JUDGMENT : M.P. Thakkar, J. The Central question which has come to the surface in the present group of matters comprising of four Second Appeals and one Letters Patent Appeal is whether the order of termination of services of an employee of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (hereafter referred to as the "Corporation") without complying with the principles of natural justice and/or without complying with the relevant regulations framed for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings can be struck down as null and void and whether a declaration can be granted that an employee concerned continues to be in the service of the Corporation. 2. On August 19, 1974, two Second Appeals, Second Appeal No. 41/73 and Second Appeal No. 228/73, came up for hearing before Rane, J. The learned Judge referred these two matters to a Division Bench in view of a conflict between a decision rendered by J.M. Shetb, J. on the one band and a decision rendered by A A. Dave, J. on the other in regard to the question as to whether a declaration can be granted in favour of an employee of the Corporation to the effect that the order of dismissal passed against him is null and void and that he continues to be in the service of the Corporation. The same question across before Rane, J. in Second Appeal No. 214/73 which he again referred to a Division Bench by his order dated August 20, 1974 for the same reasons. Thereafter on October 10, 1974 this very question arose before him in Second Appeal No. 656/70. He referred this matter also to a Division Bench. Thus four Second Appeals (Nos. 41/73, 214/73 228/73 and 656/70) came to be referred to a Division Bench. It appears that J.M. Sheth, J. had taken the view that "an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to a declaration that the order dismissing him from service was a nullity and that he continued in service. This view was taken in Second Appeal No. 405/71 which was disposed of by him by his judgment and order dated 5-7-1972. He granted a certificate of fitness for preferring an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent In view of this certificate Letters Patent Appeal No. 131/74 came to be instituted by the original plaintiff who felt aggrieved by the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 3. He granted a certificate of fitness for preferring an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent In view of this certificate Letters Patent Appeal No. 131/74 came to be instituted by the original plaintiff who felt aggrieved by the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 3. This very question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Mofatlal Narndas Barot v. J. D. Rathod, Divisional, Controller, State Transport Mehsana and another A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 1964. It was a case of an employee of the Corporation whose services had been terminated. The Supreme Court took the view that the Corporation was an autonomous statutory corporation formed under the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act. 1950. The Supreme Court expressed the view that an employee of the Corporation was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment including an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. The Supreme Court further more took the view that the impugned order was passed in contravention of the relevant regulation and in violation of the principles of natural justice, and, therefore, was bad in law. The ratio of the said decision is that an order passed in violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of the relevant regulations would be a nullity in the eye of law. If this decision holds good, there can be no room for doubt that an employee of the Corporation would be entitled to a declaration that his order of dismissal is null and void and that he continues in service in case he is able to establish that there has been violation of principles of natural justice and/or non-compliance with the requirements of the relevant regulations. J.M. Sheth, J. in disposing of Second Appeal No. 405/71 by his judgment and order dated 5/7-7-1972 took the view that the decision in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case (A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 1364) did not take into account material factors which had been considered in Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244). In the course of the decision J. M. Sheth, J. formulated the question in the following form "The only question that can survive for decision will be : whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Barot's case, which was also the case of an employee of the Corporation, will govern the present case." He then proceeded to examine the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, and the provisions of the Air Corporation Act, 1953. After examining the relevant provisions in just a position the learned Judge was of the opinion that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Bai, A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 1823 and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Executive Committee of UP. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow, v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, A I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 1244, had an impact on this question and that notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case (supra) an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to such a declaration The view taken by the learned Judge is reflected in the following passage from his judgment:- "On examining the Scheme of this Act and the Scheme of the Air Corporation Act, 1953 and the relevant material section, which required consideration for these purposes. I find there is no substantial difference. The present case would, therefore, be clearly covered by the ratio of the two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. Warehousing Corporation's case and Indian Airlines Corporation's case. It is, therefore, evident that the each respondent concerned in these appeals cannot successfully urge that the order of dismissal passed against him is unlawful, null and void and inoperative. The order of dismissal will be merely wrongful and not unlawful. The respondent, therefore, would be only entitled to a claim for damages and would not be entitled to get a declaration that he continues in service or that he be reinstated in service. The order of dismissal will be merely wrongful and not unlawful. The respondent, therefore, would be only entitled to a claim for damages and would not be entitled to get a declaration that he continues in service or that he be reinstated in service. The relief granted by the two Courts below in this behalf cannot be granted in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court." In other words though the learned Judge does not say so in so many words, the learned Judge appears to have reached the conclusion that an employee of the Corporation was not entitled to such a declaration notwithstanding the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Narandas Barot (Supra) in view of the later decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of U.P. Warehousing Corporation (supra) and Indian Airlines Corporation (supra). 4. The passage of time has facilitated the solution of the problem posed in the present matters. The decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation cases (supra) have been reversed in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, A I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 1331. Chief Justice Ray has referred to these decisions and has examined the ratio of these decisions in the context of Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case (supra). Chief Justice Ray has observed that there is a direct conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case on one hand and decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the cases of U. P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation as is evident from the following passage extracted from the judgment:- "The decisions of this Court in U. P. Where housing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation are in direct conflict with the decision of this Court in Narandas Barot's case, ( AIR 1966 SC 1364 ) which was decided by the Constitution Bench." It will be seen that the Supreme Court has stressed the circumstance that the decision in Narandas Barot's case was rendered by the Constitution Bench (consisting of five Judges). Obviously, therefore, Narandas Barot's case could not be said to have been overruled by either the U P. Warehousing Corporation case (supra) (which was decided by a two Judge-Bench) or Indian Airlines] Corporation Case (supra) (which was decided by a three-Judge-Bench). Obviously, therefore, Narandas Barot's case could not be said to have been overruled by either the U P. Warehousing Corporation case (supra) (which was decided by a two Judge-Bench) or Indian Airlines] Corporation Case (supra) (which was decided by a three-Judge-Bench). Chief Justice Ray referred to A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 855 wherein it was held that in regard to master and servant cases in the employment of the State or of Public or local authorities or bodies created under the statute the Courts have decided in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statute (see paragraph 2 in Sukhdev Singh's case). Chief Justice Ray has dealt with the question relating to the distinction drawn between a 'rule' and a 'regulation' in paragraph 33 of the judgment in Sukhdev Singh's case and has observed that there is no substantial difference between a 'rule' and a 'regulation' inasmuch as both are subordinate legislation under powers conferred by a statute It has been observed that a regulation framed under a statute applies uniform treatment to all members of the same group or class. These regulations which are required to be framed under the relevant statute impose an obligation on the statutory authorities and the statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. It has been laid down that any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declarations by Courts to invalidate against any violation of rules and regulations. Dealing with the question as to whether the employees would be entitled to only damages as in the case of master and servant contractual relationship, the law has been enunciated in no unclear terms in the following passage:- "An ordinary individual in a case of master and servant contractual relationship enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable of enforcement. In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies In the case of statutory bodies it has been said that the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations. In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies In the case of statutory bodies it has been said that the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observance of rules and regulations. Failure to observe requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring dismissal in violation of rules and regulations to be void. This Court has seperatedly observed that whenever a man's rights are affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence, of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute." In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh's Case the following propositions emerge: - (1) The law laid down in Mafatlal Narandas Barot's case is good law notwithstanding the decision rendered in the cases of J. P. Warehousing Corporation and Indian Airlines Corporation and that an order of termination of service of an employee of the Corporation would be bad in law if principles of natural justice are violated or there is non-compliance with the regulations framed under the statutory powers. (2) There is no real distinction between a rule and a regulation both of which are forms of subordinate legislation under powers conferred by statute. A regulation framed under statutory powers by a body created under a statute would have binding force and qo such regulation can be violated with impunity. If there is non-compliance with a regulation, then the action taken in violation of such a regulation will be invalidated by a court of law. (3) A duty to observe rules of natural justice and to comply with rules and regulations will be presumed to exist in the case of statutory bodies and the failure to observe principles of natural justice or to comply faith the relevant regulations whilst passing an order of dismissal will email a declaration by a Court that the order of dismissal is null and void. 5. 