JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J. 1. THIS is a tenant writ petition directed against the order of the prescribed authority and appellate authority allowing the landlord's application for release under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. THE opposite party no. 3 Munna Lal is the owner of the house no. 35/ 39, Thatheri Bazar, Allahabad. It is a double storyed building of which the entire first floor and the whole of the ground floor excepting two rooms are in the petitioner's tenancy. The landlord is in occupation of only two Kotharis on the ground floor. He applied for release of the portion in occupation of the petitioner under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act on the grounds that the said portion was required by him for his personal use and occupation and that the entire house was very old and dilapidated and required reconstruction. It may also be mentioned at this very stage that while the outer room of the ground floor had been purchased by the landlord through sale deed dated 3rd January, 1968, the inner room was later acquired by him by means of another sale deed executed in April 1970. The landlord's case was that he was using the other room as a shop for purposes of his business whereas he was residing in the Kothri adjacent to it inside the ground floor portion. The landlord also claimed the benefit of Explanation (iv) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The application was resisted by the petitioner on the grounds, inter alia, that the outer shop was in occupation of another tenant Pyare Lal and the inner room, though occupied by the landlord, was not used for residential purposes but as a godown, that explanation (iv) was not applicable to the facts of the case, that the house was in a sound condition and it was not necessary to demolish it. The application was allowed by the prescribed authority which recorded the findings that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required reconstruction, that explanation (iv) was attracted, that the need of the landlord was genuine and the accommodation was bona fide required by him. The application was allowed by the prescribed authority which recorded the findings that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required reconstruction, that explanation (iv) was attracted, that the need of the landlord was genuine and the accommodation was bona fide required by him. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 22 of the Act but the appellate authority confirmed the order of the prescribed authority and affirmed its findings. These two orders have been impugned in this writ petition. 3. THE first ground of attack was that explanation (iv) of Section 21 (1) (a) was not applicable to the facts of the case. The controversy revolves round the language of explanation (iv). The application of the opposite party no. 1 was admittedly made under Section 21 of the Act, the relevant portion of which along with the explanation reads as follws : "(1) THE prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely......... (2) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction ; Explanation-In the case of a residential building- (iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for residential Purposes shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide required by the landlord." (Emphasis added) 4. THE word 'building' should not give rise to any difficulty of interpretation as it is defined in Section 3 (i) of the Act as follows-: " 'building' means a residential or non-residential roofed structure and includes- (i) any land (including any garden), garages and outhouses appurtenant to such building ; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building ; (iii) any fittings and fixtures affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof ; This statutory definition is not in any manner inconsistent with the normal meaning of the term 'building' as used in popular parlance i.e. an edifice or structure. The U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, however, did not define the term 'building' but defined 'accommodation.' According to the settled usage; of these two expressions in the English language it can be safely inferred that while 'building' denotes a larger entity, 'accommodation' may signify only a part of it. In my opinion the word 'building' which occurs thrice in explanation (iv) was not intended to be used in the ordinary sense of the term, but was intended to bear a more restricted meaning so as to equate it with 'accommodation'. The term 'building' has been defined in the Act, but the defining provision i. e. Section 3 itself opens with the words "unless the context otherwise requires". Considering carefully the context in which explanation (iv) has been incorporated in the scheme of the Act, it appears to me that whenever the term 'building' occurs in this explanation, it should be deemed to be a synonym for 'accommodation.' Thus, if the whole building is either occupied by the landlord or let out to the tenant, the whole of the building becomes 'accommodation'. On the other hand, if the entire building is split into several parts, each one of which is let out to a particular tenant, the building shall be deemed to consist of several distinct accommodations. If two parts of a building are structurally or otherwise so distinct from each other as to be regarded as completely independent in themselves, each one of them would constitute a distinct accommodation and not part and parcel of one accommodation. If two parts of a building are structurally or otherwise so distinct from each other as to be regarded as completely independent in themselves, each one of them would constitute a distinct accommodation and not part and parcel of one accommodation. Therefore, the test that I would formulate for determining whether or not the two portions in dispute in the instant case can be regarded as parts of the same accommodation is whether the portion sought to be vacated and the one already in occupation of the landlord are so interlinked as to form one compact unit. This conception of a single unit may be the result of a variety of factors, such as structural compactness, proximity of situation, contiguity or even the sharing of certain indispensable, common amenities, such as a common use of water tap, bathroom, staircase, passage etc. In my opinion the right approach for giving effect to the scheme and object of explanation (iv) is to examine as to whether the portion occupied by the landlord and the portion sought to be vacated can be taken as forming a single independent, allottable unit. This test, to my mind, can be directly related to the underlying object of explanation (iv). It is notable that the applicability of explanation (iv) is confined to cases where any accommodation is occupied by the landlord for residential purpose and not for commercial or other purpose. Therefore, the underlying purpose of the explanation seems to protect certain interests of the landlord, such as his privacy, his claim to exclusive occupation and his anxiety not to be disturbed in his possession. If the landlord were residing in an accommodation along with a tenant who happens to be troublesome, there would be abundant source of friction between them arising from such things as joint user of certain amenities. This would obviously become a very distracting factor for the landlord. It was in order to guard against such undesirable consequences that the Legislature choose to incorporate in the Act certain provisions which would guarantee a basic protection to the landlord. This would obviously become a very distracting factor for the landlord. It was in order to guard against such undesirable consequences that the Legislature choose to incorporate in the Act certain provisions which would guarantee a basic protection to the landlord. The essential purpose and objective of framing such rule was summed up by the Full Bench of this Court in R. K. Singh v. State of U. P., 1970 ALJ 592 at page 611 in these words : "The diversity of cases in which the question of application of the rule will arise will be vast and therefore no hard and fast test can be laid down for determining when the portion falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the landlord can be regarded as portions of one accommodation, but the guiding principle will no donbt be the underlying idea behind the framing of the rule, namely that the two portions should be so situated or should be so governed by such circumstances that the owner is likely to be seriously inconvenienced if he is not allowed to have a tenant of his choice either because the proposed tenant is troublesome or otherwise unacceptable to the landlord or because the common living in portions of the accommodation is likely to bring about friction between the owner and the tenant unless both are accommodative." Although the Bench was dealing with Rule 7 framed under Act III of 1947, yet the same observations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the provisions of the present Act. Therefore, in my opinion the expression 'building' in the present context should be regarded as synonymous with 'accommodation'. A contrary interpretation would give rise to anomalous results. When the word 'building' is used for the second time in explanation (iv), the word should be construed as signifying an accommodation. If this restricted construction were not adopted, it would lead to an absurd position. These words are immediately followed by the words "the remaining part whereof". If 'building' occurring in the second and third places were identified with the whole structure or edifice, the explanation would be completely excluded unless the entire remaining portion of the building irrespective of contiguity etc. was in the exclusive occupation of the landlord. This would manifestly unjust. These words are immediately followed by the words "the remaining part whereof". If 'building' occurring in the second and third places were identified with the whole structure or edifice, the explanation would be completely excluded unless the entire remaining portion of the building irrespective of contiguity etc. was in the exclusive occupation of the landlord. This would manifestly unjust. To take an illustration, if a building consists of twenty rooms out of which eighteen are occupied by the landlord himself, one by a tenant against whom an application under Section 21 has been made, and another occupied by another tenant, it cannot be said that the remaining part of the building is in the occupation of the landlord alone. The remaining part would be in the occupation of the landlord besides one other tenant. Still, however, if the room occupied by the landlord is contiguous to the one in dispute or approachable through a common passage or a common latrine, bath room etc., have to be shared by the inmates of the two, there is no reason why the landlord should not be able to invoke the benefit of explanation (iv). 5. SIMILARLY if the words 'part of a building' are equated with the whole building or structure, it may in certain cases give undue benefit to the landlord which would not be justified. Again to take an illustration, if a building consists of 20 rooms out of which the room in dispute is situate at one extremity of the building and another room at the other extremity is occupied by the landlord and the remaining 18 rooms are occupied by different tenants and there is nothing in common between the two rooms at the respective extremities the landlord cannot successfully invoke the benefit of explanation (iv) even though he is literally in occupation of a part of the same building. Where the portion in dispute sought to be vacated is a small or insignificant portion and there is no vital link between the two portions except that they are parts of the same big building, it would be highly unjust to give any special protection to the landlord and make such accidental factor conclusive proof of his bona fide requirement. It would be wholly repugnant to the spirit of the Act. It would be wholly repugnant to the spirit of the Act. It was for this reason that while interpreting Rule 7 of U. P. Act III of 1947 Hon. Pathak, J. in the case of Shyama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad, 1967 AWR 229 (2) held that the Rule was not attracted in that case. It was observed as follows :- "It would, therefore, appear that there are two distinct units of residence. It cannot be said that when Hajela vacated the part occupied by him a portion of it fell vacant and the petitioner was in occupation of another portion of that part. Rule 7 would apply where the accommodation occupied by a tenant is also occupied in part by the owner. In other words, it would refer to an accommodation where a portion of it is in the joint use of the owner and the tenant." The same view was expressed by Tandon, J. in Srimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, 1958 AWR 853. In that case the petitioner (owner) was herself occupying one of the tenements while the rest of the building was in the occupation of about 15 or 20 tenants. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the quarters were independent of one another. The High Court rejected the argument that inasmuch as the quarters were part of the same building they must be deemed to be portions of the same accommodation for the purposes of Rule 7 of the Rules. It was held that a building containing a large number of tenements, distinct from one another, was not the same thing as accommodation used in Rule 7 and that the mere fact that two or more apartments or tenements were joined together structurally or happened to exist adjacent to one another did not render them as portions of one accommodation and that each one of them was a separate accommodation which could comprise of a part of a building also. Thus, the conclusion is that in explanation (iv) the term 'part of the building' must be held to be synonymous with 'accommodation'. 6. APPLYING the above tests to the facts of the present case, I am inclined to hold that the landlord was entitled to the benefit of explanation (iv) to Sec. 21(1). Thus, the conclusion is that in explanation (iv) the term 'part of the building' must be held to be synonymous with 'accommodation'. 6. APPLYING the above tests to the facts of the present case, I am inclined to hold that the landlord was entitled to the benefit of explanation (iv) to Sec. 21(1). The landlord being in occupation of two Kothris on the ground floor which are contiguous to the remaining portion on the ground floor occupied by the petitioner, they are so vitally connected with each other so as to constitute a single unit of accommodation. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that since one of the two rooms in dispute was admittedly used by the landlord as a shop, explanation (iv) would be ruled out. This contention must be rejected. Once the preliminary conditions for the applicability of explanation (iv) are fulfilled, any superfluous factor can be safely omitted. The use of the outer room as a shop is a wholly irrelevant factor. Therefore I am of opinion that the prescribed authority and the learned District Judge arrived at the right conclusion. 7. THE second ground of attack was that it was not open to the authorities to allow the application for release both on grounds (a) and (b) of Sec. 21(1). Sri K. C. Saxena vigorously argued that if the release in favour of the landlord was ordered under both the clauses, the tenant would be greatly prejudiced inasmuch as he would be deprived of the benefit of Sec. 24(2) of the Act. I am unable to find any bar to an application under Sec. 21 for the release of a building being made on both the grounds (a) and (b). There is absolutely no prohibition that the application for release must be made and allowed on one of the grounds only. The language of Section 21 permits the prescribed authority to order the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation if any of the two grounds exists. The grounds, therefore, are not mutually exclusive. The landlord may base his application under Sec. 21(1) on both the grounds (a) and (b), but it is not obligatory on the prescribed authority to accept both the grounds. If the eviction is ordered on ground (b) alone, the landlord cannot be permitted to deprive the tenant of the benefit contemplated by Section 24(2). The landlord may base his application under Sec. 21(1) on both the grounds (a) and (b), but it is not obligatory on the prescribed authority to accept both the grounds. If the eviction is ordered on ground (b) alone, the landlord cannot be permitted to deprive the tenant of the benefit contemplated by Section 24(2). In such a case it would be open to the tenant to apply to the District Magistrate for allotting to him the new building which has been constructed after demolition of the old one. Likewise, where the release order obtained by a landlord under clause (a) of Section 21 (1) is abused, the tenant can have recourse to the remedy provided in sub-Section (1) of Section 24. Thus, where a landlord secures an order of release with respect to a building which he proposes to occupy after demolition and reconstruction, but he fails to demolish and reconstruct the same within two months or such extended period as the prescribed authority may allow him, then the prescribed authority or the District Judge, as the case may be may on an application made in that behalf by the tenant place him in occupation of the building on the original terms and conditions. Similarly where the landlord secures the release order on the ground of bona fide need for occupation of an accommodation by himself or any member of his family etc. but he does not occupy it himself or does not confer any such person to occupy it, then also possession can be restored to the tenant of the building on the original terms and conditions. 8. WHERE the release order has been passed on both the grounds (a) and (b), the landlord is entitled to the eviction of the tenant on both grounds. It follows that eviction can be made on the ground of bona fide need alone also even though the order is based on both grounds. There is no inherent contradiction between the grounds (a) and (b). Ground (a) has a wider genus which incorporates ground (b). Clause (a) does not use the words 'dilapidated condition', which implies that the legislature visualised the demolition and reconstruction of a building even in cases other than those where a building is in dilapidated condition. For example, a landlord may choose to efface an existing archaic building and replace it by one of modern style. Clause (a) does not use the words 'dilapidated condition', which implies that the legislature visualised the demolition and reconstruction of a building even in cases other than those where a building is in dilapidated condition. For example, a landlord may choose to efface an existing archaic building and replace it by one of modern style. Therefore, clause (a) is wide enough to include cases of reconstruction and demolition and if the finding of bona fide need has once been recorded in favour of the landlord, he would not be adversely affected merely because the release order has been granted on both grounds. Thus, I am unable to find any conflict between grounds (a) and (b) of Section 21(1). In the case in hand even apart from explanation (iv) to Section 21, respondents nos. 1 and 2 arrived at a concurrent finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide and, therefore, the release application was considered and allowed on merits. In this connection it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the learned District Judge did not make a correct appraisal of the comparative needs of the landlord and tenant. I do not think it is possible for me to disturb this finding of fact in exercise of my writ jurisdiction. There does not appear to be any manifest error in the conclusions reached by respondents 1 and 2. It has now been ruled by a Full Bench of this Court in C. K. Shah v. District Judge, Varanasi, 1976 AWC 50 that Rule 16(2) of the Rules framed under the Act is ultra vires of Section 21 of the Act and, therefore, it is not necessary to make any comparative estimate of the needs of the landlord and tenant when the release is sought by the landlord under Section 21(1) (a). It is true that the Full Bench decision was concerned with the interpretation of Rule 16(2) and not Rule 16(1). Nevertheless, the Full Bench decision contains an interpretation of the basic provisions of the Act, viz. Section 21 (1) (a). The ratio of the case was that while dealing with a landlord's application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) it was sufficient that the prescribed authority should record a finding that the building was bona fide required by the landlord. Section 21 (1) (a). The ratio of the case was that while dealing with a landlord's application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) it was sufficient that the prescribed authority should record a finding that the building was bona fide required by the landlord. Once that crucial finding was recorded, it was sufficient to entitle the landlord to release and it was outside the jurisdiction of the prescribed authority to proceed to make a comparison of the needs of the parties. It is significant that the Full Bench decision did not approve of the view taken by a Division Bench in Gorakhnath Yagnik v. State of U. P., 1975 AWC 276, and the views expressed in Roshan Lal v. Ramo Devi, 1975 AWC 124 and Chunnu Lal v. District Judge Allahabad, 1975 AWC 390 which were authorities for the proposition that even though the need of the landlord was bona fide, permission could not be granted without comparing the needs of the landlord and tenant. Thus, in the present case, in view of the concurrent findings recorded by respondents 1 and 2 that the building in dispute was bona fide required by the landlord, the order releasing the same in his favour was perfectly sound in law. 9. IN the end Sri K. G. Saxena raised some minor points also for challenging the impugned orders. He contended that the order passed by the prescribed authority was vitiated inasmuch as he made local inspection of the accommodation in dispute after the arguments in the case were over. In my opinion such local inspection was absolutely necessary for the proper decision of the case in view of the peculiar circumstances which existed at the time. In brief the position was this that in the first instance there was a report submitted by the commissioner on 19-4-73 (annexure 3) to the effect that the inner kothri on the ground floor was in the occupation of the landlord and was used for his residence, a [/act which was in great controversy between the parties. Thereafter another report had been submitted by the Engineer on behalf of the landlord on 17-9-1973 wherein it was pointed out that the whole house had outlived its life and required demolition. Thereafter another report had been submitted by the Engineer on behalf of the landlord on 17-9-1973 wherein it was pointed out that the whole house had outlived its life and required demolition. As against this, on behalf of the tenant also the report of an Engineer dated 10-10-73 (annexure 4) was submitted to the effect that the building was in good and habitable condition and did not require demolition and reconstruction. The Engineer who made this report was one Sri Bhagwati Prasad. It is curious that the same engineer submitted another report dated 11-11-73 (annexure P to the affidavit) stating that certain portions were so rickety that they might fall down any moment and that the house required demolition and reconstruction. In this medley of conflicting reports the only way to find out the correct position was that the prescribed authority should have personally made local inspection. That was precisely what it chose to do and that is why its report dated 11-1-1974 (annexure 5) was made on personal inspection "after giving due notice to the parties". A provision to this effect has been expressly made in Rule 17 of the Rules which says that : "(1) Before allowing an application for release of a building under Section 21 (1) (b) on the ground that it is required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the prescribed authority shall satisfy itself- (i) that the building requires demolition; " Thus, the petitioner cannot take exception to the fact that the prescribed authority made a personal inspection before giving the decision. 10. LASTLY, my attention was drawn to the fact that the prescribed authority completely misdirected itself by considering certain documents after the argument was over and behind the back of the petitioner. This objection has no substance because the documents referred only to the question as to whether the landlord had sufficient means to effect reconstruction of the house or not. Primarily that is a matter between the prescribed authority and the landlord. Rule 17 requires that before allowing an application for release of a building the prescribed authority must satisfy itself that a proper estimate of expenditure over the proposed demolition and new construction has been prepared, that a plan has been duly prepared and conforms to the bye-laws or regulations of the local authority and that the landlord has the financial capacity for the proposed demolition and new construction. All these documents related entirely to this aspect of the matter and paragraphs 21 and 22 of the counter-affidavit explain why the documents had to be filed at that stage and could not be filed earlier. It has been averred in the counter-affidavit that the plan had already been submitted to the Nagar Maha-palika. It was only through demand notice dated 12-2-1974 that the landlord was asked to deposit the charges. In these circumstances this was an important piece of evidence and the paper had to be filed on 12-2-1974. The receipts had already been filed and, therefore, the documents were not new documents at all. The petitioner could not be said to have been prejudiced by these documents being placed on record. Moreover, if the petitioner wanted to rebut this documentary evidence he had ample opportunity to do so at the appellate stage. These documents were relevant only for ground (b) of Section 21(1) read with Rule 17. Even if these documents were excluded from consideration ground (b) alone would be affected, because they have no bearing at all on ground (a) of Section 21 (1) on which also the release application had been allowed. Thus, the impugned orders do not suffer from any apparent error of law. There is no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. However, in the circumstances of the case the petitioner is granted three months' time from today to vacate the accommodation in dispute. Petition dismissed.