JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a reference made by Sri S.K. Sarkar, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision petition moved on behalf of Deotadin against the order dated September 23, 1971 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Patti, district Pratapgarh in proceedings under section 198(2), U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and have gone through the record. The opposite parties have not appeared in this Court to contest the revision in spite of due service. 3. Bhagelu, Anganu and Prahlad, opposite parties No. 1 to 3 had moved an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Patti for cancellation of the leases granted by the Pradhan, Gaon Sabha Pure Chandi in respect of plot No. 159, area 1 Bigha 12 Biswa 12 dhurs situate in the same village. According to them this plot was Abadi in which the ancestral house of Bhagelu stood and that about six years back the old house had fallen down and thereupon a new house had been construed by Bhagelu on the same site. It was further alleged that part of the plot was used for Khalihan and the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha had had executed an illegal lease in favour of Deotadin. Deotadin claimed that the plot in dispute was Gaon Sabha property and the Gaon Sabha had in accordance with law executed the lease deed dated October 31, 1961 in his favour. The Gaon Sabha was also impleaded through the Pradhan but filed no written statement. The learned Sub-divisional Officer by his order dated September 23, 1971 cancelled the lease granted to Deota Din and ordered his ejectment. Deota Din has now come up in revision against this order. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the Land Management Committee was not impleaded in these proceedings. We find that the Gaon Sabha, Pure Chandi through its Pradhan was duly impleaded and was served but chose not to take any party in the proceedings. The learned Commissioner has observed that in view of the ruling in 1971 R.D., p. 23 were Gaon Sabha is a party the Land Management Committee which is a sub-committee thereof, need not be issued any notice. Under Rule 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, the impleadment of the Land Management Committee is necessary. The learned Commissioner has observed that in view of the ruling in 1971 R.D., p. 23 were Gaon Sabha is a party the Land Management Committee which is a sub-committee thereof, need not be issued any notice. Under Rule 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, the impleadment of the Land Management Committee is necessary. Thus, the impleadment of the Gaon Sabha instead of the Land Management Committee is be an irregularity. It has, however, to be seen whether their irregularity amounts to a material error in the exercise of the jurisdiction entitling this court to interfere in revision. The learned counsel has failed to show how the impleadment of the Gaon Sabha instead of the Land Management Committee has caused any injustice or has materially affected the outcome of the case. In this case, the irregularity cannot be said to be of the such a nature as may be considered to be a material error in exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, this court would not be entitled to interfere in revision on this ground. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that the proceedings were time-barred as the lease was executed on October 31, 1951 and its Amaldaramad was done on June 25, 1962 whereas suo motu action has been started on February 16, 1971. This contention is not correct. Where suo motu action is taken, no period of limitation is provided. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has also argued in this Court, though this point was not earlier taken, that the Sub-Divisional Officer did not have the powers to cancel the lease. First of all it may be mentioned that the impugned orders were passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Patti and by a clerical error his designation has been given by the learned Commissioner as the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer Patti/Asstt. Collector First Class Pratapgarh. A perusal of the record shows that this is not the correct designation as in the original orders the designation has been given as Sub-Divisional Officer. The learned counsel has in this connection referred to Mohammad Shafi v. State of U.P. 1976 R.D. 250 decided by a learned Member of this Court since transferred, and the order in the review petition decided by the Same Member, reported in 1976 R.D. 303. The learned counsel has in this connection referred to Mohammad Shafi v. State of U.P. 1976 R.D. 250 decided by a learned Member of this Court since transferred, and the order in the review petition decided by the Same Member, reported in 1976 R.D. 303. In these decisions the learned Member has held that only the Collector enjoys powers to cancel leases for Abadi sites under rule 115-N and it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Officer to cancel any such allotment. The learned counsel has also invited my attention to the Gazette Notification No. 365/1-A-2-1-(2)-68, dated December 5, 1968 which may be reproduced here: "In exercise of the powers under clause (4) of section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951), and in supersession of Notification No. 1976/1-A-1073-53, dated June 11, 1953, the Governor is please to empower all the Sub-Divisional Officers in Uttar Pradesh to discharge all the functions of a Collector under the said Act, except those under section 198 of the said Act." The above Gazette Notification bars the Sub-Divisional Officers form discharging the functions of the Collector under section 198 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. I would, therefore, concur with the view taken by my learned colleague in the above decisions and uphold the contention that only the Collector and not the Sub-Divisional Officer has the jurisdiction to cancel a lease under section 198(2) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 7. The result is that I hereby allow the revision and set aside the impugned order of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer as being without jurisdiction.