S. K. KAUL, J. These two revisions arise out of same transaction and are directed against same judgment. There were heard together and shall be disposed of by one judgment. Both these revisionists have come up to this Court challenging the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge who had dismissed their appeals and had confirmed their sentence and conviction awarded to them by the Magistrate who had sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each or in default to undergo 15 days R. I. under section 447 I. P. C. It is not disputed in this case that these two revisionists are employees in the Ordnance Clothing Factory at Shahjahanpur. There is a workers Union named as Pratiraksha Karmchari Union, Ordnance Clothing Factory, Shahjahanpur, which was registered under the Indian Trade Union Act, 1926. The revisionist Sridhar Gupta is General Secretary of the aforesaid Union. On 16th July, 1970, Sridhar Gupta served a notice on General Manager, Ordnance Clothing Factory, Shahjahanpur, as follows :- " Subject-HUNGER STRIKE. Respected Sir, In pursuance of the decision of our Executive Committee of our Union, I am directed to inform you that as a protest against wrongful removal from ser vice of our Vice-President Sri Rasool Bux, the Union Official will launch 48 hours hunger strike infront of the Gate w. e. 4-8-1970 from 4. 30p. m. Submitted for your information and be treated as notice also. Thanking you. Yours faithfully, Sd. Sridhar Gupta (General Secretary ). " The prosecution story now reads in this way that Sri S. R. Kalia, Deputy Manager, Ordnance Clothing Factory, Shahjahanpur, informed the General Secretary on 3rd August, 1970, that per-mission for launching hunger strike in front of the factory gate in the com-pound of the employees club and holding meetings with the use of the loud speaker in the same connection would not be granted. Copies of this letter were sent to the district authorities as well. It appears that the Union workers did not pay any heed and, as such, a tent was pitched on 4th August, 1970, inside the factory premises. A meeting was organised at 4 p. m. and thereafter not only by means of loud speakers speeches were delivered against the conduct of the higher authorities of the aforesaid factory, but Sridhar, Gupta also sat on hunger strike as proposed. A meeting was organised at 4 p. m. and thereafter not only by means of loud speakers speeches were delivered against the conduct of the higher authorities of the aforesaid factory, but Sridhar, Gupta also sat on hunger strike as proposed. On 4th August Sri Malhotra, Supervisor a grade gave confidential report to Sri Kalia drawing his attention to the aforesaid acts being done by the office bearers of the Union and other employees and thereupon Sri Kalia drafted a notice on 4th August, 1970, Ext. Ka-4 which was addressed to the General Secretary, namely, Sridhar Gupta. By means of this letter, the attention of the General Secretary was drawn to the fact that the permission had not been accorded for the acts being committed and that their occupation was not only unauthorised but they were directed to vacate the possession which they had unauthorisedly taken. This letter, according to the prosecution, was handed over to Bahu Ram for delivery, but the same was refused by the General Secretary. On 5th August, 1970, another letter on similar lines had been drafted by Sri Kalia and this was handed over to Madho Singh for delivery, but once again this letter was not received. On the basis of the report sent by Sri Kalia, the head constable Rajpal Singh posted at P. S. Sadar Bazar scribed F. I. R. Ext. Ka-6 on the basis of Exts. Ka-2, Ka-4 and Ka-5 (Ka-5 being the letter dated 5th August, 1970 ). The case was investigated by Sub-Inspector Hari Nandan Singh. He went to the spot, prepared a site-plan and after completing investigation in the usual manner, he submitted a charge-sheet on the basis of which the present two revisionists along with other members were asked to stand their trial under section 447 I. P. C. I am concerned with the case of other persons who were initially charge-sheeted because they were acquitted by the Magistrate and no appeal against their acquittal was preferred. The defence of Sridhar Gupta was that he went on hunger-strike which was a legitimate object of the Union as a protest for the illegal termination of services of the Vice-President of the Union. He denied other allegations of the prosecution and alleged false implication on account of enmity, primarily on account of the fact that he was an office bearer of the Union. He denied other allegations of the prosecution and alleged false implication on account of enmity, primarily on account of the fact that he was an office bearer of the Union. Maya Prakash admitted that he addressed the meeting, but asserted that no offence was committed by him and he too was implicated as he used to take active part in the Union activities. He denied other allegations. The Magistrate concerned, on an appraisement of the evidence, found that the charge was fully made out as against these two revisionists and, as such, he sentenced and convicted them as above. Both these accused-revisionists went up in appeal, but remained unsuceessful and it is in this manner that the two revisions were preferred to this Court. I have heard learned counsel for the revisionists at length. In my view, both these revisions should be allowed. Before dealing with the facts of the case, I would like to mention that according to section 15 (d) of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, the objects on which general funds could be spent were as follows : " The general funds of a registered Trade Union shall not be spent on any other objects than the following, namely- (d) the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of Trade Union or any member thereof ;" Section 441 I. P. C. after amendment in this State, the amendment being Criminal Laws (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1961 (XXXI of 1961) reads as follows :- " 441. Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of an-other with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having unlawfully entered into or upon such property unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, or, having entered into or upon such property, whether before or after the coming into forcre of the Criminal Laws (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1961, with the intention of taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property fails to withdraw from such property, or its possession, or use when called upon to do so by i that another person by notice in writing, duly served upon him, by the date specified in the notice, is said to commit criminal trespass. " The prosecution story, so far as the facts are concerned, is proved to this extent that a notice Ext. Ka-1 dated 16th July, 1970, noted above was served by the General Secretary of the Union on the General Manager and the purpose of this notice was that as a protest against wrongful removal from service of the Vice-President, Sri Rasool Bux, the Union officials were to go on hunger strike for 48 hours with effect from 4th of August, 1970, from 4. 30 p. m. It is also proved that Sridhar Gupta went on hunger strike for 48 hours and during this period inflammatory speeches were delivered by some persons including Maya Prakash, the other revisionist, the trend of which was against the high-handedness of high officers of the afore-said factory. The question arises whether this conduct of the two revisionists would attract provisions of sections 441/447 I. P. C. or not. So far as the first part of section 441 noted above is concerned, it is essential that before a person is convicted of the offence under section 447, the prosecution should prove the dominant intention of the person who commits the offence. It is immaterial whether he had or could have the knowledge that his conduct or action might result in annoyance or intimidation. Now, in this case the dominant intention was merely to protest and to launch a token hunger strike for 48 hours. In this connection, reference may be made to a Supreme Court ruling reported in A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 160 (Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Ali India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation and another ). In that case some workmen were dismissed wrong-fully by the bank and they had claimed reinstatement and payment of wages. The reference on two issues had a chequered career. Ultimately, the employees were dismissed and one of the grounds taken on behalf of the Punjab National Bank was that the employees being guilty under sections 441/447 I P. C. , they could not claim reinstatement. It was observed that page 176 in paragraph 47 by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that : " Does not conduct of the strikers as found by the appellate tribunal constitute criminal trespass under S. 441 of the Indian Penal Code ? That is the next point which calls for decision. It was observed that page 176 in paragraph 47 by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that : " Does not conduct of the strikers as found by the appellate tribunal constitute criminal trespass under S. 441 of the Indian Penal Code ? That is the next point which calls for decision. It is argued that the conduct of the employees amounts to criminal trespass which is an offence and as such those who committed criminal trespass would not be entitled to reinstatement. According to the Bank the employees committed criminal trespass inasmuch as they either entered unlawfully or having lawfully entered continue to remain their unlawfully with intent thereby to insult or annoy their superior officers. It would be noticed that there are two essential ingredients which must be established before criminal trespass can be proved against the employees. Even if we assume that the employees entry in the premises was unlawful or that their continuance in the premises became unlawful, it is difficult to appreciate the argument that the said entry was made with intent to insult or annoy the superior officers. The sole intention of the strikers obviously was to put pressure on the Bank to concede their demands. Even if the strikers might have known that the strike may annoy or insult the Banks officers it is difficult to hold that such knowledge would necessarily lead to the inference of the requisite intention. In every case where the impugned entry causes annoyance or insult it cannot be said to be actuated by the intention to cause the said result. The distinction between knowledge and intention is quite clear and that distinction must be borne in mind in deciding whether or not in the present case the strikers were actuated by the requisite intention. The said intention has always to be gathered from the circumstances of the case and it may be that the necessary or inevitable consequence of the impugned act may be one relevant circumstance. But it is possible to accede to the argument that the likely consequence of the act and its possible knowledge must necessarily import a corresponding intention. We think it is unnecessary to elaborate this point ; we would only like to add that the decision of the Patna High Court in T. H. Bird v. King Emperor (I. L. R. 13 Patna 268 = A. I. R. 1934 Pat. We think it is unnecessary to elaborate this point ; we would only like to add that the decision of the Patna High Court in T. H. Bird v. King Emperor (I. L. R. 13 Patna 268 = A. I. R. 1934 Pat. 158.) on which reliance was placed by the Bank is wholly in-consistent with the contention raised by it. Thus our conclusion is that the Bank has failed to prove that the conduct of the strikers as found by the appellate tribunal amounted to criminal trespass under S. 441 of the Code. " There is another case of the Supreme Court reported in Smt. Mathri and others v. The State of Punjab (1964 A. I. R. 986 (S. C.), wherein interpretation regarding section 441 was called for. The Supreme Court observed : " The proposition that every person intends the natural consequences of the act is often a convenient and helpful rule to ascertain the intention of persons when doing a particular act. It is wrong however to accept this proposition as a binding rule which must prevail on all occasions in all circumstances The ultimate question for decision being whether an act was done with a particular intention all the circumstances including the natural consequences of the action have to be taken into consideration. It is legitimate to think also that when S. 441 Penal Code speaks of entering on property, with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of the property it speaks of the main intention in the action and not any subsidiary intention that may also be present. It is legitimate to think also that when S. 441 Penal Code speaks of entering on property, with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of the property it speaks of the main intention in the action and not any subsidiary intention that may also be present. In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry ; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering ; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its ntural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult are annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. Thus where certain persons were armed with warrants of execution for delivery of possession though the date for execution of the warrants had expired, it might be that they knew that annoyance would result when they went on the land for taking possession ; still it was reasonable to think that the intention which prompted and dominated their action was to execute the warrants. Further the persons could not be reasonably expected to know that the warrants had ceased to be executable in law. Taking the circumstances into consideration it was proper to hold that criminal trespass was not committed or apprehended from the acts of such persons " It is, therefore, clear that so far as the first part of section 441 I. P. C. is concerned, the two accused-revisionists cannot be said to have committed any offence because the dominant intention of these two persons was merely to draw the attention of the higher authorities of the factory against dismissal of Rasool Bux which, according to them, was a wrongful one. They had given ample notice to the authorities and that would go to show that they considered this action to be a legitimate object of the trade union activities. The question arises whether second part of section 441 I. P. C. which was specifically brought on the statute as an amendment in this State, applies in the case of the two revisionists or not. I find that apart from the statements of Sri Kalia P. W. l and Sri Malhotra P. W. 2, there is a notice Ext. 4 dated 4tk August, 1970, which clearly goes to show that after the hunger strike commenced and the meeting was on, this notice was drafted by Kalia directing the General Secretary to remove unauthorized occupation. The second part of section 411 I. P. C. obviously would have been attracted if the prosecution had been able to prove that the notices Ext. Ka-4 and Ext. Ka-5 dated 4th and 5th August, 1970, respectively were duly served upon Sridhar Gupta, General Secretary, to whom these were addressed. Now, both Sri Kalia and Sri Malhotra did not serve the notice. On the other hand, Sri Malhotra stated that Ext. Ka-4 was handed over to one Babu Ram, gate keeper, for service, while Ext. Ka-5 was handed over to one Madho Singh for service. Their statement, no doubt, is that this notice was not accepted, but that statement would be hearsay because it is the person who is deputed to effect the service, who should have been examined in proof of the fact that these two notices, were served upon the General Secretary who is Sridhar Gupta. The provisions of section 441 Part II I. P. C. clearly require that there should not only be a notice in writing at the time when the unauthorised act was being done, but such a notice bas also to be served upon the trespasser by the date specified in the notice. It may be that both these persons Madho Singh and Babu Ram were cited in the charge-sheet, but they were not examined for reasons best known 1o the prosecution. I, therefore, find that although a notice dated 4th August, 1970 and another notice dated 5th August, 1970, were drafted by Sri Kalia, but the evidence is lacking whether such a notice was duly delivered to the General Secretary to whom these notices addressed. I, therefore, find that although a notice dated 4th August, 1970 and another notice dated 5th August, 1970, were drafted by Sri Kalia, but the evidence is lacking whether such a notice was duly delivered to the General Secretary to whom these notices addressed. It was for the prosecution to prove due service and once that evidenc is lacking in this case, it cannot be urged that secone part of section 441 I. P. C. would be attracted. As a result, I am of this view that none of these revisionists can be said to have committed an offence punishable under sec. 447 I. P. C. I would allow the revisions, set aside the sentence and conviction awarded to these two revisionists and acquit them of the charge with which they were asked to stand their trial. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded. .