Order.- This petition is preferred by one Nachimuthu Gounder for modification of the order dated 4th December, 1975 passed by this Court in Crl.M.P. Nos. 2069 and 289o of 1974, by deleting certain observations made in the said order. 2. Before mentioning the grounds mentioned by the petitioner in the affidavit filed by him, in support of this petition, it is necessary to indicate certain facts relating to the proceedings leading to this petition. 3. It is the common case that the first respondent herein viz., Sellammal filed a criminal complaint in C.C. No. 362 of 1969 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sankari, against her husband Nachimuthu Gounder (second respondent herein) and others for an offence of bigamy alleged to have been committed by the said Nachimuthu Gounder, which ultimately ended in his acquittal. Against the said order of acquittal, the first respondent Sellammal filed a criminal appeal in C.A.No. 252 of 1970 on the file of this Court. It seems that before this Court both parties entered into a compromise on 6th March, 1973 which provided, inter alia, that her husband (first respondent herein) should settle some properties in favour of his wife Sellammal and should also restore some gold jewellery weighing about eight sovereigns or their value within one year from the date of the said compromise. The learned Judge also ordered that in case the second respondent herein failed to handover possession of the properties and to restore the jewels, the first respondent herein could take appropriate action in the matter. The second respondent had. also given an undertaking to restore to the first respondent the gold jewellery or their value and had represented that he had already executed a settlement deed in respect of the properties in favour of Sellammal (first respondent). This compromise was entered into after the said appeal was adjourned on several occasions spreading for a period of over one year. The settlement deed mentioned by the second respondent had been executed by him and his father (fifth respondent herein) on 19th December, 1972. According to Sellammal, the first respondent herein, she had been put in possession of the said properties in February, 1974 in pursuance of the said settlement deed. The settlement deed mentioned by the second respondent had been executed by him and his father (fifth respondent herein) on 19th December, 1972. According to Sellammal, the first respondent herein, she had been put in possession of the said properties in February, 1974 in pursuance of the said settlement deed. While so, S. Nachimuthu Gounder, the present petitioner, filed O.S. No. 868 of 1974 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Sankari, against Sellammal, her father and her brothers, alleging that he bad purchased the said properties in execution of a money decree in O.S. No. 870 of 1972 on the file of Sub-Court, Salem, obtained by one Kaliappan against the second respondent (Nachimuthu Gounder, Sellammal’s husband), which purchase was also confirmed on 30th October, 1973. The case of the petitioner is that he has taken delivery of the properties on 18th April, 1974 through Court and is in possession thereof since then. While so, Sellammal had filed two petitions in Crl.M.P. Nos. 2069 and 2891 of 1974 in this Court. Crl.M.P. No. 2o69 of 1974 was for a direction clarifying the compromise order dated 6th March, 1973 in Crl.A.No. 252 of 1970 since the value of the gold had not been fixed in the said order. The other petition Crl.M.P.No. 289 of 1974 was to direct respondents 2 and 5 herein to discharge the encumbrance over the properties settled in her favour by the settlement deed dated 19th December, 1972 or to direct them to convey some other property without any encumbrance. 4. It transpires from the affidavit filed in Crl.M.P. No. 2891 of 1974 by one Subramaniam, brother of Sellammal, that the said Kaliappan, the decree-holder in O.S.No. 870 of 1972, is no other than the uncle of the second wife of Nachimuthu Gounder (second respondent herein) that the present petitioner, viz., the auction-purchaser is another uncle’s son of the second wife of Nachimuthu Gounder, that all of them had colluded together and that respondents 2 and 5 herein had. allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte and the execution proceedings to be proceeded with. Thus, it is mentioned that all of them, in collusion and with the mala fide intention of cheating Sellammal and depriving her of her lawful share in the properties settled in her favour and putting her in trouble, had created all these transactions. allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte and the execution proceedings to be proceeded with. Thus, it is mentioned that all of them, in collusion and with the mala fide intention of cheating Sellammal and depriving her of her lawful share in the properties settled in her favour and putting her in trouble, had created all these transactions. Thus by the said petition, Sellammal had prayed for reconsideration of the order passed on 6th March, 1973 in C.A.No. 252 of 1970. The second respondent filed a counter stating that the properties, which were the subject-matter of the settlement deed, were never attached as alleged by Sellammal and in any event the respondents therein were not all aware of any attachment over the properties. Finally he submitted that he had no other property and that the prayer of Sellammal for direction was not maintainable. Under these circumstances, Krishnaswamy Reddy, J., after hearing both parties, passed a consolidated order in Crl.M.P. Nos. 2069 and 2890 of 1974. Now, the petitioner herein, the auction-purchaser, seeks to modify the said order by deleting the following portion contained therein: “I am prima facie of the view that the respondents in collusion with the said decree-holder allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte and allowed the properties under the settlement deed alone to be brought to sale in pursuance of the decree in O.S. No. 870 of 1972. I have made these observations just to indicate that the petitioner has got a good defence in O.S.No. 868 of 1974 on the file of the District Munsif of Sankari at Salem filed by the collusive auction-purchaser.” 5. In the affidavit filed in support of this petition, the petitioner has alleged that he purchased the properties in the Court-auction in execution of the decree in O.S.No. 870 of 1972. He avers that since the first respondent attempted to give him trouble, he filed O.S.No. 868 of 1974. At the time when that suit came up for trial, the first respondent Sellammal (defendant in the said suit) gave notice of certain documents to be filed under the provisions of Order 13, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. One of the documents sought to be produced is the impugned order passed by this Court in Criminal M.Ps.Nos. At the time when that suit came up for trial, the first respondent Sellammal (defendant in the said suit) gave notice of certain documents to be filed under the provisions of Order 13, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. One of the documents sought to be produced is the impugned order passed by this Court in Criminal M.Ps.Nos. 2069 and 289) of 1974, and the first respondent sought to rely on certain observations made by this Court in the said order. According to petitioner, he was not a party to the above proceedings. He would state that he never colluded with any of the parties as indicated in the observations made by this Court and that he is 2 bona fide purchaser for consideration in the Court-auction without any notice of any collusion or otherwise among the respondents or between any of the respondents and the decree-holder. According to him, he is greatly prejudiced in the trial of the suit by the observations. He, therefore, prays that the observations may by deleted as it would otherwise put him to heavy and irreparable loss and hardship. 6. Mr.K. Doraiswami, appearing for the petitioner, would contend that the present petitioner was not a party to any one of the proceedings mentioned above and more so to the petitions on which the impugned order has been passed and hence the observation which has been made behind the back of the petitioner has to be removed from the order, as it would otherwise cause serious hardship and prejudice to his case now pending before the District Munsif, Sankari. He would very much argue, that there was no collusion between the petitioner and the second respondent or any one of the other respondents, so as to defeat the compromise order passed in Crl.A.No. 252 of 1970 or to deprive Sellammal of her legitimate share. He would further say that as be was a third party to these proceedings between the first respondent and the other respondents herein, he was not aware of any of the circumstances that led to the compromise or to the settlement effected. 7. It is true that this petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before this Court either in the criminal appeal or in the subsequent miscellaneous petitions. 7. It is true that this petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before this Court either in the criminal appeal or in the subsequent miscellaneous petitions. But, at the same time, it is not seriously disputed that the petitioner is related to Nachimuthu Gounder (second respondent), husband of Sellammal, by the latter’s alleged second marriage. 8. Mr. Jagadeesan, appearing for the respondents, would contend that the observations made by the learned Judge is justified because of the compelling circumstances present in this case. He would further his argument, contending that this Court, due to the prohibition imposed under section 362 of the new Code, corresponding to section 369 of the old Code, cannot alter or, review the order which has already been passed by a Judge of this Court except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error, that the modification sought for, if granted, would be tantamount to passing a fresh order entirely different from the original order that has been passed, that when once a final order is passed the Court has no power either to alter or to review the same as the Court becomes functus officio and that if at all the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order he must take up the matter by way of appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. Mr. Doraiswami would cite a catena of cases in support of his contention, all of which deal with the powers of the High Court under the provisions of section 561-A of the old Code, corresponding to section 482 of the new Code. In G. Vasantha Pai, In re1, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamanner, C.J., and Ganapatia Pillai, J., observed thus: “No instance was cited at the Bar by the learned Attorney-General in which a High Court invoked its inherent power to expunge from the judgment of a Judge of the High Court any remarks or observations. A judgment of a single Judge of this Court whether it be on the original side, or on the appellate side, in civil or criminal proceedings, is a judgment of the High Court. We do not think that a Division Bench or a fuller Bench of this Court has the power to delete passages from the judgment of this Court delivered by a single Judge. We do not think that a Division Bench or a fuller Bench of this Court has the power to delete passages from the judgment of this Court delivered by a single Judge. The High Court is a Court of record and that is another reason why we have no power to direct any expunging from the judgment of a learned Judge which is a part of the record of this Court." But, the law en this point has now been settled by the Supreme Court in its decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohamed Naim2, wherein their Lordships have held that the High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge the remarks made by it or by a lower Court, if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process: of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, and that the said jurisdiction is, however, of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only. 10. Reliance was placed on another decision Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar3, wherein it was held that the High Court, has inherent power to expunge objectionable remarks in the judgment or order of a subordinate Court against a stranger after it has become final. 11. Thus, it is clear that the High Court has power to expunge the remarks made by it, but that exists only in exceptional rases in order to prevent the abuse of the process of Court or where the ends of justice require that the observations made by the learned Judge should be modified or altered. As this Court wanted some clarification on the question of law, Mr.C.K. Venkatanarasimhan, a senior Counsel of this Bar, was appointed amicus curiae to render his help in arriving at the conclusion whether this Court could modify its own order or observation. Mr.C.K. Venkatanarasimhan would submit that this Court cannot review or alter its order as it is barred under section 362 of the new Criminal Procedure Code, because when once a judgment or final order disposing of a case has been signed no Court can alter or review it save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any civil law. Mr.C.K. Venkatanarasimhan would submit that this Court cannot review or alter its order as it is barred under section 362 of the new Criminal Procedure Code, because when once a judgment or final order disposing of a case has been signed no Court can alter or review it save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any civil law. Then relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above, he would contend that only in very rare and exceptional cases the Court could expunge any remarks or observations made by it, if it is so needed to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. According to him, the observations made by the learned Judge in this case cannot be said to fall under any exceptional category so as to warrant the invocation of this Court’s inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. However, he has submitted that the civil Court before which the matter is now pending can decide the issue before it on the facts of the case afresh after taking necessary evidence and hearing the parties. 12. After a reading of the order of the learned Judge including the impugned observations, it is clear to my mind that the view has beer expressed by the learned Judge as the facts prima facie appeared to him. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned Judge has not finally determined the issue regarding the facts of the case now pending before the civil Court and the impugned observation will not fall under any exceptional category so as to enable this Court to in voice its inherent jurisdiction to modify the same. Further, Mr. Doraiswami himself, in support of the proposition that the civil Court is not bound by any observation made by a criminal Court and that it can come to its independent conclusion on the available facts before it, cited the decision in Venkatapathi v. Balappa1, wherein it was held that it lies upon the civil Court to undertake an independent enquiry before itself of the absence of any reasonable and probable cause and that it is not permissible for that Court to examine the judgment of the criminal Court in order to ascertain the grounds upon which the acquittal proceeded and the views taken by the trial Magistrate of the evidence. In another case Kutumba Rao v. Venkataramiah2, cited by the learned Counsel, it has been observed that it is the duty of the civil Court to consider the evidence adduced in support of the defendant’s version and assess its value for finding the reasonable and probable cause by going behind the acquittal. Lastly, he cited Krishnan Asari v. Adaikkalam3, wherein Venkatadri, J., has observed that any decision of a criminal Court cannot be relied upon as one binding in a civil action and equally the findings in a civil proceedings are not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations. Thus, there are catena of decisions to hold that a civil Court is not bound by any observation made in a criminal case and it is for the civil Court to try the issue before it and come to an independent conclusion of its own on the available materials placed before it. 13. In the above circumstances, I am of the view that the order made by the learned Judge does not need any modification and the inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be exercised in this case. It is for the respective parties to agitate the matter before the civil C°urt by adducing necessary oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. 14. In the result, the petition is dismissed. 15. I place on record my gratitude for the assistance rendered by Mr.C.K. Venkatanarasimhan as amicus curiae in this case.