JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - Second Appeal No. 106 of 1969-70 has been filed by Hazari Lal, Durga Prasad and Paragi Lal, defendants, against the judgment and order of the Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, dated May 21, 1970 in appeal No. 31 of 1968-69 upholding the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mau, district Jhansi, in suit No. 6 of 1967-68 under section 176 of the U.P.A.Z. and L.R. Act. This appeal is with regard to the preliminary decree. 2. Second appeal No. 101 of 1972-73 has also been filed by Hazari Lal, Durga Prasad and Paragi Lal against the judgment and decree dated February 1, 1973 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, in appeal No. 107 of 1970 confirming the judgment and decree dated November 17, 1970 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mau-Garotha, district Jhansi, in case No. 3. This appeal is with regard to the final decree in the above suit. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. Smt. Kararawali, respondent No. 1, had filed a suit for the revision of holding, claiming to be a co-sirdar of the land in suit to the extent of share. The defendant-appellants Hazari Lal Durga Prasad and Pragi Lal, contested the suit. They have pleaded that Smt. Kararawali was the widow of their cousin, Ramola deceased, but had lost her rights in the land in suit on account of remarriage with one Gola resident of village Toria, district Tikamgarh, Madhya Pradesh, 14/15 years back. The courts below have decreed the suit in favour of Smt. Kararawali. 4. The first question arising in this case is whether or not Smt. Kararawali has remarried. The trial court has recorded a finding that Smt. Karawali has not remarried and that even if she had remarried it will not affect the present case, but the learned Additional Commissioner, on the other hand, held that Smt. Kararawali has remarried and she has lost her rights and title over the property, but as the defendants allowed her to remain in possession even after she lost her rights and title over the property she acquired rights by prescription. After a perusal of the record I hold that the learned Additional Commissioner has correctly recorded the finding that Smt. Kararawali has in fact remarried and lost her rights by remarriage. After a perusal of the record I hold that the learned Additional Commissioner has correctly recorded the finding that Smt. Kararawali has in fact remarried and lost her rights by remarriage. The trial court has not in considered the entire evidence properly in recording the perverse finding that Smt. Karawali had not remarried. The defendant-appellants had produced reliable oral evidence consisting of Harari, D.1. Udai, D.W. 2, Ram Dayal D.W. 3 and Laxman, D.W. 4 regarding the fact of remarriage of Smt. Kararawali. Apart from this overwhelming oral evidence, there is extract of Kutumb register of village Toria district Tikamgarh which records Smt. Kararawali as wife of Gola. Ram Dayal, D.W. 3, is not only a resident of village Toria in which the land in dispute is situated, he is also a Panch of the Biradari and he has given complete details of the ceremonies observed at the time of remarriage of Smt. Kararawali. As against this Smt. Kararawal did not produce any oral evidence except herself, nor did she produce any extract from the Kutumb register of the Village Taktoli where her first husband Ramola lived, to show that she was still living in the same village. Thus, the learned Additional Commissioner's finding about remarriage of Smt. Kararawali must be upheld. 5. The next question arising in this case is whether Smt. Karawali could retain rights of co-tenancy even after remarriage or could acquire any rights of co-tenancy by prescription under Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The learned Additional Commissioner has held that through Smt. Kararawali remarried, she was allowed to remain in possession over the share held by her husband and therefore she acquired rights and title by way of prescription over that portion. This finding of the learned Additional Commissioner is against the evidence on record and is also untenable in law. It is a well settled principle of law that the burden of proving his claim lies squarely on the plaintiff. It is also will settled that if a person wants to claim acquisition of rights by prescription the burden of proving his possession is entirely on his. Now, the only evidence Smt. Kararawali could produce about her cultivatory possession of the land is her own statement. She could not find even one witness to corroborate her statement. It is also will settled that if a person wants to claim acquisition of rights by prescription the burden of proving his possession is entirely on his. Now, the only evidence Smt. Kararawali could produce about her cultivatory possession of the land is her own statement. She could not find even one witness to corroborate her statement. She did not produce any rent receipts or receipts for payment of irrigation dues which are also good evidence of possession. In her cross-examination she admits that she does not know the numbers of the plots in disputes. She say that this year she had given the plots for cultivation on Batai (crop-sharing basis) but does not know the name of the person to whom she had given the land for cultivation. Thus, the uncorroborated testimony of Smt. Kararawali has little value is against that, the defendant-appellants had produced as many as 4 witnesses who deposed about their cultivatory possession over the land. None of these of these witnesses have been in any way contradicted or discredited. 6. The learned counsel for both sides have argued at length the question whether or not co-tenancy con be created by adverse possession, estoppel or acquiescence. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited as number of decisions to the effect that co-tenancy can be created by these means. I need not go into this question as in my opinion the question does not arise at all. It has to be seen whether the basic ingredients of co-tenant exist in the present case. The basic ingredients of co-tenancy are - (1) a joint inheritance of tenancy rights or acquisition of tenancy jointly,(2) jointly cultivatory possession and (3) joint liability for payment of rent or other Government dues. Where none of the above ingredients exists, the question of creation of joint co-tenancy by acquiescence or estoppel or prescription does not arise. In the present case, it has been established that there was joint inheritance of the tenancy. Smt. Kararawali, however, lost these rights on account of her remarriage. After the remarriage. there is nothing to show that she acquired co-tenancy of the land in suit jointly with the defendant-appellants. As regards joint cultivatory possession, there is no evidence at all that Smt. Kararawali has cultivatory possession of the land in suit in any manner whatsoever. There is no oral evidence, and no rent receipts in her favour. After the remarriage. there is nothing to show that she acquired co-tenancy of the land in suit jointly with the defendant-appellants. As regards joint cultivatory possession, there is no evidence at all that Smt. Kararawali has cultivatory possession of the land in suit in any manner whatsoever. There is no oral evidence, and no rent receipts in her favour. She did not file even an extract from the Khasra. It is true that in the Khatauni the name of Smt. Kararawali widow of Ramola resident of the village is recorded along with the names of the defendant-appellants as co-tenure-holder. The fact, however, that she is recorded as widow of Ramola means that this entry continues from before he remarriage and does not mean that her rights would continue after remarriage or that her possession had continued after her re-marriage. We have already seen that Smt. Kararawali has not in any manner discharged the liability of payment of Government dues etc. which is also one of the ingredients of co-tenancy. Thus, none of the ingredients of co-tenancy exists in her favour. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in setting up an entirely new case for the plaintiff-respondent. In her plaint, Smt. Kararawali had nowhere claimed co-tenancy rights by prescription. In her in oral testimony Smt. Kararawali had clearly stated that she had got co-tenancy rights in the land in dispute by inheritance from her late husband Ramola and that as she had not remarried she still continued to enjoy those rights. The learned Additional Commissioner, on the other hand, has given a finding against the plaintiff-respondent on the point of remarriage, but has carved out a new case for her to the effect that she has acquired rights by way of prescription. The learned counsel for the appellant has correctly argued that carving out of a new case for a party by the lower appellate court is untenable in law. 8. The result is that I find that the judgments of both the court below are perverse and erroneous in law. The plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove her claim and her suit deserves to be dismissed. I hereby allow both the appeals and set aside the impugned orders of the courts below in both the preliminary as well as in the final decree. 9. The plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove her claim and her suit deserves to be dismissed. I hereby allow both the appeals and set aside the impugned orders of the courts below in both the preliminary as well as in the final decree. 9. This order will govern both appeal Nos. 106 of 1969-70 and 101 of 1972-73, Jhansi.