JUDGMENT G.S. Sial, M. - These are three connected second appeals against the judgment and decree dated November 21, 1969 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are either Bhumidhars or Sirdars of the land in suit. They further pleaded that they were sub-tenants of the disputed plots which are grove and that they also planted trees and that they are recorded occupants of 1356F. and, therefore, they claimed either Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights. The defence was that the defendants are Bhumidhars and that the plaintiffs were looking after the trees which were planted by the defendants and that the suit is barred by principle of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Hence the second appeals. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in this case long standing entries of grove holder are in favour of the appellants and of sub-tenancy are in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. He stated that when the grove holder's name is recorded all along, in such a grove a sub-tenant cannot acquire any rights except that of an Asami. It is admitted that the plaintiff-respondent are sub-tenants of grove land belonging to the defendants. He submitted that according to the established law on the point the status of the sub-tenants will be that of Asami liable to ejectment and that the view taken by the learned Additional Commissioner is not correct. He further submitted that the observation of the lower appellate court in para 12 is not correct but is a mistaken impression and that in fact he had never conceded that the trial court's views are not correct on the point of res judicata. He further submitted that even if the concession was made it was only on a point of law and therefore, it does not bound the parties. In respect of the first point he referred to 1965 R.D. 245. He also submitted that it has not been clearly mentioned in the orders of the lower appellate court whether sub-tenants have acquired Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights. He further contended that the implied consent was necessary for the plantation of the grove. No. presumption can be drawn that there was consent of the Zamindar. 4. He also submitted that it has not been clearly mentioned in the orders of the lower appellate court whether sub-tenants have acquired Bhumidhari or Sirdari rights. He further contended that the implied consent was necessary for the plantation of the grove. No. presumption can be drawn that there was consent of the Zamindar. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the finding under section 40-G of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act are not final and binding and they will not operate as res judicata. It has been held by the Full Bench of the High Court reported in 1975 R.D. 132 that the proceedings under section 40G are binding only on the landholders and not on the sub-tenants. He referred to Section 240-H and stated the procedure given therein has not been followed and therefore, the orders passed by the Compensation officer will not operate as res judicata. The order does not indicate that there was any judicial decision between the parties inter. He also maintained that the observations recorded in para 12 of the order of the learned Additional Commissioner is correct and the word 'conceded' has not been used wrongly. Further there is no challenge thereof by the affidavit of the counsel who was counsel in the case. Moreover it is not a question of law as it requires investigation of facts. Therefore, the orders under Section 240-G of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will not operate as res judicata. 5. As regards merits, he submitted that the defendant appellants were Sir-holders of the land in suit before the abolition of Zamindari and the plaintiff respondents were sub-tenant of the sir or non-occupancy tenants. The legal position is that all Sir-holders become Bhumidhars of the land in suit on the dated of vesting and the non-occupancy tenants thereof will become Adhivasi under section 20(a) of the Z.A. and L.R. Act and under section 40-A these Adhivasi became Sirdars. The right of the landholder extinguished under the provision of section 240-G. as regards the controversy who has planted the grove he submitted that according to his case he planted the grove. He referred to section 205 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and stated that grove holder is a person who has planted trees with the consent of the landlord, or the land was let out to him for plantation of grove. He referred to section 205 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and stated that grove holder is a person who has planted trees with the consent of the landlord, or the land was let out to him for plantation of grove. He further pointed out that a tenant of Sir when he plants grove will be grove-holder only when the permission is granted for plantation of the grove. Thus according to the counsel the defendant appellant are not grove-holder. In 1359F. the defendant appellants are defendant appellants are recorded as Sirholders (Sir-malikan). 6. The learned counsel for the defendant-appellant in reply stated that the character of this land was admittedly grove and therefore, section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will apply the entries being of intermediary who holds such land will become Bhumidhar. in such a land no rights will accrue to a sub-tenant. He referred to section 20(1)(a) and submitted that no rights can be acquired on intermediary groveland. He submitted that the arguments to the contrary are not correct. 7. I have heard he learned counsel at length and have also gone through the record. The admitted facts of the case are quite clear, viz. that the character of the land in dispute is grove and further that the contesting defendant-appellants were Zamindars and the land in suits was Sir. It is also admitted that the plaintiffs were sub-tenants of the plots in dispute. The learned Additional Commissioner has gone on record to say that the period of plaintiffs possession in 1359 F. was of long duration over a period of 36 to 62 years. Thus he has come to the conclusion that the groves were planted before the enforcement of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Under the then prevalent law a written permission by the landholders for planting to grove was not required. That being the legal position, the learned Additional Commissioner has gone on to confirm that permission to plant the grove is implied in the circumstances because the landholders had not taken any steps to eject the plaintiffs. We have to analyse the respective contentions of the parties in the light of the above facts. 