R. M. SAHAI, J. The Chief Judicial Magistrate. Agra, having received information by a report dated 21st September, 1974, that the applicant has written a book by which he was intentionally dissiminating such matter as is punishable under Section 153-A and Section 256-A Cr. P. C. and being of the opinion that there is sufficient ground, proceeded to take action under Section 108/111 Cr. P. C. The applicant being present in court the notice dated on 1st October, 1974, was read and explained to him as contemplated under Section 112 Cr. P. C. He was required to show cause as to why he should not execute a bond of Rs. 100/- with two sureties of like amounts for good behavior for a period of one year. It is not clear what happened thereafter for a period of nearly 11 months although on 10th October, 1974, was fixed for prosecution evidence. The case appears to have been transferred to the Judicial Magistrate and he recorded the statement of the applicant under Section 251-A Cr. P. C. on 15th August, 1975. It is clear from his order that no prosecution evidence was recorded till then. An application was filed on 22nd August, 1975, on behalf of the applicant that the proceedings under Section 108 Cr. P. C. be dropped. This application was rejected on 31st August, 1975, on two grounds, firstly that the enquiry started with the recording of the plea of opposite party and since this was done on 15th August, 1975, the period of six months prescribed under Section 116 (6) had not expired. Secondly he was of the opinion that even if it be held that inquiry commenced with the giving of notice under Section 111/112 Cr. P. C. there existed special reasons for not terminating the inquiry. The applicant filed an application under Section 116 (7) against the direction given by the Magistrate for the continuance of the proceedings under Section 116 (6) before the Sessions Judge, Agra for vacation of such direction. The application has been rejected on 24th January, 1976, on the ground that the provision is directory and not mandatory. The Sessions Judge was further of the opinion that the Judicial Magistrate had given a detailed order for not dropping the proceedings as such there was no reason to set aside that order. The application has been rejected on 24th January, 1976, on the ground that the provision is directory and not mandatory. The Sessions Judge was further of the opinion that the Judicial Magistrate had given a detailed order for not dropping the proceedings as such there was no reason to set aside that order. Aggrieved against the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and Sessions Judge, Agra applicant has invoked inherent powers of this court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. Mr. Tejpal has raised a number of arguments in support of his application. It has been urged by him that proceedings are time barred as statutory period of six months has elapsed as contemplated under Section 116 (6)Cr. P. C. He has further submitted that the applicant stands discharged in criminal proceedings under Sections 153-A/295-A/505 of I. P. C. and 43 D. I. R. Lastly it has been submitted by him that the applicant is aged 83 years. The prosecution did not obtain sanction of the State Government or competent authority and the Chief Judicial Magistrate by an order dated on 5th January, 1976, (Annexure R. A.) consigned the file to the Record Room. In the circumstances the present proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court. In order to decide the first question it is necessary to quote Section 116 f6) Cr. P. C. It reads as under : " 116 (6): The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs ; A reading of this sub-section indicates that its essential ingredients are : (a) An inquiry should be commenced. (b) It should be completed within six months. (c) The Magistrate can for special reasons to be recorded by him extend the period of inquiry. (d) If the inquiry is not completed within six months the proceedings under Chapter VIII shall stand terminated. Section 108 is one of sections empowering a Magistrate to take preventive action for a period not exceeding one year. The power is to be exercised on sufficient ground and in the manner provided in Sections 111 to 115. (d) If the inquiry is not completed within six months the proceedings under Chapter VIII shall stand terminated. Section 108 is one of sections empowering a Magistrate to take preventive action for a period not exceeding one year. The power is to be exercised on sufficient ground and in the manner provided in Sections 111 to 115. Section 111 requires that if the Magistrate deems necessary to require any person to show cause he shall make an order in writing. Section 112 lays down that if the person is present in the court notice shall be read and explained to him. Section 116 provides that when an order under Section 111 has been read or explained under Sections 112 or 113 Cr. P. C. the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which such action has been taken. The scope of the inquiry under Section 116 is, therefore, to inquire the truth of information which prompted action under Section 108. The jnquiry therefore starts when the Magistrate decided to pass anorder under Section 111 and with that end in view issues show cause notice and reads or explains the notice as required under Section 112 to a person or who is brought before him in compliance with summon or warrant issued under Section 118. The view taken by the Judicial Magistrate that inquiry as contemplated under Section 116 (6) starts only after recording of the statement of opposite party does not appear to be correct. The inquiry against the applicant for the reasons stated hereinbefore commenced on 1st October, 1974, when notice under Section 108 was read and explained to the applicant as required under Section 111/112 Cr. P. C. The application for dropping the proceedings was made on 22nd October, 1975, i. e. , after expiry of one year from the commencement of proceedings. It has been found by the Magistrate that the first step taken was on 15th August, 1975 and the fault for delay lay on the prosecution. He however chose to exercise his powers in favour of continuing proceedings. To quote his own words : " I am of the opinion that in this case special reasons exist for not terminating the inquiry on expiry of six months. This is a case which generated a lot of heat and tension. He however chose to exercise his powers in favour of continuing proceedings. To quote his own words : " I am of the opinion that in this case special reasons exist for not terminating the inquiry on expiry of six months. This is a case which generated a lot of heat and tension. Some of the adjournments were because of the absence of the opposite party and because the court was on leave. " The question whether reasons mentioned by the Magistrate can be said to be special reasons is an aspect which may need consideration in a proper case. But much more important issue that arises in this case is whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass any order or record special reasons after the expiry of six months from the commencement of inquiry. In other words does the law mandate the Magistrate to exercise the power of extending the period of inquiry as contemplated in the Section 116 (6) within six months from the commencement of inquiry or even after it. Section 116 (1) to (5) Cr. P. C. correspond to old Section 117 Cr. P. C. But 116 (6) and (7) are new. The principle to be borne in mind while interpreting a penal provision has been described by Pollock, C. J. in Attorney General v. Sillems ( (1864)2 H. S. C. C. 431, 33 L. J. Ex. 92 (110 ).) thus : " That our institutions were never more safe than at the present moment, but we cannot lose any of the grounds of our secularity, no calamity would be greater than to introduce lax or elastic interpretation of a criminal statute to serve a special but a temporary purpose. " The Legislature has empowered the Magistrate to take action against a person for maintaining peace and for good behaviour. But the action is subject to check and balance of information and sufficient reason. Speedy action is the sine qua non of proceedings under Chapter VIII. They are inroads on individual liberty. The hazard of keeping a citizen exposed to harassment by keeping the inquiry pending for a long time has been curbed by the Legislature. The law contemplates an automatic termination of the proceedings. The Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction once the inquiry commenced is not completed within six months. They are inroads on individual liberty. The hazard of keeping a citizen exposed to harassment by keeping the inquiry pending for a long time has been curbed by the Legislature. The law contemplates an automatic termination of the proceedings. The Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction once the inquiry commenced is not completed within six months. The power to extend the period beyond six months has to be read along with the expression on the expiry of the said period shall stand terminated. The import of these words is clear that once the period of six months has expired the proceedings terminate by operation of law. It does not contemplate any order from the Magistrate. The only order contemplated is of extension and not termination. But the jurisdiction to extend can be exercised, only, so long the proceedings are alive and not after they terminate. The order dated on 21st October, 1975, extending the period of inquiry beyond six months for the reasons stated hereinbefore was without jurisdiction. The Sessions Judge rejected the application on the ground that the provision is directory and not mandatory. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory has to be judged from the language of the statute. Where law lays down performance of an act or exercise of power in a particular manner and further provides the consequence for non-performance the provision cannot be but mandatory. The language of Section 116 (6) leaves no room for doubt that the provision is mandatory. The inquiry is required to be completed within six months. The incomplete inquiry can be continued only if the Magistrate passes an order extending the period. If no order is passed then the consequence is provided in clear and unambiguous terms. It cannot in the circumstances be held that the provision is directory. Even otherwise if the provision is held directory it shall frustrate the entire purpose for which this section was enacted. The applicant in this case was required to furnish a bond for keeping good behaviour for one year and the proceeding under Section 251 Cr. P. C. was started after ten months. If the provision of Section 116 (6) is held to be directory the prosecution can keep the inquiry pending for an indefinite period. The entire purpose of putting a limitation of six months shall be defeated. P. C. was started after ten months. If the provision of Section 116 (6) is held to be directory the prosecution can keep the inquiry pending for an indefinite period. The entire purpose of putting a limitation of six months shall be defeated. As the order dated on 21st October, 1975, is held to be without jurisdiction the inquiry which commenced by the notice dated 1st October, 1974, cannot proceed. In view of the fact that the applicants first contention has prevailed it is not necessary to consider the other two submissions raised on his behalf. For the reasons stated above this application is allowed. The orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated on 1st October, 1974 and by the Sessions Judge dated 24th January, 1976, are quashed. The proceedings under Section 108 Cr. P. C. against the applicant which were started by the notice dated 1st October, 1974, are dropped. Application allowed. .