JUDGMENT : Hari Swarup, J. This is landlord's petition filed against the order of the District Judge allowing the tenant's appeal u/s 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Petitioner had earlier moved an application u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 but the same was dismissed on February 24, 1970. The application had been moved on the ground of personal need of the landlord. After the commencement of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the Petitioner moved an application on September 11, 1972 u/s 21 of the Act. In this application also he sought the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his personal need. The Prescribed Authority decided in favour of the landlord. On appeal the District Judge has reversed that finding and dismissed the application. 2. One of the grounds on which the learned District Judge has held against the Petitioner is the rule of evidence given in Rule 18 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. This is clear from the judgment even though the learned District Judge has not mentioned the provision. Section 43(2)(i) provides: Any order passed by the District Magistrate before the commencement of this Act, granting or refusing to grant permission u/s 3 of the old Act, against which no revision has been filed, shall- (i) if such order was made more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act, be final;.... Rule 18 provides: Where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for eviction u/s 3 of the old Act, on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act...and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes as application u/s 21 on the same grounds within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive.... The application u/s 3 of the old Act had admittedly been made by the Petitioner and. that had been dismissed on merits. The present application has been moved u/s 21 within a period of six months from the commencement of the new Act. The application u/s 3 of the old Act had admittedly been made by the Petitioner and. that had been dismissed on merits. The present application has been moved u/s 21 within a period of six months from the commencement of the new Act. The order passed by the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act shows that the earlier application had been moved by the Petitioner on the same ground on which the present application has been moved, viz., the need of the landlord to occupy the building. In respect of this ground the findings of the District Magistrate had to be accepted by the Prescribed Authority as conclusive. He committed a manifest error of law in proceeding to determine the question again on merits. The District Judge was right in setting aside that finding and holding that the matter was concluded. After this finding it was not necessary for even the District Judge to proceed to determine the question of needs of the parties on merits. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that Rule 18 is ultra vires. The contention of the learned Counsel is that the rule making power does not permit the making of such a rule. I do not find any merit in this contention. The rule-making power is given in Section 41 of the Act in very wide terms. It provides: The State Government may by notification in the Gazette make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, including any rules prescribing fees in respect of any proceeding under this Act. As already quoted, Section 43 of the Act gives finality to the order of the District Magistrate passed u/s 3 of the old Act. Rule 18 is only a rule of evidence providing that the findings in the proceedings u/s 3 shall be conclusive on the grounds mentioned in Section 21 of the Act if they were the same as were raised u/s 3 of the Act. Rule 18 thus provides, in effect, a rule to carry out the purposes of the Act, the determination of the question as to whose need is greater when an application u/s 21 of the Act is moved is necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The rule cannot thus be said to be beyond the rulemaking power given in the Act. 4. The rule cannot thus be said to be beyond the rulemaking power given in the Act. 4. The judgment of the learned District Judge cannot, therefore, be held to suffer from any manifest error of law. 5. Learned Counsel contended that during the pendency of the writ petition new facts have come into existence and if they are taken into consideration, it may be possible for this Court to take the view that the need of the landlord is now greater than the need of the tenant. This will certainly be beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court in deciding this petition. Here, it has only to be seen if the judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from any manifest error of law. Subsequent events, particularly which require to be ascertained on evidence, cannot be taken into account for holding that the District Judge had committed any manifest error of law in applying Rule 18 to the circumstances of the present case. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.