JUDGMENT Dr. T. Kochu Thommen, J. 1. The sole controversy in this Original Petition is as regards the right of the State Government to regulate the method of appointment of the teaching staff of the Carmel Polytechnic, Alleppey, which is an institution run by the petitioner. The petitioner, a religious organisation, started the technical institute in 1958 and has been running it with the financial aid of the Central and State Governments. The Central Government extended the aid only for five years and since 1964 the State Government alone has been financing this institution. Originally the aid was given under a scheme adopted by the Central Government and State Government. In consultation with the petitioner, the original scheme was substituted in 1964 by the grant-in-aid scheme under which the State Government alone rendered financial assistance to the institution. The State Government shouldered the finan­cial burden up to 66-2/3 per cent of the recurring expenditure. Ultimately in 1972, the State Government and the petitioner entered into the Ext. P-2 agreement whereby it was agreed that the State Government would pay the entire salary payable to the staff directly to the persons concerned and the petitioner would pay to the State Government the entire fees collected from the students. Ext. P-2 confers certain rights on the State Government to regulate the management of the insti­tution in specified matters. Purportedly in terms of Ext. P-2, the State Government issued a direction to the petitioner, asking it not to make any appointment to the teaching staff by direct recruitment. This direction is contained in Ext. P-7. 2. The complaint of the petitioner is that the State Government has no power to issue, any such direction. It is contended that Ext. P-2 is the only instrument under which the State Government gets any right to interfere with the management of the institution. There is no provision in Ext. P-2 which justifies any such direction. The petitioner therefore states that the threat contained in Ext. P-7 to the effect that financial aid payable under Ext. P-2 would be withheld if the management did not comply with the require­ment is totally unjustified. I shall now read Ext. There is no provision in Ext. P-2 which justifies any such direction. The petitioner therefore states that the threat contained in Ext. P-7 to the effect that financial aid payable under Ext. P-2 would be withheld if the management did not comply with the require­ment is totally unjustified. I shall now read Ext. P-7: “In continuation of the instructions contained in letter cited, I am directed to inform you that Government consider that direct recruitment should not be resorted to in eases where qualified hands are available in the lower categories for promotion to any post in the institution. Government desire that these instructions should be enforced in all such cases and promotion given to qualified hands in the feeder categories. In this connection it is also emphasised that direct recruitments made against vacancies for which qualified hands in the lower categories are available for promotion, will not be approved by the Technical Education Department and direct payment of salaries will not be made to the persons appointed in disregard of these instruc­tions. The Director of Technical Education is requested to ensure that these instructions are applied scrupulously and consistently in the matter.� Admittedly there is no statute or any rule or regulation having the force of law which gives the State Government any power or right to interfere with the management of the petitioner’s technical institution. The only rights in regard to this institute which are vested in the State Government are those rights which are conferred upon it under Ext. P-2 agreement. Counsel for the respondents are not in a position to point out to me any other agreement in force under which the State Government has derived a right to interfere with the management of the institute. Consequently Ext. P-7 can be considered to be valid only if it is consistent with the provisions of Ext. P-2. In the absence of any provision in Ext, P-2 which justifies Ext. P-7 it has to be concluded that Ext. P-7 was issued without jurisdiction or authority. In Ext. P-2 it is clearly agreed and recognised that the Educa­tional Agency in regard to the Carmel Polytechnic is the petitioner and the petitioner has full control and manage­ment over the same. Clauses (6) and (7) of Ext. P-2 are the two provisions which directly relate to the appointment of teachers. I shall read these two clauses: “6. In Ext. P-2 it is clearly agreed and recognised that the Educa­tional Agency in regard to the Carmel Polytechnic is the petitioner and the petitioner has full control and manage­ment over the same. Clauses (6) and (7) of Ext. P-2 are the two provisions which directly relate to the appointment of teachers. I shall read these two clauses: “6. (i) There shall be a Committee for the selection of teaching staff including workshop staff for appointment in the institution (s) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Selection Committee for Teaching Staff’). (ii) The Government shall determine who are the categories of officers and employees coming under the term ‘Teaching Staff inclu­ding workshop staff’ in this clause and the decision of the Government, thereon shall be final and legally binding on the Educational Agency. 7. (i) All future appointments to the teaching staff including workshop staff of the institution (s) whether provisional or permanent shall be made by the Educational Agency only from the list of persons prepared by the Selection Committee for teaching staff, according to the rank assigned by that Committee. (ii) The Selection Committee for Teaching staff shall consist of the following members viz., (a) Two representatives of the Educational Agency of whom one according to the choice of the Educational Agency shall be the Chairman. (b) A representative of the University (in the case of Engineering Colleges)/the State Board of Technical Education (in the case of Polytechnics). (c) Director of Technical Education or his nominee. (d) Regional Officer of the Ministry of Education or his nominee, representing the Central Government. (e) Two representatives of the Southern Regional Committee of the All India Council for Technical Education to be nominated by the Regional Officer of the Ministry of Education from the panel approved by the Southern Regional Council in consultation with the Institution and the Director of Technical Education. (f) Principal of the institution, Member-Secretary excepting for selection to the post of Principal.� It is clear from clause (6) that the Government has the right to determine the categories of officers and employees coming under the term 'teaching staff including workshop staff’. Shri Sivasankara Panicker, appearing for one of the additional respondents, strenuously contended that this clause gave the Government the authority to determine the manner in which the teaching staff could be appointed. The definition of the term ‘categories’ has been considered by this court in Dr. Shri Sivasankara Panicker, appearing for one of the additional respondents, strenuously contended that this clause gave the Government the authority to determine the manner in which the teaching staff could be appointed. The definition of the term ‘categories’ has been considered by this court in Dr. Raman Nair v. University of Cochin, I.L.R. 1974-1 Kerala 486 and in appeal by the Supreme Court in University of Cochin v. Dr. H. Raman Nair, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2390. As stated in those decisions, categories of teaching staff can only mean the various groups in which the teachers may be placed, such as Professors, Readers, Lecturers and the like. The expression ‘category’ therefore only means the sub-divisions of the teachers of the kind just mentioned and it has no reference to the method or manner of their appointment. The expression ‘category’ does not refer to appointment by direct recruitment or promotion. Consequently, in my opinion, clause (6) only authorises the Government to decide the categories of the teaching staff and not any further. Clause (6) cannot therefore be construed to mean that the Government has also the authority to decide as to the manner in which persons belonging to various categories of teaching staff can be recruited. The only other relevant clause is clause (7). This clause says that the Educational Agency shall appoint to the teaching staff only from among the persons mentioned in the list prepared by the Selection Committee according to the rank assigned to those persons by the Committee. The Committee consists of two represen­tatives of the Educational Agency, as well as representatives of the University and the Government. There is nothing in clause (7) which gives any right to the Government to lay down the method or manner of appointment of persons to the teaching staff. It only provides that appointments should be made out of the list prepared by the Selection Committee. Apart from the restriction contained in that clause there is no other restraint on the power of the manage­ment to make appointment to the teaching staff. In other words, there is no restriction as regards the method of appointment. If a person is given the proper rank by the Selection Committee and placed in the selection list, the management need not and cannot look any further. In other words, there is no restriction as regards the method of appointment. If a person is given the proper rank by the Selection Committee and placed in the selection list, the management need not and cannot look any further. It does not matter whether such person came from outside the institution or was already on its staff in a lower category. If that is the case, there is nothing in Ext. P-2 which enables the Government to compel the management to appoint persons only by promotion. In fact Ext. P-7 directly conflicts with the requirements of clause (7) of Ext. P-2, for, the management has of necessity to appoint persons out of the Select List. The management is not concerned with the question whether persons chosen by the Selection Committee already belonged to the institution in the feeder category or came from outside. The management appoints persons selected by the Committee in accordance with the assigned rank. In my opinion, Ext. P-7 has no legal basis. 3. It was contended by counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was not justified in invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters arising from Ext. P-2 contract. My attention was drawn to the decision in T. D. Joseph v. State of Kerala, 1975 K.L.T. 779 where this Court observed: “The question which arises in this case is whether jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked to challenge orders of Government in respect of contractual rights and obligations. The points urged in the petition involve complicated questions of facts which can be effectively resolved only in a civil court. This Court will not exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Con­stitution in matters of contractual obligations, unless the impugned orders of the Government are, on the face of them perverse, arbitrary or illegal, as a result of which the petitioner's civil rights are adversely affected. The pleadings do not show that Exts. P-7 and P-8 are vitiated by any such vice which is apparent on the face of the record. There is no allegation that any statutory provision has been violated. The petitioner’s contention that he was not effectively heard before the orders were passed and consequently the principles of natural justice were violated is unsustainable in the light of the facts revealed in the pleadings. There is no allegation that any statutory provision has been violated. The petitioner’s contention that he was not effectively heard before the orders were passed and consequently the principles of natural justice were violated is unsustainable in the light of the facts revealed in the pleadings. Nor is there any substance in the allegation that such orders were made without jurisdiction�. (head note). Counsel for the petitioner contends that the above decision should not be understood to mean that this Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 even where the petitioner does not seek enforcement of any contract, but only redressal against unlawful Governmental inter­ference with civil rights. The petitioner does not call upon this Court to aid in the enforcement of any provision in Ext. P-2. All that the petitioner seeks is relief against unlawful interference with its right of management of the institute. If the direction issued in Ext. P-7 is not justified either in terms of Ext. P-2 agreement or under any statute, rule or regulation having the force of law, it is an unlawful interference with a person’s civil rights. As stated by the Supreme Com in M/s Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975)-1 S.C.C. 70 ours is a Government of laws. Consequently any action of the Government which is not justified in law and which adversely affects the civil rights of a person is unsustainable and therefore invalid. I quash Ext. P-7. The Original Petition is allowed. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.