JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows: In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners are praying for appropriate writs directed against a resolution of the Dock Labour Board dated the 25th of July, 1974 whereby certain rates of levy were determined and the approval given thereto by the Central Government. 2. The case of the petitioner as made out in the petition is as follows :- (a) The petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7 are private limited companies. incorporated under or within the meaning of the Company's Act 1956. The petitioners Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8 are shareholders and directors of the petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7. The petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7 have at all material times been and still are carrying on business as stevedores and steamer agents, inter alia, at the Port of Calcutta. (b) Calcutta Dock Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as the said Board) is a body corporate constituted under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). Under the said Act, schemes were framed from time to time for regulating the employment of Dock Workers. The Scheme with which we are concerned in the present case is the Calcutta Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) scheme, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the said scheme). Some of the clauses of the said scheme have been set cut in the petition which I shall refer to later. (c) The petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7 have at all material times been and still are duly registered employers within the meaning of and tinder the provisions of the said scheme. The petitioner No.2 who is a Direct or and Secretary of the petitioner No.1 has been and is a member of the said Board for over 10 years. In connection with their business as stevedores and steamer agents, the petitioners have been and are indenting large labour forces from the Board from time to time as and when required by the petitioners. The petitioners have been indenting from the Board workers registered under the said Scheme. The Board bas been supplying to the petitioners' workers from amongst the registered monthly workers and also from the labour Pool of the Board. It is alleged that under the said Scheme the petitioners Nos. The petitioners have been indenting from the Board workers registered under the said Scheme. The Board bas been supplying to the petitioners' workers from amongst the registered monthly workers and also from the labour Pool of the Board. It is alleged that under the said Scheme the petitioners Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7 have been and are required to pay to the Beard both wages and levy in respect of pool labour indented by the said petitioners and supplied by the Board. In connection with the monthly workers indented by the said petitioners and supplied by the Board, the said petitioners have been and are required to pay wages and other emoluments and benefits to the workers direct and only the amounts of the levy to the Board. It was alleged that in connection with the employment of monthly workers in the aforesaid manner, the petitioners have been and are praying very large sums to the Board as levy in terms of the said Scheme. Such amounts of levy are paid by the said petitioners to the Board periodically as and when required by the Board. [His Lordship then referred to clauses (d) to (k) and continued] 3. On behalf of the Board an affidavit has been affirmed, wherein after setting out the object of the said Act and the relevant provisions of the scheme, it was stated, inter alia, as follows:- [His Lordship stated certain facts and continued: ] 4. An affidavit has been affirmed on behalf of the petitioner in reply to the affidavits affirmed on behalf of the respondents. I may refer to some of she allegations made in the reply;- [His Lordship stated the relevant facts and continued] 5. With regard to the new allegations in the Reply it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners should not be allowed to rely on the same. In any event an opportunity was sought for to rely on certain records and papers to deal with some of such allegations in the Reply and to show incorrectness of the same. I allowed the respondents such opportunity pursuant to which they relied on certain documents the originals of which was taken inspection of on behalf of the petitioners, copies whereof were supplied to the petitioners. 6. On behalf of the petitioners the first contention raised by Mr. I allowed the respondents such opportunity pursuant to which they relied on certain documents the originals of which was taken inspection of on behalf of the petitioners, copies whereof were supplied to the petitioners. 6. On behalf of the petitioners the first contention raised by Mr. Deb was that I have no jurisdiction to hear or consider this writ petition and that this writ petition must be adjourned sine die in view of the provisions of Art. 359 (1) of the Constitution of India and the Presidential Order made thereunder on the 8th January. 1976 in respect of Art. 19. He submitted that the impugned resolution has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground, inter alia, that it affects the fundamental right of the petitioners guaranteed by Art. 19 of the Constitution and accordingly" the same is ultra vires. He submitted that in view of the said Presidential Order I have no option but to adjourn this matter sine die because this is a petition for enforcement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19 within the meaning of Art. 359 (1). According to him the question of enforcement of any fundamental right, within the meaning of Article 359 (1) arises. if it involves the consideration of any point regarding the violation of any fundamental right which is the subject matter of any Presidential Order under Art. 359. When the attention of Mr. Deb was drawn by me to Art. 358 and also to the fact that when this Rule was issued. Art. 358 was already in force, he submitted that Art. 358 has no application in the present case because it applies only in respect of a legislation introduced during the emergency (hereinafter referred to as post-emergency legislation) or an executive action taken during an emergency (hereinafter referred to as post-emergency executive action under a post-emergency legislation" He submitted that an executive action taken during the emergency, under a pre-emergency law, as in the present case, is not protected by Art. 358. Accordingly, he submitted that the only Article relevant for the purpose of the present case was Art. 359 (1). He submitted that in any event, whether Art. 358 was attracted or not, having regard to Art. 359 (1) and the Presidential Order made thereunder on the 8th January, 1976, the bearing of this writ petition must be kept in abeyance. Accordingly, he submitted that the only Article relevant for the purpose of the present case was Art. 359 (1). He submitted that in any event, whether Art. 358 was attracted or not, having regard to Art. 359 (1) and the Presidential Order made thereunder on the 8th January, 1976, the bearing of this writ petition must be kept in abeyance. He submitted that the distinction between Articles 358 and 359 (1) was that when Art. 358 applied, the Court may consider the merits of the case, whereas when Art. 359 (1) applied, the Court cannot consider the same at all. In such a case, Mr. Deb submitted, no one can move the Court by way of a writ petition and if the Court has already been moved, the merits of the case cannot be considered, but the proceeding must remain suspended. According to him in the present case the validity of the said resolution has been challenged on the ground that it affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Art. 19. Accordingly, he submitted that this writ petition is for enforcement of fundamental rights of the petitioners and accordingly the same remain suspended in toto and Court cannot hear the matter at all. In support of his contentions Mr. Deb relied upon the following decisions: (1) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh reported in AIR 1967 SC 1170 (Para 5), (2) Shri Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR (1974) SC 366 (Para 94), (3) Makhen Singh Tarsikka v State of Punjab reported in AIR (1964) SC 381 and (4) Jagadish Ch. Agarwal v. Union of India reported in AIR 1976 Cal 17 . 7. The learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, submitted that the Dock Labour Board was "Local or other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and in this connection he placed before me the various provisions of the said Scheme and two decisions of the Supreme Court. He also submitted that accordingly the impugned resolution of the Board was an executive action within the meaning of Art. 358 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the language of Art. 358 was clear and it applied to all executive actions irrespective of the question whether it was under a post-emergency on a pre-emergency law. He also submitted that accordingly the impugned resolution of the Board was an executive action within the meaning of Art. 358 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the language of Art. 358 was clear and it applied to all executive actions irrespective of the question whether it was under a post-emergency on a pre-emergency law. Accordingly, he submitted that if a challenge under Article 19 against such an executive action was barred by Article 358, the question of enforcement of the said fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 359 cannot arise and accordingly there is no question of adjournment of this proceeding. In support of his contentions he relied on the following decisions (5) Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, reponed in AIR (1967) SC 1857, (6) Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardor Singh, reported in AIR (1975) SC 1331, (7) Union of India v. Dhirubhai Gokuldas Vora, reported in 1976 (1) CLJ 148 , and (8) State of Orissa v.Manilal Singhania, reported in AIR (1976) SC 456. 8. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Board, at the outset made it clear that he was not making any admission on the question whether the Board was a "local or other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12. Subject to this he adopted the submissions of the learned Advocate General. In addition, be submitted that no such interpretation of the expression 'executive action' used in Art. 358 can be given as suggested by Mr. Deb. He pointed out that the expression 'executive action' has a very wide connotation. It covers within its ambit all actions which are not either legislative or Judicial. He also submitted that the expression 'executive action' as used in Art. 358, particularly having regard to the use of the expression "or", was very general in nature and the same was not qualified by anything else. In respect of applicability of Art. 359 (1), he submitted that the question of enforcement of a fundamental right does not arise in the present case, as no case has been made out in the petition in respect of the same. In this context he submitted that the only solitary submission regarding the same is contained in paragraph 28 of the petition but no case is made out therein. In this context he submitted that the only solitary submission regarding the same is contained in paragraph 28 of the petition but no case is made out therein. He has further submitted that nobody has any fundamental right to carryon any business in the Port of Calcutta and therefore the question of the impugned resolution affecting anyone's fundamental right cannot and does not arise. In support of his contentions he relied upon the following decisions (9) Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab reported in AIR (1955) SC 549, (10) Jayanrilal Amartlal v. F H. Rana reported in AIR (1964) SC 648 and (11) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Asit Ranjan Majumdar reported in AIR (1962) Cal 530. 9. It may see m peculiar at first, that it is the petitioners who have obtained the Rule nisi, on whose behalf it is being urged that their writ petition cannot be heard and that it must be adjourned sine die, whereas it is the respondents opposing the writ petition who are contending that the Court must proceed to hear and dispose of the writ petition and that there is no bar to the same. The reason for the same is not far to seek. There is an ad interim order in existence in the present case which was passed when the Rule nisi was issued which prevents the Board from implementing the impugned resolution. If the contention of the petitioners, to the effect that this writ petition cannot be beard and ad interim Order, cannot be disturbed during the existence of the Presidential Order, is accepted, then this ad interim order would continue for an indefinite period to the benefit of the petitioners. 10. Before dealing with this preliminary submission, I shall set out some relevant facts and Jaw in this connection. The Dock Workers (Regulatinn of Employment) Act, 1948 came into force on 4th March, 1918. The relevant Scheme under the said Act with which we are concerned here, was framed in the year 1970. On the 3rd of December, 1971 a Proclamation of Emergency was issued by the President of India, which is still in existence. The Dock Workers (Regulatinn of Employment) Act, 1948 came into force on 4th March, 1918. The relevant Scheme under the said Act with which we are concerned here, was framed in the year 1970. On the 3rd of December, 1971 a Proclamation of Emergency was issued by the President of India, which is still in existence. As a result of the same, Article 358 of the Constitution automatically came into force which is set out herein below : "While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in article 19 shall restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any lawor to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in the Part be competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the Proclamation cease to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect. While the emergency was in force on the 11th of October, 1974 this writ petition was moved when a Rule Nisi was issued and an ad interim order passed by this Court While this application was pending the President of India proclaimed another emergency under Art. 352 on the 25th June, 1975 a Presidential order under Art. 359 was passed relating to Articles 14, 21 and 22. Art. 359 (1) provides as follows : "Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the order and also proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order ." On the 8th January, 1976 the relevant Presidential Order was passed under Art. 359(1) which is set out hereinbelow : " "MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS" ORDER New Delhi, the 8th January, 1976. G. S. R. 16(E).-In exercise or the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby declares that the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by article 19 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamations of Emergency made under clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975, are both in force. 2. This Order shall extend to the whole of the territory of India. (No. 11015/1/76-MISA) S. L. KHURANA. Secy:' 11. The question whether the Dock Labour Board is a "local or other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 or not need not engage my attention much. No such contention has been raised on behalf of the petitioners. That is obvious because if the Board is not a "local or other authority' within the meaning of Art. 12, then it would not be a "State" Within the' meaning of Part III of the Constitution (which includes Art. 19) and accordingly the question of violation of any fundamental right by any resolution of the Board would not arise and neither Art. 358 or 359 would be attracted. However, the question stands concluded by a decision of this Court in the case of (12) Bhikari Behara v. Dhanapati Bentia reported in 73 CWN 943 (paragraph 7). In that case it was held that the Dock Labour Board is a "local authority" within the meaning of Clause (31) of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In this connection it should be remembered that under Art. 367 of the Constitution, General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for the interpretation of the Constitution which would include Art. 12. Accordingly the Board must be held to be as local authority within the meaning of Art. 12. 12. The real question is whether the resolution of the Board is an "executive action" within the meaning of Art. 358. The admitted position is that the impugned resolution was passed during the emergency under a law passed prior to the emergency. In my opinion the expressiony "executive action" under Art. 358 is very general and wide in nature. 12. The real question is whether the resolution of the Board is an "executive action" within the meaning of Art. 358. The admitted position is that the impugned resolution was passed during the emergency under a law passed prior to the emergency. In my opinion the expressiony "executive action" under Art. 358 is very general and wide in nature. Article 358 not only protects a law made during the emergency, but also any executive action taken during the said period. The expression used is "to make any law or to take any executive action." Accordingly, it cannot be said that the expression "executive action" used there is only confined to an executive action taken during emergency under any law made during the emergency. In this connection it should be remembered that the functions of the State are broadly classified as legislative, executive and judicial. The executive action is the residue of that power which does not fall within the other two functions. Reference may be made in this connection to the following decisions. (9) Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab (supra) (10) Javantilal Agarwala v. F N. Rana (supra) and (13) Madhab Rafi Scindia v. Union of India reported in AIR (971) SC 530. To this connection "it is to be noted that the expression "or" is used between the words "to make any law" and "to take any executive action." Further it is important to note that the language is not "to make any law or to take any executive action thereunder". Had the relevant portion of the clause been couched in that form then that might have supported the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Deb. In my opinion there is no reason why a restricted meaning should be given to such expression in Article 358 when the legislature did not specifically chose to do so. In my opinion, the protection given under Article 358 to the executive action is not restricted or confined only to the executive actions taken during the' emergency which were under a law passed during the emergency but it also extends to an executive action taken during the emergency under a law passed before the emergency. . 13. In my opinion, the cases cited by Mr. Deb in this connection does not support his contention. . 13. In my opinion, the cases cited by Mr. Deb in this connection does not support his contention. In the case of (1) State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) the State of Madhya Pradesh made an order on 24th April 1963 in exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act. Sections 3 and 6 of the Act were challenged on the ground that they infringed the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court held tha1 Cl. (b) of Section 3(1) of the Act must be struck down in its entirety as unreasonable. In this connection it was argued on behalf of the appellant-State that as long as the state of emergency, declared on 28th October, 1962 by the President under Art. 352 was not withdrawn or revoked, the respondent could not move the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the plea that the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(d) was impugned. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the Act was brought into force before the declaration of emergency. It was further pointed out that if the power conferred by Section 3(1)(b) authorised the imposition of unreasonable restrictions, the clause must be deemed to be void in view of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution Accordingly, it was observed that Section 3(1)(b) was, therefore, void when enacted and was not revived when the proclamation of emergency was made by the President. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that Art. 358 was in terms prospective and that it did not validate a legislative provision which was invalid because of the Constitutional inhibition before the proclamation. While conceding that if Section 3(1)(b) of the Act was void before the proclamation it was not revived by the proclamation, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant-State that Art. 358 protects action both legislative and executive after proclamation and therefore any executive action taken by an officer of the State or by the State 'Will not be liable to be challenged on the ground that it infringes the fundamental freedoms under Art. 19. In this contention, their Lordships observed as follows: "In our judgment, this argument involves a grave falacy. In this contention, their Lordships observed as follows: "In our judgment, this argument involves a grave falacy. All executive action which operates to the prejudice of any person must have the authority of Jaw to support it, and the terms of Art. 358 do not detract from that rule. Article 358 expressly authorises the State to take legislative or executive action provided such action was competent for the State to make or take, but for the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. Article 358 does not purport to invest the State with arbitrary authority to take action to the prejudice of citizens and others' it merely provides that so long as the proclamation of emergency subsists laws may be enacted, and executive action may be taken in pursuance of lawful authority which if the provisions of Art. 19 were operative would have been invalid." 14. In my opinion, this judgment is not an authority for the proposition that 'When an executive action is taken during the emergency under a pre-emergency law 'Which law is not otherwise invalid, such executive action does not come within the ambit of protection given by An. 358. In the case before the Supreme Court the pre-emergency law was itself invalid and that was not revived by the proclamation and accordingly an executive action taken thereunder was also invalid because it was made under an invalid law, that is, without lawful authority and the question of any protection under Art. 358 did not arise. In the case before us the position is different. The pre-emergency law under which the resolution was taken during the emergency was not challenged as invalid. 15. For similar reasons, in my opinion, the decision in the case of Meenakshi Mills (supra) also has got no application. In that case two notifications both dated 13th March, 1973 issued by Textile Commissioners under Clauses 22 and 30(1)(b) respectively of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 was challenged in a writ petition before the Supreme Court. In that case it was contended, inter alia, that the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 was void by reasons of infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) and 31 as well as Article 301 of the Constitution. this contention was negatived by the Supreme Court. In this context it was argued that the petitions were not maintainable in view of emergency. this contention was negatived by the Supreme Court. In this context it was argued that the petitions were not maintainable in view of emergency. Dealing with the same, it was pointed out by Supreme Court that during the preoccupation of emergency, Art. 358 does not apply to an executive action taken during the emergency if the same is a continuance of prior executive action or an emanation of the previous law which is otherwise violative of Art. 19 or is otherwise unconstitutional. It was pointed out that the petitioners therein had challenged the action or previous Jaw to be violative of fundamental rights. Accordingly, it was held that if it can be shown that the executive action taken during the emergency has no authority as a valid law its constitutionality can be challenged. It was pointed out that the Cotton Textiles Order, 1948 was continued by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The impugned orders in that case were made under pre-emergency Cotton Textiles Control Order. It was further pointed out that the validity of the impugned orders was challenged under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution on the ground that it was a pre-emergency Executive Order which could have been challenged under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) before the proclamation of emergency. Accordingly, it was held that from that point of view the petitioners were competent though the challenge was insupportable on all grounds. In this connection the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (14) Bennett Coleman & Co's case reported in AIR 1973 SC 106 was relied on : "During the proclamation of emergency Article 19 is suspended. But it would not authorise the taking of detrimental executive action during the emergency affecting the fundamental rights in Article 19 without any legislative authority or in purported exercise of power conferred by any pre-emergency law which was invalid when enacted." As I have already pointed, the facts of our case are completely different. In the present case the impugned resolution cannot be" described as a continuance of a prior executive action or an emanation of a previous law which is otherwise violative of Art. 19 or otherwise unconstitutional. This case also is not an authority of the proposition propounded by Mr. Deb as indicated above. 16. In the present case the impugned resolution cannot be" described as a continuance of a prior executive action or an emanation of a previous law which is otherwise violative of Art. 19 or otherwise unconstitutional. This case also is not an authority of the proposition propounded by Mr. Deb as indicated above. 16. Therefore, the position is that the impugned resolution in the present case is an executive action within the meaning of Art. 358 and such action could not be challenged during the emergency on the ground that it violates the rights guaranteed under Art. 19. That was the position when this Rule was issued on 11th October 1974 and when the Presidential Order under Art. 359 (1) was issued on 8th January 1976 in respect of Art. 19. In my opinion, Art. 359 and/or any Presidential order made thereunder cannot be read isolatedly without any reference to Art. 358. In a case where Art. 358 is already attracted. Art. 359 (1) should be read in that background. If a particular executive action cannot be challenged in view of the protection granted by Art. 358, then the question of enforcement of the same, within the meaning of Art. 359 (1), cannot also arise. Before the question of enforcement of any fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 359 (1) may arise, that right must be an enforceable one. When this Rule was issued in October, 1974 no such question could be agitated and the impugned resolution could not be challenged on the ground of violation of fundamental rights under Art. 19 in view of the protection granted by Art, 358. Accordingly when in January. 1979 the Presidential Order was passed under Art. 359 (1) in respect of Art. 19, it did not improve the matter. The question of application of Art. 359 (1) and enforcement of any fundamental right under Art. 19 cannot arise because when the Rule was issued in October, 1974 no such right could be enforced. Accordingly, there was no enforceable right in January, 1976, when the Presidential Order was issued. 17. Even if Art. 358 had no application or could not be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the scope of a Presidential Order under Art. 359 and if Art. 359 is to be applied independently irrespective of Art. 358, that does not improve the petitioner's case. 17. Even if Art. 358 had no application or could not be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the scope of a Presidential Order under Art. 359 and if Art. 359 is to be applied independently irrespective of Art. 358, that does not improve the petitioner's case. Merely because it is alleged in this case that the action taken is ultra vires Art. 19, that is not the end of the matter and the Court is not bound to postpone the hearing of the matter merely on such allegation. It is open to the Court to examine whether any such application or claim was maintainable or not. In the present case the only allegation regarding violation of Art.19 is in paragraph 28 of the petition, wherein it has been alleged as follows ; "Your petitioners state that your petitioners Nos. 2, 4, 6 and S have a fundamental right to carryon the said business through their respective companies being the petitioners Nos. 1. 3, 5 and 7. By imposing the said prohibitive and exorbitant Levy the respondents are threatening to interfere with the said petitioners' said fundamental right to carryon their business. The said excessive Levy would prevent your said petitioners from carrying on their business. In the premises imposition of the said levy at the said rate is unconstitutional and in contravention of your said petitioners rights under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India." 18. Firstly, it is to be pointed out that the impugned resolution imposes levy payable by registered employers. In the present case, the respondents Nos. 1. 3, 5 and 7 are the registered employers concerned. They are corporate bodies and fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 are -not available to them. The respondents nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8 may be shareholders and directors of the respondent nos.1, 3, 5 and 7 as alleged, but the impugned resolution does not impose any levy on the shareholders or directors of the registered employers. They are corporate bodies and fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 are -not available to them. The respondents nos. 2, 4, 6 and 8 may be shareholders and directors of the respondent nos.1, 3, 5 and 7 as alleged, but the impugned resolution does not impose any levy on the shareholders or directors of the registered employers. I am aware of the decision in the case (15) R. C. Cooper v. Union of India (otherwise known as the Bank Nationalisation case) reported in AIR 1970 SC 564 , It is true that in certain cases an order made or law passed against or in respect of a corporate body may affect the fundamental right of its members or directors but in this case it has not been shown how by virtue of the said impugned the resolution fundamental rights of the directors or shareholders as such have been affected. 19. Secondly, it is to be noted that apart from a bald allegation as referred to above no prima facie case has been made out to show the right to carryon business guaranteed by Art. 19 has been infringed. There is no sufficient averment in the petition or material before the Court to show how the resolution affects the petitioner's right to carryon business and how it amounts to an unreasonable restriction., In this context I may point out that it was specifically alleged in the affidavit affirmed on behalf of the Board that the registered employers get reimbursement of levy paid by them from their members, i.e. the Shipping Companies, on the basis of levy certificate issued by the Board. It was further pointed out in the said affidavit that the representatives of the shipping interest in the Board fully endorsed the proposal to increase the levy on monthly workers the cost of which they are to bear in the ultimate analysis It was further stated that by the increase of levy the petitioners are in no way financially affected and none of their alleged rights has been infringed. These allegations have not been specifically denied by the petitioners in their affidavit-in-reply. Accordingly, if this levy is ultimately to be paid not by the registered employers but by the shipping companies concerned, the question of any unreasonable' restriction to any alleged fundamental right to carryon business cannot and does not arise. 20. There is another aspect of this matter. These allegations have not been specifically denied by the petitioners in their affidavit-in-reply. Accordingly, if this levy is ultimately to be paid not by the registered employers but by the shipping companies concerned, the question of any unreasonable' restriction to any alleged fundamental right to carryon business cannot and does not arise. 20. There is another aspect of this matter. As pointed out in the case of Commissioners of the Port Calcutta v. Asit Ranjan Majumdar (supra) a citizen of India cannot claim as a fundamental right to carryon a particular business such as that of stevederes in a particular area like the Docks owned by the Part of Calcutta. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, I must hold that no such fundamental right under Art. 19 exists in the petitioners and the question of any infringement of that right cannot arise. Further on the date of the issue of the Rule and on the date of the issue of the Presidential Order under Art. 359 (1), there was no such fundamental right which could be enforced by this writ petition. Accordingly, the Presidential Order under Art. 359 issued on 8th January, 1976 is no bar to the hearing and disposal of this writ petition. 22. In this context the Appeal Court judgment in the Cases of Union of India v. Vora (supra) may be referred to. In that Case a writ petition was filed by Vora whereupon a Rule Nisi was issued by Janah, J. on 6th January, 1975. When the learned Judge also passed an ad-interim order of injunction restraining the Union of India and the other respondents in the writ petition, their agents and sub-ordinates from arresting the petitioner Vora under COFEPOSA or under any other Preventive Detention Act. In March 1975, an application was made by the appellants for vacating the interim order of Janah, J. While the application was pending the President of India proclaimed emergency under Art. 352 on the 25th June, 1975. On the 27th June, 1975, a Presidential Order under Art. 359 was passed in respect of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. On 10th August, 1975, COFEPOSA was included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution by the Constitution 39th Amendment Act of 1975. Against this background, Mr. On the 27th June, 1975, a Presidential Order under Art. 359 was passed in respect of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. On 10th August, 1975, COFEPOSA was included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution by the Constitution 39th Amendment Act of 1975. Against this background, Mr. Justice P.K. Benerjee passed an order on the 24th November, 1975 in the said application for vacating the interim order, bolding that in view of the Presidential Order under Art. 359, the right to move the Court for enforcement of fundamental right has been suspended and the entire application made by Vora would be adjourned sine die Accordingly, the hearing of the writ petition was adjourned sine die on that ground the result was that the order of injunction granted by Janah, J. remained in force. Being aggrieved by the said order of P. K. Banerjee, J. the Union of India and others preferred an appeal. In this appeal, the Union of India made an interlocutory application praying that the order of P. K. Banerjee, J. be stayed and that the earlier order passed by Janah, J. on 6th January. 1975 be vacated. The Appeal Court, after examination of the facts of the case and particularly the prayers in the petition held that as no order of detention was till then passed against the petitioner, Clause (b) of the prayer made by Vora could not be allowed and since such prayer was not maintainable, the order of injunction passed in terms of Clause (i) of prayers was also beyond the scope of the application. Regarding the other prayers, after a careful consideration of the same, the Appeal Court came to the conclusion that this Court had no jurisdiction to make any of the orders asked for It was accordingly observed that the position was that in the context of the facts of the case and particularly in view of the different enactments and Presidential Orders referred to, the entire application of Vora under Act. 226 of the Constitution was bound to fail and no interim order in respect of that application could be passed by. Janah, J. IT was observed that it was in view of the Presidential Order dated 27th June, 1975, that Banerjee, J. adjourned the application. 226 of the Constitution was bound to fail and no interim order in respect of that application could be passed by. Janah, J. IT was observed that it was in view of the Presidential Order dated 27th June, 1975, that Banerjee, J. adjourned the application. However, it was pointed out that the effect of inclusion of COFEPOSA in the 9th Schedule which attracted Art. 31B, was that no action taken under it could be challenged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights. Fro the aforesaid reasons, the interlocutory application was allowed. The order of Benerjee, J. dated 24th November, 1975 was stayed and the earlier ad-interim order passed by Janah, J. was vacated. 23. The decision in Vore’s case supports, what I have held above. This decision makes it clear that merely because it is alleged that some fundamental rights specified under a Presidential Order under Art. 359 have been infringed, that is not the end of the matter ; the Court is not precluded from considering the matter and is not bound to adjourn the matter sine die. This decision also supports my view that in such a case the Court is entitled to examine the writ petition and to find out whether the petitioner has any enforceable right and whether it is open to the petitioner to challenge any action on the ground of alleged infringement of fundamental rights. Had it not been so, the Appeal Court would not have allowed the interlocutory application made before it and vacated the interim order passed by Janah, J. As pointed out in the case of (16) Jahgarkhn Colleries v. G.C. Agrawal reported in AIR (1975) SC 171 an appeal is a re-hearing of the case. Accordingly, the appeal could not have been entertained it Mr. Deb’s contention was correct. 24. Jagadish Chandra Agarwal’s case (supra) decided by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. does not help the petitioner. Firstly, in my opinion, the said decision has lost its force in view of the decision of the Appeal Court in Vora’s case. If mere allegation of violation of fundamental right specified in a Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) was sufficient to prevent the Court from considering the matter at all, then no such appeal could be entertained and no such interlocutory application could be allowed in such appeal or any such order passed by the Appeal Court. If mere allegation of violation of fundamental right specified in a Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) was sufficient to prevent the Court from considering the matter at all, then no such appeal could be entertained and no such interlocutory application could be allowed in such appeal or any such order passed by the Appeal Court. Secondly, it is to be pointed out that in that case only Art. 14 and the Presidential Order made under Art. 359 in respect of that Article was involved. The question of Art. 19 and the scope and effect of Art. 358 was not involved in that case as it is involved in the present case. 25. The observations made in Makhan Singh Tarshikka’s case (supra) which was relied upon by Mr. Deb, does not support his contention. In that case, it was observed that Art. 359 (1) and the Presidential Order issued' under it may constitute a sort of moratorium or a blanket ban against the institution of continuance of any legal action subject to two important conditions. It was pointed out that the first condition' relates to the character of the legal action and requires that the said action must seek to obtain a relief on the ground that the fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order have been contravened. This is not an authority for the proposition that merely because there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights specified in a Presidential order under Art. 359 the Court cannot examine the matter but must adjourn the same sine die. On the other hand, from the first condition, specified above, it is clear that the Court is entitled to examine the character of the legal action and the nature of the relief which is sought in the writ petition. That in my opinion support my view that the Court is not debarred from going into the question as to whether the petitioners have any enforceable fundamental right at all. 26. I may also point out that in the Case of (17) Bhupendra Ratilal Thakur & Another v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 381 Supreme Court negatived the contention of the appellant that Rules 112-B and 112-C of the rules framed under the Income Tax Act were ultra vires Art. 14. 26. I may also point out that in the Case of (17) Bhupendra Ratilal Thakur & Another v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 381 Supreme Court negatived the contention of the appellant that Rules 112-B and 112-C of the rules framed under the Income Tax Act were ultra vires Art. 14. It may be noticed that the judgment was delivered in this case after a Presidential Order under Art. 359, in respect of Art. 14, was issued. Similarly in the case of (18) Kartar Singh v. Piada Ram reported in (1976) 1 SCC 760 certain provisions of an UP Act Was challenged as ultra vires Art. 14 and Art. 19. In that case it was held that the writ petition had become infructuous. Accordingly, by a judgment and order dated 3rd December, 1975, that is, after the issue of Presidential Order under Art. 359 relating to Art. 14, the Writ petition was dismissed. If the contentions of Mr. Deb in this respect had been correct, then the Supreme Court could not have heard or considered the matter at all which they did. [ His Lordship there dealt with case all merits in paragraphs 27 to 44 and Continued: ] 45. Accordingly I reject the contention of Mr. Deb on the merits also. I hold that in adopting the impugned resolution and determining the levy, the Board has acted lawfully within its powers. The Board has acted bona fide in taking into consideration all the material facts and it was not guided in its decision by any extraneous matter. 46. Accordingly I dismiss the writ petition and discharge the Rule. All interim orders are vacated. No order as to costs. 47. A prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners for stay of the operation of this order and I reject the same. Upon the request made to that effect on behalf of the petitioners, I give below my reasons for rejecting such prayer. In this case on behalf of only three registered employers this writ petition has been filed; whereas the interim order prevents the implementation of the impugned resolution in toto and the benefit of the same is enjoyed by all the registered employers including those who are not parties herein. In this case on behalf of only three registered employers this writ petition has been filed; whereas the interim order prevents the implementation of the impugned resolution in toto and the benefit of the same is enjoyed by all the registered employers including those who are not parties herein. If a stay of the operation of this order is granted, this state of affair would continue and the resolution cannot be given effect to even in respect of those registered employers who are not parties to this petition. Anomaly of the situation becomes more patent, when it is taken into consideration that all the registered employers through their association, have participated in the deliberation of the Special Committee which has been set up as a part of the resolution impugned in this proceeding. Then again the admitted position is that the Board is deprived of a sum of Rs. 2-1/2 lakhs per month at least (according to Dr. Banerjee for the Board- Rs. 8 lakhs per month) as a result of the injunction. Up to now more than a sum of Rs. 40 lakshs is due to the Board. A good part of the money may be permanently lost to the Board because some stevedores may be ultimately unable to pay the arrears. If the stay is granted, the Board would not only be unable to recover the amount of levy in respect of the arrears but also in respect of the future period. The position is, the financial condition of the Board is not good. For sometime past, it has been running with the aid of loans granted by the Central Government which has expressed its inability to grant any further loan. On the other I hand the Central Government has asked for repayment of the loan. Therefore without the money to be collected from the levy, which is the subject-matter in this writ petition, the Board may find it impossible to operate the scheme thereby bringing misery to about 12,000 registered dock workers. If the stay is granted it would affect not merely the parties before me but it may also very likely adversely affect the whole system of the setevedore working as well as the registered workers in Calcutta and the work of the Port of Calcutta also. 30. If the stay is granted it would affect not merely the parties before me but it may also very likely adversely affect the whole system of the setevedore working as well as the registered workers in Calcutta and the work of the Port of Calcutta also. 30. Let the operative portion of this order, countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) of this Bench, be given to the learned Advocates appearing before me.