B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) SHORTLY stated the facts leading to this petition are as under: The opponent-Corporation which is the original plaintiff filed two civil suits being Regular Civil Suit No. 33 of 1972 and Regular Civil Suit No. 34 of 1972 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Kalavad against the present applicant for his eviction and possession of the suit premises and for arrears of rent and damages. Both the suits were consolidated. The suits were filed on April 29 1971 During the pendency of the suits the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1972 came in force. The applicant therefore gave an application in the suits that as the provisions of the said Act relate to eviction of the applicant from the public premises which are admittedly governed by the said Act the Civil Courts jurisdiction was ousted in view of the clear provision contained in sec. 16 of the said Act. The applicant prayed that necessary issues be raised in that behalf. The trial Court granted the application and raised the issue whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits. In the opinion of the learned trial Judge since the Act came into force on June 26 1973 Sec. 16 of the said Act would not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in pending actions. In that view of the matter the learned trial Judge by his order of January 31 1976 answered the issue in the affirmative and in favour of the Corporation It is this order which is the subject matter of this revision application before me. ( 2 ) A short but interesting question arises as to what is the effect of sec. 16 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1972 which came in force on June 26 1973 Sec. 16 reads as under: 16 No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person on the ground that he is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or for any other reason specified in sub-sec. (1) or sec. 4 or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec. (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the Corporate authority under sub-sec. (5) of sec. (1) or sec. 4 or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec. (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the Corporate authority under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 9 or any portion of such rent damages or costs. By this section the jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person on the ground that he is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or on any other ground specifically enumerated in the said section. It is common ground between the parties before me that the premises occupied by the applicant herein are owned by the opponent-Corporation in terms of the definition of words public premises given in sec. 2 (f) of the said Act. It is also common ground that the suits were pending in the Civil Court when the said Act came into force. It is settled position of law that in general when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action the rights of parties are decided according to the law as existed when the action was begun unless new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights (vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12 Edition page 220 ). In the ultimate analysis therefore it is always a question of legislative intent whether Civil Courts jurisdiction in pending actions is ousted by change in law. It may be done by express language or by necessary implications. In order to answer the question raised in issue whether the Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted by necessary implication as evinced in sec. 16 of the Act one has to look to the language of sec. 16 itself The section prohibits Civil Courts to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of a person on the prescribed ground from the public premises. The problem therefore is: what is the meaning of expression to entert- ain any suit or proceeding Does it mean to receive and determine or adjudicate upon or consider on merits. My attention has been invited to a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in GYANGIRJI NARSINGGIRJI MATH V. MANIBAI AND ANOTHER V. RAJ KUMAR HARPAL DEO AND ANOTHER A. I. R. 1967 BOM. My attention has been invited to a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in GYANGIRJI NARSINGGIRJI MATH V. MANIBAI AND ANOTHER V. RAJ KUMAR HARPAL DEO AND ANOTHER A. I. R. 1967 BOM. 92 where the Division Bench was facing a similar problem where by application of sec. 110f of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 a question arose whether Civil Courts jurisdiction was ousted in pending suits or proceedings when a Claims Tribunal was consti- tuted under the said Act. The wordings of sec. 110f of the said Act are similar to one With which I am concerned in the present petition. Sec. 110 provides :110 Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any questions relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Saints Tribunal for that area and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for com- pensation shall be granted by the Civil Court. The question therefore arose before the Bombay High Court that when Claims Tribunal is so constituted the jurisdiction of Civil Court in pending actions is ousted or not and the Division Bench reiterated the well settled rules of construction of statutes that the statutes are generally not to be construed to apply retrospectively unless made so expressly or by necessary implication except in the case of procedural laws. The Court thereafter proceeded to consider whether there was any necessary intendment in sec. 110f itself so as to oust the jurisdiction of Civil Court. In paragraph 9 of the judgment at page 94 Patel J. speaking for the Division Bench observed as under:the language moreover of sec. 110f also does not lead to an inference that the legislature intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in pending matters. The words used in sec. 110f are that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain. To entertain means to receive and determine. It is a prohibi- tion applicable in future. It does not even by implication prohibit the continuance of a proceeding already commenced in a civil Court but only prohibits the receip- tion and determination by the Court of any cause or matter after the constitution of the Tribunal. To entertain means to receive and determine. It is a prohibi- tion applicable in future. It does not even by implication prohibit the continuance of a proceeding already commenced in a civil Court but only prohibits the receip- tion and determination by the Court of any cause or matter after the constitution of the Tribunal. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner however pointed out that the meaning of words to entertain is no more in debate in view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision is M/s LAKSHMIRATAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. V. ASSTT COMMISSIONER (JUDICIAL) I. SALES TAX KANPUR RANGE KANPUR AND ANOTHER A. I. R. 1968 SC 488 where the Court was concerned with the question of right of a party to file an appeal under the U. P. Sales Tax Act 1948 and the U. P. Sales Tax Rules 1948 and the power of the appellate authorities to insist for the payment of tax before entertaining such appeal. In that case the question posed before the Court was: what is the meaning of word entertain. Hidayatullah J. speaking for the Court in that connection observed as under:a question thus arises what is the meaning of the word entertained in this context Does it mean that no appeal shall be received or filed or does it mean that no appeal shall be admitted or heard and disposed of unless satisfactory proof is available. The dictionary meaning of the word entertain was brought to our notice by the parties and both sides agreed that it means either to deal with or admit to consideration. We are also of the same opinion. The Court thereafter considered various decisions of Allahabad High Court as to the meaning of word entertain under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended The Supreme Court thereafter approved those decisions and especially HAJI RAHIM BUX AND SONS V. FIRM SAMIULLAH AND SONS A. I. R. 1963 ALL 320 which held in effect that the word entertain meant not receive or accept but proceed to consider on merits or adjudi- care upon. It has been thereafter held in paragraph 10 of the-decision of the Supreme Court that- in our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word entertain which according to dictionary also means admit to consideration ( 3 ) IN HINDUSTAN COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. It has been thereafter held in paragraph 10 of the-decision of the Supreme Court that- in our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word entertain which according to dictionary also means admit to consideration ( 3 ) IN HINDUSTAN COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. V PUNNU SAHU A. I. R. 1970 SC 1384 the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether amended Rule 90 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure would affect the rights of parties in pending actions The amended rule adopted the similar phraseology as one with which I am concerned in this revision application. The amended proviso has been set out in the said judgment. Hegde J. as he then was speaking for the Court in that context observed as under:before the High Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant and that conten- tion was repeated in this COurt that Clause (b) of the proviso did not govern the present proceedings as (he application in question had been filed several months before that clause was added to the proviso. It is the contention of the appellant that the expression entertain found in the proviso refers to the initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when the court takes up the application for con- sideration. This contention was rejected by the High Court relying on the decision of that court in KUNDAN LAL V. JAGAN NATH KARMA A. I. R. 1962 ALL 547. The same view had been taken by the said High Court in DHOOM CHAND RAIN V. CHAMANLAL GUPTA A. I. R. 1962 ALL 543 AND HAJI RAHIM BUX AND SONS V. FIRM SAMIULLAH AND SONS. A. I. R. 1963 ALL 320 and again in MAHAVIR SINGH V. GAURI SHANKER A. I. R. 1964 ALL 289. These decisions have interpreted the expression entertain as gleaning ad- judicate upon or proceed to consider on merits. This view of the High Court has been accepted as correct by this Court in LAKSHMIRATAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. V. ASSTT. COMMR. SALES TAX KANPUR A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 488. We are bound by that decision and as such we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that cl. (b)of the proviso did not apply to the present proceedings. V. ASSTT. COMMR. SALES TAX KANPUR A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 488. We are bound by that decision and as such we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that cl. (b)of the proviso did not apply to the present proceedings. (Emphasis supplied by one)IN view of this settled legal position that the word entertain would not mean to receive and determine but it would mean adjudicate upon or proceed to consider on merits. If that is the real meaing of word enter- tain it cannot be gainsaid that the Legislature under sec. 16 clearly intended that civil Courts shall have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon or proceed to consider on merits in any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person on specified grounds from public premises. In other words the Legislature by adopting the word entertain clearly intended to oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. In that view of the matter therefore I do not think that the division of the Bombay High Court can be of any assistance to the cause of the opponent Corporation. ( 4 ) THE result is that this revision application is allowed and the order of the trial Court is set aside. The issue whether Civil Court has jurisdi- ction or not is answered in the negative. The suit should therefore be dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case there should be no order as to costs in this revision application. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Application allowed. .