5. The proposition that an order of dismissal passed in violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of the relevant regulations framed by the statutory Corporation would be null and void and that an employee would be entitled to a declaration in this behalf is reinforced by the following passages from the concurring judgment of Mathew, J. :- "The learned Chief Justice has dealt with the question in his judgment whether the regulations framed by the corporations have the force of law and he has arrived at the conclusion that the regulations being framed under statutory provisions would have the force of law. Even assuming that the regulations have no force of law, I think: since the employment under these corporations is public employment, an employee would get a status which would enable him to obtain declaration for continuance in service if he was dismissed or discharged contrary to the regulations." 6. In view of the clear statement of law as enunciated in Sukhdev Singh's Case it is no more possible to dispute that the dismissal of a servant of a statutory Corporation like Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation in violation of principles of natural justice and/or In contravention of the relevant regulations can be declared as null and void and a declaration can be granted that the employee concerned continues in the service of the Corporation upon the order of dismissal being held to be void. 7. Finding himself in a tight corner on account of the law laid down in Sukhdev Singh's Case, the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation made an attempt to extricate the Corporation by recourse to an argument of desperation. It was contended that the Corporation was not a statutory Corporation like the Life Insurance Corporation and, therefore, the ratio of Sukhdev Singh's Case Would not apply. It was contended that a statutory Corporation is one which is incorporated pursuant to an Act of the Legislature. In the present case the Corporation has been created by a notification issued under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Reliance is placed on section 3 of the said Act which is in the following terms:- "3. It was contended that a statutory Corporation is one which is incorporated pursuant to an Act of the Legislature. In the present case the Corporation has been created by a notification issued under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Reliance is placed on section 3 of the said Act which is in the following terms:- "3. The State Government, having regard to- (a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by (he development of road transport; (b) the desirability of co-ordinating any form of road transport with any other form of transport; (c) the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and economical system of road transport service therein; may, by notification in the official Gazette, establish a Road Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the State under such name as may be specified in the notification". The argument is that the State Government has to issue a notification in the Official Gazette in order to establish a Road Transport Corporation for the State concerned. Thus, the Corporation comes into existence in pursuance of a notification issued under a statute. The point of distinction according to counsel is that the statute itself does not bring into existence the Corporation but the notification issued under a statute brings into existence the Corporation. We see no substance in this contention. The 'distinction is based only on a machanism built to the statute. Whether the statute itself creates or brings into existence the Corporation or whether a notification issued under the statute brings it into existence is irrelevant from the standpoint of the nature of the Corporation. These are two different modes of bringing into existence statutory Corporations Nothing turns on whether one mode is resorted to or another for creating a Corporation. Ultimately the Corporation concerned owes its origin to a statute which brings it into existence through the medium of the notification. The mere fact that a notification has to be issued in order to bring it into existence docs not alter the situation and docs not detract from the character or personality of the Corporation. Besides, in the case of Mafatlal Narandas Barot the view has been taken that the respondent is a statutory Corporation. There is, therefore, no substance in this submission. 8. Besides, in the case of Mafatlal Narandas Barot the view has been taken that the respondent is a statutory Corporation. There is, therefore, no substance in this submission. 8. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if an order of dismissal is passed by the respondent-Corporation in violation of principles of natural justice or in contravention of the relevant regulations framed by the Corporation in this behalf, such an order can be declared as null and void and the Court can grant a declaration that the employee concerned continues in service. 9. We will now proceed to deal with the individual matter on merits. L. P. A. No. 131/74 : 10. The appellant (original plaintiff) was employed by the respondent-Corporation as a Conductor. He was dismissed from service by an order dated December 12-7-1967 in connection with an incident which occurred on June 10, 1907. The charge against him was that he was guilty of misappropriation of a small sum of Ks. 2.40 in connection with the issuance of a ticket to an M. L. A. who was travelling from Junagadh to Rajkot. It was alleged that, though he had issued one free ticket to the M. L. A. concerned under pass No. 5224, he had prepared a record to show that two free tickets were issued to him and not one. It was alleged that by recourse to this modus operandi the appellant had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 2.40. A departmental enquiry was conducted against dim and by the impugned order dated December 14, 1967 he was dismissed from service for being found guilty on the charge levelled against him. The appellant instituted Civil Suit No. 507/67 and challenged the legality and validity of the impugned order of dismissal from service on the ground that the order had been passed in violation of principles of natural justice and was on that account null and void. The learned trial Judge by a well-considered judgment upheld the contention of the appellant mat the order of dismissal was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and decreed the suit by his judgment and order dated September 14, 1968. The learned Judge granted a declaration that the impugned order was void and inoperative being violative of the principles of justice and in violation of clause 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. The learned Judge granted a declaration that the impugned order was void and inoperative being violative of the principles of justice and in violation of clause 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. He also granted further declaration to the effect that the appellant continued to be in the service of the respondent Corporation. The Corporation preferred an appeal to the District Court being Appeal No. 152/68. The learned Joint Judge of Junagadh by his judgment and order dated December 14, 1970 confirmed the order passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The Corporation then approached this Court by way of second Appeal No. 405/71 as narrated earlier. When this appeal came up for hearing before J. M. Sheth, J. on 5-7-1972, the learned Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that in view of the law laid down in U. P. warehousing Corporation Case (supra) and the law laid down in radian Airlines Corporation Case (supra), the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against an employee of a statutory Corporation was null and void that he continued in service. The learned Judge did not follow the decision in Mafatlal Barot's case (supra) as he was of the opinion that the aspect considered in the cases of U. P Warehousing Corporation and the Indian Airlines Corporation was not before the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Barot's case. We have already taken the view that Mafatlal Barot's case was decided by a Constitution Bench consisting of five Judges and that the ratio of that decision has been re affirmed by the Sup erne Court in Sukhdev Singh's case. For reasons mentioned in the earlier course of discussion we have taken the view that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh's case an employee of a statutory Corporation can claim a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him is null and void in case it is established that the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or in contravention of the relevant regulations. In this view of the matter, the decision rendered by J. M. Sheth, J. cannot be sustained. So far as the merits are concerned, J. M. Sheth, J has not examined the merits. In this view of the matter, the decision rendered by J. M. Sheth, J. cannot be sustained. So far as the merits are concerned, J. M. Sheth, J has not examined the merits. The learned counsel for the Corporation is not able to show that the decision rendered by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court suffers from any infirmity. This being a second appeal, only a question of law can be agitated. The finding recorded by the lower Courts is that principles of natural justice hive been violated and that there is a contravention of clause 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure It is not necessary to dwell at length on the facts of the case for it clearly emerges from the record that the order of dismissal was passed in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of clause 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. This procedure has been prescribed in Regulation 80 which empowers the Corporation to do so while dealing with cases of misconduct, minor lapses and delinquencies. Regulation 80 in its turn has been framed in exercise of powers under section 34 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It was, therefore, obligatory on the Corporation to follow the procedure prescribed by the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. The inquiry Officer relied on an oral statement of Mr. Gohel made behind the back of the appellant. The statement was not even reduced to writing. Mr. Gohel was not examined as a witness. No opportunity was afforded to the appellant to cross-examine Mr. Gohel and yet on the basis of the oral statement attributed to Mr. Gohel of which the appellant knew nothing he was found guilty of misconduct. The second serious illegality committed by the Inquiry Officer was in relying on a statement contained in a letter alleged to have been addressed by Mr. Dharamshi Patel who was a member of the Legislative Assembly at the material time. Mr. Dharamshi Patel did not appear at the enquiry and did not give evidence. The appellants had no opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Patel. The statements contained in the alleged letter were relied upon by the Inquiry Officer even though Mr. Patel had not given evidence and even though he had not been subjected to cross-examination. Mr. Dharamshi Patel did not appear at the enquiry and did not give evidence. The appellants had no opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Patel. The statements contained in the alleged letter were relied upon by the Inquiry Officer even though Mr. Patel had not given evidence and even though he had not been subjected to cross-examination. In view of these infirmities the trial Court was justified in holding that the order of dismissal was violative of Principles of natural justice and clause (5) of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. The learned appellate Judge was right in confirming the decree passed by the trial Court in appeal. J. M. Sheth, J. has not reversed the decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court on merits. He has reversed it only on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant a declaration in view of the fact that the respondent was a statutory Corporation. Having regard to the view taken by us that such a declaration can be granted, and in view of the fact that the order passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appeal Court that the impugned order of dismissal is violative of principles of natural justice is unexceptionable, this Letters Patent Appeal must be allowed. 11. The appeal is allowed The order passed by the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 405/71 is set aside. The order passed by the learned trial Judge as confirmed by the learned appellate Judge is restored. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order regarding costs. S A- No. 41/73: 12. A conductor in the employment of the respondent-Corporation was dismissed from service on the ground of alleged misconduct pursuant to an order passed on April 28, 1967- According to the respondent-Corporation the employee concerned was guilty of misconduct inasmuch as on August 31, 1966, he had re-issued three tickets collected from passengers who got down at Gondal. The tickets were re-issued to the passengers who boarded the bus at Gondal and one to the passenger who was bound of Paliyad. It is alleged that a sum of Rs 2.20 was misappropriated in this manner He was also charged with being found in possession of Rs. 7.55 in excess of the collections made by him by sale of tickets. It is alleged that a sum of Rs 2.20 was misappropriated in this manner He was also charged with being found in possession of Rs. 7.55 in excess of the collections made by him by sale of tickets. In order to prove these charges it is obvious that the passengers who alighted at Gondal or the passengers who obtained the tickets when they boarded the bus should have been examined. So also the persons who checked the tickets and the cash should have been examined. But in the departmental proceeding not one single witness was examined by the Corporation. Even so the Inquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charge of misconduct had been established against the employee concerned. The said employee thereupon instituted Civil Suit No. 331/70 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge, (S.D.) at Junagadh. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that inasmuch as not one single witness had been examined, there was no material whatsoever on the basis of which a finding of guilt could have been recorded. In this view of the matter the learned trial Judge upheld the contention of the employee that the impugned order of dismissal was in violation of principles of natural justice and granted a declaration in his favour that the impugned order was null and void and the plaintiff continued to be in service without any break. The Corporation preferred an appeal to the District Court. The learned Assistant Judge at Junagadh by his order dated July 25, 1972 confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The Corporation has thereupon preferred the present second Appeal. 13. The substantial question as to whether a declaration can be granted in respect of an employee of the Corporation having been disposed of, no other question survives. Admittedly not a single witness has been examined and the impugned order of dismissal has been passed without there being any material on record It is a case of "no evidence". Unless some witnesses are examined and evidence is adduced to show that the employee concerned was guilty or re-issuing the three tickets which are said to have been collected from the passengers who alighted from the bus, the order of dismissal cannot be sustained. Unless some witnesses are examined and evidence is adduced to show that the employee concerned was guilty or re-issuing the three tickets which are said to have been collected from the passengers who alighted from the bus, the order of dismissal cannot be sustained. The principles of natural justice have been flagrantly violated inasmuch as the respondent has had no opportunity to show that he was not guilty of any misconduct. Even under the relevant regulations the disciplinary authority was required to record evidence in the presence of the delinquent. In the present case reliance has been placed on material gathered at the pre-enquiry stage behind the back of the employee. Unless the statements of the persons who implicated the employee were recorded at the enquiry and the employee was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine them and unless the employee was given opportunity of effectively showing cause in respect of the charge levelled against him, he could not have been held guilty and could not have been dismissed from service. The view taken by the learned trial Judge as confirmed by the appellate Court that inasmuch as no witnesses have been examined in the presence of the employee and no opportunity was afforded to the employee to cross-examine them, it was a case of "no evidence" before the Inquiry Officer, is unexceptionable. There is, therefore, no substance in the appeal. It fails and is dismissed with costs. S. A. No. 214/73 : 14. A conductor employed by the respondent-Corp oration was served with a charge-sheet on the ground that he was guilty of misconduct in connection with an incident which occurred on March 13, 1967. According to the Corporation he had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 61.90 by erasing the figures mentioned in Way Bill No. 1882 and by making alterations in the said Way Bill. At the enquiry no witness was examined. Thus, no material was elicited in the presence of the employee and he was afforded no opportunity to test the veracity of the material gathered at a stage prior to the commencement of the enquiry. In order to establish that the document was tempered with and an interpolation was made, it was essential for the prosecuting agency to establish what was the condition of the Way Bill when it was issued. In order to establish that the document was tempered with and an interpolation was made, it was essential for the prosecuting agency to establish what was the condition of the Way Bill when it