JUDGMENT 1. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the original petitioner Kistoorchand who is now represented by his successor in title Vijaykumar challenged the correctness of the decision of the Board of Revenue of Rajasthan, Ajmer (which will hereinafter be referred to as 'the Board') dated 11th July, 1967 marked Exhibit P/3 in appeal No. 4 of 1963. Kistoora v. Kishtoorchand . Before coming to this Court, the petitioner filed a review application before the Board. But the same was dismissed by order dared August 14, 1967 Exhibit P/4. Hence both the orders of the Board dated 11th July, 1967 & 14th August, 1967 have been assailed by the petitioner. 2. The facts relevant for decision of this writ application may be briefly stated as follows. The petitioner Kastoorchand Patani, since deceased, brought a suit for ejectment in the Court of Assistant Collector. Kishangarh against Kistoora and his son Likhma respondents No. 2 and 3 under section 175 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (which will hereinafter be referred to as 'the Act') with respect to agricultural land khasra Nos. 251, 252 to 262, 330 to 382, 251/6013 and 330/6014 situated in Kishangarh on the ground that the petitioner is a khatedar tenant of the land in question and he had leased out the same to respondent No. 2 Kistoora on October 4 23,1950 for a fixed rent of Rs. 51/- per annum by a Lease Deed bearing the same date but Kishtoora had illegally transferred the same to respondent No.4 Chandrasingh for a consideration of Rs.5000/- and hence the aforesaid respondents were liable to be ejected. Kistoora, Likhma and their transferee Chandraqsingh (who will hereinafter be referred to as the respondent) pleaded, inter alia, that Kistoora was a sub-tenant who had become a khatedar tenant under section 19 (1) (a) of the Tenancy Act. After recording the evidence produced by the parties on the issues framed by him, the learned Assistant Collector, by his judgement dated June 1, 1962 (Ex.P/1) came to the conclusion that Kistoora had become khatedar tenant and was consequently not liable to be ejected. In this view of the matter, he dismissed the petitioner's suit. After recording the evidence produced by the parties on the issues framed by him, the learned Assistant Collector, by his judgement dated June 1, 1962 (Ex.P/1) came to the conclusion that Kistoora had become khatedar tenant and was consequently not liable to be ejected. In this view of the matter, he dismissed the petitioner's suit. Aggrieved by the judgement of the Assistant Collector, Kistoora filed appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur, which, by its judgement dated June 4, 1963 (Ex.P/2) set aside the judgement and decree by the Assistant Collector and decreed the petitioner's suit against the respondent for ejectment from the land in dispute. The respondent then filed a second appeal before the Board which reversed the judgement by the Revenue Appellate authority and restored the judgement by the Assistant Collector and thereby dismissed the petitioner's suit. 3. Before we embark upon the consideration of the writ application on merits, we would like to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Rajnarain Munshi, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 Chandrasingh. He has submitted that the petitioner has made false averments in the case knowing them to be false and, therefore, by his conduct he has dis-entitled himself to any relief to be granted by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. It is submitted that the possession of land in question had been delivered to Chandrasingh as far back as on October 30, 1967, yet Smt. Sugnidevi widow of Kistoorchand, the original petitioner, during the course of proceedings of this writ application, asserted her possession over the land in question on March 12, 1974 and filed a false affidavit in support of this assertion. In support of his contention he has relied upon M/s. M. Haji Mohd. Ismail v. The Dy CTO, AIR 1970 Mad 422 . K Ananthan Pillai v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Ker 234 , G. Appukkuttan Pillai v. Government of India, AIR 1970 Ker 110 , Aijaz Uddin v. Taxing Officer, High Court and others, AIR 1966 All 227 ., and Mangilal Sharma v. Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, Raj, AIR 1957 Raj 167 . 4. It may be observed that a protect litigation has been going on between the parties even on the execution side in pursuance of the judgements passed by the Revenue Courts on the appellate side and the land has been changing hands. Mr. 4. It may be observed that a protect litigation has been going on between the parties even on the execution side in pursuance of the judgements passed by the Revenue Courts on the appellate side and the land has been changing hands. Mr. Rajnarain's contention is that the land in question was mutated in the name of Chandrasingh in the year 1960 as evidenced by Parcha Khatauni (Exhibit P/5) and the petitioner's objection regarding correctness of Exhibit P.5 was rejected. In support of his contention Mr. Rajnarain placed reliance on Exhibit P.19 (statement of Kistoorchand) and also on the judgement Exhibit P.1. However, he admits that after the decision by the Revenue Appellate Authority (Exhibition P.2), Chandrasingh was dispossessed some time in 1963. However, it is asserted on behalf of Chandrasingh, respondent No. 4, that he was again put in possession of the land in dispute vide documents Exhibit P.7 to Exhibit P/10 after the dismissal of the suit by the Board on July 11, 1967 (Exhibit P/3). There is no doubt that this Court dismissed the stay petition filed by the petitioner on November 27, 1967. The order dated November 27, 1967 dismissing the stay application reads as follows:- "Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has urged that his client has already got possession of the disputed property on 30.10.67 in restitution proceedings and, therefore, the stay application is infructuous. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that his client is still in possession of the property and that even if respondent No. 4 was put in possession of the property by the revenue authorities, those proceedings were illegal. It would suffice to observe that from the perusal of Exs. P.7, P.8, P.9 and P.10, it appears prima facie that respondent No. 4 was put in possession by the Tehsildar in pursuance of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The question whether the petitioner is still continuing his possession on the disputed property would be one of pure facts which we cannot decide in the stay application. As regards petitioner's contention about the illegality of the restitution proceedings, it may be further observed that the point cannot be decided in the stay application. It is open to him to challenge the legality of those proceedings in separate proceedings. The stay application is, therefore, hereby dismissed." 5. As regards petitioner's contention about the illegality of the restitution proceedings, it may be further observed that the point cannot be decided in the stay application. It is open to him to challenge the legality of those proceedings in separate proceedings. The stay application is, therefore, hereby dismissed." 5. After the aforesaid order had been passed, it appears, that the petitioner filed appeal from the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated October 30, 1967 (Ex.P/9). The appeal was dismissed on February 20, 1968 (Ex.P/13). The petitioner then filed a second appeal which was dismissed by the Board on November 20, 1970 (Ex.P/8). It is urged that in the memo of the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Board, the petitioner admitted that he had been dispossessed from the land in question in execution of the Board's judgement Ex. P/3 and that the land had been mutated in the name of respondent No. 4 on December 24, 1973. It is submitted that the petitioner even then sold the land in dispute to Vijaykumar on February 6, 1974 vide Sale Deed Exhibit S/3. The petitioner Kistoorchand thereafter died on 12th February, 1974. Smt. Sugnidevi widow of Kistoorchand made an application for being impleaded as Kistoorchand's heir on March 12, 1974 and made another application on the same date for restraining Chandrasingh from pursuing the mutation proceedings with respect to the land in question. It is submitted that in this application Smt. Sugnidevi made false averments that she was still in possession of the land. It is argued by Mr. Rajnarain that Smt. Sugnidevi is guilty of deliberate concealment of material facts as well as making false averment and, therefore, this Court should decline to consider the case on merits. 6. On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the documents Ex.P/7 to P/10 had been produced by the petitioner himself, thought he petitioner had contended that the handing over possession of land to respondent No. 4 was false. it is also argued that the fact that the documents Ex.P/7 to P/10 were prepared on the same date i.e 30th October, 1967 raises a serious doubt as to the correctness of the proceedings and that, in fact, actual physical possession of the land was never delivered to Chandrasingh. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner, has further argued that the same Tehsildar who signed the order Ex. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner, has further argued that the same Tehsildar who signed the order Ex. P/9 dated October 30, 1967 subsequently observed vide Ex.P/16 that the question of possession required to be determined by a civil court and till that was done, it could not be said as to which party was in actual possession of the land. It was contended that the petitioner is still in possession of the land in dispute and that his name appears in Girdawari Register pertaining to Samwat year 2024 to 2028 & 2030 marked Ex. P/14, P/15 and P/16 and that he has also paid levy for the current year. 7. After having given our careful consideration to the preliminary objection, we have come to the conclusion that no case has been made out for rejection of the writ petition on the preliminary ground of alleged suppression of material facts or misrepresentation. When the first application dated 7th October, 1967 for grant of stay was moved by the petitioner Kistoorchand, he was admittedly in possession of the land in dispute. he had been consistently contesting the fact of alleged delivery of possession of the land to the respondent No. 4 on October 30, 1967. In these circumstances, after his death if his widow believing the contentions of her husband to be true, filed the application dated 12 March, 1974 alleging the possession of the petitioner, it cannot be said that she has deliberately made false averment on facts or has concealed material facts. In any case the petitioner has not taken any advantage out of the assertions made by him or her. 8. The case relied upon by Mr. Rajnarain are clearly distinguishable. In none of these cases was a bonafide dispute regarding the facts sought to be suppressed. We also wish to point out that upto February 12, 1974 when Kistoorchand died, the case was being looked after by Kistoorchand himself and only a month thereafter on March 12, 1974 Smt. Sugnidevi widow of Kistoor Chand made the application on the same line as was adopted by her husband and, therefore, too she cannot be held guilty of such conduct as to disentitle the petitioner to a decision of the writ petition on merits. We therefore, overrule the preliminary objection. 9. We therefore, overrule the preliminary objection. 