JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Priya Kumar Chatterji has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He prays that the order dated 3-4-1975 passed by Sri Mamraj Singh, terminating his service be quashed. 2. Petitioner was a temporary Government servant employed as a tracer in the Consolidation Department. On 3-4-1975 Sri Mamraj Singh, Settlement Officer Consolidation, acting under the rules applicable to temporary Government servants, gave a notice to the petitioner stating that his service was no more required and was to stand terminated with effect from the date of its receipt. The notice also mentioned that the petitioner was to be paid one month's wages in lieu of notice. Petitioner challenges the validity of the aforesaid notice on following grounds: (a) Impugned notice, terminating petitioner's service is invalid inasmuch as it seeks to dismiss or remove the petitioner from service, without complying with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. (b) Sri Mamraj Singh, Settlement Officer Consolidation who gave the impugned notice was ill-disposed towards the petitioner. He issued the impugned notice on account of ill-will and for male fide reasons, 3. On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that the impugned notice s simple and innocuous notice terminating the service of a temporary Government servant, in accordance with the rules applicable to such servants and that Article 311 of the Constitution has no application to the facts of the case. They also denied that Sri Mamraj Singh bore any ill-will towards the petitioner or that his action was actuated by mala fide. 4. It will be convenient to state at this stage the circumstances emerging from various affidavits filed in the case which culminated in issuing of the impugned notice terminating petitioner's service. Petitioner was employed as a tracer in temporary capacity with the Consolidation Department in the year 1958. Subsequently he was elected as the President of the Union of 4th class employees of Varanasi district. It appears that Sri Mamraj Singh, Settlement Officer Consolidation, had suspended the President of the Provincial Unit of 4th class employees Union on 23-12-1974. Petitioner, in his capacity as President of the District Unit of the union presented a charter of demands before the Settlement Officer Consolidation and claimed that those demands be favourably considered by 31-12-1974. It appears that Sri Mamraj Singh, Settlement Officer Consolidation, had suspended the President of the Provincial Unit of 4th class employees Union on 23-12-1974. Petitioner, in his capacity as President of the District Unit of the union presented a charter of demands before the Settlement Officer Consolidation and claimed that those demands be favourably considered by 31-12-1974. As the demands raised in the charter were not conceded the petitioner and other employees started a relay-fast and resorted to picketing in front of the office of the Settlement Officer. This strike was ultimately withdrawn on the intervention of Sri D. S. Shukla Dy. Director of Consolidation and according to the petitioner he was assured that he and other employees were not to be victimised for having gone on strike. However, despite the aforesaid understanding Sri Mamraj Singh gave notices for terminating the service of some of the employees and also called upon some others to offer their explanation. The petitioner again met the Settlement Officer and reminded him of the assurance given by him. Sri Mamraj Singh told the petitioner that he had not given any such assurance, but if any such assurance was given by the Dy. Director of Consolidation, he would after consulting the Dy. Director, withdraw the proceedings Subsequently Sri Mamraj Singh withdrew notices terminating the services of various employees. 5. On 20-3-1975; Sri Mamraj Singh inspected the office of the Consolidation Officer. In that connection he reviewed the work of the petitioner at a considerable length and prepared an inspection note, copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1 to the petition. The inspection note translated in English reads thus. "There is no complaint against any other employee except Sri Priya Kumar Chatterji, Sri Chatterji is the President of the 4th class employees Union (Chakbandi) district branch. Complaint against him is that he does not do his work and instigates others not to do their work. At the time of inspection draftsman could not, because of fear, say anything'. Consolidation Officer should submit a detailed report about the work and conduct of Sri Chatterji. It appears that it will not be in public interest to retain the services of Sri Chatterji. If it be so, the Consolidation Officer should immediately submit a confidential report so that indiscipline may not percolate in members of the staff. Daily diary of Sri Chatterji perused. It appears that it will not be in public interest to retain the services of Sri Chatterji. If it be so, the Consolidation Officer should immediately submit a confidential report so that indiscipline may not percolate in members of the staff. Daily diary of Sri Chatterji perused. It shows that for most of the time he has been on leave. No leave has been sanctioned on his application. Sri Chatterji is accustomed to be absent without leave. Tracing work also seen. Sri Chatterji has never dated the tracing maps. It appears that every day full work is shown, but full work is not done. The sketch maps are not being dated with a view to avoid detection at the time of inspection. Sri Chatterji's work is unsatisfactory." 6. The Consolidation Officer Baragaou submitted a report on 13-3-1975 stating therein that it was difficult to take work from Sri Chatterji in a decent manner. Sri Chatterji had absented himself from duty without obtaining leave in the months of December and January, He had extended threats to the draftsman whose report along with his comments was also being forwarded for necessary action. According to the Consolidation Officer Sri Chatterji had no inclination to work and his conduct and behaviour did not befit a Government servant, Sub-sequently, on 3rd April 1975 the Settlement Officer Consolidation issued the impugned notice terminating the services of the petitioner. The notice on the face of it is a pure and simple notice of termination of service of a temporary Government servant which merely recited that petitioner's service was being terminated as it was no more required. 7. In the case of Satish Chandra v. Union of India AIR 1953 SC 250 it has been held that termination of service of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the rules of service applicable to him does not amount to his dismissal or removal from service and accordingly such termination does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 8. In P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , Das C. J. speaking for the majority made following observations in paragraph 27 of the judgment. 