JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the tenant of an accommodation of which respondent No. 3 has been found to be the landlord. An application sus made by respondent No. 3 for release of the said accommodation under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 on the ground that she was an old lady and needed the accommodation in question bona fide for her own use. According to her, she was not possessed of any alternative accommodation. The case of the petitioner, on the other hand, was that she was residing along with respondent No. 4 who was one of her relations, and was occupying one house in Dhaliapur as also another house in the same Mohalla where the accommodation in question is situate. It was further asserted by the petitioner that the need of respondent No. 3 was not bona fide. The Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide but he took the view that since she was an old lady living all alone, her need would be satisfied if one room alone out of the accommodation in question which may be mutually decided by the parties may be released in her favour. He passed an order accordingly. Against that order, both the parties went up in appeal before the District judge. The appeal of respondent No. 3 was allowed and that of the petitioner dismissed with the result that the entire house was ordered to be released in favour of respondent No. 3. It is these orders of the authorities below which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the need of respondent No. 3 was not at all bona fide because she was comfortably living with respondent No. 4 in the two houses which he was occupying and the authorities below have not given due weight to this circumstance. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission. The prescribed Authority and the Additional District judge have both adverted to this circumstance and have not ignored it as is clear from their orders. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission. The prescribed Authority and the Additional District judge have both adverted to this circumstance and have not ignored it as is clear from their orders. In regard to the house situate in the same Mohalla where the accommodation in question situate, the additional District Judge has recorded a categorical finding that respondent No. 3 had not been living with respondent No. 4 in that house for the last twenty years or so as alleged by the petitioner. In regard to the other house, the authorities below have taken the view that even if the respondent No. 3 was living with respondent No. 4 as a licensee her need could not be ignored because it was open to respondent No. 4 at any time to require the respondent No. 3 to vacate the accommodation occupied by her. It is only after due consideration of the various aspects of the matter put forth before them by the parties that the authorities below have come to the conclusion that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide. In Mattualal v. Radhe Lal, 1975 R C.J. 86 it has been held that the finding reached by the Additional District Judge on an appreciation of evidence that the landlord does not bona fide require the premises in question is a finding of fact act and not a finding of mixed law and fact and it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in Second Appeal unless it is shown that in reaching it a mistake of law is committed by the Additional District Judge or it is based on no evidence or is such as no reasonable man can reach. The principle laid down above would equally apply even to a case where the Additional District Judge has recorded a converse finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide. In this view of the matter, the findings recorded by the authorities below cannot be challenged in the present writ petition unless they suffer from any of the errors as pointed out above. In my opinion, the said finding does not suffer from any of these errors. 3. In this view of the matter, the findings recorded by the authorities below cannot be challenged in the present writ petition unless they suffer from any of the errors as pointed out above. In my opinion, the said finding does not suffer from any of these errors. 3. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that when the prescribed Authority had taken the view that if on room alone was released in favour of respondent No. 3 her need would be satisfied, it was incumbent upon the Additional District Judge when he was passing an order of reversal to give cogent-reason for holding as to why the order of release was necessary to be passed in respect of the entire accommodation as was done by him. It was further urged that the Additional District Judge was under a misapprehension of fact when he stated in his order that the accommodation in question was comprised of just two rooms. 4. In support of the second submission, reliance was placed on paragraph 25 of the writ petition wherein it has been stated that the disputed house consists of three rooms on the ground floor and a small court-yard and two rooms and a verandah on the first floor and that fact is established from the report of the Inspector which formed part of the record. Along with the rejoinder affidavit a copy of the report of the Inspector has also been filed by the petitioner A perusal of the said report indicates that the accommodation in question is double storeyed. On the ground floor it consists of two rooms and one side room. On the first floor there are two rooms and one small verandah. Further, there is one latrine and a hand-pump on the ground floor. There is no electric connection. From this report it is apparent that the Additional District Judge was under some misapprehension when he stated in his order that the disputed building "consists of only two small rooms." 5. Reverting to the first submission made by counsel for the petitioner it would be seen that section 21 of the Act leaves it to the discretion of the Prescribed Authority to pass an order of eviction against a tenant either from the whole building under his tenancy or from any specified part thereof. Reverting to the first submission made by counsel for the petitioner it would be seen that section 21 of the Act leaves it to the discretion of the Prescribed Authority to pass an order of eviction against a tenant either from the whole building under his tenancy or from any specified part thereof. As seen above, the Prescribed Authority had taken the view that the release of one room alone would meet the requirement of respondent No. 3. The Additional District Judge has not pointed out any legal flaw in the said order and has yet passed an order of release in respect of the whole house. In view of the foregoing discussion the order of the Additional District Judge deserves to be quashed with a direction to decide the appeals afresh. 6. It was urged by counsel for respondent No. 3 that since respondent No. 3 had claimed release of the entire house and the petitioner was also contesting her claim in respect of the entire house, it is possible that the parties may not have produced evidence on the point about the actual extent of the accommodation which may satisfy the need of the petitioner. I am not expressing any opinion in respect of this submission. If the Additional District Judge fees that he parties have been prejudiced on this score, it would be open to him to permit the parties to produce additional evidence in support of the irrespective claim. 7. Lastly, it was urged by her counsel that respondent No. 3 was entitled to the benefit of Section 12(3-A) of the Act as has been inserted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976. According to counsel for the petitioner that sub-section is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Since, however, this plea was not raised before the Additional District Judge and the necessary material on the basis of which the said sub-section could be held to be applicable is not on the record, I am not expressing any opinion on this point also. It would be open to respondent No. 3 to raise this plea also before the Additional District Judge. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. It would be open to respondent No. 3 to raise this plea also before the Additional District Judge. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Additional District Judge dated August 6, 1976, is quashed and he is directed to decide the two appeals afresh expeditiously in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made above. In the circumstances of the cart parties will bear, their own costs.