LODHA, J.—By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed that the order by the Director of Industries, Rajasthan, Jaipur dated August 20, 1974 by which the allotment of plot No. 30(P) in the Industrial Area, Alwar made in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled and the earnest money deposited by the party forfeited on account of the alleged failure of the petitioner to set up the industry on the said plot within the time prescribed in the lease deed and the Rajasthan Industrial Area Allotment Rules, 1959 (which will hereinafter for the sake of shortness be referred to as the Rules), may be quashed. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this petition are these : The petitioner which is a partnership firm, applied to the Government of Rajasthan for allotment of some land in the industrial area, Alwar and by a lease deed dated August 27, 1970 (Exhibit-1) plot No. 30-A measuring 3.75 acres was allotted to the petitioner on lease for a period of 99 years for the purpose of setting up a pre-mixed granulated fertilizers industry within a period of two years from the date of taking over possession of the land. Admittedly the petitioner got possession of the land on August 22, 1970. The petitioners case is that on account of its failure to obtain raw materials for setting up the said industry, it could not carry out the condition of putting up that particular industry for which the lease had been granted in its favour, even though it had raised some construction on the plot. Consequently the petitioner applied to the Government that it may be permitted to put up a barium component industry instead of granulated mixed fertilizers industry. An application to that effect is stated to have been made some time in 1971. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it could not obtain the requisite material to start even a barium component industry. In the meanwhile, there was some change in the personnel of the firm also and, therefore, the Government was approached that the lease may be converted in favour of M/s. Pioneering Products instead of M/s. Kamal Mixed Fertilizers in whose favour the lease had originally been granted This M/s. Pioneering Products, it is stated, was able to secure a process for manufacture of Paraffin Max from Slack Max. The matter pertaining to the change in the name of lessee as also change in the type of industry remained pending before the Department of Industries. But the petitioner neither succeeded in getting the lease changed in the name of M/s. Pioneering Products nor in getting another type of industry substituted in place of granulated mixed fertilizers industry for which the lease had been taken. A lot of correspondence passed through the petitioner and the department in this connection, which has been mentioned and reproduced in detail in the writ petition, 3. But I do not think it necessary to refer to all that. Ultimately the Assistant Director of Industries and Civil Supplies Department, Alwar by his letter dated October 25, 1972 issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why the land be not deemed to have reverted to the Government on account of the failure on the part of the petitioner to set up the industry for which the lease had been taken. A few more letters exchanged between the party and the Government. However, again by letter dated May 24, 1974 the Joint Director of Industries, Rajasthan, Jaipur called upon the petitioner to submit its reply within 15 days of the receipt of the notice as to why the possession of the land be not taken back by the Government on account of its failure to set up the industry for which the lease had been taken, lest it would be deemed that petitioner had nothing to say against the proposed action of the Government to taken back possession of the land. It appears that the petitioner did not submit any reply and consequently the impugned order Exhibit- 16 came to be passed on August 20, 1974 to which reference has already been made in the earlier part of this judgement. 4. Mr. It appears that the petitioner did not submit any reply and consequently the impugned order Exhibit- 16 came to be passed on August 20, 1974 to which reference has already been made in the earlier part of this judgement. 4. Mr. Mridul learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following points in support of this petition : (1) That the Director of Industries, Rajasthan, Jaipur who passed the impugned order Exhibit-16 had no jurisdiction to do so, as the power to cancel the allotment made under the Rules had not been delegated to him by the Government; (2) That the order is bad because the Government was itself a party to the agreement namely, the lessor and a party cannot be judge in it own cause, and (3) That no opportunity had been given to the petitioner by a competent authority to show cause for the action taken against it namely, cancellation of allotment and resumption of land by the Government. 5. The writ application has been opposed on behalf of the Government, which has also filed a written reply to the writ petition, as well as the other officers impleaded as non-petitioners in the case. 6. So far as the first point raised on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, learned counsel has relied upon section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act). It is argued by him that State Government had never delegated its power under the said Act in respect of the Rules to the Director of Industries It is true that no notification of delegation of powers by the Government to the Director of Industries has been put on record by the opposite parties. But it is contended on behalf of the State that no such delegation is required, inasmuch as the lease deed as well as the Rules provide that if the industry for which the lease has been granted has not been set up within a period of two years on the land allotted for the purpose, the land shall revert to the Government, unless the period of two year is extended by the Government, for valid reasons. At this stage, I may observe that the Rules have been made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 100 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 7. At this stage, I may observe that the Rules have been made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 100 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 7. I may here reproduce certain relevant Rules bearing on the subject:— 1-A Industrial areas defined—The expression "Industrial areas" shall mean an area of land which may have been reserved and set apart, or may hereafter be reserved or set apart, under sec 92 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, for the purpose of setting up an industry or industries. xx xx xx 7. Setting up of industries—Industries shall be set up within a period of two years on the land allotted for the purpose failing which the land shall revert to the Government unless the period of 2 years is extended by the Government for valid reasons. 8. Land not to be used for other purpose—The land given for industrial purpose shall not be used for any other purpose except constructing factory premises and such other residential quarters as are required for those engaged in that industry. No constructions shall be permit- ted which may have the object of using it as a commercial undertaking other than the industry permitted to be established." 8. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has also relied upon the following clauses of the lease deed in support of the impugned order :— "1. That the lessor agrees to let the said plot and lessee has agreed to occupy the said plot for a period of nintynine years on rent hereinafter specified for the purpose of setting up Granula- ted Premixed Fertilizers industry for which the leasee had applied under the provisions of Rajasthan Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959. xx xx xx 4.(iv) The leasee shall set up on the said plot of land Premixed Granulated Fertilizers industry for which land has has been leased to him by the lessor within a period of two years from the date of taking over possession of the land as above mentioned, and in case of his failure to do so the said plot shall revert to the lessor unless the period of two years is extended by the lessor on valid grounds. xx xx xx 4.(vi) The lessee agrees not to construct or build any structures or buildings on the said plot of land or on a portion of it which may have the object of using it as a commercial undertaking other than for the industry aforesaid for which the said plot has been leased. xx xx xx 4.(x) In case any default is made by the lessee in respect of any of the terms and condi- tions aforesaid the plot of the land shall revert to the lessor.................." 9. The aforesaid provisions in the Rules as well as the terms and conditions contained in the lease deed leave no doubt that the lessee is bound to set up that particular industry for which the lessee had applied and for which the lease had been given. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is at liberty to set up any type of industry other than the industry mentioned in the application and the lease deed cannot be accepted. In the present case it is the admitted case of the petitioner that it has not set up the Premixed Granulated Fertilizers industry for which the lease had been granted. It is also admitted by the petitioner that no application for extension of the period beyond two years for setting up the industry was made. The question then arises whether any case had been made out or any occasion had come up for giving a decision that a breach of the terms and conditions of the lease deed had taken place. In my opinion, on the admitted facts no occasion arose for the Government or any other officer to whom the power may be delegated to give a decision. If the petitioner had contended that he has actually set up the industry for which the lease had been given within the prescribed time or he had applied for extension of the period, then the question as to who should decide the matter may have arisen. But so for as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned, in my opinion, no such situation has arisen. 10. It is also clear to me that the condition for setting up the industry within the prescribed period of two years is obligatory unless the period of two years is extended by the Government for valid reasons. But so for as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned, in my opinion, no such situation has arisen. 10. It is also clear to me that the condition for setting up the industry within the prescribed period of two years is obligatory unless the period of two years is extended by the Government for valid reasons. It is also further clear that on failure on the part of the lessee to set up the industry within the prescribed period, the land shall revert to the Government. The reversion appears to be automatic and no adjudication is required for the same. The relevant clauses of the lease deed reproduced above give a right to the Government of re-entry on the land and taking possession of the same All that the Director of Industries has, therefore, done by the impugned order in the present case is to have intimated to the petitioner that on account of the breach of the terms of the contract on the part of the petitioner, the land stood reverted to the Government. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that the impugned order is not liable to be be quashed on the simple ground that the Director of Industries, Rajasthan, Jaipur was not competent to pass any such order. 11. In this connection reference may be made to section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides, inter alia, that a leases of immoveable property determines by forfeiture, that is to say— (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself, or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. 12. 12. The word revert has been defined in Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as follows : Revert "v.t. turn back : to reverse.—v.i. to a return: to fall back to a former state: to recut to former subject: to return to the original owner or his heirs." Thus the word revert has the same significance and meaning in the present context as the word re-enter has in section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is well established that a lessor while enforcing his right of forfeiture has every right to take possession of the premises without resorting to Court to obtain an order for possession. In this view of the matter. I have come to the conclusion that the reversion of the land to the Government which was declared by the impugned order Exhibit-16 cannot be successfully challenged on the ground that it is without jurisdiction, as it is only a declaration that the land stood reverted to the Government. 12. The next contention of the petitioner, as already stated above, is that since the Government is a party to the contract, it cannot be a judge in its own cause and in this connection learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Rai Saheb Chan-danmnll Indrakumar vs. State of Orissa (1), M/s. Marwar Tent Factory vs. Union of India (2) and Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab (3). 13. In Bishan Das and others vs. State of Punjab and others (3) it was found that the buildings constructed on the land in question did not belong to the Government and that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances it was held that the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. 14. 14. In Rai Sahab Chandanmull Indrakumar Private Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1), it was observed that in view of the long possession of the petitioner over the lease-hold, the several transactions in which Government and its subordinate officers accepted the petitioner-company as lawfully entitled to work the mines and be in possession as the lessee and the general dealings of the parties spread over two decades led the court to conclude that the petitioners possession was not that of trespasser and that Government was not justified in acting in the manner it did to dispossess the petitioner from the virgin area of the lease-hold. 15. In M/s. Marwar Tent Factory vs. Union of India and other (2) a demand on account of compensation/damages alleged to have been suffered by the Government was made and the amount was sought to be recovered either by case payment or by deduction from the pending or future bills of the contractor. On the construction of the relevant clause of the contract, it was held that there were no words in the clause conferring a right on the purchaser to adjudicate its claim. It was further held that to read the power of adjudicate as implicit would be to constitute the purchaser a Judge in its own cause. It was further held that the demand was also liable to be quashed because the same was intended to be binding and operative against the contractor who was not heard before making the demand. 16. In the present case, it may be pointed out, there is nothing to be adjudicated upon nor there is any clause in the lease deed conferring a right on the Government to adjudicate its claim. The ruling has, therefore, no application to the case on hand. 17. As already observed above in connection with the discussion on point No. 1, in the present case there is a clause in the agreement as well as there is a provision in the Rules that on failure of the petitioner to set up the particular industry for which the lease was granted, the land shall revert to the Government. There is nothing to adjudicate about the matter. Admittedly the petitioner neither set up the industry for which he had taken the lease within the prescribed time of two years nor did he apply for extension. The land, therefore, reverted to the Government. There is nothing to adjudicate about the matter. Admittedly the petitioner neither set up the industry for which he had taken the lease within the prescribed time of two years nor did he apply for extension. The land, therefore, reverted to the Government. I am, therefore, unable to accept the second contention of the petitioner also and the same is hereby over-ruled. 18. The last point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity of being heard before the impugned order was passed against it. In support of this contention, learned counsel has relied upon City Corner vs. Personal Assistant to Collector and Additional District Magistrate, Nellore (4) and The State of Mysore vs. K. Manche Gowda (5). Manche Gowdas (5) case is one under Article 311(2) of the Constitution and it was held therein that it is necessary that the Government servant must be told of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and that it would be no answer to suggest that every Government servant must have had knowledge of the fact that his past record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punish-ment on him, nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he knew as a matter of fact that the earlier punishments were imposed on him or that the knew of his past record. In my opinion these observations have no bearing on the case on hand. 19. In City Corner vs. Personal Assistant to Collector and Additional District Magistrate, Nellore (4) it was observed that the observance of the principles of natural justice is fundamental to the discharge of any quasi-judicial function and that the principles of natural justice will always depend upon the facts of each case. The show-cause notice in that case in respect of cancellation of grant of licence under Section 12 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Places of public Resort Act issued to the appellant contained summary of all those documents which was sufficient to enable him to make his representation. It was held that if the appellant asked for the original documents he could at least have been told that he had already been given a summary of the document which was sufficient to enable him to make his representation. It was held that if the appellant asked for the original documents he could at least have been told that he had already been given a summary of the document which was sufficient to enable him to make his representation. It was further observed that the order passed by the District Magistrate post haste immediately he received the appellants reply without either giving him the copies asked for or at least telling him that the material already furnished was sufficient to enable him to make his representation and if he had any further representation to make he could do so offends the principles of natural justice. That case also, in my opinion, is beside the point. In the present case a lot of correspondence took place between the party and the Government as already stated in the earlier part of this judgment, and ultimately a registered acknowledgment due notice Exhibit-15 was also served upon the petitioner to show cause why the allotment made in its favour be not deemed to have been cancelled and the land be deemed to have reverted to the Government on account of breach of the agreement and provisions of the Rules. But even than, the petitioner did not make any reply and, as it transpires from the averments in the petition itself, the petitioner has no plausible defence, as it has neither set up the industry for which the lease was taken within the prescribed time, nor did it apply for the extension of the period as provided in Rule 7. I am of opinion that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case. 20. So far as the question of forfeiture of the security deposit is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner expressly stated that he did not press it, as the amount involved is very meagre. 21. The writ application is, therefore, without force and is hereby dismissed, But in the circumstances of the case, I make no order order as to costs.