8. In P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , Das C. J. speaking for the majority made following observations in paragraph 27 of the judgment. "...cases may arise where the Government may find a servant unsuitable for the post on account oI misconduct or negligence in efficiency or other disqualifications, If such a servant was appointed on a post, permanent or temporary, either on probation or on officiating basis then the very transitory character of the employment implies that the employment was terminable at any time at reasonable notice given by the Government. Again if the servant was appointed to a post permanent or temporary on the express condition or term that the employment would be terminable on say a month's notice as in the case of Satish Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250 then the Government might at any time serve the requisite notice. In both cases the Government may proceed to take action against the servant in exercise of the powers under the terms of contract of employment express or implied or under the rules regulating the conditions of service if any applicable and ordinarily in such a situation the Government will take this course. But the Government may take the view that a simple termination of service is not enough and that the conduct of the servant has been such that he deserves a punishment entitling penal consequences. In such a case the Government may choose to proceed against the servant on the basis of his misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or the like and inflict on him the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank carrying with it the penal consequences, in which case the servant will be entitled to protection of Article 311." 9. Aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court clearly show that in its opinion, in a case where there are allegations of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications against a temporary Government servant it is open to the appointing authority to terminate the service of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the rules applicable to such a servant. Aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court clearly show that in its opinion, in a case where there are allegations of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications against a temporary Government servant it is open to the appointing authority to terminate the service of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the rules applicable to such a servant. But it may, instead of making a simple order of termination of service in accordance with the Rules choose to punish him for the alleged misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification by way of dismissal or removal from service and in such a case the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution will be attracted. This observation clearly means that merely because the real reason for terminating the services of a temporary Government servant is some misconduct, negligence or inefficiency or other disqualifications. the d termination of service does not necessarily result in his dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. It will attract the provisions of Article 311 only if the appointing authority has chosen to terminate the services of the Government servant by way of punishment entailing penal consequences, Ultimately the learned C. J. summed up the legal position in paragraph 28 thus: "The position may therefore be summed up as follows:- any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Termination of service brought about by exercise of contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal as has been held by this Court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250 . Likewise termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating conditions of service is not tantamount to infliction of punishment and does not attract Article 311 (2) as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 369 . In either of the above-mentioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. In either of the above-mentioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay or allowances under R. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the special service rule, nevertheless if a right exists under the contract or the rules to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is as Chagla C. J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, AIR 1956 Bom 455 ) (supra) wholly irrelevant. In short if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has by contract or under the rules the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may nevertheless choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct negligence inefficiency or other disqualification then it is a punishment and the requirement of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post then unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and therefore a dismissal or removal within Article 311 for it operates as a forfeiture of the right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowance. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank then the very reduction from that rank will operate as penal, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank then the very reduction from that rank will operate as penal, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If however he has no right to the particular rank his reduction from an officiating higher rank to the substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has by contract express or implied or under the rules the right to reduce him to the lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowance or loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to the lower rank tinder the terms of contract of employment or under the rules in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression 'terminate' or 'discharge' is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expression the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above viz. (1) whether the servant has a right to the post or rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind herein before referred to? The use of the expression 'terminate' or 'discharge' is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expression the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above viz. (1) whether the servant has a right to the post or rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind herein before referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as reduction in rank and if the requirement of the rules and Article 311 which give protection to Government servant have not been complied with the termination of service or reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the Constitutional right of the servant." 10. These observations in our opinion clarify beyond any doubt that according to the Supreme Court termination of service of a Government servant can be considered to be a punishment only if it operates as forfeiture of his rights or visits him with evil consequences like ( loss of pay and allowance, casting of stigma or affecting his future carrier. 11. In the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 : (1968 Lab IC 1286) Mitter J. reaffirmed the law laid down in Dhingra's case, ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) by stating the following proposition: "(1) Services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination, without anything more would not attract the operation of Art, 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive for it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts a stigma against his character or integrity it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts a stigma against his character or integrity it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authority only to ascertain whether the public servant 'should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i. e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said Article." 12. Latest decision of the Supreme Court on this point wherein the same position has been reaffirmed is in the case of State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi. Civil Appeal No. 258 of 1975 decided on 1-9-75: (1976 Lab IC 1647) (SC). In this case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court after noticing almost all the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court on the point observed thus: "Keeping in view the principles extracted above the respondent's suit could not be decreed in his favour. He was a temporary hand and had no right to the post. It is also not denied that both under the contract of service and the service rules governing the respondent, the State had a right to terminate his services by giving him one month's notice. The order to which exception is taken is ex facie an order of termination of service simplicities. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor it is founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order an i claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It does not cast any stigma on the respondent nor does it visit him with evil consequences, nor it is founded on misconduct. In the circumstances, the respondent could not invite the Court to go into the motive behind the order an i claim the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. We, therefore, agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment by probing into the departmental correspondence that passed between the superiors of the respondent overlooking the observations made by this Court in I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1967) 2 SCR 496 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1264 ) that when there are no express words in the impugned order itself which throw a stigma on the Government servant, the Court would not delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some king of stigma could be inferred on such research." 13. After the decision of the Supreme Court in P. L. Dinghara's case, ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) apart from the cases mentioned above, a large number of other cases with regard to termination of service of Government servant came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. Invariably the law laid down by the Supreme Court in P. L. Dhingra's case was affirmed. In cases where the order of termination of service of the temporary Government servant was innocuously worded, the Supreme Court examined the circumstances in which it came to be made. If it came to the conclusion that the order had the effect of casting stigma on the Government servant, it held that provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution should have been complied with. In other cases where even though the real reason for making the order of termination of service of a temporary Government servant was his misconduct but there was nothing in the order, or in the circumstances in which it was made, to cast any stigma on the Government servant concerned, the Supreme Court ruled that it was merely the motive for terminating the service and as such the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution need not have been complied with. As has been observed by the Supreme Court, facts of each case will have to be examined and the nature of the order impugned has to be gathered from the entirety of circumstances preceding and attending it. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, placed strong reliance on the following lines appearing in the Supreme Court judgment in Dhingra's, AIR 1958 SC 36 (supra) ".....the Government may nevertheless choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications then it is a punishment and the requirement of Article 311 must be complied with. The use of the expression terminate or discharge is not conclusive." and urged that they clearly imply that if the main and basic reason for termination of service of a Government servant is his misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, such termination of service being founded on misconduct etc. would amount to punishment or dismissal or removal from service, attracting the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this submission. In the first place, the observation relied upon by the learned counsel is not to be read in isolation, The observations of the Supreme Court read as a whole clearly indicate that where a simple order of termination of service has been passed, the courts, in order to determine whether it is by way of punishment have to apply two tests viz. (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or rank and (2) as to whether he has been visited with evil consequences. In a case where the Government servant had a right to the post any termination of service would per se be punishment. But in the case of a temporary Government servant, it would be so only if it visits the Government servant concerned with evil consequences or casts stigma upon him. Moreover, the precise expression used by the Supreme Court "If the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications" and not that "if the termination of service is actually based on allegations of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications." Termination of service can be sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency etc. Moreover, the precise expression used by the Supreme Court "If the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications" and not that "if the termination of service is actually based on allegations of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications." Termination of service can be sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency etc. if there is something in the order itself or in the circumstances in which it has been made which is designed to convey that the service of the Government servant had been terminated because of his misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualifications etc. In the absence of any such implication, it will not be possible to say that the order is sought to be founded on misconduct negligence., etc. Acceptance of the argument of the petitioner that whenever the real and substantial reason of termination of service of a Government servant is misconduct, it must be taken that it is founded on misconduct, would mean that the only method of getting rid of a temporary Government servant, who in the opinion of the Government is not suitable for the post as he has misconducted himself, will be by proceeding to punish him by dismissing or removing him from service and it would not be possible for the Government to terminate the service in accordance with the rules of service applicable to him. This argument certainly runs counter to what has been specifically stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 of the judgment in P. L. Dinghra's case. 15. In order to decide whether the impugned notice issued to the petitioner in this case has the effect of punishing him it will be necessary to examine whether the notice has been issued in such circumstances that it visits the petitioner with evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his integrity etc. In case it is found that neither is the petitioner visited with evil consequences nor is an aspersion cast upon his integrity or character, it would mean that the Settlement Officer Consolidation has merely terminated petitioner's service and has not chosen to punish him by way of dismissal or removal and no question of complying with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution would arise. 16. 16. On the face of it, the impugned( notice is a simple notice of termination) of petitioner's service, issued in accordance with the rules of service applicable to him. Such termination of service in accordance with the rules of service does not visit him with any evil consequences. There is nothing in the notice which casts any aspersion or stigma on the character or integrity of the petitioner. Only thing, therefore, that remains to be seen in this connection is as to whether there is anything in the circumstances in which the notice came to be issued that casts a stigma on the character or integrity of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that inspection note of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the confidential report made by the Consolidation Officer clearly indicates that his service has been terminated because of misconduct and as such it casts a stigma on him. We are again unable to accept this submission. Merely because the employee or the Government knows that the real reason for terminating the petitioner's service was that in the opinion of the Government he had misconducted himself, it does not mean that the petitioner is being stigmatised. A stigma is cast only if there is something in the order itself or in the circumstances in which it is made which is designed to convey to others that the petitioner had misconducted himself. The inspection note prepared by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the confidential report made by the Consolidation Officer were documents which were not meant to be perused by outsiders. There is nothing else in the notice or in the circumstances in which it came to be issued 1 which was designed to convey to the others that the petitioner's service had been terminated on account of some misconduct. It cannot be said that what was contained in the confidential report had the effect of converting an innocuous order of termination of service into an order of dismissal or removal from service. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of I. N. Saksena v. State of Madh. It cannot be said that what was contained in the confidential report had the effect of converting an innocuous order of termination of service into an order of dismissal or removal from service. It is precisely for this reason that in the case of I. N. Saksena v. State of Madh. Pra, AIR 1967 SC 1264 the Supreme Court observed that in order to determine whether the order had been made by way of punishment or casts a stigma upon the employee, it was not permissible to probe into the departmental correspondence or to delve into Government files and to infer some kind of stigma therefrom. We are accordingly of opinion that in this case the petitioner has not succeeded in showing that he has been punished and no question of applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution or of giving an opportunity to him for explaining the misconduct which was the real reason for termination of service, arises. 17. We now proceed to consider as to whether or not the petitioner has succeeded in making out that the impugned notice was issued because of the mala fide of Sri Mamraj Singh and whether it deserves to be quashed on that ground. According to learned counsel for the petitioner in paragraph 12 of the writ petition it was clearly stated that his service has been terminated on account of ill-will and mala fide of respondent No. 2 Mamraj Singh, who did not file a counter affidavit denying this allegation. The allegation of inala fide against Sri Mamraj Singh, therefore, deserves to be accepted and the impugned notice is liable to be quashed on that ground. In this connection learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 962 . 