JUDGMENT T.S. Misra, J.: - This appeal arises in the following circumstances. Sri Prakash Ojha, the respondent was appointed as Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force on 10-1-1967. He was placed on probation for a period of two years. A notice dated 12-9-1968, copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition, was served on him intimating him that his conduct had not been found satisfactory inasmuch as he had unauthorisedly occupied Rail way Quarter No. K. Block No. WW/8 in the R. P. F. Lines, Mawaiya, Lucknow since June, 1968 and that he had not vacated the said quarter despite orders made by S. I/R. P. F. and the C. I/R. P. F. He was, therefore, informed that in view of the said lapse on his part it was considered that his further retention in service was not in the interest of the Department and, therefore, action to terminate his probation was proposed to be taken under R. 25 (ii) of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, He was, therefore, called upon to make representation if any, against the proposed action within the specified period. The respondent submitted his representation, Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It seems that in view of the allegations made by him in his representation the Assistant Security Officer asked the Circle Inspector, R. P. F. to enquire into the facts and submit a report thereon. The Circle Inspector consequently made enquiries into the facts of the case and submitted his report dated 13-11-1968. The Assistant security officer after making this fact finding enquiry considered the representation and passed a final order on 19-11-1968 discharging the petitioner from service with effect from that date under R. 25 (ii) of the R. P. F. Rules 1959. A copy of that order is Annexure 3 to the writ petition. A copy of the order sheet was also attached to the said order and sent to the respondent. It further transpires that the respondent then preferred an appeal against the said order. The Security Officer rejected that appeal and his order was communicated to the respondent vide Annexure 4 on 23-12-1968. A copy of the order sheet was also attached to the said order and sent to the respondent. It further transpires that the respondent then preferred an appeal against the said order. The Security Officer rejected that appeal and his order was communicated to the respondent vide Annexure 4 on 23-12-1968. The respondent then filed the writ petition which has given rise to this appeal claiming a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the said orders of the Assistant Security Officer and the Security Officer, and for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to treat him in service as Rakshak on the same scale of pay which he was drawing without any break. 2. The writ petition was contested, The learned single judge having come to the conclusion that the termination of the respondent's probation was brought about in an illegal manner quashed the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer. He also quashed the order passed by the Security Officer, though the Security Officer was not implead ed as a party. Aggrieved by that decision the Union of India and the Assistant Security officer, R. P. F. have preferred this appeal. 3. Referring to R. 25 the learned Single Judge observed that the rule had no application to termination during the period of probation and that it applied only to the stage after the period of probation was over, or after the extended period of probation was over as the case may be. In his view the said R. 25 could not be resorted to while the period of probation was still on, hence it was concluded by the learned single judge that the termination of the respondent's probation was brought about in an illegal manner, 4. For the appellants it was urged that the aforesaid view taken by the learned single judge was erroneous. It was submitted that the provision of R. 25 of the R. P. F. Rules also applies to the termination of service during the period of probation, In order to appreciate the argument it would be appropriate to read R. 25. It says: "25. Probation (1) All appointments by direct recruitment...... shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. It says: "25. Probation (1) All appointments by direct recruitment...... shall be on probation for two years subject to the provision that the appointing authority may extend this period in special cases. (2) The appointing authority shall, on the expiry of the period of such probation or such extended period pass an order declaring that the probationer has completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. If he considers him unsuitable, the probationer shall be informed in writing of the reasons for terminating his probation and given an opportunity to submit any representation he may wish to make within a reasonable time and any representation submitted within that time shall also be considered and final orders passed by such authority." Along with this Rule we may also read R. 41 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 the material part of which says: "41. Nature of Penalties ................ Explanation The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule (i) to (vii) .......... (viii) termination of service (a) of a member of the Force appointed on probation, during or at the end of the period of probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation; or (b) .......... (c) ............" 