9. Coming to the merits on the case, the Board has held that by virtue of the Lease Deed executed by Kishtoora in favour of the petitioner Kistoorchand, the former became a sub-tenant. It is further observed that the Settlement Parcha Ex. D/6 (which has been marked Ex.P/5 in this record and will hereinafter be described as Ex.P/5) was issued in favour of Kistoora on August 5, 1955 and Kistoora was described therein as sub tenant & the State as the last owner. It was operative for Samwat 2010 to 2018. The learned members of the Board have observed that Ex.P/5 should be considered as an Annual Register for the purpose of giving benefit of section 19 (1) (a) of the Tenancy Act. According to the Board the cumulative effect of section 126 and 132 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Land Revenue Act) obviously is that the record of rights prepared by the Settlement Department in August, 1955 viz. 2 months before the commencement of the Tenancy Act shall prevail unless it can be shown that in the meantime the same had been modified in accordance with law. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the Board has committed a grave error of law in considering the settlement Parcha Ex. P/5 as record of rights current at the commencement of the Tenancy Act. According to the learned counsel it did not fall within the ambit of the term 'Annual Registers' for the purpose of attracting the applicability of section 19 (1) (a) of the Tenancy Act. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon Mst. Wahidan v. Angana, 1974 RRD 489 : Ramdeo v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, 1961 RRD 11 and Shri Bachansingh v. Shri Gopalsingh, 1961 RRD 7 . It is true that under section 19 for conferment of Khatedari rights it is necessary that the tenant of Khudkast as well as Sub tenant must have been entered as such in the Annual Registers then current. It is true that under section 19 for conferment of Khatedari rights it is necessary that the tenant of Khudkast as well as Sub tenant must have been entered as such in the Annual Registers then current. Sections 132 says that "The Land Records officer shall maintain the record of rights and for that purpose shall, annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe, cause to be prepared a set or an amended set, as the case may be of the registers enumerated in sections 114 and 120 and the registers so prepared shall be called the annual registers". Section 114 provides that:- "The record of rights shall be prepared in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government and shall consist of the following namely:- (a) a khewat, this is to say, a register of all estate-holders in the area under survey and record operations or under record operations, specifying the nature and extent of the interest of each of his co-sharers, mortgagees in possession & persons holding land from him otherwise than as tenants, if any; (b) a khatauni, that is to say, a register of all persons cultivating or otherwise holding or occupying land in such area, specifying the particulars required by section 121. (c) a register of all persons holding land in such area free of rent or revenue, and (d) such other registers as may be prescribed." Section 120 reads as under:- "120. Register of village.- The Land Records Officer shall prepare in the prescribed form a list of all villagers in the area under survey and record operations or under record operations, showing therein in the prescribed manner - (a) the area liable to fluvial action, (b) the area having precarious cultivation, (c) the revenue or rent assessed thereon and the person through whom it is payable, and (d) the area of which the revenue or rent has, either wholly or in part been realised, remitted, redeemed, assigned or compounded specifying the authority therefor and the condition thereof. 11. To contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Exhibit P/5 is only a Parcha Chakbandi and Parcha Chakbandi cannot be equated with record of rights. It has also been urged that the Board has confused record of rights with Annual Registers. 11. To contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Exhibit P/5 is only a Parcha Chakbandi and Parcha Chakbandi cannot be equated with record of rights. It has also been urged that the Board has confused record of rights with Annual Registers. It is argued that Exhibit P/5 is neither a record of rights nor an annual Register but is only a step towards preparation of record of rights. On the other hand Mr. Rajnarain, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has submitted that the Settlement Parcha Exhibit P/5 falls under section 121 which reads as under:- "121. Particulars to be stated in khatauni (1). The register of persons cultivating or otherwise holding or occupying land, prescribed by clause (b) of section 114, shall specify as to each tenant the following particulars, namely:- (a) the nature and class of his tenure as determined in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 or any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of the State. (b) the amount of premium, if any, paid by him for the acquisition of khatedari rights. (c) the date of the katedari parcha, and the transfers, if any, made by him, together with all the particulars of such transfers. (d) the khatedari number of each field comprised in his holding and the area thereof, (e) the annual rent payable by him. (f) any other condition of the tenure whether contained in a written lease or not, (g) in the case of a person other than a khatedar tenant, the number of years during which he has held the land then in his possession and (h) such other particulars as may from time to time be prescribed. 2. The register shall also specify the estate holders (if any) holding land as khudkast in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 or other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of the State and shall state with respect to such land the number of years during which they have so held it." He has also referred to rules 21,27,30,48,64,72 and 73 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Survey, Record and Settlement) Rules, 1957 and has argued that the Board has not committed any manifest error in construing the document Ex. P/5. 12. P/5. 12. It may be pointed out that the Land Revenue Act came into force on July 1, 1956 whereas the relevant date for accrual of the khatedari rights under Section 19 of the Tenancy Act is October 19, 1955. Section 126 of the Land Revenue Act provides that until a new map and a field book are prepared under section 112 or until a new record of rights if framed under section 114, the existing map, field book & record of rights if any shall be the map, field book & record of rights of the area concerned. The Board has held that in view of Section 126 referred to above the Settlement Parcha prepared on 5th August, 1955 shall be considered as valid until a new record of rights is prepared under Section 114 or unless the same has been amended or modified in accordance with law. It is further observed that the onus to establish that Ex. P/5 should not be deemed to be the record of rights as current at the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act lies on the person who questions its validity. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force on October 15, 1955. Consequently there is force in the Board's observation that Ex. P/5 prepared in August, 1955 i.e. two months before the commencement of the Tenancy Act will be held to be good and valid unless it can be shown that in the meantime it had been modified in accordance with law. 13. It may be also relevant here to state that it is clear from a perusal of Ex. P/5 and the statement of Kistoorchand petitioner that prior to the attestation of the entries in Parcha Khatauni objection was raised by the petitioner on which case No. 78 was registered. The objection was decided on 28th February, 1955 and corrections were made in the register Parcha Chakbandi Settlement. It was thereafter that Ex. P/5 was issued to Kistoora respondent No. 2. The remark column in Ex. P/5 reads with as under:- cgqDe Jheku tks eq0u0 78@28&2&55 ds vuqlkj ckn nqljh bZuke ipkZ rS;kj fd;kA Sd/- fpjathyky tSu 5&8&53 14. The petitioner failed to appeal against these proceedings by taking appropriate proceedings in time. He has admitted in his statement Ex. P/5 was issued to Kistoora respondent No. 2. The remark column in Ex. P/5 reads with as under:- cgqDe Jheku tks eq0u0 78@28&2&55 ds vuqlkj ckn nqljh bZuke ipkZ rS;kj fd;kA Sd/- fpjathyky tSu 5&8&53 14. The petitioner failed to appeal against these proceedings by taking appropriate proceedings in time. He has admitted in his statement Ex. S/19 that Kistoora thereafter went on depositing rent, and he made application for correction of the entries after the filling of the present suit. 15. In view of the above quoted provisions of law and the proceeding which had taken place before preparation of Ex. P/5, we fail to see any apparent manifest error in the impugned judgement of the Board by which it was held that Kistoora will be deemed to have been entered in the Annual Registers then current as sub tenant of the land and consequently must be treated as a Khatedar tenant of the land in dispute. 16. As to the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner we may state that they are distinguishable on facts. In Shersingh v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, 1969 RLW 623 it was observed that the provisions of section 132 to 137 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are for Annual registers and do not apply to the procedure for making entries arising at the time when the settlement operations are going on. No just exception can be taken to this observation but in the present case settlement operation had come to end, as admitted by the petitioner himself much prior to the issuance of Exhibit P/5. 17. The case Mst. Wahidah v. Angana, 1974 RRD 489 has no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as in that case it was held that Khasra Girdawari was not an annual register and even in the Khasra Girdawari the appellant was not shown as being in possession of the land either in Samvat year 2010 and 2011 or 2012. No Settlement Parcha was issued to the appellant to that case. 18. In Bachansingh v. Gopalsingh, 1961 RRD 7 the Board observed that Annual Registers are not the same as the Settlement record or record of rights prepared under section 113 and 114 of the Act. No Settlement Parcha was issued to the appellant to that case. 18. In Bachansingh v. Gopalsingh, 1961 RRD 7 the Board observed that Annual Registers are not the same as the Settlement record or record of rights prepared under section 113 and 114 of the Act. But this observation was made in light of the facts of that case viz that an application for correction of the entries in the settlement record came under section 136 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956. 19. In Ramdeo v Board of Revenue, 1961 RRD 11 a Division Bench of this Court approved the finding of the Board that the petitioner in that case was neither entered in the Annual Register current at the commencement of the Act as a sub-tenant nor obtained a subsequent declaration under section 19(2) of the Tenancy Act. In these circumstances it was rightly held, if we may so with respect, that the petitioner in that case was not entitled to any benefit under section 19. We fail to see any observation in that case helpful to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 20. The result is that we do not see any force in this writ petition and hereby dismiss it with costs. *******