JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, dated June 30, 1971 in appeal No. 47/59 of 1967-68 against the order dated October 17, 1967 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jhansi in suit No. 17 of 1966 under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1, Smt. Ram Kunwar, had filed a suit for division of holding, claiming her own share to be ?rd in the joint holding. The defendant-appellants, Mohan and Pinney, contested the suit, alleging that the plaintiff-respondent or her late husband Janki had nothing to do with the land in dispute. The also alleged that after the death of Janki in 1945 Smt. Ram Kunwar had remarried one Gyasi Kachhi, left the village and was now living with her second husband in Jhansi City. The trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court has however, set aside the order of the trial court and decreed the suit. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that Smt. Ram Kunwar lost her rights in the land after remarriage with Gyasi and thereafter there is no evidence that she continued in possession or that the appellants recognized her rights as co-tenant. The learned counsel has contended that the finding of the lower appellate court to the contrary is based on perverse reasoning. Both the courts below have held that after the death of her husband, Janki, Smt. Ram Kunwar has remarried Gyasi more than 20 years back. There is overwhelming evidence on this point and so the fact of remarriage is not in doubt. The learned Additional Commissioner has, however, held that even after remarriage Smt. Ram Kunwar has continued in possession as co-tenant and other co-tenants did not object to this. This finding is quite perverse. It is certainly possible that even after remarriage a widow may be allowed to continue as a co-tenant in possession by the landholder as well as by the remaining co-tenant, but be in such a case co-tenancy cannot be claimed only by assertion. There must be positive evidence both of consent of the landholder and of the co-tenant and cultivatory possession of the person claiming co-tenancy after remarriage. There must be positive evidence both of consent of the landholder and of the co-tenant and cultivatory possession of the person claiming co-tenancy after remarriage. Unfortunately, Smt. Ram Kunwar has filed no evidence whatsoever to show that either had given their consent for her continuing in possession after remarriage. As regards the possession, she filed a receipt showing the deposit made by her in the Zamindari Abolition Fund. This receipt neither mentions plot numbers nor does it indicate whether in fact a Bhumidhari Sanad was given to her. She also produced a single receipt for payment of dues for the year 1347 Fasli. For subsequent years, she has herself admitted in her statement that he has no rent receipt and that she pays her share to Mohan. Single receipt for 1347 Fasli cannot indicate to mean that Smt. Ram Kunwar is in possession since then. She also filed an extract from Khasra of 1373 Fasli in which Mohan, Smt. Ram Kunwar and Panney are recorded as co-tenants in Column 4. The record of Smt. Ram Kunwar's name in the tenant-in-chief column along with Mohan and Pinney does not show cultivatory possession. It merely indicates that her name continues in the tenant-in-chief column as the widow of her late husband Janki. After remarriage, however, this entry loses its legal value in so far as possession is concerned. 5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that is window co-tenant does not acquire independent rights after remarriage and that she would be only a licence and not a co-tenure-holder. This is a purely legal argument. The learned counsel for the respondent has in this connection invited by attention to the decision in Bhagan Ram and others v. State of U.P. and others 1967 R.D. 396 in which Sri S.D. Khare, J. has observed as follows- "The status of Deoraj as co-tenant though it had come to knowledge of Mathura prior to the year 1946 was not questioned till as late as 1958 A.D. Again it was questioned only by means of a declaratory suit. The names of the two co-tenants remind entered in the revenue records and the co-tenants or their heir reminded entered in the revenue records and the 18 years before the declaratory suit was filed. The names of the two co-tenants remind entered in the revenue records and the co-tenants or their heir reminded entered in the revenue records and the 18 years before the declaratory suit was filed. In these circumstances, Smt. Manoria could very well say that both her husband and she had acquired co-tenancy rights by virtue of their names being recorded in the revenue papers for a very long period and also possession. It was held in the case of Dudh Nath v. Smt. Dhanraja that section 23 of Act 3 of 1926 did not exhaustively lay down the modes by which a person could become a co-tenant and the acquisition of co-tenancy rights by estoppel was not opposed to the provisions of any statue. respectively agree with that view. The provisions of the proviso to section 23 of Act 30, 1926 will not be against the acquisition of co-tenancy rights by estoppel or even by adverse possession". Learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to Ram Nath v. Smt. Raj Kunwar 1970 R.D. 2 in which Sri V.N. Varma, Member, has observed as follows- "The learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has contended that Smt. Rukmani succeeded Rukmani succeeded either as a daughter-in-law in which case she could have only claimed life interest or she succeeded because the two sons of Paltu admitted her as a tenant by way of consolidation. It is quit clear That Smt. Rukmani could not succeed as daughter-in-law. Therefore, any contention about her having a life interest has no meaning. The circumstances of her being admitted as co-tenure-holder may be by way of consolidation when the two brothers allowed the elder brother's widow to be admitted as co-tenant. In the Khewat of 1342 Paltu's name is entered in pattis No. 122, 142, 160 and 162 and there is a note in red ink that Ram Nath and Sheo Balak sons of Paltu and Rukmani widow of Jang Bahadur be entered as a heir. These entries having been made in the Khewat one has been repeated in the Khatauni. According to the above entry in the Khewat it is obvious that Smt. Rukmani could not be entered as an heir but