JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the landlord of an accommodation of which one Aftab Ahmad Khan was the tenant. It transpires that Aftab Ahmad Khan was transferred to Unao. Thereafter applications were made for the allotment of the said accommodation one such application was mode by respondent No. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer required the Inspector of his department to make a local inspection and submit a report. A report was submitted by the Inspector informing the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the tenant Aftab Ahmad Khan had vacated the accommodation and that it would he deemed to be vacant and available for allotment. On the receipt of the report of the Inspector persons concerned were given notice to file objection, if any. From the order of the additional District Judge as also from paragraph 4 of the writ petition it is apparent that even the petitioner was given such a notice. The petitioner in place of making any application for release in his favour on the ground that the accommodation was needed by him, took up the case that it was not at all vacant. He, however, did not file any objection but supported the objection filed by the Jawad Hasan Khan who claimed to be the brother-in-law of the erstwhile tenant Aftab Ahmad Khan. According to Jawad Hasan Khan he was occupying the accommodation and as such it cannot be deemed to be vacant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not agree with the objection raised by Jawad Haan Khan which was supported by the petitioner and passed an order of allotment in favour of respondent No. 3 on 20th December 1972. Thereafter the petitioner made an application, a copy of which Annexure II to the writ petition on 2nd of January, 1973, reiterating his earlier stand that the accommodation in question was not vacant. In the alternative he prayed that the accommodation in question be released in his favour. He also made a second application on 23rd October 1973, with a specific prayer for cancellation of the order of allotment passed in favour of respondent No. 3. This application was really in the nature of are view application under section 16(5) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. He also made a second application on 23rd October 1973, with a specific prayer for cancellation of the order of allotment passed in favour of respondent No. 3. This application was really in the nature of are view application under section 16(5) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The case of the petitioner was that the order of allotment had been procured by respondent No. 3 by practising fraud on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The fraud, which according to the petitioner was perpetrated on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, was that respondent No. 3 was actually occupying another accommodation as a tenant but in the application for allotment he made a statement that he was occupying the accommodation as a guest or the landlord, one Shri Khurana, Rent Control and Eviction Officer after considering the material placed by the petitioner in support of his application dated 2nd January, 1973, came to the conclusion that no fraud had been practised by respondent No. 3 in obtaining the order of allotment. The application dated 2nd January, 1973, was accordingly dismissed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer also stated in his order that the need of the landlord is not made out. The order is dated November 11h, 1974. Against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer an appeal was filed by the petitioner which was dismissed by the IVth Additional District Judge on January 25, 1975. It is these orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Additional District Judge which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the order of allotment passed in favour of respondent No. 3 by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was without jurisdiction inasmuch as he had passed the said order without disposing of the application filed by the petitioner for release of the said accommodation. This argument was apparently based on the facts stated in paragraph 7 of the writ petition. During the course of arguments counsel had, however, to concede that no application for release had been made by the petitioner before the order of allotment dated December 20, 1972, was passed in favour of respondent No. 3. The submission made by counsel, therefore, is misconceived. 3. During the course of arguments counsel had, however, to concede that no application for release had been made by the petitioner before the order of allotment dated December 20, 1972, was passed in favour of respondent No. 3. The submission made by counsel, therefore, is misconceived. 3. In so far as the impugned orders are concerned no such other error has been brought to my notice which may justify these orders being quashed in a writ petition. As seen above, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated November 11, 1974 had been passed in proceedings under section 16(5) of the Act aforesaid. The said sub-section is inter alia to the effect that where the landlord of a building comprised in an order of allotment satisfied the District Magistrate that such an order was not made in accordance with clause (a) of section 16(1) the District Magistrate may review the order. As such, at the instance of the petitioner, who was the landlord, 1 the order of allotment passed in favour of respondent No. 3 could be reviewed only if he was able to satisfy the District Magistrate as aforesaid. The petitioner has failed to substantiate that the order of allotment had not been made in accordance with clause (a) of section 16(1). The only ground which was passed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Additional District Judge in support of the submission that the order of allotment had not been made in accordance with clause (a) and which has been negatived by them was that the said order had been obtained by fraud. 4. It may be pointed out that in so far as the plea of the petitioner that the accommodation in question was not vacant is concerned, it was on his own case without any substance. It was not disputed on behalf of the petitioner that Aftab Ahmad Khan had been transferred to Unnao and had joined his duties there and had also shifted along with his family. What was urged was that ha brother-in-law Jawad Hasan Khan was occupying the accommodation in question and some goods of the erstwhile tenant were also there. It was not disputed on behalf of the petitioner that Aftab Ahmad Khan had been transferred to Unnao and had joined his duties there and had also shifted along with his family. What was urged was that ha brother-in-law Jawad Hasan Khan was occupying the accommodation in question and some goods of the erstwhile tenant were also there. Sub section (1) of section 12 of the Act provides that a landlord or enant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. "Family" is defined in clause (g) of section 3 of the Act. The brother-in-law of the tenant is not included in definition of the term "family". Even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the brother-in-law of Aftab Ahmad Khan was occupying the accommodation in question, he not being a member of the family of Aftab Ahmad Khan the accommodation in dispute could be deemed to be vacant under section 12 of the Act since Aftab Ahmad Khan along with his family had shifted to Unnao on his being transferred. It is thus apparent that the petitioner was supporting the wholly unmerited case of Jawad Hasan Khan just in order to avoid the accommodation in question being allotted in favour of respondent No. 3. 5. Coming to the plea that the order of allotment dated December 20, 1972, had been obtained by respondent No. 3 by practising fraud it would be seen that in paragraph 4 of the writ petition itself it has been stared that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order on November 18, 1972, to the effect that the petitioner may file an application for release by November 22, 1972, otherwise the accommodation in dispute would be allotted. The order of allotment was thus not passed by keeping him in the dark. It is in this background that the plea aforesaid has to he considered. The order of allotment was thus not passed by keeping him in the dark. It is in this background that the plea aforesaid has to he considered. The authorities below after considering the material on record have found that respondent No. 3 had not practised any fraud in obtaining the order of allotment in his favour. That finding is essentially a finding of fact and cannot be challenged in writ petition. 6. An application was made today for summoning the record of the Sales Tax Office, Allahabad, on the assertion that the said record would indicate that respondent No. 3 had made a declaration to the effect that he was occupying the house of Shri Khurana aforesaid as a tenant. It was urged that if it was so the order of allotment would obviously be vitiated by fraud inasmuch as it was obtained by respondent No. 3 by making a wrong statement in his application about the nature of his occupation of the house of Shri Khurana. Reliance was placed on sub-rule (5)(c) of Rule 10 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. This sub-rule is to the effect that no building shall ordinarily he allotted to the persons or for the purposes of residential accommodation of a person already occupying a building governed by the Act or any public premises other than any premises granted to him free of rent in connection with the discharge of any duties of public nature and situated any where in the State or any member of the family of such person or any person of whose family he is a member, except where such person will vacate the other building or public premises at the time of allotment. Before clause 5(c) of Rule to could be applicable it had be shown that the house of Shri Khurana, which according to the petitioner was being occupied by respondent No. 3 as a tenant, was governed by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. No such material has been brought to my notice which may indicate that the said house is governed by the Act aforesaid. Even in the application for summoning the record of the Sales Tax Office and the affidavit accompanying the said application no such assertion has been made. No such material has been brought to my notice which may indicate that the said house is governed by the Act aforesaid. Even in the application for summoning the record of the Sales Tax Office and the affidavit accompanying the said application no such assertion has been made. In this view of the matter clause (5)(c) of Rule 10 was not at all attracted. 1 do not, therefore, consider it expedient to summon the record of the Saves Tax Office as prayed in the application referred to above. The said application is dismissed. 7. Since as seen above there is no material to indicate that the house of Shri Khurana which respondent No. 3 is said to have been occupying as a tenant is governed by the Act it cannot be said that respondent No. 3 made any deliberate misstatement of fact in his application for allotment just to procure the order of allotment in his favour. No ingredient of fraud is made out. Neither the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nor the appellate authority can be said to have committed any manifest error of law in taking the view that the order of allotment had not been procured by respondent No., 3 by practising fraud. 8. It was then urged that since there was no period of limitation prescribed for making an application for release the prayer contained in this behalf in the application dated January 2, 1973, ought to have been considered even though the said application had been made after the actual passing of the order of allotment in favour of respondent No. 3. On the facts of the instant case I am of opinion that the petitioner's contention in this behalf too does not deserve to be accepted. 9. Here the accommodation in question was vacant and the petitioner was given an opportunity to make an application for release if he so desired before the order of allotment was passed in favour of respondent No. 3 but the petitioner did not choose to make any such application and continued to reiterate that the accommodation in question was not vacant since it was occupied by the brother-in-law of the erstwhile tenant. It is not one of those cases in which it can be said that the petitioner was denied any opportunity of putting forth his claim for the release of the accommodation before passing the order of allotment. In this view of the matter even if the prayer made by him for release of the accommodation in question in his favour in the application dated January 2, 1973, deserved to be otherwise considered and has not been considered, it is not a fit case in which this Court will be justified in issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders. In this connection it would also be relevant to point out that the petitioner did not come even to this Court with clean hands. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition an assertion was made that the order of allotment made on December 20, 1972, was passed without considering and deciding the release application which was filed by him before the said order of allotment was passed. This was clearly wrong statement of fact. However, the statement of fact was such that if true it would have constituted a good ground for quashing the impugned orders and the writ petition may very well have been admitted on the base of this statement of fact and the ex parte order of stay dated March 12, 1975, may have been passed on this very ground. A Full Bench of this Court in Asiatic Engineering v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 Allahabad 746 held that a person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution must cone with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant facts from the Court, must refer in from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts. If the facts are stated in such a way as to mislead and deceive the Court, there is a power inherent in the Court, in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process, to discharge the interim order and to refuse to proceed further with examination of the merits of the application. If the facts are stated in such a way as to mislead and deceive the Court, there is a power inherent in the Court, in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process, to discharge the interim order and to refuse to proceed further with examination of the merits of the application. In my opinion the writ petition, indeed, deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 10. Lastly on the basis of certain facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit it was urged that respondent No. 3 has since been transferred to Kanpur and as such the order of allotment deserves to be set aside. Reliance in this behalf was placed on section 12 (3-A) as inserted by U. P. Act 28 of 1976. The said subsection (3-A) is to the effect that if the tenant of a residential building holding a transferable post under any Government or local authority of a public sector corporation or under any other employer has been transferred to some other city, municipality, notified area or town area, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building with effect from the thirtieth day of June following the date of such transfer or from the date of allotment to him of any residential accommodation (whether any accommodation be allotted under this Act or any official accommodation is provided by the employer) in the city, municipality, notified area or town area to which he has been so transferred, whichever is later. It has not been stated in the rejoinder affidavit that any accommodation has been provided to respondent No. 3 at Kanpur. Further the respondents did not have any opportunity to meet the facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit inasmuch as under the Rules of the Court the respondents are not entitled as of right to file any further affidavit in reply to the rejoinder-affidavit. If the facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit are correct and if the requirements of sub-section (3-A) aforesaid are made out it would be open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, to take such proceedings as may be considered proper. 11. No other point has been pressed. 12. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 11. No other point has been pressed. 12. In the result the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The ex parte order of stay dated March 12, 1975, is confirmed on May 16, 1975, is vacated.