JUDGMENT : M.N. Shukla, J. This is a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the Respondents not to demolish the Petitioner's shop No. 89, situate in Mohalla Taju Khel in the city of Shahjahanpur. 2. The allegations made by the Petitioner are that he is the owner of the aforesaid shop which was a 'pucca' construction, built by him long ago on the basis of a plan duly sanctioned by Respondent No. 1, namely, the City Board, Shahjahanpur. The shop was thereafter assessed by the Board for purposes of House Tax and Water Tax and the Petitioner had been regularly paying taxes to the City Board. It is alleged that some officials of the City Board, however, recently arrived on the sport and threatened that in case the aforesaid construction was not dismantled by the Petitioner himself, it would be got demolished by them at the Petitioner's cost. It was in these circumstances that the Petitioner filed the present writ petition. 3. Counter affidavits have been filed, both on behalf of the District Magistrate, Shahjahanpur, who is arrayed as Respondent No. 2 and the City Board, Shahjahanpur, which is arrayed as Respondent No. 1. The main allegations in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the City Board are that the Petitioner was asked by its officials to remove the encroachment failing which, he was told, they would be removed by the Board itself. It is, however, explicitly stated in the counter affidavit of the City Board that the Board was intending to remove the Chabutra only which had been made by the Petitioner on Municipal land in violation of the sanction and was, therefore, an encroachment. 4. Thus, it is manifest from the pleading of the parties that the incident as alleged in the writ petition did take place, that some officials of the Board visited the spot and asked the Petitioner to remove the encroachment and in the event of his failing to do so the demolition thereof was threatened. Apart from the facts staled above, it is not the Respondents' case that any written notice was served on the Petitioner. In other words, the Respondent No. 1 was relying only on the oral notice given by the officials of the Board for the removal of an alleged encroachment. Apart from the facts staled above, it is not the Respondents' case that any written notice was served on the Petitioner. In other words, the Respondent No. 1 was relying only on the oral notice given by the officials of the Board for the removal of an alleged encroachment. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the case would come only within the ambit of Section 211 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which deals with the power of removing encroachments and projections and for which oral notice was not sufficient. Section 211 of the Act runs as follows: 211. Power to remove encroachment and projections over streets and drains.- The Board may, by notice require the owner or occupier of a building to remove, or to alter a projection or structure overhanging, projecting into or encroaching on a street, or into, on or over any drain, sewer or aqueduct therein: Provided that in the case of any such projection or structure lawfully in existence on or before the tenth day of March, 1900, the Board shall make compensation for any damage caused by the removal or alteration, which shall not exceed ten times the cost of erection and demolition. 5. On the other hand, Sri Asif Ansari representing the City Board, Shahjahanpur before us submits that a written notice was not required u/s 211 of the Act and an oral notice was sufficient compliance of the provisions of law. As already observed, admittedly there was no written notice. According to Sri Ansari the action taken by the officials of Respondent No. 1 on the spot unmistakably amounted to an oral notice to the Petitioner, apprising him of the action contemplated to be taken against him by the Board and that was sufficient. The answer to the above question would depend on an interpretation of the provisions of Section 211 and other connected provisions of the Act indicating the powers of the Board with regard to these matters and the safeguards intended to be provided by the Act to the persons against whom action for removal of encroachments or projections etc. may be taken. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondents drew our attention to Section 186 of the Act in which according to him the Legislature had advisedly used a different language. This Section 186. may be taken. 6. Learned Counsel for the Respondents drew our attention to Section 186 of the Act in which according to him the Legislature had advisedly used a different language. This Section 186. Power of Board to stop erection, and to demolish building erected. The Board may at any time by written notice direct the owner or occupier of any land to stop erection or alteration of a building or part of a building or the construction or enlargement of a well thereon in any case where the board considers that such erection, re-erection, alteration, construction or enlargement is an offence u/s 185 and may, in like manner, direct the alteration or demolition as it deems necessary of the building, part of a building, or the well, as the case may be. It is apparent that whereas Section 186 provides for a written notice, Section 211 does not use the word "written". But mere omission to prefix the word "notice" by "written" is not conclusive on the point as to whether written notice was still not contemplated by the Legislature. If on an examination of the entire scheme of the Act it is found that the relevant provisions cannot be adequately applied to the practical circumstances of the case as they arise and mere oral notice would not be feasible, it will have to be laid down that by necessary implication the notice given u/s 211 must also be a written and individual notice. Several outstanding circumstances appear to us to lean in favour of the requirement of a written notice. In the first place, we may refer to Section 211 which envisages that the owner or occupier of the building must comply