JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the defendant tenant against whom a decree for eviction and arrears of rent had been passed by both the Courts below. ( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to this appeal are that the suit accommodation was let out for non-residential purposes to Hardayal, father of the defendant shambhudayal. Hardayal died in the year 196? leaving behind three heirs, two sons namely Shambhudayal the present defendant, his brother Pooranlal and a minor daughter Genda Bai. It was also not disputed that Pooranlal lived at some other village, i. e. Kondagaon and the defendant was running the shop in the suit premises. ( 3. ) THE plaintiff required the suit accommodation for shifting his cycle shop, which he was running in a rented premises. It was also contended by the plaintiff that be had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for keeping the shop. ( 4. ) THE case of the defendant was that the plaintiff has various open plots in his occupation and if his need for shifting his cycle shop from the rented premises would have been genuine, he would have constructed a shop on the open plot. As regards the maintainability of the suit, it was contended by the defendant that after the death of his father Hardayal, the defendant himself, his brother Pooranlal and his minor sister Genda Bai, all inherited the monthly tenancy as tenants-in-common in accordance with the provisions of section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, and, therefore, they being not joint tenants, the tenancy could not be determined by serving quit notice only on Shambhudayal, the defendant alone, and no decree for eviction could be claimed in a suit in which Pooranlal and Genda Bai were not impleaded as parties. It was also not disputed that the quit notice was served only on shambhudayal and it is also apparent that Pooranlal, the brother and Genda bai, minor sister of the defendant have not been impleaded as parties. ( 5. ) THE Courts below have decreed the suit for eviction by holding that the need of the plaintiff, to shift the cycle shop from the rented premises, was genuine and the contention of the defendant that because the plaintiff had various open plots, he should have constructed a shop for the purpose, was not liable to be accepted. ( 5. ) THE Courts below have decreed the suit for eviction by holding that the need of the plaintiff, to shift the cycle shop from the rented premises, was genuine and the contention of the defendant that because the plaintiff had various open plots, he should have constructed a shop for the purpose, was not liable to be accepted. The Courts below were also of the opinion that after the death of Hardayal, his two sons and one minor daugher were joint tenants and the landlord was entitled to determine the tenancy by serving a quit notice even on one of the joint tenants and the suit against one of the joint tenants in actual occupation and control of the premises was also maintainable without impleading Pooranlal (his brother) and Genda Bai (his minor sister) ( 6. ) THE finding regarding genuine need and bona fide requirement of the suit premises could not be challenged before this Court. The learned counsel for the appellant found it difficult to point out any such matter to indicate that the aforesaid finding of fact was perverse in any manner. On the contrary, in view of the admitted position that the plaintiff was having his shop in a rented premises and wanted to shift his cycle shop to the suit accommodation belonging to him, the case of genuine need was apparently made out. It could not be rejected merely on the ground that the plaintiff has some open plots on which he could have constructed a shop for his own purposes. As nothing could be shown that the plaintiff was in occupation of some other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation in the town, the issue regarding genuine need and bona fide requirement for the purposes of his business, as contemplated under section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was rightly decided and is binding on the parties for the purposes of this second appeal. ( 7. ( 7. ) THE judgments and decrees of the Courts below were challenged mainly on the following grounds :- (i) That after the death of Hardayal, the present defendant Shambhudayal, his brother Pooranlal, and minor sister Genda Bai, inherited the monthly tenancy as tenants in common and were not joint tenants and, therefore, service of quit notice on one of them did not determine the tenancy; and (ii) That the suit for eviction brought against the defendant alone without impleading his brother and sister was not maintainable. ( 8. ) ON going through the documents on record, both documentary and oral, it is found that there was nothing to show that the landlord had treated pooranlal (the brother) and Genda Bai (the minor sister of the defendant)as tenants in common along with the defendant. So far as the landlord is concerned, the defendant, his brother Pooranlal, sister Genda Bai, all will be joint tenants even if they had inherited the monthly tenancy as tenants in common according to the provisions of section 19 of the Hindu Succession act. The tenancy in the present case had been one indivisible single unit so far as the landlord was concerned. The liability of both the brothers and sister was joint and was not treated and made several by the landlord and, therefore, qua landlord the defendant, his brother and sister all were joint tenants and service of notice on the defendant alone was sufficient to determine the tenancy. ( 9. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant relied on Valiyaveettil Konnappan v. Kunnivil Manikkam (AIR 1968 Kerala 229 ). On behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed on ramubai v. Jiyaram (AIR 1964 Bom. 96.) and Smt. Vishnawati v. B. V. Chowdhry ( AIR 1970 All. 389 ). Apart from these two decisions, (here is one more decision in Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Abdul Ahad ( AIR 1970 Pat. 338 ), in which his Lordship Justice Untwalia, as he then was, relied on Ramubai v. Jiyaram (supra) and Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal singh ( AIR 1951 SC 186 ). 389 ). Apart from these two decisions, (here is one more decision in Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Abdul Ahad ( AIR 1970 Pat. 338 ), in which his Lordship Justice Untwalia, as he then was, relied on Ramubai v. Jiyaram (supra) and Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal singh ( AIR 1951 SC 186 ). The Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that unless by renovation of the contract or the transaction of lease, the lessor agrees to recognise the heirs who inherited the leasehold property as tenants in common, not as joint tenants, but separate from one other, that is to say, if the lessor agrees to make their liabilities several and does not keep it as joint, they may not become separate or several tenants and the tenancy which was single indivisible at its inception cannot become several tenancy because the heirs, who inherited the leasehold interest do so as tenants in common. In such a case, notice to quit served on one of the joint tenants would be deemed to be a service of notice on all such tenants. Similar is the view taken by the High court of Allahabad as reported in Smt Vishnawati v. B. V. Chowdhry (supra), wherein the decision of Kerala High Court reported in Valiyaveettil Konnappan v. Kunnivil Manikkam (supra) has been distinguished. ( 10. ) I am of the opinion that even two or more persons being co tenants or co-lessees may be ordinarily and generally tenants in common between themselves, yet qua landlord, they may be joint tenants unless the landlord has by renovation of the contract agreed to recognise them as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. It was not disputed that the tenancy with Hardayal, father of the defendant, was one single tenancy. How can it be said that after his death, their heirs, who undoubtedly inherited the leasehold rights as tenants in common, become several tenants by splitting up one single tenancy without the consent of the plaintiff landlord into several tenancies. In this view of the matter, even if Pooranlal, the brother of the defendant, and Genda bai, minor sister of the defendant, had inherited the leasehold right as tenants in common, they were joint tenants qua the landlord. In this view of the matter, even if Pooranlal, the brother of the defendant, and Genda bai, minor sister of the defendant, had inherited the leasehold right as tenants in common, they were joint tenants qua the landlord. The tenancy which was one single unit continued to remain so even after the death of Hardayal and they being joint tenants, service of notice on the defendant alone was sufficient to determine the entire tenancy. There is nothing in the contents of the notice to infer that the entire tenancy was not being terminated or the notice was intended to determine only the interest of the defendant alone. Once it is held that they were joint tenants, the legal position, already settled by the Supreme court in Kanji v. Trustees Post of Bombay6, regarding sufficiency of service of notice on one of the joint tenants applies. Similarly the suit for eviction and arrears of rent brought against one of the joint tenants, who was in actual possession and control of the suit premises, is also not bad and was maintainable. I rely on the decision of the Single Bench of this Court reported in bhuramal v. Kanwerlal (Second Appeal No 33 of 64, decided on the 28th April 1964=1964 MPLJ Note 172-1964 JLJ Note 197.), where it was held that notice to one of the joint tenants is sufficient and the suit against one of the joint tenants for eviction is also good. These observations were made by the learned Single Judge by placing reliance on the observations made in Kanji v. Trustees, Port of Bombay. Thus, the objections raised by the appellant regarding the invalidity of the notice and non-maintainability of the suit cannot be accepted and are accordingly rejected. ( 11. ) NO other point was pressed. ( 12. ) THE appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee at Rs. 50 if certified. Appeal dismissed.