Deivasigamani and another v. M. S. Kamrudeen Rowther
1976-01-06
S.RATNAVEL PANDIAN
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
Order: The accused in C.C.No. 42 of 1973 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ulundurpet, are the revision petitioners herein, against whom the respondent-complainant filed a private complaint under sections 500 and 501, Indian Penal Code, for and on behalf of M.K.M.S. Sons, Arakandanallur, Tirukoilur Taluk. 2. Briefly, the indictment against the petitioners was as follows: The complainant and his brothers are carrying on business under the name and style of M.K. M.S. Sons, commonly referred to as “M.K.M.S.” The said M.KM,.firm are rice mill-owners, wholesale dealers in rice and paddy and further operating bus services and carrying on business in cinema touring talkies, having their headquarters at Arakandanallur. The said firm possesses a number of godowns at Arakandanallur out of which some have been leased out to one Sheik Rowther (P.W.6) who is an authorized wholesale dealer in paddy and rice under licence given by the Tamil Nadu Government, for storing and hulling paddy in the godowns leased out. He has been stocking the said paddy in Sultan Mill Godowns and Caltex Godowns. 3. The first petitioner (accused-1) was the Secretary of the Marxist Party, Tirukoilur on the relevant date whilst the second petitioner was the proprietor of Veeramani Press, Tirukoilur. On 19th December, 1972 there was an unprecedented flood in Pennar river and Thurunjal river and as a result of that, there had been a sudden rise in the water level, which entered into the godowns and washed away the Government paddy stored therein. P.W. 6 (Sheik Rowther) had sustained huge loss. The loss of the Government paddy stored has been assessed and verified by responsible officials and a final report has been sent to the Government on 19th December, 1972 by the Collector of South Arcot. This fact pertaining to the loss caused due to the flood has been published in the “Daily Thanthi”(newspaper) on 11th December, 1972. 4. That being so, the firstpetitioner had caused the pamphlet Exhibit P-1 to be printed in the printing press of the second petitioner on 27th December, 1972 containing imputations against the said. M.K.M.S. under the caption and published putting the pamphlets into circulation.
4. That being so, the firstpetitioner had caused the pamphlet Exhibit P-1 to be printed in the printing press of the second petitioner on 27th December, 1972 containing imputations against the said. M.K.M.S. under the caption and published putting the pamphlets into circulation. As per the complaint, the said pamphlet contained defamatory allegation against M.K.M.S. (referring to the complainant) and others, as though they had committed a huge fraud in respect of the bags of paddy and the said fraud had been organised in a big scale in collusion with Government officials and some ministers of the ruling party. In fact, the said M.K.M.S. had nothing to do with the loss caused by the floods, and the imputations made againt the said firm are calculated to lower them in the estimation of the public, knowing or having reason to believe that the imputations of fraud would harm the reputation of M.K.M.S. and lower the moral character in the estimation of the business people and others who hold the said firm in very high esteem. Thus both the petitioners have committed the offences punishable under sections 500 and 501, Indian Penal Code. 5. The complainant examined P Ws. 1 to 6. including himself to prove his case and marked Exhibits P-l to P-4 and M.Os. 1 to 4, in support of his contention. Both the petitioners-accused admitted the publication and printing of the pamphlet Exhibit P-l. But, the first petitioner had stated that he did not intend to defame or dishonour the complainant’s firm in any manner and he caused the pamphlet to be printed and published only in good faith for the public good. D.Ws. 1 to 3 were examined on the side of the defence. 6. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, after considering the evidence let in by the prosecution and the defence and rejecting the defence that the accused acted in good faith and for the public good, held that the prosecution has established the guilt of the first accused of an offence under section 500, Indian Penal Code, and that of the second accused of an offence under section 501, Indian Penal Code, convicted them thereunder and sentenced the first petitioner to suffer simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100 in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month, and the second petitioner to pay a fine of Rs.
100 in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month, and the second petitioner to pay a fine of Rs. 100 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court the petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, South Arcot Division, Cuddalore in C.A.No. 75 of 1973. But, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the convictions and sentences passed by the trial Court. It is as against this, the present revision petition has been filed. 7. Before entering into a discussion of the matter, I shall mention certain salient features of this case. Exhibit P-5 is a petition presented by P.W.6 on 9th December, 1972 to the Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W. 3), relating to the damage caused to the paddy stored in the godovns and Exhibits P-6 and P-7 are the two entries made in the General Diary at 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. It is the admitted case that a mahazar dated. 16th December, 1972 has been forwarded, to the Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu under Exhibit P-8, giving a detailed account of the loss sustained by various persons on account of the flood in the rivers Pennar and Thurunjal Aru, on 9th December, 197.1 and claiming flood relief. Exhibits P-2 and P-3 are the two acknowledgements signed by petitioners 1 and 2 acknowledging receipt of the notices dated 28th December, 1972 issued by the respondent-complainant. But, the notices or copies thereof have not been tiled. The reply notice dated 1st January, 1973 sent on behalf of the petitioners 1 and 2 through their counsel to the respondent’s counsel, is marked as Exhibit P-4. By this reply, the petitioners have admitted the printing and publication of Exhibit P-l but would contend that the averments contained in Exhibit P-l are not defamatory and that the said averments were made by the first petitioner only on the information received from he general public and from some individuals in particular which information he had no reason to disbelieve. Further, it is stated that the first petitioner did so in good faith and for public good. He has also emphatically stated that he had no malicious ulterior motive for issuing and putting the pamphlet into circulation and. he had. no personal animosity against the respondent firm.
