Judgment By this writ application under Article 227 of the constitution of India, the petitioner challenges the legality of the order, dated the 8th of December, 1974, passed by the Commissioner of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar (respondent no. 1), which is contained in Annexure 1 to this writ application. 2. In order to appreciate the points raised for our consideration, it is necessary to state briefly the facts. Respondents 2 and 3 had filed a joint application on the 13th April, 1975, before the District Mines Officer, Monghyr (respondent no. 5) for grant of mining lease in regard to quarrying of stone metal cover approximately 8 acres forming part of survey plot no. 1524 of Nawagarhi hills in the District of Monghyr. The petitioner made a similar application on the 20th May, 1975. It is not disputed that respondent no. 5, communicated to the petitioner by his letter no. 843/M, dated the 20th September 1973 that his application for grant of the mining lease had received approval of the Collector of Monghyr (respondent no. 4). Although the date of the order of the grant of the mining lease is not mentioned in the petition, it is agreed at the Bar that the date of the order is 9th of September. 1973. It may also be mentioned that respondent no. 5 had issued earlier another communication to respondent no. 2 and 3, dated the 15th September 1973, informing disapproval of their application a copy of the said letter of communication has been annexed to this application and marked as Annexure 2. The said respondents 2 and 3 filed a revisional application before respondent no. 1, the Commissioner of Mines, Bihar, on the 12th of November, 1973. In this application, the petitioner was also impleaded as opposite party no. 3. A prayer was made in this petition by the said respondents 2 and 3 that the order of the Collector rejecting their application be set aside and the lease in question be granted to them "canceling and quashing the order obtained by opposite party no. 3. It is on this revisional application that the respondent no. 1 has passed the impugned order. It may be mentioned that in the communication (Annexure 2) mentioned above, two grounds were taken by respondent no. 3 appertaining to the defects in their application. 3. It is on this revisional application that the respondent no. 1 has passed the impugned order. It may be mentioned that in the communication (Annexure 2) mentioned above, two grounds were taken by respondent no. 3 appertaining to the defects in their application. It is not necessary to indicate those grounds for the decision of the question following for our decision. 3. In the aforesaid proceeding before respondent no. I, the petitioner had raised the question of limitation to the effect that the revisional application was time barred. This fact is noted in the order of respondent no. 1, dated the 24th September, 1974, who purported to receive orders in the matter and there after has passed the impugned order on 6th December, 1974. 4. Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, appearing for the petitioner, contends that the respondent no 1 has committed an apparent error in passing the impugned order thereby cancelling both the orders communicated by respondent no. 5, firstly, that of the rejection of the application of respondents 2 and 3 and the other granting lease to the petitioner without disposing of the question of limitation. According to his contention once it is held that the revisional application itself was out of time, it was not maintainable and respondent no. 1 had on jurisdiction to entertain them much less to pass any order in the matter. 5. It is true that in the impugned order, there is no discussion of the question of limitation raised on behalf of the petitioner before respondent no. 1. However, we permitted the learned counsel to argue the question of limitation at full length and in order to appreciate the question, we would refer to the relevant provisions of the rules, namely, the Bihar Mines Mineral Concession Rules, 1972 (briefly 'the Rules') governing the matter. Under Chapter II (General restrictions as under taking mining operation), rule 4 lays down the prohibition for mining operation without permit or mining lease. The next Chapter III deals with the provisions for grant of mining lease and rule 9 prescribes that a mining lease shall he granted by the 'Collector' on an application made in Form A to him or any other officer authorised by him, accompanied by some fees etc. The next Chapter III deals with the provisions for grant of mining lease and rule 9 prescribes that a mining lease shall he granted by the 'Collector' on an application made in Form A to him or any other officer authorised by him, accompanied by some fees etc. Rule It, which is very relevant and reads as follows : "11 Disposal of application for mining lease.-(1) An application for the grant of mining lease shall be disposed of within 90 days from the date of its receipt. (2) If any application is not disposed of within the period specified in sub-rule (1), it shall be deemed to have been refused; Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing by the Collector any such application may be considered and disposed of after the said period of 90 days but not exceeding! 80 days from the date of the receipt of the application." Then in point of relevancy is rule 20, which lays down that "the Collector may, for reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant, refuse to grant or renew a mining lease over the whole or part of the area applied for. Under Chapter VI (Appeal and Revision). rule 43 is the rule providing a right of revision to a person aggrieved by any order made by the Collector under these rules within sixty days from the date of communication of the order to him to the Commissioner observing certain formalities with which we are not concerned. Power has been given in proviso to sub-rule (J) of this rule to entertain an application for revision even after the said period of sixty days for cause to the satisfaction of the Commissioner. Then comes as explanation at the end of this rule and we would usefully quote whole of the same, as : "Explanation.-for the purposes of this rule where the Collector has filed to dispose of an application for the grant or renewal of a mining lease within the period specified in respect thereof in these rules, the Collector shall be deemed to have made an order refusing the grant or renewal of such lease on the date on which such period expires." These are all the relevant provisions on which learned counsel for both the par ties have based their submission. Now, we propose to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner with respect to the question of limitation. Sub-rule (1) of rule 45 apparently prescribes a period of sixty days for making a revision application. As to how this period of limitation, i.e. sixty days, has to be computed has also been sufficiently indicated in this sub-rule and that is "from the date of communication of the order to him." If sub-rule (1) to rule 45 is construed on the face of it, no question of limitation arises in the presentation of the revisional application filled by respondents 2 and 3 before respondent no. 1, as the application which was filed on the 12th of November, 1973, was still within time from their date of the communication of the order on their application dated the 15th of September, 1973. Learned counsel for the petitioner, ho Never, builds his contention on the basis of rule 11 referred to above, and submits that in as much as the application of respondents 2 and 3 was not disposed of Within sixty days from the date of its receipt i.e. 13th of April, 1973 by the Collector, under the express provision contained in rule 11, the said application of respondents 2 and 3 would be deemed to have been automatically refused as the power to extend the period of sixty days for reasons to be recorded in writing as laid down in the proviso to section 11 was not exercised by the Collector. Learned counsel therefore, contends that in view of the automatic or deemed refusal or disposal of the application of respondents 2 and 3 immediately on the expiry of ninety days from the date of their application, the period of limitation for filing the revisional application within the meaning of rule 45 started running and the application was barred by time as according to him otherwise there was no necessity for the rule making authorities to append the explanation to rule 45 of the Rules and its only purpose was to apply the period of limitation of 60 days, for filing a revision by an applicant on whose application an express order was passed by the Collector. 6. We have given our serious consideration to this question and having examined it from all possible angles have failed to pursuade ourselves to accept the contention of the learned counsel. 6. We have given our serious consideration to this question and having examined it from all possible angles have failed to pursuade ourselves to accept the contention of the learned counsel. Before, however, we deal with this matter, we would refer to the analogous provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, and 1960, which are the rules framed by the Central Government in the Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel. In rule 57 of the 1949 Rules, a provision was made that where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for the grant or renewal etc. within the period prescribed there-for in those rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of those rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate and any person aggrieved by such failure might within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Government for reviewing the case. Our purpose of refering to this rule is to show that there was such an intention, namely. to file a review or the like as has been contended by Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal in this case making us to hold similarly on the basis of the present explanation to rule 45, of the rules in question, the rule making authorities, in a very clear and unambigous language, indicated this intention. 7. Mr. Lakshman Saran Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, who has brought to our notice these rules of the Central Government, contends that inasmuch as hardship was felt by such persons, who had not received any communication of the order of refusal on account of the deemed refusal under the 1949 rules in filing review, the Central Government when framed the rules in the year 1960 in supersession of the 1949 rules, deleted that provision from the analogous provision contained in rule 54 of the new rules and a similar explanation, as finds place to rule 45 of the rules in question, was added. We find force in this contention. We may a1so refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Nookela Setharamaiah V. Kataish Naidu and others which was considering the Minerals Concession Rules of 1949 which also reversed a Bench decision of this court in Dey Gupta and Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 Patna 487. We find force in this contention. We may a1so refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Nookela Setharamaiah V. Kataish Naidu and others which was considering the Minerals Concession Rules of 1949 which also reversed a Bench decision of this court in Dey Gupta and Co. vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 Patna 487. In the aforesaid Patna case sub-rule (2) of rule 37 of 1949 Rules were construed as only "to enable an applicant desiring to have a Mining lease to by the review application without unnecessarily waiting for a long period without any order being passed on his application. In other words, laying down that by the lapse of the fixed time for passing the order from the date of the receipt of the application, the State Government did not cease to have jurisdiction over the matter to pass another order on the application in question. The Supreme Court repelled this view and laid down that the State Government was incompetent to deal with any application pending before it after it has failed to dispose of the same within the period prescribed there for in the rules and such failure shall, for the purpose of the rules, be deemed to be refusal to grant the lease. It seems to us that in order to reconcile the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the rule-making authorities have very deliberately brought within the fold of the revisional order also these orders which are deemed to be order of refusal simply on account of the lapse of the prescribed period in disposing of the application, as that it could not be contended that sub-rule (1) of rule 45 simply provided for filing revisional applications only against those orders which were expressed over and communicated to a person as directed under rule 20 of the rules and not to these applicants on whose application an express orders were passed, but which stood rejected automatically by lapse of the statutory period fixed for disposal thereof, to me, this seems to be the only purpose for providing the explanation to this rule. 8. So far as the question of computation of the period of limitation of sixty days is concerned; it also stands entirely differently. We may usefully refer to the scheme of the Limitation Act, as well. 8. So far as the question of computation of the period of limitation of sixty days is concerned; it also stands entirely differently. We may usefully refer to the scheme of the Limitation Act, as well. In schedule to the Act, there are always three headings, one the nature of the matter, then the prescribed period of limitation fixed for the relief and then "the time from which the period begins to run. It is apparent, therefore, that fixation of period of limitation is one thing and the computation of the same is different. In other words, in order to compute the fixed period of limitation, there must be a definite point from which the period of limitation is to start to run. It appears to me that for computation of the period of sixty days, the rule making authorities have unequivocally laid down that this period would start to run from the date of the communication of the order to the applicant Even such an applicant who is aggrieved by the deemed refusal with have the advantage of filing a revision after expiry of the period prescribed under rule 11 although no communication is received by him and in that case, the question of limitation would not arise against him. In this view of the matter, we do not find that the question of limitation raised by the petitioner before respondent no. 1 in the aforesaid revisional application had any substance. Respondent no.1 would have done better to dispose of also the question of limitation, in his order, dated 6th December, 1974, no doubt, but having given our full thought to the question and feeling satisfied that the question of limitation did not arise in the case, we would not like to interfere on this ground that respondent no. 1 did not answer the question of limitation in his order. Once the revision application was competent before him certainly he was entitled to pass the impugned order on setting aside both the communications, of the order of rejection as well as of the approval passed by the Collector communicated to respondents 2 and 3 and the petitioner respectively on the ground that they were wholly without jurisdiction. The view taken by the learned Commissioner now also lands full support from the aforesaid Supreme Court decision cited earlier. . 9. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent nos. The view taken by the learned Commissioner now also lands full support from the aforesaid Supreme Court decision cited earlier. . 9. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, appearing for respondent nos. 2 and 3 also relied upon a decision of this court in Abdul Majid and others. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and others for the ground that the grant in favour of the petitioner being apparently without jurisdiction this court should not in its discretionary jurisdiction interfere. In this decision, it was held that the writ of certiorari is not a writ of course and the very object of this rule is to foster justice and right a wrong. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with this view. 10. Mr. Tarkeshwar. Dayal also contends that, in any way, the Commissioner having set aside both the orders should have remanded the whole matter to the authorities concerned, and makes a similar prayer before us. It is difficult to accept this contention as well. By doing so, a clear illegality win be committed inasmuch as the application has got to be disposed of within a period of 9 days, from the date of their filing. the consideration of the application of the petitioner or of the respondents 2 and 3 now stands apparently barred under rule 11 and, therefore, we would refrain from making any such order of remand. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this application, which is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we would not make any order for costs. It will, however, be open to the parties concerned to make fresh applications for grant of the lease and if so, their applications would be considered by the authorities in accordance with law. Application dismissed.