5. A perusal of R. 41 makes it manifest that the termination of service of a member of the Force appointed on probation during the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing probation does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of R. 41. We do not have on record the letter of appointment from which the terms of appointment of the respondent could be gathered, nor do we have the order governing his probation. Rule 25, referred to here in above, however, deals with the procedure for terminating the service of a member of the Force appointed on probation. The first part of sub-cl. (ii) of R. 25 stipulates that on the expiry of the period of probation the appointing authority shall pass an order declaring that the probationer had completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. On such an order being passed the probationer may be confirmed in the rank. The first part of sub-cl. (ii) of R. 25 stipulates that on the expiry of the period of probation the appointing authority shall pass an order declaring that the probationer had completed the period of probation satisfactorily and is suitable for confirmation in that rank. On such an order being passed the probationer may be confirmed in the rank. If the appointing authority considers him unsuitable no order of confirmation would naturally follow. The provision of sub-cl. (ii) of R. 25 also contemplates that an action may be taken to terminate the service during probation period not by way of penalty but on the ground that the incumbent was consider ed unsuitable. The service may also be terminated by imposing a penalty by taking resort to the provisions of R. 44, but such action can be taken by the disciplinary authority as laid down in R. 43 which says that the disciplinary authority in respect of member of the Force for the purpose of imposing any particular penalty or the passing of a disciplinary order shall be the authority specified in this behalf in Schedule II in whose administrative control the member is serving and shall include any authority superior to such authority. R. 41 defines major penalties. They are, inter alia, dismissal and removal from service. Schedule II to the said Rules prescribes that the order of dismissal and removal may be passed by the Security Officer against all members of the Force except Sub-Inspectors and Inspectors. It also mentions that the Assistant Security officer does not have any such power. Therefore, an order of dismissal or removal from service by way of penalty could be passed only by the Security officer and not the Assistant Security Officer, R. 25 however provides that the appointing authority may terminate the probation on the ground of unsuitability. The Assistant Security Officer was the appointing authority of the respondent. He could, therefore, take action under Rule 25 but not being the disciplinary authority he could not take action under R. 44. The Assistant Security Officer in the instant case did not purport to act under R. 44. On the contrary, in his notice, Annexure 1, he expressly mentioned that he proposed to terminate the probation under R. 25 sub-cl. (ii) of the said Rules. We are, therefore. The Assistant Security Officer in the instant case did not purport to act under R. 44. On the contrary, in his notice, Annexure 1, he expressly mentioned that he proposed to terminate the probation under R. 25 sub-cl. (ii) of the said Rules. We are, therefore. of the view that action to terminate the probation could also be taken during the period of probation under R. 25. The impugned order passed by the Assistant Security officer could not, therefore, be said to be illegal merely on the ground that it was passed under R. 25. 6. (ii) of the said Rules. We are, therefore. of the view that action to terminate the probation could also be taken during the period of probation under R. 25. The impugned order passed by the Assistant Security officer could not, therefore, be said to be illegal merely on the ground that it was passed under R. 25. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent then urged that even if action could be taken to terminate the probation during the period of probation under R. 25, the impugned order passed by the Assistant Security Officer was bad on the following grounds: (i) that the Assistant Security Officer had after the receipt of the representation of the respondent proceeded to make enquiries which amounted to disciplinary proceeding and as no further opportunity was given to the respondent to show cause why the proposed penalty be not inflicted, the order was hit by Article 311 of the Constitution; (ii) that even if the enquiry made by the Assistant Security officer did not amount to a disciplinary proceeding the Assistant Security Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction by making further inquiries after the receipt of respondent's representation inasmuch as R. 25 does not require that any enquiry should be made by the appointing authority after the receipt of the representation from the probationer, and (iii) that at any rate the Assistant Security Officer had based his order on certain grounds which were not mentioned in his notice dated 12-9-1968, Annexure 1 or the writ petition inasmuch as in the said notice it was stated that (a) the respondent had unauthorisedly occupied the railway quarter which was actually allotted to Rakshak Surendra Singh, and (b) that it had been reported by the S. I. R. P. F. Lines that the respondent did not vacate At in spite of being asked to do so both by the S. I. R. P. F. Lines as also by the C. I. R. P. F. Lines whereas the impugned order was based not only on the aforesaid alleged lapses but also on the ground that the respondent had vacated the said quarter only when he learnt that the discharge notice was being served on him and that after vacating the said quarter he started living outside unauthorisedly and despite repeated orders had not even cared to come over to the barracks. 7. 7. We find no substance in either of these contentions. we have already observed above that the Assistant Security Officer in the case in hand, did not take action under R. 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, He could not also take such an action inasmuch as he was not the disciplinary authority as defined in R. 43 read with Schedule II. The question of affording a second opportunity to show cause why the proposed order of termination of the probation be not passed did not, therefore, arise. The provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were in these circumstances not attracted. That apart, Article 311 of the Constitution would be applicable to a case where a penalty is sought to be imposed. We are unable to hold that the discharge of a probationer on the ground that he was considered unsuitable to hold the post in question invariably amounts to imposition of a penalty. A probationer may be found unsuitable to hold the post in question. If the appointing authority, at any time during the period of probation, or at the end of the (probation finds that the probationer is unsuitable to hold the post an order discharging him from service on that ground may be passed. Such an order. cannot be said to be an 'imposition of penalty as contemplated by R. 41 of the R,P.F. Rules. The respondent was admittedly appointed as Rakshak in the Force on probation for two years. The post on which he was appointed was subject to certain discipline, one of the rigours of that discipline being that he had to obey the command of his superior officer. Discipline is necessary for an orderly life. It is all the more necessary in a force maintained for the maintenance of law and order. If any member. of such a Force acts in an undisciplined manner and refuses to obey the command of the superior officer, he would be found to be lacking in one of the basic and essential requirements of the post on which he is appointed. If any member. of such a Force acts in an undisciplined manner and refuses to obey the command of the superior officer, he would be found to be lacking in one of the basic and essential requirements of the post on which he is appointed. The Assistant Security Officer in his notice, Annexure 1 to the writ petition, pointed out to the respondent that he had unauthorisedly occupied the railway quarter in question which was actually allotted to another Rakshak, Surendra Singh, The Sub-Inspector, R. P. F. Lines Lucknow and the Circle Inspector, R. P. F. Lines had ordered the respondent to vacate the said quarter, but the respondent paid no heed to the same and did not obey the order of his superior officers. The Assistant Security officer pointed out to the respondent that it was a lapse on his part which was not expected from a member of a disciplined Force like Railway Protection Force. lie, therefore, proposed to terminate the probation: The respondent in his reply had admitted that he had occupied the quarter at the behest of Surendra Singh to whom he had agreed to pay Rs. 10 p. m. as rent. Since he failed to pay the said sum regularly to Surendra Singh the latter reported the matter to higher authorities and thereafter he shifted to a private quarter in Alambagh. Thus he had vacated the railway quarter in question on 11-9-1968. In view of these allegations made in his representation the Assistant Security Officer deemed it proper to make a fact finding enquiry, and therefore asked for the report of the Circle Inspector in the light of the averments made by the respondent in his representation. This enquiry was obviously not made in the nature of a regular disciplinary proceeding for imposing any major or minor penalty against the probationer, but for ascertaining the facts in the light of the averments made by the respondent in his representation. The lapses on the part of the probationer pointed out to him by the Assistant Security officer, were in fact admitted by him in his representation. The lapses on the part of the probationer pointed out to him by the Assistant Security officer, were in fact admitted by him in his representation. However, it seems that in the fitness of things the Assistant Security Officer called for a report from the circle Inspector, R. P. F. On the allegations made by the respondent, the Circle Inspector R. P. F. accordingly interrogated the respondent and also another person who was cross-examined by the respondent. A detailed report was then submitted to the Assistant Security officer, Thereafter the representation of the respondent was considered. The respondent had admittedly never resided in a barrack, though one of the essential requirements of his post was that he should have normally stayed in a barrack vide R. 6 of the Chap. XXIV of the Railway Protection Force Regulations, 1966 which reads as under: "6. Residential Accommodation For provision of residential accommodation the members of the Force have been classified as "essential" on the railways and as such, they are required to live as near the place of their duty as possible. The accommodation will be either in the shape of barracks or family quarters. Where there is large concentration of men (50 or more) barrack accommodation shall be provided to the extent of 50 per cent of the strength. For the remaining 50 per cent family quarters shall he provided. At stations where the number of men is small, family quarters shall normally be provided for them. Barrack accommodation shall be free of rent. If the members, living in barracks have rented private accommodation for their families, they shall be entitled to the payment of house rent allowance equal to 75% of the rates which would otherwise have been admissible to them under the Rule. The quarters and barracks shall, as far as possible. be in a compact area." In this view of the platter as well it cannot be said that the impugned order of the Assistant Security Officer was violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 8. There is also no merit in the contention that the Assistant Security Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction by making further inquiries after the receipt of the respondent's representation. We have already pointed out above that no enquiry in the nature of regular disciplinary proceeding was made by the Assistant Security Officer. 