was issued. Not one single witness was examined at the enquiry and the employee had no opportunity whatsoever to cross-examine any of the witnesses. Under. the circumstances, the learned trial Judge come to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice had been flouted and clause 6 A of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure had also been contravened. On this ground alone the impugned order was liable to be declared as null and void. The learned trial Judge also took into account the fact that the Inquiry Officer had indulged in cross-examination of the employee though no evidence was adduced at the enquiry and had conducted the enquiry in an unfair manner. Reliance was placed on the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Company v. Their Workmen reported in 1963-II Labour Law Journal 396 (S.C.). In this view of the matter the learned trial Judge decreed the suit and granted a declaration in favour of the employee that the order of dismissal was null and void and he continued to be in service This order has been confirmed by the appeal Court. 15. The learned counsel for the Corporation is unable to show that the view taken by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court is contrary to law. In fact the order passed by the lower Courts in unexceptionable on merits. Admittedly not a single witness is examined at the enquiry. No opportunity has been afforded to the employee to cross-examine. No facts are established at the enquiry which implicate the employee. It is, therefore a case of "no evidence". Both the Courts were, therefore, perfectly justified in passing a decree in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. 16. There is no substance in the appeal. It fails and is dismissed with costs. S.A. No 228173 ; 17. A Conductor employed by the respondent-Corporation was dismissed from service by an order dated August 10, 1969 on the ground of alleged misconduct. The case of the Corporation was that the respondent Conductor had committed misappropriation in respect of a small sum of Rs. 0.85p. from a passenger who boated a bus from Victor for Dudhala. A Conductor employed by the respondent-Corporation was dismissed from service by an order dated August 10, 1969 on the ground of alleged misconduct. The case of the Corporation was that the respondent Conductor had committed misappropriation in respect of a small sum of Rs. 0.85p. from a passenger who boated a bus from Victor for Dudhala. It is alleged that the Conductor did not issue any ticket to the passenger and misappropriated the amount At the enquiry no witness was examined by the department. Having regard to the nature of the charge it was essential to show that a ticket was issued in favour of the passenger. The passenger, was not examined Not even the person who made the checking was examined Thus, there was no evidence whatsoever before the Inquiry Officer. As no witness had been examined, naturally the employee had no opportunity to cross-examine. In the absence of any evidence the disciplinary authority could not have recorded a finding of guilt against the employee. Even so, such a finding was recorded It was a case of "no evidence". The learned trial Judge in this view of the matter decreed the suit instituted by the employee in Regular Civil Suit No. 478/69. The Corporation preferred an appeal to the District Court. The learned Assistant Judge, Junagadh, by his judgment and order dated July 25, 1972 confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court. It is not shown how the decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court is rendered vulnerable in the present second appeal. The facts are not in dispute. It can scarcely be contended that an order of dismissal rendered at the conclusion of an enquiry at which no witness is examined and no opportunity is afforded to the delinquent to cross-examine can be said to be in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The lower Courts were right in upholding the contention of the employee that the impugned order was null and void and that he continued to be in service. Learned Counsel for the appellant is not able to show in what respect the decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appeal Court suffers from any legal infirmity. 18. There is no substance in the appeal. It fails and is dismissed with costs. S.A. No 656170 : 19. Learned Counsel for the appellant is not able to show in what respect the decree passed by the trial Court as confirmed by the appeal Court suffers from any legal infirmity. 18. There is no substance in the appeal. It fails and is dismissed with costs. S.A. No 656170 : 19. In this matter a reference was made to the Division Bench because there was a conflict of view between a decision rendered by J.M. Sheth, J. on one hand and A.A Dave, J. on the other. The view taken by J. M. Sheth, J. was that an employee of a statutory Corporation was not entitled to a declaration that the order of dismissal passed against him was null and void and that he continued to be in service even if the order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. A. A. Dave, J. had taken the contrary view. This conflict has now been resolved by us in deciding the aforesaid four matters. So far as the present appeal is concerned, it will have to be placed before a learned single Judge taking second appeals for decision in accordance with law inasmuch as it now does not involve any question which requires to be resolved by the Division Bench. The office will, therefore, take steps to place the appeal before the learned Judge taking second appeals for being disposed of in accordance with law. 20. In the result, Letters Patent Appeal No. 131/74 is allowed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in Second appeal No. 405/71 is set aside. The order passed by the learned trial Judge as confirmed by the learned appellate Judge is restored. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order regarding costs. 21. Second Appeals Nos. 41/73,214/71 and 228/73 are dismissed with costs. 22. Second Appeal No. 656/70 will be placed before the learned Single Judge for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. Appeals allowed.