Further, it is stated that the first petitioner did so in good faith and for public good. He has also emphatically stated that he had no malicious ulterior motive for issuing and putting the pamphlet into circulation and. he had. no personal animosity against the respondent firm. M.O. 1 series are the negatives of the photos (M.O. 2 series) caused to be taken by P.W. 3 at 9 A.M. on 9th December, 1972. M.O. 3 series are the negatives of the photos (M.O. 4 series) caused to be taken by P.W. 3 on 10th December, 1972. These material objects are marked in this case for the purpose of showing the flow of water in the godowns. 8. Mr. N.P. Vanamamalai, appearing for the petitioner would urge before me that the judgments of the Courts below suffer from manifest illegality, as both the Courts have misdirected themselves materially on points of law while applying the exceptions to section 499, Indian Penal Code, and that the Courts below ought to have held that P.W. 1, is not an aggrieved party as he is not competent to file a complaint as there is nothing against P.W. 1 or his firm in Exhibit P-l and that it is clearly stated in Exhibit P-l that only officials were responsible for the fraud committed and action had been prayed, only as against the officials. Further, he would contend that there was no animosity either on personal grounds or on political grounds between P.W. 1 and the first petitioner and that Exhibit P-l was published in good faith for the public good without any malice or ill-will against P.W. 1 or his firm. He would, further submit that P.W. 6, the alleged lessee, is not an income-tax assessee, but on the other hand he is a declared insolvent as admitted by P.W. 1 and that P.W. 6 has not produced either his licence or his stock register and therefore, this circumstance would only probabilise the version of the first petitioner that P.W. 6 was only a name lender for P.W. 1. Mr.
Mr. C.K. Venkatanarasimhan resisting the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, would urge that this Court sitting in its revisional jurisdiction, cannot examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the Courts below in respect of the plea of good faith or public good, because any finding to be made by this Court would amount to re-assessing and re-appreciating the oral and documentry evidence and according to him, there is no failure or miscarriage of justice as to warrant or justify an interference by this Court in this revision, as contemplated under section 435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, and that the findings of the Courts below are justified in the light of the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution. He also submitted that M.K.M.S. firm has got nothing to do with the business of P.W. 6 and the averments made in Exhibit P-1 are highly defamatory, lowering the reputation of the firm in the eye of the public, and as such the petitioners are not protected by exception No. 9 to section 499, Indian Penal Code. 9. Normally, this Court, sitting on its revisional jurisdiction, will not examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court in respect of the petitioner’s plea of good faith and public good, because they are findings made by the appellate Court on assessing and appreciating the evidence adduced and as it happens, the said finding of the lower appellate Court confirms the view taken by the trial Judge himself. Whether or not good faith has been proved by the accused and pleads in his defence the 9th exception to a charge of defamation under, section 500, Indian Penal Code, would no doubt be a question of fact. As has been held by the Supreme Court, even if it is assumed to be a mixed question of fact and law, if the Courts below make a concurrent finding on such a question,this Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, generally does not re-examine the matter for itself under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code. But in the present case, I am unable to agree with the concurrent findings of the Courts below, because it is plain to my mind that both the Courts below have misdirected themselves materially on points of law.
But in the present case, I am unable to agree with the concurrent findings of the Courts below, because it is plain to my mind that both the Courts below have misdirected themselves materially on points of law. Besides, the lower appellate Court has failed to take note of the manifest illegality committed by the trial Court in taking into consideration certain extraneous matter, viz., Government records which were not admitted in evidence. I may point out here that the said Government records from which along with the evidence of P.W. 5 the trial Court seems to have come to the conclusion that P.W. 6 was the authorised dealer of the Government for stocking paddy and rice, are also not available now on records. 10. The main questions that arise for my consideration in this revision petition are: (1) Whether the impugned statement published by the petitioners is defamatory, lowering the reputation of the respondent firm? (2) Whether the impugned, statement was true and had been made for the public good, attracting execption No. 1 to section 499, Indian Penal Code? (3) Whether the averments in the statement would attract exception No. 9 to section 499, Indian Penal Code, or whether the imputation was made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or any other person or for the public good? Point No. 1: To find out whether Exhibit P-l contains defamatory matter relating to the firm of P.W. 1, I shall extract certain portions of the statement which are claimed by the prosecution as defamatory. Exhibit P-1 begins as an appeal to the public under the caption: the public to see and hear about the huge fraud committed, even taking advantage of the flood). The first paragraph of this Exhibit P-1 states that there was a news item in the Daily Thanthi,dated 11th December, 1972 that 5,000 bags of paddy belonging to the Government had been washed away from the godown of M.K.M.S. Kamruddin Rowther. In the second paragraph it is mentioneel that R.Deivasigamani viz., the first petitioner herein made a personal visit to Arakandanallur and inspected the M.K.M.S. Mandi. In the third paragraph it is stated that when Kamruddin Rowther was inquired about the loss, he stated that 12,000 to 15,000 bags of paddy were on stock. He would not clearly state the actual loss.
In the third paragraph it is stated that when Kamruddin Rowther was inquired about the loss, he stated that 12,000 to 15,000 bags of paddy were on stock. He would not clearly state the actual loss. The Officials were taking account of the loss, Then, under the sub-heading (Is it true?) questions are raised on lour points. A description of the compound wall and other buildings, fields, railway track etc.. around the M.K.M.S. Mandi, is given and the question is posed under point 4 as to how it could have been possible for the paddy bags to have been washed away by crossing the above obstructions. The main averments in Exhibit P-1 on which the respondent-complainant tried to build up his case, are as follows: (if the allegation is that the paddy bags had been washed away whether M.K. M.S. or the Government officials have taken any preventive steps as a precautionary measure or seized the bags, if so washed away also remains a mystery). Mr. G.K. Venkatanarasimhan, world request the Court to take the cumulative effect of the entire reference and remarks made by the first petitioner under Exhibit P-1 and would contend that by making such allegations the first petitioner had defamed M.K.M.S. firm by imputing the responsibility for this loss, if any to the respondent. Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, submits that there is absolutely no reference that the M.K.M.S. firm had committed any fraud but on the other hand M.K.M. S.‘s name is mentioned just to show that the paddy bags were stocked in the godown of M.K.M.S. and that the question as to what preventive steps were taken by M.K. M.S. as a precautionary measure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be defamatory, lowering the reputation of the firm. But on the other hand, he would contend that the fact that the paddy bags were stocked in the M.K.M.S, Mandy (Godown) was admitted by the respondent-complainant and therefore, while referring to the fact of the said bags being washed away, the first petitioner had necessarily to make mention of the name of M.K.M.S. Godown and secondly as M.K.M.S. is admittedly the owner of the godown, he is to be generally questioned as to what was the precautionary preventive step taken by him.
Next he would urge that the notice fixes the responsibility for the huge fraud only on the officials and on some ministers of the ruling party, that too in a general way, that there was a talk among the public to the effect that the officials and some ministers of the ruling party were responsible and the said fraud was a pre-planned one and therefore Exhibit P-1 poses a question as to whether the Government would be prepared to transfer immediately the officials who were responsible for this and conduct an impartial enquiry, to find out the truth. Lastly, the learned counsel would contend that by this letter Exhibit P-1 an appeal is made to the public to rise up and prepare themselves to prevent such kind of fraud. In order to substantiate his contention Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, has filed a petition Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1264 of 1975 seeking the admission of the certified copy of the petition in O.P. No. 1 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, South Arcot, Cuddalore, as additional evidence in this revision petition, the said Original Petition was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Collector of South Arcot, as against the respondent-complainant (P.W. 1) P.W. 6 and two others, under section 3 (1) of the Criminal Law (Amendmen) Ordinance, 1944. On behalf of the respondent complaint, Mr. C.K. Venkatanarasimhan, has filed a petition in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1502 of 1975, seeking the permission of the Court to file the certified copy of the order in the above O.P. No. 1 of 1975. I allow both these petitions and mark the certified copy of the petition O.P No. 1 of 1975 as Exhibit D-1 on the side of the petitioners and the certified copy of the order in the said petition as Exhibit P-10 on the side of the respondent-complainant. 11. In Exhibit D-1 it is averred that the petitioner in O.P. No. 1 of 1975 has appointed the first respondent therein (P.W. 6) on 5th February, 1972 as an authorized wholesaler-cum-hulling agent for storing the Government-levy paddy and hulling and.
11. In Exhibit D-1 it is averred that the petitioner in O.P. No. 1 of 1975 has appointed the first respondent therein (P.W. 6) on 5th February, 1972 as an authorized wholesaler-cum-hulling agent for storing the Government-levy paddy and hulling and. despatching the resultant rice to places directed by the petitioner (Government) and as an authorized wholesaler appointed by the Government P.W. 6 was entrusted with 12,558 bags of paddy, and that on 10th December, 1972 P.W. 6 reported to the Government that 8,024 bags of paddy and 568.23 quintals of rice have been washed away by flood water on 9th December, 1972. Further Exhibit D-1 reads: “According to his (P.W. 6’s) report, the flood water entered into the godown and the mill premises and washed the Government stock of paddy. On his report, the petitioner (Collector representing the State Government) took up enquiry in the matter, to find out the truth of the report made by the first respondent (P.W. 6). After enquiry it was found out that the first respondent’s report was false. The petitioner found out that the first respondent, along with the help and active cooperation and connivance of the other respondents (P.W. 1 the complainant, and two of his brothers) have misappropriated the Government stock of paddy by selling the stock to the other dealers. It is believed that respondents 1 to 4 have committed offences under sections 120-B and 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The Police have taken up investigation in this matter and are enquiring into the matter.” The prayer in the said original petition was for obtaining an order of attachment of the properties of the respondents in the original petition, viz., P.W. 6, P.W. 1 and the other two. The Court, after scrutinizing the documents marked on both sides, passed the final order by making the interim order of attachment absolute so far as it related to the properties of the first respondent (P.W. 6), but dismissed the petition and vacated the interim attachment so far as the order related to the properties of the other respondents, viz. the complainant and his two brothers. It transpires from Exhibit P-10 that a criminal case under sections 120-B and 409, Indian Penal Code in Crime No. 142 of 1973 of Arakandanallur Police Station, is registered in which P.W. 6 (Shaik Rowther) and.
the complainant and his two brothers. It transpires from Exhibit P-10 that a criminal case under sections 120-B and 409, Indian Penal Code in Crime No. 142 of 1973 of Arakandanallur Police Station, is registered in which P.W. 6 (Shaik Rowther) and. P.W. 5 (Kantharaj), the then Taluk Supply Officer, ‘Tirukoilur seem to have been implicated. But there is no definite evidence before come in respect of these criminal proceedings. Moreover, I am of the view that I need not take into consideration these criminal proceedings in this case, except for the fact that a case is registered, against P.W. 6 and P.W. 5 by the State, Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai has also brought to my notice that the lower appellate Court mas allowed a petition filed by the petitioner here in (appellant therein) praying for receipt of the book issued as a Supplement, to the ‘Tamil Arasu’ dated 16th February, 1974 as an additional evidence. The portion sought to be marked is at page 29 of the said book, wherein the Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu is reported to have replied in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly that a letter was received by the Government from one Deivasigamani in respect of the matter in dispute in this case and that the same was forwarded to the Collector of the concerned district for enquiry and that action was being taken under the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, etc. But this book has not been marked as an Exhibit in the said appeal. Nevertheless, it is found among the material papers forwarded to this Court. As the said document has not been marked as an exhibit. I do not propose to place any reliance on it. 12. Mr. N.T. Vanamamali revying on the document Exhibit D-1 very strongly contends that the allegations made by the petitioners-accused are supported by Exhibit D-1. 13. It seems that Exhibit P-1 has been issued in the name of the Indian Communist (Marxist) Party of Tirvkoilur Branch. Admittedly the first petitioner is an active member of the said political party, being the Secretary of the Branch. It is not disputed by him that he caused the pamphlet Exhibit P-1 to be printed and published. But, the deffence that is put forth is that he did it in good faith for the public good.
Admittedly the first petitioner is an active member of the said political party, being the Secretary of the Branch. It is not disputed by him that he caused the pamphlet Exhibit P-1 to be printed and published. But, the deffence that is put forth is that he did it in good faith for the public good. Before we go into that question, I shall refer to certain evidence on the side of the prosecution itself. It is admitted by P.W. 1 (complainant) that out of the four godowns owned by the complainant’s firm, two godowns have been leased out to P.W. 6, who is none other than his senior paternal uncle’s son-in-law, that he was a declared insolvent and that he was an authorised wholesales-cum-hulling agent for storing the Government levy paddy and billing and despatching the resultant rice to various places, as directed by the Government. The said godowns were commonly known as ‘‘M.K.M.S. Godowns“as admitted by P.W. 6, the lessee himself in his cross-examination. Further it is the admission of P.W. 1 in the cross-examination that he was responsible for the maintenance of the godown. P.W. 1 has also deposed in his further cross-examination that P.W. 3 the Sub-Inspector of Police, Arakandanallur, has been suspended after he was examined on his behalf, and that he does not know whether P.W. 5 was suspended for not getting back the resultant rice from P.W. 1. But he would say that he does not know as to how many bags of paddy have been washed away and he did not enquire about the damage even subsequently. He would also deny a suggestion that the licence for paddy and rice dealership was obtained in the name of P.W. 6 as his benamidar. P.W. 2 who is the Block Convenor of Congress (O) of Mohayur, would say that the Caltex godown and the M.K.MS. Godown were destroyed by the floods, and he came to know that P.W. 6 (Sheik Rowther) had stocked the paddy in the said godowns. Further, it is his evidence in the cross-examination that the paddy bags were washed away through a hole on the northern side of the Caltex Godown, of the measurement of 4’X3’.
Godown were destroyed by the floods, and he came to know that P.W. 6 (Sheik Rowther) had stocked the paddy in the said godowns. Further, it is his evidence in the cross-examination that the paddy bags were washed away through a hole on the northern side of the Caltex Godown, of the measurement of 4’X3’. P.W. 3 is the Sub-Inspector of Police, Arakandanallar, who speaks about the receipt of Exhibit P-5 from P.W. 6 and his entries in Exhibits P-6 and P-7 and about his causing the photos (M.O. 2 series) to be taken at 9 A.M.on 9th December, 1972 and M.O. 4 series on 10th December, 1972. Further, he has admitted that he went to M.K.M.S. godown with four or five persons, but he could not save the paddy bags from being washed away. P.W. 4 the Executive Engineer Public Works Department, Villnpuram would depose that he went to Arkandanallur on 11th December, 1972 to assess the damage caused by various sources and on the way he was taken by the Civil Supplies officials to the godown where the Government paddy etc. were stored and that he visited the compound and also the godowns and noted the damages to the compound walls and according to his estimation, there would have been 4’ water in Arakandanallur and Tirvkoilur. P.W. 5 was the Taluk Supply Officer of Tirukoilur from 20th September, 1972 to 1st January, 1973. He would say that on 8th December, 1972, as per his office records there were 11, 898 bags of paddy, each bag containing 75 kgs. and 589.53 quintals of rice and that on 10th December, 1972 he went to Arakandanallur Godowns and found the locks of all the four godowns intact and that he found in three places in the main godown and in one place in the side godown he walls having fallen down. In the Caltex Godown, in the south and north, the walls had fallen down and he found rice and paddy in and around the rice mill. He sent intimation to the Revenue Divisional Officer on 12th December, 1972. According to his report, the Government sustained a loss of 8,024.20 bags of paddy and 568.2.3 quintals of rice and he has estimated the loss to the tune of Rs. four lakhs.
He sent intimation to the Revenue Divisional Officer on 12th December, 1972. According to his report, the Government sustained a loss of 8,024.20 bags of paddy and 568.2.3 quintals of rice and he has estimated the loss to the tune of Rs. four lakhs. P.W. 6 would admit that the lease agreement was written about one year before, the copies of which are with P.W.J and himself and that on 9th December, 1972 morning there were 11,898 bags of paddy and’”589.53 quintals of rice on stock. When he was questioned whether he had not filed the insolvency petition (LP. No, 2 of 196) before the Official Receiver) first of all he would depose that he did not give it but later on stated that at the instance of but father-in-law he gave an application. But that he was not declared as an insolvent. ‘The admission of this witness goes to show that he was not paying any income-tax. But the general evidence of this witness is that there was an unprecedented flood and as a result of that the flood water rose to a height of 8’ to 9’ at about 3 p.m. on 9th December, 1972 in his mill and he gave Exhibit P-5 to the Police. From the evidence of this witness it transpires that all the godowns including the godowns leased out to P.W. 6 were generally and commonly known as M.K.M S. Godowns and P.W. 1 the complainant was responsible for their maintenance. Apart from the question whether the said 3,024.20 bags of paddy and 568.23 quintals of rice had been entirely washed away or not all that the petitioners have published in Exhibit P-l is that the paddy bags which are alleged to have been washed away in then flood were stored in M.K.M.S. godowns and they have raised the question as to what precautionary steps were taken by M.K.M.S. to prevent such kind of loss. The lower appellate Court while dealing with this aspect in paragraphs 7, 8,9 and 10 of its judgment, has laboured very much and given the following reasons for confirming the convictions of the petitioners herein: 9 (1).
The lower appellate Court while dealing with this aspect in paragraphs 7, 8,9 and 10 of its judgment, has laboured very much and given the following reasons for confirming the convictions of the petitioners herein: 9 (1). If at all the contention of the appellants (Petitioner) is that they have referred to M.K.M.S. in the pamphlet only as a godown in which the Government paddy and rice were stocked they should not have made any mention about the connection of M.K.M.S. with the paddy or rice stocked in the said godown (videpara. 7); (2) If M.K.M.S. firm has got no connection with the stock in the godown, there need not have been any reference to the precautions that should have been taken by M.K.M.S. The very fact that this kind of reference has been made in Exhibit P-l would mow that the appellants (Petitioners) wanted to impute M.K.M.S. firm with the alleged fraud (vide para. 8); (3) the suggestions made to P.W. 6 to the effect that he was only a name-lender to M.K. M.S. firm would go to show without any doubt that the petitioners have meant only the M.K.M.S. firm when they have referred to the godown by the name “M.K. M.S.” and they have not referred to M.K.M.S. as a place where P.W. 6 had stocked the Government paddy and rice (vide para. 9); (4) There could not be any slight doubt that the imputation is only against M.K.M.S. firm and the reference in Exhibit P-l is only to M.K. M.S. firm and not merely to the place where the Government paddy and rice were stored. 14. Coming to the first reasoning, it is true that Exhibit P-l contains an averment that the Government pady in M.K.M.S. Kamruddin Rowther’s Godown have been washed away. In my view the said reference to “M.K.M.S. Godown”is only to indicate the place where the paddy bags were stored. It is admitted by the complainant that the godowns in which the paddy bags were stored were commonly known as M.K. M.S. Godowns. Therefore, while referring to the place, the author of Exhibit P-l has made a mention of the name “M. K.M.S. Godown”. There is absolutely no reference that M.K.M.S. firm has stored the paddy. Under these circumstances, as rightly urged by Mr.
Therefore, while referring to the place, the author of Exhibit P-l has made a mention of the name “M. K.M.S. Godown”. There is absolutely no reference that M.K.M.S. firm has stored the paddy. Under these circumstances, as rightly urged by Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, it cannot be said that this reference has been made to impute M.K. M.S. firm with the storing of the paddy. On the other land, he had necessarily to make mention of the name of M.K. M.S. Kamruddin Godown to indicate the place. 15. Coming to the second reasoning, it is admitted by P.W. 1 himself that he was responsible for the maintenance of the godown. In the light of this admission, the statement made in Exhibit F-1. about the precautionary measures to be taken by P.W. 1 or by the Government cannot be said to be unwarranted. The reasoning that there need not have been such a reference to the precautions to be taken by M.K.M.S. is not correct. From this statement alone, one cannot say that there is an express or implied imputation against the firm of any fraud. There is only a refrence to the wide talk among the public that the officials and some of the the ministers of the ruling party are responsible for this fraud. If really the petitioners had intended to impute and fraud as against M.K.M.S., they would have included the name of M.K.M.S. firm also along with the officials and ministers. 16. Coming to the third reasoning given by the lower appellate Court, it may be noted that under the Criminal Jurisprudence the accused is entitled to take various defences and to make suggestions to the witness in support of his defence. The mere suggestion that P.W. 6 was a name-lender cannot be said to lead to an inference that the petitioners had made imputations against M.K.M.S. firm. There is no doubt that P.W. 6 was a declared insolvent, as admitted by P.W.I. In these circumstances, nothing is strange in making this kind of suggestions, especially when P.W. 1 himself was a licensee, having his godown at Chidambaram and was also a close relation of P.W. 6. 17. As regards the fourth reasoning, it is clear from the discussion on the third, that there is no imputation against M.K.M.S. firm and Exhibit. P.1 makes only a reference to the place where the Government paddy and rice were stored.
17. As regards the fourth reasoning, it is clear from the discussion on the third, that there is no imputation against M.K.M.S. firm and Exhibit. P.1 makes only a reference to the place where the Government paddy and rice were stored. 18. It is significant to note that bereft of the evidence of P.W. 1 there is no other tangible and acceptable evidence to prove that the reputation of the M.K.M.S. firm has been lowered down in the estimation of the public in general. As against the evidence of the complainant, the accused have examined D.Ws. 1 to 3, of whom D.W, 1 is a rice mill-owner belonging to the ‘Congress (O) party. He would say that the allegation that the paddy bags were washed away by flood is not true, and that there was only some damage caused by the flood, to the walls of the godown. Of course, this witness has admitted in cross-examination that he was one of the signatories in Exhibit P-8 in which it has been averred that there was 9 water in the rice mill. D.W. 2 was the President of the Town Congress Committee of the Congress (CO Party and the President of the Co-operative Bank. He would say that on 9th December, 1972 the flood rose to a hight of 4’ and no paddy bag has been washed away from P.W. l’s godown. Except same vague-suggestions made in the cross-examinations, nothing tangible has been brought out in the cross-examination, challenging his evidence. D.W. 3 is the Town Secretary of the D.M.K. Party of Arakandanallur. According to him, on 9th December, 1972 there was 3 to 4 feet water in Arakandanallur and by 6 p.m. the water receded and at no point of time the level rose to more than 4’ and that neither the paddy bags nor the rice stored in the godown have been washed away. 19. Mr.
