JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the tenant of a shop of which respondent No. 3 is the landlord. An application was made by respondent No. 3 for the release of the said shop under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, on the ground that he needed it to establish his son Promod Kumar in business of brass and aluminium utensils. According to him Pramod Kumar had left his studies and was without employment. The application was contested by the petitioner but was allow by the Prescribed Authority on August 12, 1975. The petitioner filed an appeal against that order which was dismissed by the 22nd Additional District Judge Muzaffarnagar, on May 5, 1973. Aggrieved he has instituted the present w petition with a prayer to quash the aforesaid orders. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the impugned orders are vitiated inasmuch as they have failed to consider the statutory guidelines contained in clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 16 (2) of the Rule framed under the aforesaid Act. In respect of the applicability of clause (c) aforesaid it was urged that respondent No. 3 had extensive business and in considering the application for release this aspect of the matter has been ignored by the authorities below. Reliance was placed on an assessment order dated January 27, 1975, a copy of which has been attached as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. It indicates that the assessee M/s. Hari Kishan Dass Ram Kissan Dass, Shami, district Muzaffarnagar, were assessed on a total Income of Rs. 1,10,720/-. As regards this submission I am of opinion that the Additional District Judge has considered this aspect of the matter. A perusal of his order indicates that he has recorded a categorical finding that respondent No. 3 along with is another son Subhash Chand were partners in the firm M/s. Hari Kishan Dass Ram Kissan Dass and their share in the firm was ?rd. It is thus clear that remaining 23rd share was held by other partners. A perusal of his order indicates that he has recorded a categorical finding that respondent No. 3 along with is another son Subhash Chand were partners in the firm M/s. Hari Kishan Dass Ram Kissan Dass and their share in the firm was ?rd. It is thus clear that remaining 23rd share was held by other partners. The Additional District Judge has recorded a further finding that the said business was not sufficient to engage all the sons of respondent No. 3 and provide sufficient income for the maintenance of the family and it was obviously necessary to settle Pramod Kumar in some other business in view of the aforesaid finding I am of opinion that even though the Additional District Judge may not have specifically referred to clause (c) of Rule 16(2) in his order he has certainly considered the requirements of the said rule while disposing of the appeal filed by the petitioner. 3. Coming to clause (a) of rule 16(2) it was urged that the petitioner had been carrying on iron business in the shop in question for the last more than 12 years and this aspect of the matter has been ignored by the authorities below. The order of the Additional District Judge does not contain any reference to this aspect of the matter. In the writ petition it has been asserted that this plea was raised before the Additional District Judge. The counter-affidavit on the other hand contains an assertion that all the pleas raised before the District Judge have been dealt with by him. It was also asserted on behalf of respondent No. 3 that in view of the finding recorded by the authorities below that the petitioner had sufficient accommodation at his disposal and that a new business of cloth had been started in the shop in question in place of the iron business, the extent of the period for which the petitioner has been occupying the accommodation was immaterial. Considerable arguments were also advanced on the point as to whether the requirements of clause (a) of Rule 16(2) were mandatory or directory. In my opinion it is not necessary to go into this last question in the present case in view of the findings recorded by the authorities below. Considerable arguments were also advanced on the point as to whether the requirements of clause (a) of Rule 16(2) were mandatory or directory. In my opinion it is not necessary to go into this last question in the present case in view of the findings recorded by the authorities below. The Prescribed Authority has held :- "The opposite party has admitted that as iron business declined, so he chose to do cloth business and invested Rs. 10,000/- but it was done in his name is not proved by any documentary evidence " The Prescribed Authority seems to have accepted the case of respondent No. 3 that the cloth business was being carried on not by the petitioner but by his son-in-law Sadho Ram. The said authority also recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner can easily accommodate himself in the adjacent shop No. 775 which has four Khans and that he had no need for the shop in question. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Sadho Ram was doing the cloth business in his own right independently or the same was owned by the petitioner and Sadho Ram was just sitting on the shop on behalf of the petitioner. As seen above the Prescribed Authority seems to have accepted the case d respondent No. 3 that Sadho Ram was sitting in the shop in his own right. Tie Additional District Judge, however, did not record any categorical finding on this point but be agreed with the Prescribed Authority that the need of respondent No. 3 was genuine and that the accommodation in the adjacent shop referred to by the Prescribed Authority was obviously more than sufficient for the petitioner's needs. He also recorded a finding that "Admittedly the shop in question is not required by the tenant for his old iron business" but was being used for cloth business which according to the petitioner has been started by him and, according to respondent No. 3, was the business of Sadho Ram, son-in-law of the petitioner. 4. The finding recorded concurrently by the authorities below that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide and that the petitioner has sufficient alternative accommodation are finding of fact and cannot be challenged in the writ petition. 5. 4. The finding recorded concurrently by the authorities below that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide and that the petitioner has sufficient alternative accommodation are finding of fact and cannot be challenged in the writ petition. 5. In so far as the applicability of clause (a) of Rule 16(2) is concerned the length of time for which the tenant has been occupying the accommodation, in my opinion, is material mainly from the point of view of good will that the tenant may have acquired on account of his carrying on the business since along. In view of the finding recorded by the authorities below that the iron business which was being carried on in the shop in question had been given up and that cloth business had been started, the question of any good-will hardly arises. The cloth business has admittedly been started very recently. The fact that the petitioner had been occupying the shop in question for more than 12 years for carrying on iron business therein, the circumstances of the instant case, ceased to be of any material consequence. In this view of the matter even if the sub mission made by counsel for the petitioner is accepted that the authorities below have not kept in view the requirements of clause (a) of Rule 16(2) I am of opinion that the impugned orders do not deserve to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution, this being the settled law that certiorari does not issue as a matter of course. 6. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that in the back portion of the shop in question the iron business was still being carried on. So far as this argument is concerned, as seen above the Additional District Judge has held that "Admittedly the shop in question is not required by the tenant for his old iron business." The word "Admittedly" is of significance. Further the case of the, petitioner himself was that the business in iron declined sufficiently so that he had to start the cloth business. Consequently, even if it is accepted that the back portion of the shop in question was still being used for iron business, the extent of the period since when the petitioner was carrying on the iron business, which in place of prospering had sufficiently declined, was hardly material. Consequently, even if it is accepted that the back portion of the shop in question was still being used for iron business, the extent of the period since when the petitioner was carrying on the iron business, which in place of prospering had sufficiently declined, was hardly material. As regards, the comparative hardship of the parties the authorities below have recorded a finding, which is a finding of fact, against the petitioner. 7. It was also urged by counsel for the petitioner that the observation made by the Additional District Judge that "It would be too much to deny the owner right to occupy his building and leave him to search out some other rented accommodation for establishing his sons in business when he has got his own building" indicated that the District Judge did not appreciate correctly the object of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act. I am unable to agree with this submission. The aforesaid observation is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read in the context of the findings recorded by the Additional District Judge. The findings recorded by him are that the need of the landlord for the shop in question is genuine and bona fide, that the landlord admittedly does not own any other business accommodation or shop in Shamli in which his son Pramod Kumar can carry on the proposed business, that the tenant had an alternative accommodation which was more than sufficient for his needs, that he can make the shop in question available to the landlord without any loss or difficultly being caused to him in the business and that no hardship is likely to be caused to him if he is evicted. Read in that context nothing surprising is to be found in the aforesaid observation. 8. In view of the foregoing discussions I find no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs.