JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Sri S.M. Hasan, Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision petition against the order dated September 7, 1970 passed by the Judicial Officer, Faizabad in Case No. 597 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Ram Naresh and Barsati, opp. parties Nos. 1 and 2, had filed a suit for declaration of their Bhumidhari rights in certain plots and Sirdari rights in certain other plots. The suit was contested by the revisionist Srimati Pujarain who claimed that the land in suit was the tenancy of her father-in-law Bisheshar and that after the death of Bisheshar she was a con-tenureholder along with the plaintiff-respondents. The trial court held that Srimati Pujrain had remarried with Pukaj during the life time of Bishoshar and thus she had no rights in the land. The suit was accordingly decreed. Srimati Pujrain has come up in revision against this order. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the finding of the trial court regarding remarriage of the revisionist after the death of her husband is perverse and is not supported by any cogent evidence. The learned counsel has also contended that the trial court has wrongly applied the law of remarriage in this case against the provisions of Hindu Law. 5. The learned counsel for the revisionist has referred to the decision Aikram v. Smt. Laddo, 1931 R.D. 604, in which a learned Member has held the view that it is not permissible to draw from the fact that a widow is a loose woman living in sin the inference that there has been a remarriage. The learned counsel has also referred to the decision Lal Singh v. Baboo Lal, 1948 R.D. 127 in which the following observations have been made: "It is true that under the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act IV of 1856 remarriage of widow is permissible, but Section 6 of that Act contemplates the performance of almost the same ceremonies which are required in the case of the marriage of a Hindu female. In the present case the concurrent finding of the courts below is that no valid ceremonies were performed. In the present case the concurrent finding of the courts below is that no valid ceremonies were performed. The allegation that Arya Samaj rites were performed seems to be only an afterthought. Even the Pandit who is said to be performed certain ceremonies was not in Arya Samaj. It is a matter of common knowledge that even after the passing of the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act, 1856, remarriage of widows among higher castes of Hindus is still very rare." 6. The learned counsel has further referred to the decision in Smt. Phuljhara v. Smt. Kailasha, 1959 R.D. 213 in which the following observations have been made: "The main question was whether defendant-respondent had entered into Ghar Baithiki (remarriage) with Kripal. There was evidence that Smt. Kailasha had been ex-communicated by her Biradari because of her marriage lapse in having an adulterous intercourse with Kripal. It is, therefore, clear that the sexual union between Smt. Kailasha and Kripal was not approved of by the community and hence it could not mature into a valid remarriage. For all intents and purposes, Smt. Kailasha would be deemed not to have remarried with Kripal. She would not, therefore, lose her rights in the land." 7. The learned counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, referred to Mohammad Jan Khan v. Mst. Sundar and another, 1934 AIR 884 is which Mr. Young, J. had held that continued living as man and wife raises presumption of legal marriage and this prescription is greatly strengthened when they are described as man and wife in Municipal papers. The presumption of legal marriage must prevail over a suggestion of concubinage. 8. Another decision cited by the learned counsel is Baniraj v. Gaya, 1969 A.W.R. 579 in which Mr. M.N. Shukla, J. has observed as follows: "The proof required for marriage or relationship of husband and wife stands on a different footing from the ordinary standard of proof in respect of other facts. In fact, the rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence has been in a way relaxed in cases where marriage or relationship of one person to another has to be proved. In fact, the rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence has been in a way relaxed in cases where marriage or relationship of one person to another has to be proved. It is not essential that the factum of marriage must be established by eye-witnesses or proof of the performance of ceremonies." and again - "In the first place, the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Remarriage Act shall not be applicable to a case of remarriage in accordance with the custom or usage of a community. Certainly the observance of the rites and ceremonies under statutory provisions is not essential in the case of a marriage according to the custom of a particular tribe or community. Secondly, the language of Section 6 of the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act cannot be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a marriage in accordance with a custom or usage and not a statue, the performance of those ceremonies at the time of remarriage is essential. All that Section 6 of the Hindu Remarriage Act enacts is that in case those ceremonies are performed at the time of remarriage and evidence has been led to show that they were so performed, they shall have the effect of proving a valid remarriage. The converse of the proposition is not true. It is quite far from saying that the essential requirement of a valid remarriage is the proof of observance of those rites and ceremonies." 9. In the present case there is sufficient and convincing evidence about the remarriage of the revisionist Srimati Pujrain alias Srimati Maina with Pukai after the death of her former husband Ram Das. Thus, in the voters list of 1950 of the village Khanpur Srimati Maina is recorded as the widow of Ram Das alongwith other members of the family of Bisheshar. In the voters list of the same village in the year 1955 Srimati Maina is not recorded in this family. Other members of the family excluding Bisheshar who had died were however, recorded. In the Kutumb register of the village Kakoli duly certified by the Pradhan on September 13, 1967, on the other hand, Srimati Maina is recorded as the wife of Pukai In her statement dated March 1, 1968 before the Tahsildar Srimati Pujrain has admitted that after the death of her former husband Ram Das, she was living whith Pukai. In the Kutumb register of the village Kakoli duly certified by the Pradhan on September 13, 1967, on the other hand, Srimati Maina is recorded as the wife of Pukai In her statement dated March 1, 1968 before the Tahsildar Srimati Pujrain has admitted that after the death of her former husband Ram Das, she was living whith Pukai. She had of course denied her remarriage with Pukai. Her statement establishes that she had in any case left the household of her father-in-law after the death of her former husband. The documentary evidence alongwith the oral evidence is sufficient to establish the fact of remarriage. No evidence to rebut the extract from the Kutumb register recording the revisionist as the wife of Pukai has been shown. As has been rightly held in the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court, referred to above, the presumption in the circumstances would be that Srimati Pujrain had remarried Pukai and the remarriage could not be disbelieved merely on the ground that actual evidence about the performance of remarriage rites was not produced. Further, in the decision of the Board of Revenue in 1948 R.D. 127 the concurrent finding of the courts below was that no valid ceremony was performed and that there was no remarriage. In the present case, however, the concurrent finding of both the courts below is that the revisionist has remarried and there is no material for this Court in revision to set aside this concurrent finding. 10. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also contended that the trial court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in ordering expunction of the name of the revisionist from the Khatas in dispute. The record shows that Srimati Pujrain alias Sri mati Maina, widow of Ram Das is recorded as a co-tenure holder alongwith the plaintiff as an heir of Bisheshar. It is clear that Srimati Pujrain could only claim 'title in the land through succession from her former husband Ram Das. In view of her remarriage, however, she would lose her rights in the land in suit, if ever indeed she acquired them. It she remarried during the life time of her father-in-law, she would not even acquire any rights by inheritance. On the other hand, if she remarried after the death of Bisheshar she would lose the rights as a consequence of the remarriage. It she remarried during the life time of her father-in-law, she would not even acquire any rights by inheritance. On the other hand, if she remarried after the death of Bisheshar she would lose the rights as a consequence of the remarriage. By her own admission, Srimati Pujrain is neither living in the village where the land in dispute is situated nor living with the family members of her father-in-law, but has left that house and is living in another village Kakoli with Pukai. Her plea that she has not remarried with Pukai is merely an afterthought, so that she could claim her rights in the land in dispute. The trial court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in ordering the expunction of her name. 11. The learned counsel for the opposite party has also contended that in the present case no revisional interference is called for in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 S.C. 497 . The learned counsel for the revisionist has, on the other hand, referred to the decision of the Board of Revenue in Anoop v. Bhagwati, 1960 R.D. 66 to show that a revision did lie in the present case. I need not consider the question whether or not this Court could interfere in revision in the present case in view of the fact that the revision must fail on merits. 12. Agreeing with the recommendation made by the learned Additional Commissioner, I hereby dismiss the revision.