with certain specific direction and the non-compliance of the same would be visited with a penalty. Section 307 provides that if a notice has been given under the provisions of this Act to a person requiring him to execute a work in respect of any property, movable or immovable, public or private or to provide or do, or refrain from doing anything, within a time specified in the notice, and if such person fails to comply with such a notice, then the board may cause such work to be executed or such thing to be provided or done, and may recover all expenses incurred by it on such account from the said person. Therefore, after giving a notice u/s 211 if the projection or encroachment is not removed by the owner or occupier within the specified period, the Board may proceed to take this drastic measure. Unless the person affected by such action is precisely apprised of the action that he must take in order to escape the consequences of non-compliance, it would be against all canons of law and equity that such pre-judicial action against him should be approved. Any vagueness either with regard to the specific measure or action required to be taken by the Petitioner or about the grievance which he may legitimately make to the competent authority against the threatened action cannot be countenanced. The entire action and conduct in this regard must be strictly and unmistakably specified by law. It does not stand to reason that the question of actual default committed by an owner or occupier or the disobedience of the directions given to him may be left merely to the oral allegations and counter allegations made by the parties and may not be referable to specific instructions or directions issued in the form of a written notice to the individual. Hence, we are reluctant to accept the Respondents' contention that an oral notice purported to be given u/s 211 of the Act was sufficient in law. 7. The predicament of a person threatened with action u/s 211 would become still more apparent when the provisions with regard to an appeal contemplated by Section 318 of the Act is examined. The above section gives right to an owner or occupier aggrieved by such action to prefer an appeal to the competent authority. The right of appeal is a very valuable right and its utility must be preserved by law. It is by no means common in judicial experience to come across appeals against oral orders or directions passed on the alleged breach of some oral notice. That would give rise to utter confusion. To take only a concrete illustration furnished by the instant case, a few officials and other persons reached the spot and threatened action of removal or demolition of the encroachments. In the absence of any written notice or direction it is not possible for the aggrieved person to attribute such action to any particular officer or authority and avail of the remedy of appeal against the same. In the absence of any written notice or direction it is not possible for the aggrieved person to attribute such action to any particular officer or authority and avail of the remedy of appeal against the same. Moreover, unless there is a written notice to the individual, how can he ascertain the exact extent of the alleged encroachment and accordingly attack the legality of the proposed action against him? The problem becomes still more complicated on account of the veriety of forums provided for preferring an appeal. Section 60 of the Act provides that in any municipality where there is an Executive Officer certain powers of the Board shall be exercised by such officer alone and those powers include "the powers conferred by the section or sub-section specified in the first column of Schedule II". Section 211 is included in the first column of Schedule II of the Act. Section 61(1)(a) of the Act provides for an appeal against such orders passed by the Executive Officer; the appeal lies to the Board. If such orders are, on the other hand, passed not by the Executive Officer but by the Board itself u/s 211 of the Act, then according to Section 318 of the Act the appeal shall lie to "such officer as the State Government may appoint for the purpose of hearing such appeals or any of them, or failing such appointment, to the District Magistrate." A mere oral notice cannot meet the exigencies of the situation and serve as proper guide to the individual concerned for the purpose of availing himself of the remedy of appeal. 8. Yet another clue to the interpretation of Section 211 is furnished by the title in Column (2) of Schedule If of the Act. ft purports to be a description of the 'nature of powers or duties' arising under the various sections of the Act mentioned in the Schedule. The relevant entry in column 2 of the Schedule against Section 211 noted in column 1 reads: "to issue a notice for the removal or alteration of a projection". Thus, the duty cast by Section 211 is "to issue" a notice for removal or alteration. Established usage demonstrates that it is only a written notice which is "issued" and not an oral notice. Therefore, it would be erroneous to hold that Section 211 of the Act contemplates any oral notice. 9. Thus, the duty cast by Section 211 is "to issue" a notice for removal or alteration. Established usage demonstrates that it is only a written notice which is "issued" and not an oral notice. Therefore, it would be erroneous to hold that Section 211 of the Act contemplates any oral notice. 9. Thirdly, the Act prescribes the exact mode of service of notices issued under its various provisions. Section 308(1) of the Act says that every notice or bill issued under any section of the Act or under any rule or bye-law shall, unless it is in such section or rule or bye-law otherwise expressly provided, be served or presented- (a) by giving or tendering the notice or bill, or sending it by post, to the person to whom it is addressed, or (b) if such person is not found, then by leaving the notice or bill at his last known place of above, if within municipal limits, or by giving or tendering the notice or bill to some adult male member or servant of his family, or by causing the notice or bill to be fixed on some conspicuous part of the building or land (if any) to which the notice or bill relates. It is obvious that the mode of service prescribed by Section 303 of the Act by necessary implication means a "written notice" and therefore an oral notice u/s 211 is ruled out by the provisions of the Act itself. When the statute contains a specific provision in this regard there is no room left for any speculation. 10. Fourthly, Sri Ansari attempted to argue that the mode of service of notice may vary accordingly as the provisions of the Act contemplate a public or individual notice. It was submitted that a public notice need not necessarily be in writing; it may well be in some other mode such as by oral instructions or beat of drums etc. A notice contemplated by Section 211, it was suggested, was only a public notice and, therefore, it was not imperative that such notice should be a written notice. We have already observed in the earlier part of our judgment that Section 211 contemplates written and individual notice, as it entails most detrimental consequences to the owner or occupier of a building. We have already observed in the earlier part of our judgment that Section 211 contemplates written and individual notice, as it entails most detrimental consequences to the owner or occupier of a building. Even assuming that public notice is contemplated by the provisions of Section 211 of the Act the mode of service of a public notice is also expressly provided by Section 304 of the Act. It runs as under : 304. Method of giving public notice - Subject to the provisions of this Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law, in every case where public notice is to be given by a board, such notice shall be deemed to have been given if it is published in some local English or vernacular paper (if any) and pasted upon a notice board to be exhibited for public information at the building in which the meetings of the board are ordinarily held. An oral notice would not meet the requirements of Section 304. Thus, the contention of the Petitioner (Respondent) that a written notice u/s 211 was not necessary and that an oral notice in the manner alleged to have been given to the Petitioner was sufficient compliance of Section 211 is untenable. 11. We would like to add that a general appeal to the citizens in the shape of printed pamphlets or hand bills as are alleged to have been distributed by the Respondent Board will not be tantamount to a written notice as required u/s 211. One specimen of such handbills has been filed as Annexure A-1 to the counter affidavit. Its caption indicates that it is an appeal in connection with the Safai Abhiyan or the Cleanliness Drive. It is problematic whether such campaign serves even the avowed object of making the city cleaner and purging it of its ugly in sanitary spots, but what connection such drive has with the demolition or removal of long existing structures is something which passes comprehension. Surely it is not a notice within the meaning of Section 211 of the Act. We are also not satisfied that the mere fact that some officials of the City Board reached the spot and actually made measurements and demarcated portions of the disputed constructions and thereafter informed the Petitioner that they were encroachments and were likely to be removed amounts to giving of a notice as contemplated by Section 211 of the Act. We are also not satisfied that the mere fact that some officials of the City Board reached the spot and actually made measurements and demarcated portions of the disputed constructions and thereafter informed the Petitioner that they were encroachments and were likely to be removed amounts to giving of a notice as contemplated by Section 211 of the Act. 12. In the end the Respondents raised the plea that since the relationship between the parties was in the instant case regulated by an agreement entered into between them, a "written notice" should be dispensed with. In other words, the submission was that as the Petitioner had chosen to waive the rights which he could have claimed u/s 211 of the Act, by entering into an agreement, he was bound by such oral notice as was given to him on behalf of the Respondents. This argument appears to be fallacious. A copy of the agreement has been attached as Annexure II to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur. All that the agreement provides is that the Board may proceed to remove a projection on the expiry of a notice given to the Petitioner. The concluding part of the agreement expressly says that it would be without prejudice to the rights of the Board available u/s 211 of the Act. On a proper construction the agreement instead of being against the statute is in conformity with the provisions of Section 211 of the Act and does not run counter to it. It cannot be said that the parties intended to contract out of the statute by means of the said agreement. Section 211 and the other relevant provisions of the Act relating to the mode of service of notice are fully attracted to the case and the agreement in question does not alter or affect the rights of the parties in that regard. 13. Thus, the cumulative effect of the various provisions of the Act and the scheme underlying it is to lead to the irresistible conclusion that it was incumbent on the Board to serve a written, individual notice on the occupier or owner of the shop in question, namely, the Petitioner before taking action u/s 211 of the Act for the purpose of removal of the alleged projection or encroachment. It is abundantly clear that in the instant case no such notice was given and an oral notice of the kind alleged by the Respondent Board does not satisfy the requirements of law. 14. In the result this writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. A writ of mandamus is issued to the Respondents restraining them from demolishing the construction in dispute made by the Petitioner except in accordance with law and after giving him a written notice as contemplated by Section 211 of the Act.