According to him, on 9th December, 1972 there was 3 to 4 feet water in Arakandanallur and by 6 p.m. the water receded and at no point of time the level rose to more than 4’ and that neither the paddy bags nor the rice stored in the godown have been washed away. 19. Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, while summing up his arguments, has urged that the petitioners have not made any imputation intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such statements would harm, the reputation of the respondent-complainant and that the said statement now sought to be relied upon by the respondent stating that it has done severe harm to his reputation either directly or indirectly by lowering his character in the estimation of others, cannot be said to be a false statement especially in view of Exhibit D-1 and the registration of the criminal case as against P.W. 6 and others; at any rate, the said statements world be protected either under exception No. 1 or under the 9th exception to section 499 Indian Penal Code. I see much force in the above argument. Point No.2: The first exception to section 499 is available to an accused person if it is shown by him that the impugned statement was true and had been made for the public good. In other words, the accused must satisfy the Court by proving the two requirements of the first exception viz., (i) that the said statement is true; and (ii) that the publication is for the public good. The proof of truth, which is one of the main ingredients of the first exception, is not an ingredient of the 9th exception. What the 9th exception requires is that the accused person has made the statement is good faith. Of course, in this case the petitioners have not laid as much emphasis on the protection under the first exception as they have done for protection under the 9th exception. Besides the arguments advanced under point No. 1, the learned Counsel would urge that the legal actions taken by the Tamil Nadu Government, both civil and criminal, against P.W. 6 and others, would show that the allegations that 8,024.20 bags of paddy and 568.23 quintals of rice have been washed away by the flood, are false and as such the impugned statement must be taken to be a true one.
Further, he would submit that if the impugned statement does not come under exception-1, definitely it would be attracted by exception -9. The materials placed before me in this case are not sufficient in my view to give a judicial finding that the impugned statement is true. When an accused pleads exception-1 it is incumbent upon him to prove in the first place that the statement made by him is true in its substance and effect and it is not sufficient if only a part of the libel is true. As 1 have already mentioned the evidence is not adequate to give any finding on the plea of justification of truth and I am of the view that this case cannot come under exception-1. Point No. 3: In the present case if the ingredient of public good is satisfied, the only question which arises before me for consideration is whether the imputation can be said to have been made in good faith. There is no doubt that these two requirements viz., good faith and public good have both to be satisfied and the failure of the revision-petitioners to prove both these requirements would exclude the application of exception-9 in their favour even if one of the ingredients is satisfied. 20. Section 105 of the Evidence Act, relieves the prosecution of the necessity of proving the absence of facts which might bring the case within the general or special exception or exemption or proviso under the Penal Code or any other criminal law. According to this section, when an accused person relics on any exception under the penal law, it is incumbent upon him to prove the existence of circumstances which would show that any of the general or special exception would take his case out of criminal liability. 21. What is the nature and extent of the onus of proof expected from a person accused of an offence as contemplated under section 105 of the Evidence Act, has been frequently considered by Courts in various decisions. The principle laid down in these cases is that where the burden of proving anything is on the accused, this burden is less than what is required when the burden is on the prosecution.
The principle laid down in these cases is that where the burden of proving anything is on the accused, this burden is less than what is required when the burden is on the prosecution. As observed in R.V. Carr v. Braint1: "In any case where, either by statute or at common law, some matter is presumed against an accused person ‘unless the contrary is proved’, the jury should be directed that it is for them to decide whether the contrary is proved, that the burden of proof required is less than that required at the hands of the prosecution in proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the burden may be discharged by evidence satisfying the jury of the probability of that which the accused is called upon to establish." 22. In accordance with this principle, it has been held in various decisions, all of which I think it is unnecessary to refer to,that the standard of proof required from the accused is not the standard required from the prosecution. The Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the degree of proof that has to be offered by an accused person while claiming exception 9 to section 499, in Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab and another2. Their lordships have laid down at page 101 as follows: "....there is consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view:hat where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required, to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That no doubt, is the test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has discharged, its onus to prove the guit of the accused; but that is not a test which can be applied to an accused person who seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case falls under an exception. Where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an exception, law treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds ‘in proving a preponderance of probability’. As soon as preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus.
Where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an exception, law treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds ‘in proving a preponderance of probability’. As soon as preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." Again at page 102, it is observed: "It will be recalled that it was with a view to empbasising the fundamental doctrine of criminal law that the onus to prove its case lies on the prosecution, that Viscount Sankey in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions3, observed that no matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. This principle of common law is a part of the criminal law in this country. That is not to say that if an exception is pleaded by an accused person, he is not required to justify his plea, but the degree and character of proof which the accused is expected to furnish in support of his plea cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof expected from the prosecution which is required to prove its case. The onus on an accused person may well be compared to the onus on a party in civil proceedings, and just as in civil proceedings the Court trying an issue makes its decision by adopting the test of probabilities, so must a criminal Court hold that the plea made by (he accused is proved if a preponderance of probability is established by the evidence led by him." Then at page 103, their Lordships have further pointed out thus: "Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether on accused person acted in good faith under the ninth exception, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or test.
It would be a question to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case — what is the nature of the imputation made; under what circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the person who makes the imputation; was there any malice in his mind when he made the said imputation; did he make any enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he acted with the due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true? These and other considerations would be relevant in deciding the plea of good faith made by an accused person who claims the benefit of the ninth exception." Bearing in mind the above principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court, now I shall discuss whether the revision petitioners had acted in good faith for the public good, and whether the evidence proves their case by the application of the test of probabilities, thus entitling him to the ninth exception. 23. Good faith is defined in section 52 of the Indian Penal Code. It says that nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith, which is done or believed without due care and attention. So, in considering the question as to whether the revision-petitioners had acted in good faith in publishing the impugned statement, we have to examine whether they acted with due care and attention. No doubt, a bald plea that the petitioners believed what they stated was true by itself will not sustain their case of good faith, so as to attract the ninth exception. Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. On the other hand, it must be shown that the belief in the impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief. Therefore, the element of due care and attention plays an important role. If it is shown that the accused did not take due care and attention then his plea of good faith will be defeated. But it must be remembered that good faith docs not require logical infallibility. The question of good faith is necessarily a question of fact, whether the accused enters that plea and proves it or the prosecution gives proof to show the absence of it.
But it must be remembered that good faith docs not require logical infallibility. The question of good faith is necessarily a question of fact, whether the accused enters that plea and proves it or the prosecution gives proof to show the absence of it. The test to be applied for the proof of good faith is whether there is no lack of good faith and it must be gathered from the surrounding circumstances. Whether or not the matter has been published for public good, an enquiry must be directed to the benefit that the publication has rendered or sought to render to the public or to a section of the public and secondly whether the matter did concern the public. From the evidence adduced and the circumstances appearing in this case, it leaves no doubt in my mind, that the publication of the impugned statement has really rendered benefit to the public at large, and the petitioners have published this Exhibit P-l in good faith and for the public good. The Supreme Court in Sukra Mahto v. Basudeo Kumar Mahto1, while dealing with the proof of good faith, observed as follows: "In the ninth exception, the person making the imputation has to substantiate that his enquiry was attended with due care and attention and he was thus satisfied that the imputation was true. The accent is on the enquiry, care and objective and not subjective satisfaction." In this case, the first petitioner, even at the earliest point of time, under Exhibit P-4 has come forward with the case that he published the pamphlet Exhitit P-l only “on the information received from the general public and from some individuals in particular and which information he had no reason to disbelieve and hence, believing it to be true, in good faith, he had personaliy visited the spot and gathered the particulars which were published in the said pamphlet”. Coming to the evidence, D.W. 1 would say that the first petitioner enqiired him about the news item that appeared in the “Daily Thanthi” that the paddy bags have been washed away by the flood and he (D.W. 1) told him that the said item was false.
Coming to the evidence, D.W. 1 would say that the first petitioner enqiired him about the news item that appeared in the “Daily Thanthi” that the paddy bags have been washed away by the flood and he (D.W. 1) told him that the said item was false. Similarly D.W. 3 would say that on 1.1th December, 1972 the first petitioner enquired him about the news item in Daily Thanthi and he (D.W. 3) replied that there was no such loss or damage and that the said news item was incorrect. Thus, it is seen that the first petitioner, before causing the pamphlet to be printed, has made enquiries from the local people and he has come forward with this case even at the earliest point of time. Thus, it can be seen that the first petitioner has taken due care and attention before the publication of Exhibit P-1. 24. It is pertinent to note that there is no evidence on the side of the complainant to show that the petitioners were having any personal malice or animosity towards the firm or its partners. It has been observed in Debajyoti Barmah v. The State1, as follows: “The word ‘others’ in the Explanation to section 499 refers to a reasonable and fair minded man and not to a man with morbid or suspicious mind. Explanation IV to section 499, Indian Penal Code, does away with much of the fine distinctions under the English Law and seems to imply that what constitutes defamation has to be determined not upon an interpretation that may be found for a word by laborious research in a Court of law, but upon the meaning that might be conveyed by the word to a reasonable and fair minded man.” The reasons given by the lower appellate Court on this aspect are not justifiable. On the other hand, the lower Court has proceeded on the misconception that the petitioners have made imputations against M.K.M.S. firm connecting the said firm with the loss of the Government paddy and rice. For the above discussions, I find on this point that the impugned statement clearly and squarely falls within exception 9 to section 499. 25. Thus, the petitioners have succeeded in showing that they are entitled to the protection under the ninth exception to section 499, Indian Penal Code, and therefore are entitled to an order of acquittal. 26.
For the above discussions, I find on this point that the impugned statement clearly and squarely falls within exception 9 to section 499. 25. Thus, the petitioners have succeeded in showing that they are entitled to the protection under the ninth exception to section 499, Indian Penal Code, and therefore are entitled to an order of acquittal. 26. The approach of the lower appellate Court in dealing with the plea of exception pleaded by the petitioners, is erroneous. I am fully satisfied from the above discussion that the said Court has mis-directed itself in law in dealing with the question of the nature and scope of the protection given by the ninth exception to section 499, which the petitioners have claimed. 27. In the result, therefore, the revision petition is allowed and the order of the lower appellate Court convicting and sentencing the petitioners is set aside and the petitioners are acquitted of the offences with which they stand charged. Fine amounts, if paid, shall be refunded to them.