8. There is also no merit in the contention that the Assistant Security Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction by making further inquiries after the receipt of the respondent's representation. We have already pointed out above that no enquiry in the nature of regular disciplinary proceeding was made by the Assistant Security Officer. The respondent had made certain averments in his representation and the Assistant Security Officer deemed it proper to ascertain facts in the light of those averments. The Circle Inspector, It, P. F. Lines was accordingly called upon to submit his report which he did after interrogating the respondent and another person, who was allowed to be cross-examined by the respondent. The petitioner was thus in no way prejudiced by this fact finding enquiry which was necessitated due to the averments made by the respondent in his representation. 9. The third objection raised on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the Assistant Security Officer had based his order on certain grounds which were not mentioned in his notice is also not sustainable. The respondent was clearly told by notice dated 12-9-1968 that he had unauthorisedly occupied the railway quarter which was actually allotted to Rakshak Surendra Singh, and that the respondent did not vacate it in spite of being asked to do so. True it is that in the impugned order it was also mentioned that when the respondent learnt that discharge notice was going to be served on him he vacated the quarter and started living outside unauthorisedly and did not even care to come over to the barracks. Regulation 6 contained in the Railway Protection Force Regulations, 1966 requires that the respondent should have lived as near the place of his duty as possible. Residential accommodation would be either in the shape of barracks or family quarter, and the barrack accommodation shall be free of rent. The respondent had admitted in his representation that he had left the quarter allotted to Rakshak Surendra Singh and had shifted elsewhere. Obviously he had not returned to the barracks. The Assistant Security Officer had thus taken note of a fact which had been admitted by the respondent in his representation. These facts were taken into account for considering whether the respondent was suitable to hold the post of Rakshak. Nothing extraneous was thus taken into consideration while determining the question of his suitability. 10. The Assistant Security Officer had thus taken note of a fact which had been admitted by the respondent in his representation. These facts were taken into account for considering whether the respondent was suitable to hold the post of Rakshak. Nothing extraneous was thus taken into consideration while determining the question of his suitability. 10. We thus find no procedural or jurisdictional error in the impugned order passed by the Assistant Security Officer. The said order does not, in our view, suffer from any manifest error of law resulting in manifest injustice, No provision of law or rule was brought to our notice which entitled the respondent to file an appeal against the impugned order. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, referred us to R. 52 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 which provides that a member may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in Rule 41 to the authority immediately superior to the authority imposing the penalty. We have already held above that the impugned order did not impose upon the respondent any of the penalties specified in It. 41. The order was passed under R. 25 (ii) of the said Rules. The respondent was found unsuitable to hold the post of Rakshak. His probation was, therefore, terminated and lie was discharged from service. R. 52 was therefore not attracted in the case in hand. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent also drew our attention to Annexure 3 to the writ petition wherein it was stipulated that under R. 1717 R. I. an appeal against the order would lie to the S. O. (E) Lucknow. We have perused R. 1717 R. I. That rule, however, does not deal with the fling of and appeal from an order passed by the Assistant Security Officer. There is in fact no provision in the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 which provides for an appeal from an order passed under R. 25 (ii) of the said Rules. In the circumstances, the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Security officer was incompetent. In any case, the appeal preferred by the respondent was also considered and dismissed by the Security officer. 12. In the result, the special appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned single judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances, the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Security officer was incompetent. In any case, the appeal preferred by the respondent was also considered and dismissed by the Security officer. 12. In the result, the special appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned single judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.