JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a reference made by Shir Banwari Lal, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision filed by Ram Milan Singh and another against the order dated October 20, 1973 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad, in case No. 134/96/90 under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The plaintiff-revisionists had filed a declaratory suit which was decreed in terms of compromise on June 17, 1973. On July 24, 1973, the defendant-opposite party Sheo Dutt Singh filed an application, alleging that in the original plaint only one plot was mentioned and that the compromise was also for one plot only, but by fraud and forgery, a decree was obtained in respect of three plots. The trial court by the impugned order has observed that in the copy of the plaint filed by the applicant only 1 plot No. 268 was mentioned but in the copy of the plaint in the court three plots were mentioned. The court, therefore, decided to call the copies of the plaint as served to the Gaon Sabha and the State of U.P. This order has been challenged in the present revision. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionists has pleaded that the trial court has materially erred in reopening the case, which had already been decided by the court on the basis of duly identified and verified compromise of the parties. The learned counsel for the revisionists as also cited by decision in Hukam Chand and another v. Sukhbir and another, 1968 R.D. 15 in which a learned Member of this Court has held that if a compromise filed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 is challenged on the ground of fraud, the remedy lies only by a regular suit to set the proceeding aside. So far as Order XXIII, Rule 3 is concerned all that is to be seen is that the agreement is not unlawful even though it may be voidable and challengeable in independent proceedings filed in respect of it. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has on the other hand argued that if fraud is committed upon the court itself. It is the duty as well as the power of that court to set aside the decree obtained fraudulently. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has on the other hand argued that if fraud is committed upon the court itself. It is the duty as well as the power of that court to set aside the decree obtained fraudulently. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred to 3 decisions. The first is Kauleshwar v. Ajodya, 1967 R.D. 274 in which A.N. Sapru and S.S. Zaheer have observed as follows- "The definition between fraud upon a private party and upon a court is well recognized. In this case, the fraud consisted in the fact that though two or the plaintiffs had not put their thumb-impressions their impressions were forged and the suit was filed and pursued without their knowledge. The acts alleged as amounting to fraud are acts of the use of fraud against the plaintiffs whose thumb-impressions were forged and the other plaintiffs who had no knowledge of the proceedings. The question of jurisdiction must therefore, be considered holding that the alleged fraud was fraud against a private party. The view of the Board is fairly well established that where fraud is committed upon the court itself the court may use its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. to set aside a previous decree on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently." The second decision is Bindeshwar Prasad Chaudhary v. Debendra Prasad, AIR 1958 Pat. 618 in which a learned Bench of Patna High Court has held that where fraud is practised on the court in obtaining an order recording the compromise, the Court is perfectly justified in setting aside the same under its inherent powers. The third decision is Baidya Nath Dubey v. Deo Nandan Singh, 1968 (8) S.C. Decisions 275 in which a learned Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down the following principle- "It cannot be doubted that a court has inherent powers to recall orders obtained by practising fraud on it, at the instance of a party to the proceedings. There is no question of the Court being functus officio because the Court retains the jurisdiction to recall such orders. There is no question of the Court being functus officio because the Court retains the jurisdiction to recall such orders. The learned counsel referred to us the following observations made by Shah, J. in the dissenting judgment in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 S.C. 527 ." "Inherent jurisdiction of the court to make orders ex deotio justibiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be exercised so as to nullify with a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive." But the majority in that case seems to have held otherwise for Raghubar Daya, J. observed- "The section (Section 151) itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. Further when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. But here no question of nullifying any provisions of the Code arises. Order XXI, Rule 78 on which reliance was placed is not bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, in cases like the present where it is alleged that orders have been obtained by fraud practised on the Court. It is not a case of any irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. It has not been shown which other express provision of the Code would be nullified if the impugned orders are recalled by the court under Section 151." 6. It is not a case of any irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. It has not been shown which other express provision of the Code would be nullified if the impugned orders are recalled by the court under Section 151." 6. In the present case, the allegation of the opposite party is that a fraud has been committed upon the court itself and not merely on a private party in as much as in the original plaint as well as in the compromise only one plot was mentioned but subsequently by fraud two more plots have been added in the plaint and the compromise and thus a decree in respect of three plots was fraudulently obtained. In support of the allegation, the opposite party had filed a copy of the plaint as received by him. The decision of the Supreme Court as well as other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party do not leave any scope for obtaining that where the fraud is played upon the court itself, it is the duty as well as the jurisdiction of that court to nullify a decree obtained by fraud. The trial court has rightly decided to call for the copies of the plaint as served upon the Gaon Sabha and the U.P. State to find out whether or not fraud has been practised upon the court. The trial court has thus acted in the interest of justice and has not committed any illegality or irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. The present revision has no sub-stance. 7. Agreeing with the recommendation of the learned Additional Commissioner, I hereby dismiss the revision with costs.