JUDGMENT - B.M. SAPRE, J.:---This criminal revision application is directed against an order dated 27th October, 1975 passed by the Sessions Judge, Kolaba at Alibag, upholding the order dated 8th July, 1975 passed by the Collector of Kolaba at Alibag confiscating a motor truck belonging to the petitioner under the provisions of section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act). The facts found established and about which there is no longer any dispute are these. The petitioner is the owner of the motor truck bearing No. MRS 9892. The petitioner is residing in Bombay. He sends his truck with his driver Vijay Shankar Bhosale to places outside Bombay for bringing goods on hire. On that night of 12th February, 1975, the said truck was intercepted by P.S.I. Khedkar on a road near village Shahabaj in Alibag Taluka. Four persons were found inside the truck in which rice was being transported. It was the case of P.S.I. Khedkar that the rice was being carried to Bombay in contravention of the orders issued under the Act. In due course, the Collector proceeding under section 6-A of the Act confiscated not only the rice but also the truck. The order of confiscation of the rice was not challenged. The petitioner, however, challenged the order of confiscation of the truck by filing a criminal appeal before the Sessions Judge, Kolaba at Alibag, under section 6-C of the Act. So far as the driver of the truck was concerned, his case was that while he was intending to take some fish and other commodities in the truck towards Bombay, he was contacted by Gangaram Kadam of Goregaon (who was one of the four persons found in the truck), who told him to carry the load of rice towards Goregaon. Gangaram gave an assurance to the driver that there was no ban on the transport of the rice from one place to another within the district and Gangaram also took upon himself all responsibility if the truck were to be confiscated on the way. On that assurance, the driver agreed to carry rice for which he was to have received Rs. 300/- after reaching Goregaon. The case of the petitioner was that he used to send his truck outside Bombay for transporting coconuts, dry fish and other commodities from Alibag and Panvel to Bombay. On that assurance, the driver agreed to carry rice for which he was to have received Rs. 300/- after reaching Goregaon. The case of the petitioner was that he used to send his truck outside Bombay for transporting coconuts, dry fish and other commodities from Alibag and Panvel to Bombay. The driver was not supposed to carry rice in the truck if its transport was prohibited by law. If the driver had transported rice when its transport was prohibited he as the owner was not liable and the truck was not liable to be confiscated. The learned Sessions Judge, in view of certain decision cited before him, accepted the position that ordinarily, there is no question of vicarious liability of the master who had no knowledge about his servants illegal acts when the master was not present at the time those acts were done. He, however, held that those authorities are of no help in view of the special provisions in the Act as regard presumption of culpable mental state. The special provision is in section 10-C which reads as under :--- "10-C. Presumption of Culpable mental State---(1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Court shall presume the existence of such material state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation.---In this section culpable mental state includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe a fact. (2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability." The learned Sessions Judge held that in view of this provisions in the Act, the Court had to presume the existence of a culpable mental state on the part of the owner. In other words, a presumption had to be drawn that in the instant case, the petitioner as the owner of the truck was conniving at the activities of his driver in transporting rice against which there was prohibition in law. The burden was on the petitioner to prove otherwise and this burden had not been discharged. In other words, a presumption had to be drawn that in the instant case, the petitioner as the owner of the truck was conniving at the activities of his driver in transporting rice against which there was prohibition in law. The burden was on the petitioner to prove otherwise and this burden had not been discharged. Mr. Agarwal for the petitioner has made three submissions before me, viz.:--- (1) The learned Sessions Judge was in error in applying section 10-C. That section can be applied where there is a "prosecution for any offence" under the Act. In the instant case, there was no prosecution but only proceedings under section 6-A of the Act. If section 10-C does not apply, no presumption of culpable mental state of the petitioner could be raised and in the absence of any such presumption, there is no evidence to prove mens rea on the part of the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge has also not stated in his judgment that apart from the presumption under section 10-C , there was evidence to prove mens rea on the part of the petitioner. (2) Even if section 10-C, is applicable, from the material placed on record by the petitioner, it could be said that he had discharged the burden that he had no such mental state with respect to the act of his driver. (3) Under the second proviso to sub-section (1)(c) of section 6-A of the Act, in lieu of confiscation of the truck the petitioner has to be given an option to pay fine not exceeding the market price of the rice seized which is Rs. 8789.50 P. Having heard elaborate argument son either sides, I find that Mr. Agarwal must succeed on his first submission and it is, therefore, not necessary to deal with his second and third submissions. I have already reproduced section 10-C. The opening words of the section are "in any prosecution for any offence under the Act". Section 10-C is in the nature of an exception, inasmuch as the burden which is normally there on the prosecution to bring home the offence to the accused has been shifted on to the accused to prove that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as is required to be proved for establishing the offence. It has, therefore, to be strictly constructed. It has, therefore, to be strictly constructed. In other words, it cannot be extended to anything beyond what it intends to cover. As noted, the opening words are "in any prosecution for any offence under this Act". Now, it is only under section 7 of the Act that there can be a prosecution. The present proceedings were taken under section 6-A and those proceedings cannot amount to a "prosecution for any offence". Proceedings under section 6-A are independent of a prosecution that may be launched under section 7. This will be clear from section 6-D which runs thus:--- "6-D. The award of any confiscation under this Act by the Collector shall not prevent the infliction of any punishment to which the person affected thereby is liable under this Act." The order of confiscation made under section 6-A is described as an award and there is no scope for passing an order of conviction and imposing a sentence which is the normal result on conviction when there is a prosecution for an offence. Mr. Agarwal has referred to the decision in (Kishori Lal v. Additional Collector, Kanpur)1, A.I.R. 1969 All. 159 where also the distinction between the proceedings under section 6-A and the prosecution under section 7 is pointed out. Mr. Wale, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, is unable to dispute the position that proceedings under section 6-A of the Act cannot be in the nature of a prosecution for an offence under the Act. He also concedes that section 10-C opens with the words "in any prosecution for any offence under this Act". His argument is that it is possible to give extended meaning to the expression in any prosecution for any offence under this to Act" cover even proceedings under section 6-A of the Act which end in some kind of penalty when the order of confiscation is made and which provisions are, therefore, penal in nature. As I have said, section 10-C is in the nature of an exception, inasmuch as it departs from the normal rule of placing the burden on the prosecution and raises a presumption against the accused and it requires him to prove the non-existence of mens rea on his part for an act charged as an offence. As I have said, section 10-C is in the nature of an exception, inasmuch as it departs from the normal rule of placing the burden on the prosecution and raises a presumption against the accused and it requires him to prove the non-existence of mens rea on his part for an act charged as an offence. It has, therefore, to be strictly construed and the normal and ordinary meaning to the expression "in any prosecution for any offence under this Act" must be given. If that is done, the expression clearly would not include proceedings under section 6-A of the Act. The next question is whether if the prosecution cannot call in aid section 10-C of the Act, can it be said to have discharged the burden of establishing mens rea on the part of the petitioner in the act of his driver in using the truck for purposes of transporting rice which was prohibited by law. In the case of Kishori Lal referred to above, it has been held, with which view I respectfully agree, that even while passing an order of forfeiture under section 6-A, the consideration of mens rea or bona fides is relevant. Now, what is the evidence here? The case of the driver was that ordinarily, he would have taken fish and other commodities in the truck to Bombay, but because Gangaram of Goregaon, asked him to carry the load of rice and assured him that there was no ban on the transport of the rice from one place to another within the district, he had agreed to carry the rice for which he would have received Rs. 300/- after reaching Goregaon. This clearly indicates that not only the driver himself would not have agreed to transport the rice had he known that its transport was prohibited by law, but also that his master did not expect him to do anything prohibited by law. The case of the petitioner was also that he was sending the truck with the driver for transporting coconuts, dry fish and other commodities from Alibag and Panvel to Bombay and if the driver had transported rice, which was prohibited by law, it was without his consent or knowledge. The learned Sessions Judge has conceded that the petitioner as owner of the truck at Bombay had no control over the activities of the driver. The learned Sessions Judge has conceded that the petitioner as owner of the truck at Bombay had no control over the activities of the driver. At page 53 of the proceedings in Case No. ECA/3/75 before the Collector, there is an affidavit of the petitioner in which he had stated that he had entrusted the truck to his driver for the purposes of bringing dry fish and he had absolutely no knowledge that the driver was going to transport or had transported rice which was prohibited by law. In the affidavit, he has affirmed that he had never asked his driver to do any act which was prohibited by law. At page 51 is the affidavit of one Ravindra Yeshwant Patil who is working as an agent of Joglekar Motor Transport Co. at Alibag. He has stated in his affidavit that the truck owned by the petitioner often comes to Alibag and he sends coconuts and fish to Bombay in that truck. At page 55 is the affidavit of one Bhalchandra Dajiba Magar who is the Manager of Koaba Motor Transport Service at Alibag. He has also stated in the affidavit that in the truck of the petitioner he used to send coconuts, fish and rice under permit. All this evidence has not at all been taken into consideration by the learned Sessions Judge. His approach has been that under section 10-C of the Act, there was a presumption of culpable mental state on the part of the petitioner and that presumption had not been rebutted by the evidence adduced by the petitioner. But that approach has been found to be clearly wrong, inasmuch as section 10-C is not at all applicable and no presumption of mens rea on the part of the petitioner can be raised. The petitioner has placed on record sufficient material which, to say the least, certainly makes the defence of the petitioner reasonably probable that the act of his driver was solely his and the petitioner had no knowledge thereof and he had not consented to nor connived at the activities of the driver. That in itself is sufficient to set aside the order of confiscation of the truck. In the result, this application in revision is allowed and the rule is made absolute. That in itself is sufficient to set aside the order of confiscation of the truck. In the result, this application in revision is allowed and the rule is made absolute. The order of confiscation of the truck made by the Collector and confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside and the truck is directed to be released and delivered to the petitioner. The surety bond executed by the petitioner stands cancelled. -----