Judgment :- 1. These revisions arise respectively out of O. A. Nos. 443/71, 363/71, 364/71 and 361/71. The original applications were laid by four different kudikidappukars for purchase of kudikidappu under S.80B of Art 1 of 1964 against the common land owner. There were two other similar applications also. The contention of the landowner in all the cases was that he is in possession of only 4 acres and 55 cents of land, and consequently, the total number of kudikidappukars in his property, namely ten, were together entitled to get only 50 cents of land. The Land Tribunal ordered the six purchase applications substantially accepting the contention of the landowner. Four of the applicants went in appeal, while two applicants acquiesced in the order passed by the Tribunal. The appellate authority, however, took the view that each of the kudikidappukars is entitled to purchase ten cents, and the appeals were accordingly allowed. These revisions are directed against that order. 2. The only question that arises for consideration is whether each of the respondents in these revisions is entitled to only 5 cents of land as contended by the revision petitioners or to ten cents of land as held by the appellate authority. There is no dispute that the revision petitioners themselves hold only 4 acres and 55 cents. The reasoning adopted by the appellate authority is that the wife of the original respondent landowner has 1 acre and 19 cents of land in her possession, and when that also is added to the property owned by the original owner then the total area exceeds five acres. The contention of the revision petitioners, who are the heirs of the original respondent landowner is that their mother got only a life estate under Ext. D4 regarding that 1 acre and 19 cents. On going through the document I am satisfied that there has been an absolute transfer of the property by the executant in favour of her children even in 1961 subject to a right to take the usufructs from certain items during the life time of the settlor. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt regarding the exact nature of the right which the wife of the original respondent possessed in relation to the disputed 1 acre and 19 cents. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt regarding the exact nature of the right which the wife of the original respondent possessed in relation to the disputed 1 acre and 19 cents. What has to be considered is whether the life interest so held is property held for for the purpose of S.80A(12)(b) of the Act 1 of 1964. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (12) of S.80 S.80A may be read: "12. For the purposes of this section, [a] the extent of land held by a person shall be the total extent of land held by such person, either as owner or as tenant, on the 1st day of July, 1969; [b] in calculating the extent of land held by a person who is a member of a family and the number of kudikidappukars in the lands held by such person, the extent of the land held individually by any member of his family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family, and the number of kudikidappukars thereon shall also be taken into consideration;" To attract clause (a) the property should be held by the concerned person "either as owner or as tenant". The expression "either as owner or as tenant" is not repeated in sub-clause (b). The question is whether this omission is of any consequence. I am inclined to answer in the negative for more reasons than one. Clause (a) deals with the property held by the concerned person. The object of clause (b) is to tack on the property held by some other person also in determining the rights and liabilities of the person affected by clause (a). It is difficult to presume that in the case of properties held by third parties (no doubt members of the person's family) no particular capacity was in contemplation. Clause (b) has to be read with clause (a). It is difficult to presume that in the case of properties held by third parties (no doubt members of the person's family) no particular capacity was in contemplation. Clause (b) has to be read with clause (a). Even if clause (b) is to be read in isolation I do not think that any difficulty will arise in understanding the intention of the legislature because the expression, "to hold land" is defined in S.2 (59) of the Act in the following terms: "'to hold land' means to be in possession of land as owner or as tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant; or in respect of any land owned by the Government, to be in occupation either as lessee or otherwise;" If the intention behind clause (a) cannot be read into clause (b), then certainly the definition clause will apply for interpreting clause (b). So for the purpose of clause (b) also the property in question must be held "either as owner or as tenant or partly as owner or partly as tenant". Reference may be made in this context to S.80A(4) which deals with the relative rights as between the landowner and the kudikidappukars based upon the extent held by the landowner There too it is specifically mentioned that the land is to be held by the person "either as owner as tenant". Thus for more reasons than one it has to be held that when land falling under clause (b) of sub-section 12 of S.80A is to be taken into consideration in a given case the holding with respect to that land also must be in the capacity "either as owner or as tenant". The 1 acre and 19 cents of land from which the wife of the original landowner was entitled to take usufructs cannot be treated as property being held by her "either as owner or as tenant" within the meaning of the Act. It follows, therefore, that the 1 acre and 19 cents held by the wife of the original landowner cannot be added to the property of the original landowner for the purpose of determining the extent within the meaning of S.80A(12) of the Act. The appellate authority was in error in proceeding on the basis that de facto possession alone is relevant to attract clause (b) of sub section (12) of S.80A. The Tribunal has made the correct approach. The appellate authority was in error in proceeding on the basis that de facto possession alone is relevant to attract clause (b) of sub section (12) of S.80A. The Tribunal has made the correct approach. In the result, the order passed by the appellate authority in each one of these cases is hereby set aside, and the order passed by the Tribunal in the concerned cases is restored. All the revisions are allowed. No costs. Allowed.