Judgment 1. The Management of Navshakti Publishing Co., Ltd., has filed this writ application for quashing the order of the Labour Court dated November 11, 1971, Annexure 2 to the writ application allowing the application of respondent No. 2 filed under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the Act) directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 28,000/-. 2. The only question raised Colour consideration is that the Labour Court was not competent to entertain the application of the second respondent under the aforesaid provision of the Act inasmuch as that Court was not specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and therefore the order is without jurisdiction. 3. The relevant facts are these: The services of respondent No. 2 were terminated by the petitioner in the year 1960 whereupon he raised an industrial dispute which was referred to by the State Government to the Labour Court, Patna for adjudication. The question referred to the Labour Court was "whether Sri Jugal Kishore Singh should be reinstated as Editor "Navashakti and/or given any other relief ?" 4. By his award dated 19-10-1962, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Patna, in the aforesaid reference case No.5 of 1961, held that respondent No. 2 was removed from his post of editor without rhyme and reason while the newspaper was still in circulation and therefore his removal was illegal and unjustified. He accordingly directed for his reinstatement without any break in service with full wages for his idle period. In pursuance of this award the second respondent made an application under Section 33-C (2) on August 30, 1968, before respondent No. 1. The petitioner did not appear in this proceeding and the impugned order was passed on 11-11-1971 ex parte. 5. Now we come to the question of law raised before us. Under Section 7, the appropriate government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more Labour Courts for adjudication of the industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule and for performing such other function as may be assigned to them under this Act. Now we come to the question of law raised before us. Under Section 7, the appropriate government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more Labour Courts for adjudication of the industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule and for performing such other function as may be assigned to them under this Act. The Governor of Bihar in exercise of the aforesaid powers contained in Section 7 of the Act constituted the first Labour Court for the State of Bihar by a Notification No. III/DI-12015/57L-4664 dated the 12th March, 1957, of which Shri Ali Hasan, a Member of the Bihar Superior Judicial Service was appointed the Presiding Officer. Very soon thereafter by another Notification No. III/DI-12047/57-L-13149 dated the 26th July, 1957, the State Government in supersession of the first notification constituted three Labour Courts in the State namely (1) Labour Court, Tirhut Division with headquarters at Muzaffarpur, (2) Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division with headquarters at Ranchi and Labour Court, Patna Division, with headquarters at Patna; the local limit of the jurisdiction of each of the Labour Courts was specified in the schedule. In supersession of this notification dated the 26th July, 1957, the State Government again in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 of the Act, constituted three Labour Divisions, namely, Labour Court, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur, Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi and Labour Court, Patna Division, Patna. A copy of this notification is Annexure E to the counter-affidavit and by subsequent notification dated February 6, 1970, the State Government appointed Shri Gopalji Shahai Verma, Additional Subordinate Judge as the Presiding Officer of Labour Court, Patna, to perform his function within the local limits of the jurisdiction of this aforesaid Labour Court and when by notification dated April 12, 1971, the three Labour Divisions aforesaid were reconstituted the State Government by subsequent notification dated the 30th November, 1971 re-appointed the said Gopalji Shahai Verma, Additional Subordinate Judge as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Patna, constituted under the notification dated 12-4-1971 with effect from the date he took over the charge. After the constitution of the Labour Court under the notification dated the 26th July, 1957. After the constitution of the Labour Court under the notification dated the 26th July, 1957. the State Government issued a Notification No. III/DI-12032/581-9803 dated the 7th June, 1958, Annexure C to the counter-affidavit in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 33-C of the Act specifying the respective jurisdiction of the Labour Courts constituted under the aforesaid notification as the Labour Courts for determining the amount that any workman was entitled to receive from the employers and the benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money for being recovered as provided for in sub-section (1) of Section 33-C of the Act. After the supersession of the Labour Courts constituted by the notification dated 26-7-1957 and when the Labour Courts were re-constituted by the notification dated 30-1-1967 (Annexure E) and Shri Gopalji Shahai Verma, Additional Subordinate Judge was appointed as Presiding Officer as already referred to earlier; no notification in terms of that dated 7th June, 1958 (Annexure C) under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was issued until February 10, 1973, on which date the State Government issued a notification specifying the respective jurisdictions of the Labour Courts constituted under the notification dated the 30th Jaunary, 1967 (Annexure E) for determining the amount of money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money u/s. 33-C (2) of the Act. From the facts stated above therefore, it is apparent that after supersession of the earlier Labour Court by notification dated 30-1-1967, when the Labour Courts were re-constituted no notification specifying the powers within the meaning of Section 33-C (2) of the Act was made until the year 1973 by Annexure 3-1. Counsel for the petitioner therefore contends that in the absence of such notification specifying the requisite jurisdiction in the Labour Court which was constituted on 30-1-1967, the application filed by the second respondent before respondent No. 1 on 30-8-1968 under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was not maintainable and the order passed was wholly without jurisdiction. 