JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a revision against the judgment and decree dated January 31, 1975 passed by Shri R.L. Sharma, Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, in appeal No. 347/121 of 1973 arising out of miscellaneous case No. 722 in original suit No. 36 under section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Sheo Lochan Singh, revision No. 3, had filed a suit for division of holding, which was decided on the basis of an alleged compromise on January 27, 1971. On February 26, 1971, Sheo Mohan Singh, who is one of the defendants, filed an application to the effect that the compromise was fraudulent one; that no summons was ever served upon him and that he had never filed any compromise and his signatures on the summons as well as on the Vakalatnama were forged. He prayed that the order dated January 27, 1971 be set aside and that he should be allowed to file a written statement. This application was dismissed by the trial court. Thereupon, Sheo Mohan Singh sent up in appeal and the learned Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the trial court. The trial court was directed to decide the application of Sheo Mohan Singh on merits. Pratipal Singh and others have now come up in revision before this court against the order of the learned. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contented that a compromise decree duly recorded and passed on the basis of agreement entered into between the parties could not be set aside under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code; that even assuming that the compromise decree was obtained by fraud, it could not be looked into in the present proceedings and could be set side only by a regular suit; that the learned Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to set aside the compromise decree and that no fraud on the court was pleaded, proved or passed by the parties in the case. 5. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to four decisions. 5. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the revisionists has referred to four decisions. The first is Union of India v. S. Raghubir Saran and others 1956 A.L.J. 825 in which a learned Bench of Allahabad High Court has observed as follows- "When one party to a case alleges that an adjustment has taken place an and the other denies the allegations the court has to go into the question whether the alleged adjustment has taken place. There is no sufficient reason why the court should be debarred from going into the question whether the agreement is vitiated by fraud etc. It was said that the word 'lawful' could have referred merely to the nature of the agreement and not to facts which rendered it invalid. Even if this is accepted, the question remains whether it can be said that an adjustment by an agreement which has been obtained by fraud or undue influence etc. is an adjustment at all which can be enforced against the party defrauded when it has been repudiated by the party, because after all the court is enforcing the compromise by recording it and passing a decree in terms of it, it is conceded that such a compromise and the decree based up on it can be sent aside in a separate suit if fraud or any other vitiating factor is proved. The tendency of law is against multiplicity of proceedings. Why should the law allow the enquiry regarding fraud to be held on a separate suit and not in the very proceedings in which the question is raised. Why should the law permit a decree to be passed at all when the agreement is ultimately beyond to fail if the allegations are true. It is said that such questions are not fit for being enquired into the summary proceedings. Under Order 23, Rule. 3. It does not appear to us that the proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 are so summary that an allegation of fraud cannot be investigated. It can be investigated in the same manner as the denial of an adjustment can be investigated." The second is Mohammad Zaheerul-Haq v. Mst. Under Order 23, Rule. 3. It does not appear to us that the proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3 are so summary that an allegation of fraud cannot be investigated. It can be investigated in the same manner as the denial of an adjustment can be investigated." The second is Mohammad Zaheerul-Haq v. Mst. Kusmi 1957 R.D. 184 in which A.N. Sapru and S.H. Zaheer had held that where the act complained of is an act which specifically concerns the party complaining of the fraud and there is no allegation of any direct abuse of the process of law or any act aimed at pre-judicating the courts decision, the fraud alleged is fraud upon the party. If the act was a fraud upon the party then according to the well settled view the court itself could not set aside the decree on the ground of fraud but the opposite party's remedy lay in a regular suit. The third is Mauja v. Raju 1973 A.W.R. (Revenue) 19 in which a learned Member of this court has held that a suit for cancellation of a decree obtained by fraud in a suit under section 59-61 U.P. Tenancy Act is cognizable by civil court only. The last decision cited by the learned counsel for the revisionists is Monoharbahal Collery v. K.N. Mishra 1975 A.I.R. S.C. 1632 in which it has been held that a compromise of an appeal by the counsel who has found to be duly authorised to appear on behalf of the respondent was binding on the respondent. 6. The learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that the summons was never served on her client. On the other hand, by a conspiracy of fraud her clients' signatures were forged on the summons. Her client also never entered into a compromise or lawful adjustment, instead the alleged compromise was signed by Sri R.C. Nigma, Advocate, on behalf of her client. This advocate had no lawful authority to represent her client as the signature of her client were also forged on the Vakalatnama filed by Sri Nigam. Thus, the compromise decree was obtained in this case by a fraud upon the court itself and it was the courts duty to nullify that decree. In support of her contention, the learned counsel has referred to a number of decisions. The first is Mst. Kalpa v. Sita Ram A.I.R. 1955 Alld. Thus, the compromise decree was obtained in this case by a fraud upon the court itself and it was the courts duty to nullify that decree. In support of her contention, the learned counsel has referred to a number of decisions. The first is Mst. Kalpa v. Sita Ram A.I.R. 1955 Alld. 187 in which a learned Bench of the Allahabad High court-has held that where in a suit a petition of compromise between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 was filed and verified before the court, but subsequently defendant No. 1 filed a statement that she had entered into no compromise nor appeared for a verification in the court, but the court refused to go into the factum of compromise the order was appealable under Order ILIII, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Bench further held that in such a case it was evidently the duty of the court to have come to a conclusion on the allegations made by the defendant no. 1 with regard to the compromise for it a party to a compromise denies having entered into the compromise, court will have to come to a finding whether there had or had not been a compromise effected between the parties and then also to decide if the agreement or the adjustment was lawful. The learned Bench also held that the defendant could raise the point in the trial court itself instead of filing a separate suit for it was not open to a party before an order for record of compromise had been passed to prove that he did not make or verify the compromise, it would mean that the court could take no action even if a fraud was practised upon it. The second decision is Mohammad Hasnain v. Yasuf Hasan A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 121 in which it has been held that under order XXIII, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code it is not open to the court to go into the merits of the case without first deciding whether there has been lawful adjustment or if so what were the terms of the adjustment. The third decision is Mst. Sujarat v. Mohammad Raza A.I.R. 1957 Alld. The third decision is Mst. Sujarat v. Mohammad Raza A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 457 in which a learned Bench of the Allahabad High Court has observed as follows:- "So far as the case before us is concerned, the main question for decision before the court below as whether the alleged agreement, which was set up by the defendant and denied by the plaintiff, was in fact arrived at between them. Order XXIII, Rule 3 says that- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise....the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." The rules requires a court, when it is pointed out to it that the suit has in whole or in part been adjusted by a lawful agreement to record that agreement, and to pass a decree accordingly. The court, before it will proceed to record the agreement, or pass a decree in accordance therewith, will require to be satisfied that the agreement pleaded by any party has in fact been reached. Whether the agreement so reached between the parties is voidable or can otherwise be avoided by any party thereto on any other ground, is a different matter than the fact whether the agreement has been reached between them. The jurisdiction conferred by rule 3 requires a court to satisfy itself whenever any agreement is pleaded before it that it has been reached or not. Not until that decision has been reached by the court that the other steps required to be carried out by this rule can be gone into. The court must find, whenever there is a dispute between the parties, whether the agreement has really been arrived at or not. Without this finding, it will be impossible for a court to record a compromise much less to pass a decree in accordance therewith. The whole purpose of rule 3 will be lost if the court is deprived of the power to decide whether the agreement pleaded by a party has been reached or not. If the court is deprived of that power, it will enable any dishonest litigant to get away from a compromise reached by him freely and lawfully merely by pleading that he had not done so. If the court is deprived of that power, it will enable any dishonest litigant to get away from a compromise reached by him freely and lawfully merely by pleading that he had not done so. That could never be the intention of the Legislature." The fourth decision is Bhidurbhai v. Purshottamdas AIR 1962 Gujarat 10 in which the following observations were made- "Fraud vitiates the most solemn transaction, and if a plaintiff suppresses as vital fact on the basis of which the court is induced to pass ex parte order and obtains the decree in his favour, it would amount to fraud in relation to the proceedings of the court. A suit to set aside such decree is maintainable notwithstanding the fact that it has not been proceeded by an application under Order 9, Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. Where, however, the only fraud alleged is a bare non-service of summons, such a suit would not be maintainable. But it is quite a different matter where the whole suit is attacked on the ground of fraud, and the incident of improper of defective service is relied on as one indicia of fraud. A fraudulent suppression in the matter of service of summons can afford a sufficient ground for setting aside an ex parte decree and the jurisdiction of the court to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud cannot in such case be denied through it is to be exercised with care and reverse. Of course, the fraud must be actually positive amounting to an intentional contrivance to keep the parties and the court in ignorance of the real facts and obtaining a decree by such a contrivance. The fraud must also be extrinsic to the proceedings of the court, that is, it must be in the conduct of the suit by keeping the defendant out of court by a deliberate employment of the machinery of the court in such a way that the defendant is prevented from placing his case before the court. In suits to set aside an ex-parte decree on the ground of fraud, it is the plaintiff's mental approach to the suit which is material, and the mere proof of non-service of summons or falsity of the claim by themselves will not be sufficient to sustain an action unless they form part of the scheme of effecting a general design to commit fraud. A decree can be reopened by a new action when the court passing it had been misled by fraud, but it cannot be reopened when the court is simply mistaken. There is thus a substantial difference between a mere mistake of the court and the court being misled and in the case of ex parte decree where defendant had never appeared in court, the attempt to mislead the court by suppressing the summons would itself be the contrivance and really an effective one for keeping the defendant in ignorance of the suit and depriving him of his legitimate right of defending the suit." 7. I am entirely in agreement with the view taken in A.I.R. 1957 Alld. 450 and Bhidurbhai v. Purshottamdas AIR 1962 Gujarat 10. Where an ex parte decree had been obtained by fraud in service or summons by forging signatures of the party summoned and by forged Vakalatnama such a decree is nullity and cannot be allowed to stand. To say that the remedy of the aggrieved party lies only to file a civil suit is not only to deprive the court of the power to prevent the abuse of its process but would also lead to encouragement of dishonest practices in litigation by unscrupulous litigants and their unscrulpulous counsels. 8. As regards the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Monoharbahal Collery v. K.N. Mishra C.A. No. 563 of 1962, dated December 14, 1964 (S.C.) with it I respectfully agree. In that case, it was found that the counsel who entered into the compromise was duly authorised to enter into a compromise on behalf of the respondent. The present case is, however, exactly the reverse and the allegation is that the counsel who entered into a compromise on behalf of the defendant opposite party was never authorised to appear on their behalf. On the other hand, it is alleged that the Valkalatnama of this counsel bears forged signature of some one. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in no way support the case of the present revisionists. 9. As a result of the above discussion, I hold that the impugned order of the trial court dismissing the application of the defendant opposite party is quite erroneous in law and the learned Additional Commissioner has rightly set aside this order. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court in no way support the case of the present revisionists. 9. As a result of the above discussion, I hold that the impugned order of the trial court dismissing the application of the defendant opposite party is quite erroneous in law and the learned Additional Commissioner has rightly set aside this order. The learned Additional Commissioner is directing that the trial court shall decide the application on merits has not in any way acted illegally or with any material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. Had a compromise been duly entered into between the parties, the learned Additional Commissioner would have no jurisdiction to set aside the compromise decree, but in the present case no compromise duly entered into by the parties is on record. The alleged compromise has been signed on behalf of the defendant opposite party, Sheo Mohan Singh by an advocate, who, it is alleged was not authorised to appear on behalf of the defendant opposite party at all. 10. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that an advocate duly engaged by a defendant could sign the agreement on behalf of the defendant. This is an innocent-looking statement but in fact contains a big fallacy. The point to be seen is whether the advocate, who had signed the agreement, was in fact duly engaged by the defendant on whose behalf he signed the agreement. If the advocate was not duly engaged and his Vakalatnama was forged, clearly he had no authority to sign the agreement at all. 11. The learned counsel for the revisionists has also contended that the U.P. State was not a party in the original proceedings and could not be arrayed as a party in the appeal. I find that the state has been arrayed as a party both by the revisionist in the revision and earlier in the appeal which has been filed by the opposite party No. 1. If the impleadment of the State is not necessary, this defect is immaterial and does not have any legal effect. 12. I find that the state has been arrayed as a party both by the revisionist in the revision and earlier in the appeal which has been filed by the opposite party No. 1. If the impleadment of the State is not necessary, this defect is immaterial and does not have any legal effect. 12. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to Pandurang v. Maruti A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 153 in which a learned Bench of the Supreme court has laid down the extent of revisional powers of the High Court and has held as follows- "The provisions of Section 115 of the code have been examined by judicial decisions on several occasions. While exercising its jurisdiction under section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact, however, gross they may be or even errors of law, unless the said error have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. As Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115 indicate, it is only in cases where the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has filed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may arise in proceedings instituted before subordinate courts which are related to questions of jurisdiction. It is will settle that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of section 115 of the code. A finding on these pleas in favour of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of section 115 of the code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the sub-ordinate court which has no relation to question of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115." I need only observe that in the present case, the learned counsel for the revisionists has not only failed to make out a case for revisional interference by this court but has ever, failed to show that the decision of the learned Additional Commissioner is erroneous in law. 13. I am satisfied that the order of the learned Additional Commissioner is a perfectly sound one and does not suffer from any illegality of impropriety or error in the exercise of jurisdiction. The revision has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs.