's own case as set out in the affidavit filed by him before the Prescribed Authority, a copy of which is filed as Annexure II to the writ petition, the family got constructed house No. 90/240 Iftikharabad, Kanpur. If the family was the tenant and the said family had “built” a residential building before the commencement of the Act the proviso to Sub-section (3) was clearly attracted. The date of commencement of the Act is 15th July, 1972. In view of the proviso the tenant, viz. If the family was the tenant and the said family had “built” a residential building before the commencement of the Act the proviso to Sub-section (3) was clearly attracted. The date of commencement of the Act is 15th July, 1972. In view of the proviso the tenant, viz. the joint Hindu family, shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under its tenancy upon the expiration of a period of one year from 15th July, 1972, i.e., on 15th of July, 1973. Admittedly the accommodation in question was held to be vacant and an order of allotment was passed in respect thereof after one year from the commencement of the Act. The view which I take in this behalf finds support from a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 414 of 1974, Mangal v. Smt. Krishna Devi, decided on 12th May 1976. Counsel then urged that if Girdhari Lal and not the joint Hindu family was the tenant the proviso to Section 12(3) would not be applicable because Girdhari Lal was not occupying the accommodation in question on and after the commencement of the Act. I am unable to accept this submission also. If the tenancy was subsisting, even if Girdhari Lal was not physically occupying the accommodation in question on the commencement of the Act and thereafter but the Petitioner was occupying it on his behalf, it is Girdhari Lal and not the Petitioner who would in law be the occupant of the accommodation in question us a tenant thereof. 10. Lastly it was urged that the authorities below should have, in the circumstances of the case, allotted the accommodation in question to the Petitioner. No such plea was raised before the said authorities and they cannot now be blamed for not doing so. I may also point out that the Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the amendment made in Section 14 by U.P. Act 28 of 1976 because as is clear from the supplementary counter affidavit of Respondent No. 5 and its annexures proceedings for ejectment of the Petitioner were pending on the date when the Amending Act came into force. 11. No other point has been pressed. 12. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The parties will however, bear their own costs. 11. No other point has been pressed. 12. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The parties will however, bear their own costs. The Petitioner is given one month's time to vacate the accommodation in question.