8. That being the legal position, the learned Additional Commissioner has gone on to confirm that permission to plant the grove is implied in the circumstances because the landholders had not taken any steps to eject the plaintiffs. We have to analyse the respective contentions of the parties in the light of the above facts. 8. The main point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the judgment by the compensation Officer under section 240-G of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act is final and binding between the parties and will operate as re judicata. The order mentions the names of the objectors and a long list of names of the opposite parties. It does not describe the status of the opposite parties in any manner. The order is a three lines order which reads as follows: "Plot No. 86/C-11, 87/1 (.009), 87/2 (area .10), 90/1 (area .65), 422/1 (area .05) are grove land. The objector shall be recorded as Bhumidhar and the opposite party as Asami and dismissed for the rest." 9. The order reproduced above does not mention under which provision of law it was passed nor does it contain any discussion how the status of the opposite parties has been determined to be as that of Asami. The order is, therefore silent on the point of status of the parties inter se and also whether there was any genuine dispute in respect thereof in the court of the Compensation Officer. The appellants then contended that the order in question as recorded by the Additional Commissioner in paragraph 12 of his order that the appellants conceded that the decision dated March 12, 1958 in proceedings under section 240-G of the Act No. 1 of 1951 did not operate as res judicata is not correct. the learned counsel in the court, stated that there was no such 'concession' and that even if there was any such admission, the point being legal one could be raised in the second appeal. The point, therefore, to determine is whether the orders of the Compensation Officer are res judicata between the parties. This very question has been determined in Avadhesh Singh v. Vikram Ahir 1975 R.D. 138 by a Special Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. The point, therefore, to determine is whether the orders of the Compensation Officer are res judicata between the parties. This very question has been determined in Avadhesh Singh v. Vikram Ahir 1975 R.D. 138 by a Special Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court has analysed the matter in detail and specified the circumstances in which the orders of compensation officer will operate as res judicata or constructive re judicata. The answer provided is that the decision given on objections of the nature contemplated by section 240-H(2)(a) and (b) of the Act above are such decisions by court which would bind the landholders concerned and in case someone claiming to be Adhivasi has been impleaded or on his own initiative has become a party to the proceedings under section 240-H(2) such a decision given by competent courts by any principle of law connect be open to challenge in collateral proceedings. In case an objection is filed under Section 240-H(2)(a), the objection has to be considered as a suit and in that even the compensation Officer s required to frame an issue to the effect and referred it to the court which has jurisdiction to decide the case under section 229-B, read with section 34(a). The compensation officer will encorprorate the decision in his order. In this case, it has not been established that there was any objection by the recorder Asamis of the nature contemplated under section 240-H(2) (a) of the Act or that the dispute had been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, it cannot be seriously argued that there was any final determination of rights between the landholder vis-a-vis the recorded sub-tenants. The finality of compensation statement serves to extinguish the right and title of the landholders but it will not affect the rights of the Asamis as the requirements of the Act in this behalf had not been complied with. The orders of the Compensation Officer will, therefore, not operate as res judicata with regard to the rights of the recorded Bhumidhars vis-a-vis Adhivasi. 10. The second contention of the learned counsel is that when the grove-holders name is recorded all along, in such a grove sub-tenant cannot acquire any rights except that of an Asami liable to ejectment. He submitted that the land being an intermediary's grove section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will apply. 10. The second contention of the learned counsel is that when the grove-holders name is recorded all along, in such a grove sub-tenant cannot acquire any rights except that of an Asami liable to ejectment. He submitted that the land being an intermediary's grove section 18 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will apply. He relied upon sections 18 and 20(a)(i) of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act. Section 18 of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act provides for settlement of certain land with intermediary as Bhumidhar in case the land is held by them as grove or as grove-holder. The term grove-holder is a well understood as referred to in section 205 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The grove-holder is a person who has planted the trees with the written consent of the landlords or the land was let out to him for the plantation of a grove. The provisions of sections 18 and 20(a)(i) are clearly not applicable to the case of the defendants-appellants for it cannot be claimed in this case that the intermediary held the land as a grove, because of the long standing entries in favour of the respondents in the revenue on records. The case of the plaintiff on the other hand, falls on within the scope of section 20(a)(i) which says that a tenant of Sir or an occupant thereof will become an Adhivasi, and be entitled to take or retain possession thereof. Thus, I am afraid of the contentions of the defendants-appellants have no legs stand even on this ground. 11. The third contention was that no presumption can be drawn that there was any consent of the Zamindar or Sir Malikan to the plantation of the grove. The answer to this question has been given by the Additional Commissioner. The written consent not being required under the old Act, the consent will as it stood prior to the enforcement of the U.P.T. Act, 1939 be presumed to be implied in view of the long standing nature of the grove. 12. In view of the above findings, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is correct and does not call for any interference. The appeals have no force and stand dismissed. 13. This order will govern S.A. No. 268 to 270 of 1968-69, Ballia.