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1976 DIGILAW 714 (ALL)

Rani Devi v. District Judge, Fatehpur

1976-10-27

AMITAV BANERJI

body1976
JUDGMENT Amitav Banerji, J. - The petitioner landlady by means of this writ petition seeks to challenge the order of the District Judge, Fatehpur dated 28th September, 1974 passed under Section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). 2. The petitioner applied for the release of the two shops in the possession of the respondents 2 and 3 and a hull behind the said shops in the possession of the respondents 4 and 5 under Section 21 of the Act. The case of the petitioner was that her father, Mannu Lal, was the owner of a big building. A portion of that building comprising the two shops and one hall behind the shops was sold to the petitioner by her father and she became the landlady of the premises in question. Her application for release was based on the ground that she needed the shops and the hall for bona fide requirement of her sons. This application was resisted by the respondent 2, 3, 4 and 5. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 27th March, 1974 allowed the application of the petitioner and held her need to be genuine and ordered for the eviction of the respondents 2 to 5 from the premises in question. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents 2 and 3 filed Rent Appeal No. 8 of 1974 and the respondents 4 and 5 filed Rent Appeal No. 11 of 1974. While the appeal of the respondents 4 and 5 was dismissed, the appeal of the respondents 2 and 3 was allowed. The result was that the shops were allowed to be retained by the respondents 2 and 3 but the hall behind the said shops was directed to be released in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner has now filed the present writ petition. 3. The principal contention on her behalf is that the only passage to the hall behind the two shops is through the said shops and the refusal to release the shops has resulted in an incongruous position, as the petitioner does not have an access to the hall behind the two shops from any other side. 3. The principal contention on her behalf is that the only passage to the hall behind the two shops is through the said shops and the refusal to release the shops has resulted in an incongruous position, as the petitioner does not have an access to the hall behind the two shops from any other side. This point was raised before the Appellate Authority but was dealt within the following words :- "This fact was brought to my notice on behalf of the parties that in case Taj Mohammed and Rani Das are not expelled from the building then the landlord would have no access to the portion in the occupation of Manna Lal. I do not know how far this difficulty is genuine but that should not furnish an occasion for ordering the expulsion of Taj Mohammed and Ram Das. It could also not be a ground for rejecting the landlord's application for release with respect to the portion in the occupation of Mannu Lal's sons." To order of the Appellate Authority is not clear. It was for the Appellate Authority to find out whether the hall in possession of the respondents 4 and 5 had any other point of access. The Appellate Authority could find out if the passage to the hall lay only through the two shops occupied by the respondents 2 and 3 or there was an alternative passage. The question posed by the Appellate Authority that be did not know as to whether the difficulty was genuine or not could have been easily solved either by making a local inspection or by appointing a Commissioner for the purpose. The landlady had applied for the release of the two shops and the hall for her own purpose. While her wed had been accepted qua respondents 4 and 5, it had been refused qua respondents 2 and 3. The respondents 4 and 5 have not filed any writ petition against the order of dismissal of their appeal in this Court and, as such, that order has become final. The landlady's need has, therefore, been established for regaining possession of the hall. The landlady had also asked for the two chops for the purpose of business for her sons. The respondents 4 and 5 have not filed any writ petition against the order of dismissal of their appeal in this Court and, as such, that order has become final. The landlady's need has, therefore, been established for regaining possession of the hall. The landlady had also asked for the two chops for the purpose of business for her sons. It was, therefore, necessary for the Appellate Authority to find out as to whether the release of the hall alone would be sufficient to meet the requirement of the landlady, but there is no finding on this point. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the respondents also. His contention was that the Appellate Authority was perfectly justified in refusing the relief in respect of the two shops occupied by the respondents 2 and 3, for the sons of the petitioner were already carrying on their business from other shops. It is quite clear that the Appellate Authority has not applied its mind to the question whether the landlady's requirement would be met by releasing the hall only and whether a passage to the hall was necessary for its use and enjoyment. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner can always have an access to the hall through the shops as an easement of necessity. It is not merely the question of access through the shops, but it is a question as to whether the petitioner can use and enjoy the hall without an access to it. This question has not been decided by the District Judge. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is a manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record and as such the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained. It must be set aside and the case sent back to the Appellate Authority for a fresh decision of the appeal filed by the respondents 2 and 3. The Appellate Authority shall consider the material on the record and also find out if the hall can be approached from any other side. The Appellate Authority may make a local inspection or appoint a Commissioner for the said purpose. It would be open to the Appellate Authority to allow the appeal in full or in part or dismiss the appeal after considering the material on the record. 6. In the result, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The Appellate Authority may make a local inspection or appoint a Commissioner for the said purpose. It would be open to the Appellate Authority to allow the appeal in full or in part or dismiss the appeal after considering the material on the record. 6. In the result, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 28th September, 1975 is set aside and quashed and the case is sent back to the Appellate Authority for being decided afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.