6. In the counter-affidavit these facts are not controverted but according to the stand taken by respondent No. 2 in his counter-affidavit is that in spite of the supersession of the, previous Labour Court constituted by the earlier notification dated the 26th July, 1957. 6. In the counter-affidavit these facts are not controverted but according to the stand taken by respondent No. 2 in his counter-affidavit is that in spite of the supersession of the, previous Labour Court constituted by the earlier notification dated the 26th July, 1957. which was a fully competent Labour Court to entertain all the applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Act in spite of re-constitution by a subsequent notification, respondent No. 1 retained full jurisdiction to entertain all the applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention has placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this Court in East India Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. V/s. Shri G. S. Verma, (1973 Pat LJR 324 = (1973 Lab IC 1501) and of the Supreme Court in Treogi Nath V/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., AIR 1968 SC 205 = (1968 Lab IC 193). 8. In the Patna case the effect of the supersession of the notification directly fell for consideration and S. N. P. Singh, J., who delivered the judgment for the Bench (now Honble the Chief Justice) on a consideration of a large number of authorities on the subject, observed that the effect of supersession of the Labour Court by the succeeding notification amounted to cancellation of the previous notification by which the Labour Court had been constituted. The constitution of a fresh Labour Court would not result in the abolition of the Labour Court under the previous notification so far as pending references and other pending cases were concerned. The new notification would operate from the date of that notification and the reference made and cases filed thereafter would only be taken cognizance of by the new Labour Court or Courts as the case may be, constituted under the fresh notification. We find ourselves in full agreement with this observation. It is well settled that the proceeding under Section 33-C (2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding and merely on the constitution of a Labour Court under Section 7 of the Act it does not assume the powers to entertain an application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. This is manifest from the intention and clear language in sub-section (2) of Section 33-C itself. This is manifest from the intention and clear language in sub-section (2) of Section 33-C itself. It is for this reason that the State Government had felt the necessity of issuing separate notifications from time to time after the constitution of Labour Court, under Section 33-C (2) of the Act. We therefore do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the powers under Section 33-C (2) were in the nature of "by-product" and a Labour Court which is constituted under Section 17 of the Act would also exercise all the powers under Section 33-C (2) of the Act as powers incidental to the constitution of the Labour Court. This contention is also directly opposed to a clear exposition by the Supreme Court. In Treogi Naths case (1968 Lab IC 193) (SC) the Supreme Court clearly observed that Section 33-C (2) can be exercised only by the Court specified in that behalf and a Labour Court constituted under Section 7 (1) of the Act does not automatically get such jurisdiction. In view of these authoritative pronouncements we do not feel any difficulty in accepting the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act filed on 30-8-1968 by the second respondent before the first respondent under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was not maintainable and that the order passed by the first respondent in pursuance of the said application by the impugned order dated 11-11-1971 must be held to be without jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Rama Raman, learned counsel for the respondent also faintly argued that great delay was made by the petitioner in filing the writ application. We, are not impressed by this argument which has lost its force further at the stage of the final hearing of the application. The order being ex parte some time might have been taken by the petitioner in deriving the knowledge of it and there is some explanation furnished in the petition as well in this regard. In any event the order suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction, and must be set aside. 10. For the reasons discussed above this application succeeds. It is accordingly allowed and the order dated 11th November, 1971, passed by respondent No. 1 which is Annexure "2" to the writ application is hereby quashed and cancelled. In any event the order suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction, and must be set aside. 10. For the reasons discussed above this application succeeds. It is accordingly allowed and the order dated 11th November, 1971, passed by respondent No. 1 which is Annexure "2" to the writ application is hereby quashed and cancelled. Let a writ of certiorari be issued accordingly. In the circumstances of the case we shall direct the parties to bear their own costs.