Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the State of Kerala and the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education from the judgment of a learned single judge of this Court allowing O. P. No. 657 of 1975. The 1st respondent herein was the petitioner in the Original Petition. The 2nd respondent is the Registrar, University of Kerala. The first prayer in the Original Petition was "To pay forthwith to the petitioner all the arrears of salary and other emoluments due to him as an Additional Professor (I Grade) in the Post-Graduate Department of the College, at the recognised scale of pay for the post, as revised from time to time and with all due increments, accruing monthly from the 1st of September 1972, together with compensatory interest thereon from such dates calculated at a minimum rate of 18% per annum". The learned judge by the judgment under appeal has allowed the earlier part of this prayer but has declined the compensatory interest claimed in the prayer. 2. It will be useful to refer very briefly to the past history of this petition. There was an earlier Original Petition by the 1st respondent, O.P. No 1491 of 1973 which contained three prayers. The questions that arose for consider-action in that Original Petition were formulated in the judgment in these terms: "(1) Was the post of an additional Professor a post recognised by the Ordinances thai were in force on the Ist of March, 1972 when the petitioner was appointed to that post? (2) Does that appointment require any approval or recognition by the University? (3) If the appointment does not require any approval or recognition by the University, can the communications Exts. P4 and P6 issued by the 1st respondent stand in so far as they state that the appointment cannot be approved. (4) If the answers to all the three questions formulated above are in favour of the petitioner, is he entitled to the relief couched in language which is not easy to understand, in prayer No. 3 of the petition, but when understood, necessarily conveying a clear import?" 3. After the case was heard, judgment was dictated in court on the 19th of December, 1973. Before the judgment was finalised and signed, the petitioner in that Original Petition moved C. M. P. No. 15852 of 1973 for withdrawing the 3rd prayer in the petition. After the case was heard, judgment was dictated in court on the 19th of December, 1973. Before the judgment was finalised and signed, the petitioner in that Original Petition moved C. M. P. No. 15852 of 1973 for withdrawing the 3rd prayer in the petition. This petition was heard and allowed on the 31st of January, 1974. The order is reported in 1975 KLT. 348. It was also directed by the order that the "question arising from prayer No. 3 is thus left open". Consequent on the allowing of the petition, the discussion relating to prayer No. 3 in the judgment as originally dictated were deleted and after dealing with the first three questions the judgment stated in Para.12: "The petition, C. M. P. No. 15852 of 1973, for withdrawing the 3rd prayer in the Original Petition was granted by us by order dated 31-1-1974. So we express no opinion on the question whether the petitioner is entitled to get his salary or not. This must be decided with reference to statutory provisions if any that are applicable or the terms of the agreements that have been reached. It will be open to both parties to urge their contentions in this regard and for the appropriate authorities to take the decision." 4. The present Original Petition the judgment from which is under appeal, has been filed for the reliefs which we have adverted to. Two contentions have mainly been raised by the appellants in opposition to the petition. One was based on facts and the other question of law whether in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution any directions could be issued by this Court for disbursement of the salary in the circumstances of the case. The learned judge by the judgment under appeal found against the appellant on both these aspects. 5. The first contention of the Government Pleader on behalf of the appellants was that the question whether there has really been an appointment of the 1st respondent as an Additional Professor, 1st Grade on the 1st March, 1972, as claimed is still under investigation and that there is reason to believe that there has been no such appointment and that therefore the appellants were justified in withholding the payment of salary. It was next contended that what the 1st respondent sought to enforce was an agreement entered into between the State Government and the managements of Private Colleges and that this Court would not enforce contractual obligations in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution and particularly so at the instance of a third party to such an agreement. We shall deal with these contentions. 6. As regards the first question, it has to be stated that no contention had been raised in the earlier petition, O. P. No. 1491 of 1973, by the respondents thereto who were the Manager of the Nirmala College (2nd respondent) where the 1st respondent herein is employed by the 3rd respondent, the Principal of the said College, by the 4th respondent, the State of Kerala, or by the 1st respondent, the Registrar of the University of Kerala, that the 1st respondent herein had not been appointed as an Additional Professor, 1st Grade with effect from the 1st of March, 1972. The only contention that was raised was that the appointment was ineffective in that no approval of the appointment had been granted by the University and the attempt had been to sustain Exts. P4 and P6 in those cases by which approval had been declined. On that basis it was further urged that the 1st respondent herein, the petitioner in O. P. No. 1491 of 1973, could not be treated as an Additional Professor, Ist Grade. Those contentions were negatived by the judgment and the first three questions that were formulated were all answered in favour of the petitioner therein, the 1st respondent herein. The contentions now raised that there has been an amendment of the First Ordinance of the University, which was admittedly in operation and force on the 1st of March, 1972. by the passing of the first statute on the 6th of March. 1972, and that the First Statute did not provide for a post of an Additional Professor in a Private College were all contentions that could have been raised in O.P. No 1491 of 1973 and which we consider, ought to have been raised in that Original Petition. In the absence of any such contention in O.P. No. 1491 of 1973, we do not think that the appellants are justified now in raising such contentions in the present proceedings. In the absence of any such contention in O.P. No. 1491 of 1973, we do not think that the appellants are justified now in raising such contentions in the present proceedings. We have therefore to proceed on the basis that there has been an appointment of the 1st respondent on the 1st of March, 1972 as Additional Professor. The learned judge in the judgment under appeal has found that there has been an appointment and the fact had been communicated to the University on the 24th of June, 1972. That communication specifically stated that the appointment was as on the 1st of March, 1972. We are of the opinion that the matter is not open for discussion or for a fresh decision in these proceedings. 7. Passing on now to the question of law urged by counsel on behalf of the appellants, what has been contended is based on very well-known principles. Those principles are that this Court would not normally seek to enforce contractual obligations by resort to Art.226 of the Constitution. Contractual obligations though perhaps enforceable at law in appropriate other proceedings has been ruled by the Supreme Court to st m from breaches of contracts and not from breaches of law (AIR 1972 S.C 1450). The other well-known principle, of course there are exceptions, is that a third party to a contract cannot seek to enforce it. So in Kumari Regina v. St Aloysius Higher Elementary School and another AIR. 171 S.C. 1920 and in The State of Assam and another v. Ajit Kumar Sarma and Others AIR. 1965 S.C.1196, the court declined relief at the instance of a third party holding that agreements entered into between the management and the State or administrative instructions by the State to Private Colleges have not the force of law and that those even if they amounted to contracts could not be enforced at the instance of third parties. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Har Shankar and others etc. v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc. AIR. 1975 S.C.1121 by counsel for the appellants. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Har Shankar and others etc. v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others etc. AIR. 1975 S.C.1121 by counsel for the appellants. The Supreme Court ruled therein that there was a concluded contract in the case and that the writ applicant was ingeniously finding out or attempting to find out invalidating circumstances It was ruled that the Court in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution will not assist the writ applicant in establishing those invalidating circumstances to plead that the contract is non-est. Coming now to the decisions of this Court we may refer to the following decisions in T.D Joseph v. State of Kerala & Others 1975 KLT. 779 and in State of Kerala v. P. C. Abraham 1974 KLT. 779 wherein the same principles have been applied. We do not think we should tarry to consider these decisions elaborately for the principles enunciated therein appear to be well-established. 8. In the case before us too, there was an agreement, or to be more accurate, there were agreements, between the State Government and the various managements of private colleges. Those agreements do contain a provision that the State Government should pay the salaries of the teachers in the colleges which term would include Additional Professors If the claim of the 1st respondent had been rested exclusively on that agreement, perhaps the principles of the decisions that have been relied on by counsel for the appellants would have to be applied. 9. It appears that simultaneous with the negotiations with the management of private colleges and the Government, there have been negotiations going on between the organisations representing the teachers of these Private Colleges and the Government. The Government accepted the representations made by such Teachers' organisations and undertook the responsibility to pay the salaries of the teachers directly without reference to the managements. This demand on the part of the Teachers' Associations have been accepted by the Government and the Government issued an order which has been produced in the Original Petition marked as Ext. P7 dated 4 91973. This demand on the part of the Teachers' Associations have been accepted by the Government and the Government issued an order which has been produced in the Original Petition marked as Ext. P7 dated 4 91973. The order clearly states that "..........all the teaching staff who were on the rolls of Private Arts and Science Colleges in vacancies other than leave vacancies on or before 1-9-72 will be given the benefit of direct payment of salaries, irrespective of whether their appointments and their posts were approved by the University or not. This will include payment of salaries to those members of the staff who have been, will be declared supernumeraries by the Universities. Such of those who are later found to be in excess of staff pattern will be declared as supernumerary hands and retained as such till they are absorbed in regular vacancies or till they retire or resign from the service of the college. They will be entitled to all the benefits admissible to regular teaching staff. Where ever supernumeraries exist, future vacancies arising in that cadre shall not be filled up before absorption of all the supernumeraries." 10. Ext. P7 is only an executive order or it may be termed as an administrative direction. But it is not as though executive orders or administrative directions have no force; nor does it mean that there is no obligation on the part of the Government issuing such orders or administrative directions to carry them out. Similar questions have arisen before the Supreme Court a number of times. The decision in Union of India v. K.P. Joseph and others AIR. 1973 S. C. 303 refers to some of the earlier decisions of the Court on the subject. It will be useful to extract Para.9 and 10 of the judgment in Union of India v. K. P. Joseph and others AIR. 1973 S. C. 303 in which Mathew J., observed as follows: "9. Generally speaking, an administrative Order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. It will be useful to extract Para.9 and 10 of the judgment in Union of India v. K. P. Joseph and others AIR. 1973 S. C. 303 in which Mathew J., observed as follows: "9. Generally speaking, an administrative Order confers no justiciable right, but this rule, like all other general rules, is subject to exceptions. This Court has held in SantRam Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1968) ISCR 111 = (AIR 1967 SC 1910) that although Government cannot supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, yet, if the rules framed under Art.309 of the Constitution are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill up gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed and these instructions will govern the conditions of service. 10. In Union of India v. M/s. Indo Afghan Agencies Ltd. (1968) 2 SCR 366 at p. 377 = (AIR 1968 SC 718, this Court, in considering the nature of the Important Trade Policy said: "Granting that it is executive in character, this court has held that Courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the Schemes upon the departmental authorities." To say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that we have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. The learned judge then referred to a passage from Mr. Harrison's Instances and sounded a note of warning in Para.11: "We should not be understood as laying down any general proposition on this question. But we think that the Order in question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the conditions of his service. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right." 11. We should in the light of these pronouncements examine the obligations if any imposed on the State by the order Ext. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right." 11. We should in the light of these pronouncements examine the obligations if any imposed on the State by the order Ext. P7 and whether this order is part of the scheme in relation to an important matter, University education in the higher level evolved by the State on the basis of public policy in the discharge of a public duty which every civilized State must undertake. There can be little doubt that there has been such a scheme evolved by the State. This is discernible from the agreements entered into by the Government with the managements and from the order Ext. P7 by which in unequivocal terms the Government undertook to pay the salaries of teachers of Private Colleges. There can be little doubt that these agreements were entered into and the order was passed in exercise of the functions of a State in the matter of ensuring proper education. It is a matter of Public policy is also clear from the fact that Government wanted to ensure that those who taught in those Colleges received adequate remuneration and without fail and regularly and without any unauthorised deductions. Consequently the order Ext. P7 was passed undertaking unequivocally that the salaries of the Teachers will be paid by the Government directly. This is no doubt a solemn undertaking given by no less an authority than the Government itself. Such an authority giving such an assurance in such circumstances as a measure of implementing a public policy, we think, must sustain it and any failure to comply with such assurances contained in those orders can be enforced by this Court. This is in a sense what has been done by the learned judge by the judgment under appeal and we see no justifiable reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Judge. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal and so dismiss this Writ Appeal with costs. Dismissed.