Judgment :- KAILASAM, J: 1. This petition is referred to a Bench by Koshal, J. The question that arises for consideration is the scope of the amended S. 6 clause (a) (ii) proviso of the Land Acquisition Act. A notification under Sub-S.(1) of S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 15th March 1967 and was published in the Government Gazette on 29th March 1967. Simultaneously, a declaration under S. 6 dispensing with the objections under S. 5-A was also passed. The petitioner challenged the declaration under S 6 in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, namely, W.P. No. 2793 of 1968, and which was disposed of on 21st January 1970, striking down the declaration on the ground that no case for dispensing with the objection under S. 5-A of the Act had been made out. The authorities then invited objections under S. 5-A and decided to issue a fresh declaration under S. 6, which was published on 9th September 1971. The main ground that was urged was that under the first proviso no declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4. The proviso is important and is extracted: “Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under S. 5 Sub-S.(1), published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication”. It is common ground that this case falls squarely under this proviso. The notification under S. 4(1) was made on 29th March 1967 and the local amendment (Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, came into force on 20th January 1967. Therefore, the notification under S. 4 (1) was published after the commencement of the Ordinance of 1967. The declaration under S. 6 was made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification under S. 4(1). 2. On behalf of the State, it was contended that as the proceedings were held up due to the pendency of the writ proceedings before this court, the litigant should not be allowed to take advantage of the stay granted by the court, and therefore, the period during which the writ petition was pending should be excluded in computing the period. On behalf of the State, it was contended that as the proceedings were held up due to the pendency of the writ proceedings before this court, the litigant should not be allowed to take advantage of the stay granted by the court, and therefore, the period during which the writ petition was pending should be excluded in computing the period. In support of such a view, the learned Government Pleader relied on the jugement of a single Judge of this court in W.P. No 642 of 1969 and another judgment in W.P. Mo. 2397 to 2399 of 1976. Ismail, J. in W.P. No. 642 of 1969 held that the general principle that the pendency of proceedings before a court cannot operate to the prejudice of the parties will come into operation so that the period for which the acquisition proceedings remain stayed by reason of an order of the court would be excluded for the purpose of determining the period of three years mentioned in the proviso. Alagiriswami, J. in W.P. 2397 to 2399 of 1966 took the same view. The learned Judge obser ved— “It is a well established proposition of jurisprudence that no order passed by a court can be allowed to injure a litigants interest. The petitioners, having obtained an order of stay, cannot now be allowed to take advantage of that stay order to urge that notwithstanding the order of stay, the Government should either have issued a fresh notification under S. 4(1) or that they would be debarred from issuing a declaration under S. 6, if they did not do so within ten years of the promulgation of the Ordinance”. With respect, we are unable to accept the view taken by the learned Judges. The proviso is unequivocal in that it provides that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under S. 4 Sub-S.(1) shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication. The period of limitation in the case of debt relief enactments, which stay the filing of suits, it is specifically provided that certain periods, during which the matter was pending before courts should be excluded. It is legislative practice to provide for such exclusion. No such exclusion is provided in the proviso. The period of limitation in the case of debt relief enactments, which stay the filing of suits, it is specifically provided that certain periods, during which the matter was pending before courts should be excluded. It is legislative practice to provide for such exclusion. No such exclusion is provided in the proviso. We do not think that there would be any justification for reading into the proviso the words which are not there. We respectfully agree with the view of the referring Judge, Koshal, J. who was of the view that the proviso is couched in unambiguous language and there is no scope for exceptions being grafted on to it. The learned Judge proceeded to observe that the principle that an act of court shall prejudice nobody is well established, but then, it will not apply to a specific legislative measure providing limitation which does not except from its domain causes which are delayed by reason of issuance of a court order. We agree with the above view and hold that the period of three years specified in the proviso is absolute and that any time during which writ proceedings are pending cannot be excluded. In this view, the decision of Ismail, J. and Alagiriswami, J. will have to be held as not good law. 3. In the result, the petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.