one having been entered these entries have continued. The defendants look no steps to correct the entries. These entries having been made in the Khewat one has been repeated in the Khatauni. According to the above entry in the Khewat it is obvious that Smt. Rukmani could not be entered as an heir but one having been entered these entries have continued. The defendants look no steps to correct the entries. If they allowed her name to continue in records over the share which Jang Bahadur if alive, would have inherited, it is now too late for the defendants to have these long standing entries of 40 years to be challenged. The oral evidence produced shows that Smt. Rukmani had been in cultivatory possession and had been realising her own rent from the sub-tenants. Therefore, though the defendants may have admitted her at the outset with intention and not challenged her rights to the tenancy, it is no longer open to them to challenge it because there is no proof that they admitted her by way of consolidation. In view of the long standing entries and long standing possession of Smt. Rukmani, her rights as co-tenure-holder is undisputed. She succeeded to the tenancy in an independent capacity and is an independent tenure-holder." 6. It may be observed that the principle laid down in both the judgments is that co-tenancy can be acquired by acquiescence and adverse possession of a long duration. None of the above judgments, however, relate to remarriage. The case of remarriage is to be distinguished. In that, it is not a case of acquisition of co-tenant but of losing of co-tenancy rights under the law by the fact of remarriage. Thus, presuming for a second that Smt. Ram Kunwar had not remarried after the death of her first husband Janki and that the defendant-appellants had contested the claim of both Janki and Smt. Ram Kunwar for co-tenancy, as they have indeed done in the present case, Smt. Ram Kunwar could still have co-tenancy rights by proving adverse possession of Janki as well as herself. But this plea will not help her in the present case. The possession of the land in dispute by Janki and by Smt. Ram Kunwar whether that of a rightful co-tenure-holder or adverse comes to an end by the remarriage of Smt. Ram Kunwar with Gyasi. She has now to establish that after the remarriage she re-acquired adverse possession and has thereafter remained in possession for a period beyond prescription. The possession of the land in dispute by Janki and by Smt. Ram Kunwar whether that of a rightful co-tenure-holder or adverse comes to an end by the remarriage of Smt. Ram Kunwar with Gyasi. She has now to establish that after the remarriage she re-acquired adverse possession and has thereafter remained in possession for a period beyond prescription. As seen above, there is no evidence of her acquiring any kind of possession after her remarriage. There is thus no question of her acquiring her rights as a co-tenure-holder. 7. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that as many as 14 plots were the sole acquisition of the appellants and could not be presumed to be the sole acquisition of three brothers Mohan , Pinney and Janki, late husband of Smt. Ram Kunwar. This contention is correct. The suit relates to as many as 26 plots. Smt. Ram Kunwar had filed a lease deed recorded in the name of Mohan Pinney and Janki but this lease deed relates only to 12 plots. Thus, the lease deed could only prove that 12 plots were jointly acquired. There is no evidence at all that the remaining 14 plots were also acquired jointly. It may be that Mohan was recorded as co-tenure-holder of all the plots, but this fact has now become immaterial in view of the remarriage of Smt. Ram Kunwar. 8. The last contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the respondent No. 1 herself filed a written statement on June 26, 1969. In case Laxmi v. Mohan and admitted that she was not even heir and had no rights in the land in dispute and that the lower appellate court has illegally not considered the effect of the document. A copy of this document was filed before the Additional Commissioner. According to this document, Smt. Lami, daughter of Janki, had filed a suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act against Mohan and Pinney. Smt. Ram Kunwar filed a written statement admitting that after the death of Janki Laxmi, as the daughter has inherited hi share on that Smt. Ram Kunwar had no right. She claimed that she was merely looking after the land as the guardian of Laxmi. This admission of Smt. Ram Kunwar has not been rebutted. Smt. Ram Kunwar filed a written statement admitting that after the death of Janki Laxmi, as the daughter has inherited hi share on that Smt. Ram Kunwar had no right. She claimed that she was merely looking after the land as the guardian of Laxmi. This admission of Smt. Ram Kunwar has not been rebutted. Thus, it means that Smt. Ram Kunwar had herself admitted that she had no right in the land in dispute. In this statement, he does not claim even her own possession but merely the possession of minor daughter through her mother and guardian. This document was not before the trial court, but certainly it was before the learned Additional Commissioner before the pronouncement of the judgment land the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in ignoring this document as a self-contradictory document. Even if the document may be self-contradictory, it will still have to be read as evidence against Smt. Ram Kunwar. The only way Smt. Ram Kunwar could challenge this document is by challenging its genuineness. She could have summoned the original record before the Additional Commissioner and thereafter send the signatures or thumb-impression on the original document for comparison with her own admitted signatures or thumb-impressions. She has not only done this, but has not at any stage come forward either before the Additional Commissioner or in this court to deny the genuineness of the document. Thus, its genuineness cannot be doubted. 9. The result is that I find that the learned Additional Commissioner's findings are perverse and erroneous in law. The trial court had correctly held that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to prove her title and dismissed the suit. I hereby allow the second appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore the order of the trial court.