18. In our opinion, the burden of proving that the action of the respondents was vitiated because of mala fides, is on the petitioner, that burden cannot be discharged merely by asserting that the action of the respondents was mala fide. The petitioner has to state in his affidavit facts from which the inference that the action of the respondents was actuated by oblique motive is to be drawn. The petitioner has to state in his affidavit facts from which the inference that the action of the respondents was actuated by oblique motive is to be drawn. Case of C. S. Rowjee, AIR 1964 SC 962 ) which was cited by the petitioner, does not support the submission that once it is alleged that impugned action was actuated by mala fide and the allegation is not controverted by the person concerned. the court is bound to accept that the action was actuated by oblique motives. In paragraph 20 of the judgment in C. S. Rowjee's case, (supra) Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court observed thus: "It is, no doubt, true that allegations of mala fide, and of improper motives on the part of those in power are frequently made and their frequency has increased in recent times. It is also somewhat unfortunate that allegations of this nature which have no foundation in fact, are made in several of the cases which have come up before this and other courts and it is found that they have been made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of it at least might stick. Consequently it has become the duty of the Court to scrutinise these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them in cases where they have no foundation in fact. In this task which is thus cast on the courts it would conduce to a more satisfactory disposal and consideration of them, if those against whom allegations are made came forward to place before the Court either their denials or their version of the matter, so that the Court may be in a position to judge as to whether the onus that lies upon those who make allegations of mala fide on the part of authorities of the status of those with which this appeal is concerned, have discharged their burden of proving it. in the absence of such affidavits or of materials placed before the Court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. in the absence of such affidavits or of materials placed before the Court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. This is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves in the present case." Proceeding further the learned Judge in paragraph 22 of the judgment observed thus: "The next question is as regards the inference to be drawn from these facts which in the absence of their denial have to be taken as true. It is here that we have felt the greatest uneasiness, because if the facts which serve as the foundation for the plea of mala fides are made out, the only question would be whether the inference of mala fides on thr. part of the Chief Minister would be a reasonable one to draw. It is at this point that we are faced with the necessity of having to proceed without there being any effective answer to the propriety of drawing the inference which the appellants desire. There has been no denial by the Chief Minister nor an affidavit by any person who claims or can claim to know personally about the truth about these allegations ........" Aforementioned observations make it clear that in the absence of the counter affidavit filed by the person against whom the allegations of mala fide has been made, the court is to accept the facts stated in petitioner's affidavit from which the inference of mala fide is sought to be drawn, provided those facts were such which could be replied to only by that person, and then to proceed to decide whether or not mala fides could be inferred. This case therefore. does not bear out submission made by petitioner's counsel. We have, therefore, to scrutinise the facts stated by the petitioner and to consider whether they are such as would lead to an inference that action of Sri Mamraj Singh was actuated by oblique motive. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of the petition it had been clearly stated that the petitioner was the President of the District Union of the IV class employees and in that connection he had staged hunger strike before Mamraj Singh. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of the petition it had been clearly stated that the petitioner was the President of the District Union of the IV class employees and in that connection he had staged hunger strike before Mamraj Singh. Even though Sri Mamraj Singh conceded the demands of the employees and agreed that he would not take revengeful action, yet he nurtured ill-will against the petitioner. He was on the look out and was trying to find some opportunity to punish the petitioner. Accordingly, he made an inspection and made a report (Annexure 1 to the petition) on 20-3-1975. He contended that these facts having not been denied by Sri Mamraj Singh should be accepted as correct and they fully make out case of mala fides. 20. We are unable to accept this submission. A perusal of the allegations contained in aforementioned paragraphs shows that petitioner's assertion that Sri Mamraj Singh bore ill-will against him and was in the look out to find some reason to punish him is based only on two objective facts viz. that the petitioner who was the President of the Union of 4th class employees of District Varanasi had resorted to hunger strike and that Mamraj Singh had carried out an inspection and written a report against him on 20-3-1975. In our opinion, neither facts relied upon by the petitioner is such on which an inference that Sri Mamraj Singh while making the impugned order was actuated by oblique motive or by mala fide can be drawn. It may be that as the petitioner had gone on hunger strike, Sri Mamraj Singh did not like his action and was for that reason not happy with him. Merely because Sri Mamraj Singh was not happy with the petitioner it does not mean that in terminating petitioner's service, he was actuated by mala fide or that he did so for oblique motive. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the petitioner's service was terminated in order to victimise him for having gone on hunger strike. Merely because Sri Mamraj Singh was not happy with the petitioner it does not mean that in terminating petitioner's service, he was actuated by mala fide or that he did so for oblique motive. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the petitioner's service was terminated in order to victimise him for having gone on hunger strike. Instead, the inspection note prepared by Sri Mamraj Singh and the report submitted by the Consolidation Officer show that considering the manner in which the petitioner had been acting vis-a-vi9 other employees and was doing his work, the respondent thought that it was not in public interest to retain him in service Whenever service of a temporary Government. servant is sought to be terminated (because of misconduct or inefficiency, it would always be that the officer terminating his service is not pleased with the Government servant, but merely because the officer terminating the service of the Government servant was not happy with him. it does not mean that he was actuated by mala fide. We are, therefore, of opinion that the objective facts stated by the petitioner are not such which can reasonably lead to an inference that while terminating petitioner's service Sri Mamraj Singh was either actuated by mala fide or by oblique motive. 21. In the result, we find no force in any of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed.