Ramaprasada Rao, J.-The curtain is about to be drawn on a considerably fought — out battle which is merely a squabble on accounts which was going on from 1959. One Chidambaram Chettiar had three sons Natesan Chettiar, Thirunavukkarasu Chiettiar and Sabapathy Chettiar. Admittedly, there seems to have been a partition in the family in 1925. It is claimed however that Chidambaram did not take any conceivable share in the family properties but reserved for himself certain solid cash which according to the defendants were set apart for charitable purposes and hence retained by him. The plaintiffs’ case however is that such retention was not for any known charitable purposes though a feeble attempt was made by Chidambaram to create a trust in respect of the fund retained by him and that in the light of the events that happened the said amount should be deemed to be amount kept in common for the benefit of the coparceners and that amount having passed hands from Chidambaram to Natesan and thereafter to Sabapathi and Sabapathi’s heirs who are the defendants in this action not having properly accounted for the available funds which were transmitted to them as heirs from Sabapathi Chettiar, the plaintiffs who are the sons of Natesan have filed this action for accounts and for a partition and separate delivery of their one-third share in such amounts left by their father and which ultimately traced itself in the family of Sabapathi Chettiar and if they are not properly accounted for to direct the defendants 1 to 3 to account for the same and to pay their legitimate share in such unaccounted money. The defence was that during the lifetime of Chidambaram he created endowments in the names of Sivasthala Thiruppani, Mayavaram Nandavanam, and Chidambaram Thannirpandal and that at all material times Chidambaram and his heirs accepted such endowments and acted upon them and that therefore they are not funds which the defendants 1 to 3 have to account for to the plaintiffs as common joint family funds in their hands after the death of their father Sabapathi Chettiar. The fourth defendant remained neutral and would not take active interest in this litigation. The fourth defendant remained neutral and would not take active interest in this litigation. A preliminary decree was passed in which the Court held that there was no complete dedication of the common funds of the family retained by the ancestor-father which would prompt a Court to accept the charities as named by the defendants and for it to hold that there were no such funds in the hands of Chidambaram or bis heirs such as Natesan or Sabapathi for defendants 1 to 3 to account for. In the result, the trial Court while passing the usual preliminary decree for accounts held that there was no dedication of the family ‘funds and that therefore it passed on from heir to heir and that in the absence of complete and clear accountability of such funds which passed ‘from Chidambaram to Natesan and Natesan to Sabapathi, the defendants 1 to 3 are to account for such of those items enumerated in paragraph 7 of the plaint which according to the plaintiffs is the sheet anchor or the basis of account. The defendants 1 to 3 abortively filed an appeal against the preliminary decree in the sense that they presented an appeal beyond time and it was dismissed. The result is that the finding of the trial Court at the time of passing the preliminary decree has become final. The consequential observation which is necessary for us to make at this stage is that the defendants 1 to 3 have been characterised as parties who should render an account of such of those funds enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 7 of the plaint and which have not been specifically accounted for by their ‘father Sabapathi Chettiar or by their uncle Natesa Chettiar. The parties sought for the passing of the final decree on the basis of such a preliminary decree and after a Commissioner was duly appointed to go into these accounts ranging from the year 1930 onwards the Court below gave a decree charging the defendants 1 to 3 as the accountable persons and quantifying their liability regarding such accounts. It is as against this, the defendants 1 to 3 have filed the present appeal and the plaintiffs in turn have filed their memorandum of cross-objections. 2. A few material facts which are relevant for our consideration may be touched upon. It is as against this, the defendants 1 to 3 have filed the present appeal and the plaintiffs in turn have filed their memorandum of cross-objections. 2. A few material facts which are relevant for our consideration may be touched upon. After the admitted partition in the family in 1925 and after Chidambaram retained with himself a sizable sum of money for purposes of propagating religious charities, Chidambaram is said to have executed a power of attorney Exhibit A-7 in favour of his eldest son Natesan who is the father of the plaintiffs herein. Soon thereafter Chidambaram realised that Natesan was not properly managing or did not specifically account for the amounts entrusted to him for purposes of carrying out the wishes of the ancestors. Naturally, therefore Chidambaram finding that Natesan was not a fit and proper person to be placed at the helm of affairs for the conduct of the named charities which he himself invented caused the cancellation of the power-of-attorney given to his son under Exhibit A-7 to be made and in turn sought it that Sabapathi his third son who is the father of the 1st and 2nd defendants and husband of the 3rd defendant to be the agent for the proper and due conduct of the charities above enumerated. Exhibit B-95 is the power-of-attorney given by Natesan Chettiar in favour Sabapathi Chettiar. Whilst this was the position Chidambaram in order to make good the funds which have considerably depleted during the time of Natesan obtained from his own son as seen from Exhibit B-6 a hundi by which Natesan acknowledged his liability to pay back a sum of Rs. 13,119-15-3 and also Exhibit B-7 which was an additional security which the father took in connection with the liability so undertaken by natesan. We are referring to this at this stage only to remind ourselves that relationship apart the family was customarily commercialminded and the father would not grudge to take a hundi from the son and contemporaneously take a security from him for the repayment of the debts due by the son to the father. We are referring to this at this stage only to remind ourselves that relationship apart the family was customarily commercialminded and the father would not grudge to take a hundi from the son and contemporaneously take a security from him for the repayment of the debts due by the son to the father. Almost contemporaneously with such events, we find, that Chidambaram in order to make his intentions clear executed a deed of trust Exhibit B-1, dated 25th March, 1935 for the benefit of Sivasthala Thiruppani, but curiously enough did not include therein the other charities which he was performing according to the parties before us. The controversy now is as to whether the defendants 1 to 3 are accountable at all and if so to what extent. 3. We have already touched upon the fact that the sheet-anchor of the plaintiffs’ claim in this case where under they charge the defendants 1 to 3 as the accounting parties is contained in paragraph 7 of the plaint. Paragraph 7 of the plaint can be reproduced for better appreciation of the plaintiffs’ intention. "The plaintiffs learn that during the time of their father and before he began to flounder and get ruined as stated above there were considerable amounts of common monies kept intact as abovesaid invested with others either through him or to his order or to that of the grandfather and he (grandfather) having some general controlling relationship with the same, the right to operate therein having been given to him by power-of-attorney given by late Chidambaram Chettiar in that behalf but subject to the overall control of said Chidambaram Chettiar who acted with mental reservations. Some of them appear to be as the plaintiffs are now able to gather to have been invested with the persons denoted by the vilasams hereunder set out: 1. Mtt. K.M.M.SM.A.R. as for 12-2-1931 Rs. 2,754-4-9 2. S.S.SV. as for 12-2-1931 Rs. 5,806-10-3 3. S.N.SP. as for 12-2-1931 Rs. 2,500-0-0 4. A.P.RM.VM. as for 24-3-1941 Rs. 5,887-0-0 5. V.A. V. as for 13-4-1929 Rs. 5,075-0-0 6. PL.V.S.L. as for 14-3-1931 Rs. 5,354-15-9 7. P.R.Y.PL. as for 29-1-1931 Rs. 4,450-14-6 8. Sholavandan A.M.R. AR. as for 12-2-1930 Rs. 6,460-4-9 9. A.KN. as for 31-12-1930 Rs. 8,747-12-0 10. A.KN. as for 14-3-1930 Rs. 15,000-0-0 11. AM.R. as for 31-12-1930 Rs. 4,000-0-0 12. Under the caption of Sundalkadalai as for 12-2-1931 Rs. 2,355-1-6 4. 5,075-0-0 6. PL.V.S.L. as for 14-3-1931 Rs. 5,354-15-9 7. P.R.Y.PL. as for 29-1-1931 Rs. 4,450-14-6 8. Sholavandan A.M.R. AR. as for 12-2-1930 Rs. 6,460-4-9 9. A.KN. as for 31-12-1930 Rs. 8,747-12-0 10. A.KN. as for 14-3-1930 Rs. 15,000-0-0 11. AM.R. as for 31-12-1930 Rs. 4,000-0-0 12. Under the caption of Sundalkadalai as for 12-2-1931 Rs. 2,355-1-6 4. It is clear that the plaintiffs desired that the defendants 1 to 3 should account for the various items numbering 12 mentioned by them in paragraph 7 and it is on this basis the parties went to trial. In a suit ‘for accounting the two facts which ordinarily come up for consideration either at the trial stage or thereafter is (a) who are the accounting persons and (b) what is the quantum of liability or the content of accountability. There may be cases where the Court may find certain parties to be accountable persons, but the Court may not be in a position to make them accountable to a particular figure for the reason that clear proof of transmission, of funds which have to be accounted for to the hands of the accountable persons was not forthcoming. Accountability is one thing and quantum of accountability is totally a different thing. The content of accountability depends upon a strict proof of the handling of amounts or properties by the accountable persons to the prejudice of the opposite party who has come to Court seeking for such account and accountability. A fortiori in a case where the accounts suit is filed against the heirs of a deceased person who in legal terminology can be characterised as the primary accounting person, then the standard of proof required by the plaintiff in such accounts suit so as to fix up the quantum of accountability |on the heirs of the deceased primary (accounting person is more stringent and should be more clear and clinching. A Division Bench of our Court in P. Murugayya v. S. Somasundaram1 observed thus: “Where a person liable to account is not alive at the time the account has to be taken and his legal representative, in view of the inheritance of his property has to render accounts, there is an initial burden on the plaintiff who asks for accounts to show that the individual liable to account has not discharged his burden in regard to sums of money that have come into his hands”. 5. This proposition is very well known as is seen from an earlier decision of our Court in Kasi v. Ramanathan Chettiar2. Viswanatha Sastri, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench said that the legal representatives of an agent or a partner are not directly liable to render accounts or vouch them and the onus is on the plaintiffs to allege and prove their right to any specific sums that might be claimed by them, and the only difference in substance between the position of an agent and that of the legal representative in the matter of accountability is that the initial burden of proof in the latter case rests on the party claiming an account. 6. With the above background, we have to see whether the plaintiffs have discharged their initial burden in this case and whether their claim for total accountability as projected by them in paragraph 7 of the plaint is well founded. 7. In so far as items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 12 mentioned in paragraph 7 of the plaint are concerned, the judgment at the preliminary decree stage makes it very clear that there was no evidence at all in respect of such items. This means that the plaintiffs have not discharged their initial burden in establish the existence of such items or the transmission of such items by inheritance to the heirs of Sabapathi. The learned Judge went wrong in assuming an automatic transmission of such funds in the hands of the legal representatives of Sabapathi. He has placed the onus of proof on wrong shoulders and assumed that the defendants 1 to 3 as heirs of Sabapathi should be deemed to have secured such funds on the death of Sabapathi and in consequence accountable therefor. This is a wrong approach both in law and in fact. He has placed the onus of proof on wrong shoulders and assumed that the defendants 1 to 3 as heirs of Sabapathi should be deemed to have secured such funds on the death of Sabapathi and in consequence accountable therefor. This is a wrong approach both in law and in fact. In law, because the burden of proof has been wrongly laid on a shoulder other than the one who is obliged initially to discharge that burden and in fact because there was no evidence of either the existence of such amounts or the flow of such alleged amounts from the hands of Sabapathi to the hands of his heirs. Mr. T. R. Mani refers to the decree and says that as there is a recital in the decree compelling the appellants to account for the said amounts that would be sufficient. This is again an argument which we are unable to countenance. A final decree is a continuation of the preliminary decree and in the final decree certain situations which have become final earlier in the eye of law and which cannot be revoked or reviewed cannot be the subject-matter of a fresh adjudication at that stage. This was exactly the thing that was undertaken by the Court below when, while passing the final decree but without adverting to the finding which is clinching and clear in the preliminary decree, the lower Court went further and upheld the plaintiffs’ claim to obtain an account in relation to items which have not been anyway proved by the plaintiffs as existing or as having come into the hands of the appellants as heirs of Sabapathi. Mr. Mani would also refer us to the written statement in answer to the plaint allegations in paragraph 7. The answer in the written statement is contained in paragraph 9 thereof which is reproduced here: “The allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the plaint are untrue. This defendant denies that the investments referred to in the said paragraph were common monies divisible among the brothers. They were monies set apart and invested by Chidambaram Chettiar for Mayavaram Nandavanam, Chidambaram Thannirpandal, Sivasthala Thiruppani and Sundal Kadalai Charity. Neither the plaintiffs’ father, plaintiffs, this defendant’s father nor defendants have any right thereto”. 8. This is in answer to paragraph 7 of the plaint. They were monies set apart and invested by Chidambaram Chettiar for Mayavaram Nandavanam, Chidambaram Thannirpandal, Sivasthala Thiruppani and Sundal Kadalai Charity. Neither the plaintiffs’ father, plaintiffs, this defendant’s father nor defendants have any right thereto”. 8. This is in answer to paragraph 7 of the plaint. There is the usual denial by the defendants that all the allegations contained in paragraph 7 are untrue. They of course used the plural ‘they’ and would add that this defendant’s father nor these defendants have had anything to do with the monies set apart and invested by their grandfather for the charities referred to by them. An accent is made on the plural used in the written statement. Obviously this was a general pleading. At that time it is not reasonable to expect that the person who is called upon to account would have had the occasion of going through the accounts in full and satisfy himself about his responsibility or otherwise and thereafter plead in the written statement. They have said that the allegations in paragraph 7 are untrue. But they would justify in their written statement that their grandfather at all material times intended that the amounts retained by him should be utilised and invested for purposes of Mayavaram Nandavanam, Chidambaram Thannirapandal, Sivasthaia Thiruppani and Sundal Kadalai Charity. We may also point out that the defendants did not stop with filing a written statement, but would file what is known as a rejoinder to the reply statement filed by the plaintiffs. There they would say that the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs’ reply statement are false and misleading and that the plaintiffs are bound to make out and establish that the funds referred to in paragraph 7 of the plaint and in paragraph 6 of this defendant’s written statement were kept undivided for being divided among the members of the family in future. In any event, as accountability can flow only after it is found with reasonable certainty that the accountable person has in his hands or has been proved to be in possession of accountable funds and as that has not been done in the instant case, we are unable to agree with the matter of fact finding of the Court below that the appellants are to account for items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 12 in paragraph 7 of the plaint. 9. 9. The next point of Mr. Balasubramanian is that the lower Court went wrong in directing an account of the sums of money said to have been collected from one firm known as V. KR. ST. Exhibit B-2 is the day-book kept in the regular course by Natesan. There is no doubt an entry in this account book to the effect that a sum of about Rs. 10,000 was invested with a firm called V. KR. ST. Exhibit B-2 is the account for the period commencing from 1925 to 1930. Exhibit B-8 is an account which is an almost continuous one from Exhibit B-2 with this difference that there was a time-lag of over one year between these two ledgers. Exhibit B-3 is an account for the period from 1935 to 1939. It is common ground that Natesan died on 30th January, 1937, Chidambaram died on 29th September, 1948 and Sabapathi died on 5th February, 1956. It is no doubt true that Sabapathi was asked to manage even during the lifetime of his father under the power-of-attorney Exhibit B-95 of the year 1934. Mr. Mani’s contention is that there has been a suppressio veri in this case in that the account books for the period 14th March, 1930 to 16th October, 1931 is not forthcoming. Obviously, this is for the period of the financial year 1930-31. One would expect that in Exhibit B-8 which is obviously a continuation of the previous financial year’s account, the entry relating to this V. KR. ST. firm should have been carried forward if that account was still alive and still enforceable . It is common ground that even in Exhibit B-8 there is no such entry. It should be remembered that at the time when Exhibit B-8 commenced Sabapathi had nothing to do with it, it was still with Natesan. At one time and particularly during the preliminary decree stage an objection was taken that Exhibit B-8 is not admissible in evidence, since it has not been proved or identified by a person who had something to do with it. One Mr. Renga Raghava Iyengar was admittedly the person who was with Natesan and who wrote Exhibit B-8. He was not examined during the preliminary decree stage. But the appellants in order to make the records complete took the risk of calling Mr. One Mr. Renga Raghava Iyengar was admittedly the person who was with Natesan and who wrote Exhibit B-8. He was not examined during the preliminary decree stage. But the appellants in order to make the records complete took the risk of calling Mr. Iyengar on their side, mostly for the purpose of proving Exhibit B-8. Their apprehensions were not unfounded. D.W. 7 though examined in chief on behalf of the appellants during the cross-examination was trying to be more loyal than to the king and would give a certificate to Natesan that he never took any money from the charity funds. We have already referred to the fact that Natesan himself acknowledged such user of public funds under Exhibits B-6 and B-7. But Mr. Iyengar would say to the contrary. In this perspective the appellants wanted to declare Mr. Iyengar as a hostile witness. But the Court below would not do so. The point however is that the halo of doubt which was concerning Exhibit B-8 at the time of the preliminary decree was removed by the examination of D.W. 7 during the final decree proceedings. We take therefore Exhibit B-8 as a document which could be looked into by a Court of law. The objection of the learned counsel for the respondent however is that Exhibit B-8 is only a copy and according to D.W. 7 he copied it meticulously at the dictation of Sabapathi and with the use of some notes given by him. Obviously, D.W. 7 is uttering a lie. A casual look at Exhibit B-8 shows that it is an account book which was copied from a regularly-kept account book even if it should be a copy. Pages are left blank, totals have been made up and even a casual look at Exhibit B-8 gives the impression that even though it has been copied from another book it is one kept in the regular course of business. If therefore this is the badge of acceptance which should be given to Exhibit B-8 which as already stated by us, has been proved in a manner known to law, then we find no acceptable reason at all as to why there is no entry about this V. KR. ST. firm in Exhibit B-8. If therefore this is the badge of acceptance which should be given to Exhibit B-8 which as already stated by us, has been proved in a manner known to law, then we find no acceptable reason at all as to why there is no entry about this V. KR. ST. firm in Exhibit B-8. If therefore there was no such entry in Exhibit B-8 one cannot expect such an entry in Exhibit B-3 which is again a continuation of that account for the years 1935-1939. It was only during 1934-35 that Sabapathi took over the estate from his brother Natesan. Their father did not like him to continue as manager of the so-called trust. We are therefore not satisfied with the observation of the Court below that the defendants are liable to account for this sum of Rs. 10,000 as if Sabapathi had any occasion at all to collect it from V. KR. ST. firm and as if he transmitted such collected funds to his heirs for them to account for it to the plaintiffs in this action. 10. The next point urged by Mr. Balasubramanian is dealt with under the head of Point No. 4 in the judgment appealed against. The learned Judge in paragraph 19 of his judgment refers to these items. He would find that Exhibits B-32 and B-47 cannot be discredited and that Exhibit B-48 mentions 4 inams from which obviously are culled out items 6, 9 and 11 of paragraph 7 of the plaint, and also one item relating to one Muthu, KR. We are not however concerned with that item relating to Muthu KR. The learned Judge rightly held that Exhibit B-47 cannot be viewed as a concocted document. Even so he could not for the reasons stated by him and hereinafter to be stated by us reject Exhibit B-48 either. But after dealing with the three items referred to above and after having observed that Natesan was responsible to account for the sum of Rs. 12,108-14-9 suddenly came to the conclusion that the said amount ought to be taken as having come into the hands of Sabapathy and as such the appellants are accountable therefor. But after dealing with the three items referred to above and after having observed that Natesan was responsible to account for the sum of Rs. 12,108-14-9 suddenly came to the conclusion that the said amount ought to be taken as having come into the hands of Sabapathy and as such the appellants are accountable therefor. We have already observed that unless there is nexus between the fund of which in accountability is asked and the person against whom it is asked and unless there is proof that such fund has come into the hands of the accountable person, the question of accountability is alien in such circumstances. We accept the finding of the Court below that Exhibits B-47 and B-48 are acceptable documents. Exhibits B-47 and B-48 indicate that Natesan collected the above three items and also other items. This is clear from Exhibit B-48 which is reproduced here: 11. The learned Judge after having observed the voluntary statement given by Natesan who has admitted the collection of the various amounts against the three items as above and having also found that Exhibit B-95 has not been challenged by the plaintiffs in the action, cannot, as a matter of course and as if it is a necessary consequence, hold that the said amount which Natesan collected himself should again be assumed to have been transmitted by a process which has not been proved, to Sabapathi and that Sabapathi in turn passed on such a liability to his heirs. As long as it is clear from Exhibit B-48 that it was Natesan who collected the amount and so long as there is no evidence to prove that when Natesan gave up the management of the so called trust he handed over also those amounts making up the three items as above to Chidambaram, there cannot be any decree as to accounting as against the appellants, regarding these items. We have already stated the principle on which such a decree for accounting could be passed against the legal representatives of an accountable person. In this respect therefore the finding of the Court below that the appellants herein are to account for a sum of Rs. 12,108-14-9 is set aside. 12. Several other points have been raised by Mr. We have already stated the principle on which such a decree for accounting could be passed against the legal representatives of an accountable person. In this respect therefore the finding of the Court below that the appellants herein are to account for a sum of Rs. 12,108-14-9 is set aside. 12. Several other points have been raised by Mr. Balasubramanian, but they are only additional strings to the main bow of his argument viz., that items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 12 are not items to which the appellants could by any stretch of imagination be made accountable for. It is unnecessary for us to consider the other items. 13. In the cross-objections filed by Mr. Mani for the plaintiffs the first head of claim is that in respect of the amounts collected by way of rent by Natesan or Sabapathi during their terms of management no interest was allowed and having regard to the nature of dealings and the customary manner in which interest is claimed and given by the parties notwithstanding their relationship, interest should be allowed on this amount and that should be at the rate of 12 per cent., per annum. There seems to be considerable force in this. Having regard to the nature of dealings between the parties and on a looking at Exhibit B-48, Exhibit B-6 and Exhibit B-7, wherein relationship was outweighed by commercial understanding, we uphold the claim for interest made by the plaintiffs under this head towards rent collected from Kulalampur house and the interest shall be calculated at 12 per cent. per annum. 14. The second head of attack is as follows. It is common ground that even though the other charities were held to be not charities in the eye of law as there was no proof of total dedication on the part of Chidambaram, yet the plaintiffs would concede that at least one charity by way of Kulagarkoil kumbabishekam was done. For this purpose the entries in the account book show that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was drawn on four occasions from the banks and the drafts were sent to the primary person entrusted with the performance of kumbabishekam. The argument therefore is that the defendants cannot claim interest at 12 per cent. For this purpose the entries in the account book show that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was drawn on four occasions from the banks and the drafts were sent to the primary person entrusted with the performance of kumbabishekam. The argument therefore is that the defendants cannot claim interest at 12 per cent. for all the credits made under this head and as it has been established that all such amounts were borrowed from banks and not from Chetty firms, the reasonable interest to which the defendants would be entitled to on this head would be 6 per cent. Mr. Balasubramaniam’s contention, however, is that according to the custom of the family the interest has been calculated. But custom would operate only in the absence of acceptable evidence. But when the evidence is available, then reliance on custom is not proper. As a matter of fact, only 6 per cent. interest has been paid for the borrowing of Rs. 20,000. Therefore, the claim at the rate of 12 per cent. interest in the account books would lead to unjust enrichment and we are not inclined to make one richer than the other though it may be as between brothers under this head. The interest therefore shall be reduced to 6 per cent. 15. Two items of monies sent by Sabapathi to Chidambaram Chettiar were adverted to by the Court below as evidence of partial discharge of his liability to account. One such item is a sum of Rs. 1,197. In so far as this is concerned, there is clear evidence that this amount was sent by a cheque and it was acknowledged by Chidambaram himself. This is referred to by the learned Judge. Exhibit B-172 was the copy of the draft which was sent and Exhibit B-27 is the pass-book of the Indian Bank and Exhibit B-171 was the letter written by Chidambaram to Sabapathi revealing such details. The cross-objection therefore cannot claim relief for this amount of Rs. 1,197. As regards Rs. 5,241-0-8 there is some force in the contention of the learned counsel for the cross-objector that there is no evidence that the cheque though’ purported to have been sent by Sabapathi ever reached Chidambaram. The learned Judge is aware of this situation. A cheque for Rs. 5,241-0-8 was drawn in favour of Chidambaram Chettiar from Karur Hindu Bank Limited. 5,241-0-8 there is some force in the contention of the learned counsel for the cross-objector that there is no evidence that the cheque though’ purported to have been sent by Sabapathi ever reached Chidambaram. The learned Judge is aware of this situation. A cheque for Rs. 5,241-0-8 was drawn in favour of Chidambaram Chettiar from Karur Hindu Bank Limited. Exhibit B-65 reads that Sabapathi directed his father to send a receipt to him. The Commissioner found that there was no evidence that the cheque was ever handed over to Chidambaram or the father ever sent a receipt to the son. The learned Judge found that the defendants are not accountable to this sum of Rs. 5,241-0-8. We are unable to accept the conclusion of the learned Judge which is not based on any reasoning. It therefore follows that the defendants vis., the appellants are to account for the sum of Rs. 5,241-0-8. 16. The other head of attack is that a sum of Rs. 2,485-14-0 has been wrongly debited and that the debit must be reversed and the amount accounted for. Again certain mistakes in the judgment such as the omission of items 9 (a) and 9 (b) and 23 (a) and 23 (b) in the Commissioner’s statement and the direction regarding bank accounts and fixed deposit receipts given by the learned Judge but not incorporated in the decree were also pointed out. There cannot be any objection to this reasonable request made by the cross-objector in the matter of: (a) the reversal of the entry of Rs. 2,485-14-0, (b) the correction of the omission relating to items 9 (a) and 9 (b) and 23 (a) and 23 (b) in the Commissioner’s statement and (c) the inclusion of a direction as provided for in the final decree regarding the bank accounts and the fixed deposit receipts. The appeal and cross-objections are partly allowed and there will be no order as to costs in both. 17. The question whether the appellants have to pay court-fee or whether the respondents have to pay court-fee will be decided at the execution stage and whoever is entitled to receive any amount from the other shall be made liable to pay court-fee.